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“For, the mind having ... a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires ... is at 
liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.  In this lies 
the liberty man has....”  (John Locke (1690), Essay, II, XXI, p. 48) 
 
“Mind precedes all mental states.  Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought.  If with an impure mind 
a person speaks or acts, suffering follows him like the wheel that follows the foot of the ox....  If with a 
pure mind a person speaks or acts, happiness follows him like his never-departing shadow.”  (The 
Buddha, Dhammapada, 1.1-1.2, Buddharakkhita translation) 
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I dedicate this book to five philosophers:  To my first philosophy teacher, Professor Jerome Stolnitz 
(Lehman College), who first recognized the philosopher in me, to Professor Eric Steinberg (Brooklyn 
College), who inspired my first serious investigation into the problem of free will, to Professor Andrew 
Wengraf (Brooklyn College), who has been my philosophical mentor ever since, and to Harry Frankfurt 
(Princeton) and the Buddha, whose theories of freedom of the will and of mental freedom, respectively, 
have most influenced my own. 
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Preface 
 
This book engages with all of the major arguments and theories posited by contemporary Western 
analytic philosophers seeking to understand the nature of human agency, what constitutes free will, and 
whether we possess it.  One way in which this book is unique is in the author’s reliance upon Buddhist 
philosophy, methodology, meditation practices, and intuitions in the formulation of its overall outlook on 
free will.  Buddhism is at its core a millennia-spanning philosophy of mental freedom that has evolved the 
introspective equivalent of our “extrospective” sciences.  Buddhists practice meditation as their main 
methodology for cultivating states of mind characterized by volitional and affective detachment, mental 
clarity, and psychological equilibrium, thereby decreasing states of mental bondage as they increasingly 
approach the final state of total mental freedom in liberation or enlightenment.  The accumulated wisdom 
within their long-standing philosophical tradition of contemplative phenomenological practice clearly 
bears on the issue of free will.   
Very recently, Buddhism has made its way into the laboratories of Western neuroscientists, who 
are now engaged in tracking the brain states of advanced long-term meditation practitioners during 
various types of meditation, using functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI), positron emission 
tomography (PET) scans, and related brain-scanning devices.  Their discoveries are fascinating.  I will 
mention only two here.  One is that the brains of long-term practitioners of a compassion-generating 
meditation have significantly many more neurons and synaptic activity than the average person does in 
the empathy center of the brain (Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson, 2008), and long-term 
practitioners of an attention-training meditation have analogously superior neuronal behavior in the 
brain’s attention circuitry (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson, 2008).   
These findings have the opposite effect of most neuroscientific findings that locate this or that 
valued human attribute in this or that center of the brain, which normally implies a debunking of the 
phenomenon so identified at the neuronal level, as if love, humor, empathy and other prized, distinctively 
human attributes are “just” complex chemical reactions among and within the neural networks that light 
up when they are present.  For here it is clear that purely mental phenomena – that no doubt are subserved 
by purely neuronal phenomena – are capable of restructuring the brain and altering its functions.   
While the physicalist will insist that the fact that mental phenomena are completely dependent on 
(if not one-to-one identical with) neuronal phenomena exhausts the explanation, in that nothing truly 
explanatory about human behavior abides at the “purely” mental (i.e., non-neuronal) level, these recent 
 xi 
 
findings throw a wrench into that ideology.  In other words, neuron-rich chop-meat does not seem to be 
able to reflect on its own activities and alter its structure and function at will, but apparently we are able to 
do so, in which case we appear to be more than “just” electro-chemically complex grey matter.  This is 
not to deny that we are entirely or “just” physical; perhaps we are.  However, even if we are, we are 
capable of doing a lot more than what is implied here by the word “just”.  If we can rearrange the 
structure and function of our own brains, but our brains are what primarily determine our behavior, then 
we are able to significantly determine ourselves.  That sounds like a powerful form of free will. 
The tension between the third-personal, logical-empiricist strand in analytic philosophy and the 
first-personal, contemplative (if not mystical) strand in phenomenologically-oriented Buddhism has 
played a role in the formulation of my understanding of free will.  This book evolved out of the research 
that went into my dissertation for the philosophy program at the CUNY Graduate School, a program 
largely dominated by the analytic philosophical vision, a vision that until very recently eclipsed almost 
anything first-personal or phenomenological, at least in practice.  In the most general terms, this book is a 
significantly revised presentation of that same argument, in outline, an argument with premises in an 
eclectic variety of disciplines outside of philosophy, such as evolution theory, primate psychology, 
behaviorism, and pico-economics, to mention just a few.  As a dissertation presented under the guidance 
of a committee of Western analytic philosophers, with their preference for the Ockham-based pirinciple of 
parsimony, single-criterion theories, and similar meta-principles, the syncretic nature of my approach was 
difficult enough to sustain, but the reliance on Buddhist ideas was, as a matter of prudential wisdom, 
largely removed from the main body of the text and relegated in significant part to the footnotes, despite 
the fact that my main thesis might be described as the Buddhist theory of free will, couched in analytic 
and scientific terms.   
The main idea in Buddhism is that mindfulness of volitions reveals which ones lead to mental 
bondage and which ones lead to mental freedom, and this awareness brings them under volitional control, 
leading ultimately to total mental freedom or liberation.  To the extent that this ability is stronger or 
weaker in a particular individual, it seems correct to think that such agents possess greater or lesser 
degrees of free will, for the mental state one is in at the moment of choice no doubt is the primary 
influence on that choice, as Galen Strawson argues (2002), though he takes that fact to be conclusive 
grounds for the inference that we can never be truly free or ultimately responsible for our actions, despite 
the fact that he has relied on related Buddhist ideas in formulating his own skeptical views about free will 
(1986).  That very basic Buddhist intuition – that mindfulness of volition makes volitional self-regulation 
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possible – drives the philosophical attempt to identify free will in this book in analytic terms.  Buddhists 
already believe in mental freedom and assume we have sufficient free will for purposes of undertaking the 
task of cultivating total mental freedom, so they do not need to be persuaded of the main argument of this 
book; analytic philosophers, therefore, are the main audience for this work.  The main difference between 
this book and the dissertation, however, is that the figure/ground, text/footnotes relationship regarding my 
Buddhist and analytic philosophical ideas about free will has been significantly (although not entirely) 
reversed:  The Buddhist ideas have been brought to the fore, into the main body of the text, where they 
belong, rather than in the footnotes.  Of course, the analytic philosophy ideas also remain in the main text. 
 Several other major changes and revisions have been made to this book relative to the version that 
was presented in the form of my dissertation.  In addition to this Preface, Chapter 1 is entirely new, and 
the newly numbered Chapter 2 has been significantly updated.  Many important developments have 
emerged in the free will literature since 2005, and I have engaged with and responded to them wherever 
such developments bear upon my arguments.  The format requirements for the dissertation, moreover, 
were constrained by space and other limitations that are not applicable to this monograph.  Consequently, 
the entire monograph has been altered significantly so that it reads more fluidly, less cryptically, and with 
greater explanatory force. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Almost every day the science section of the newspaper reports some new brain/behavioral correlation, 
some new “seat of” some phenomenon that we hold dear, such as the “humor center” in the brain, or the 
“empathy center”, along with some debunking explanation or “error theory” about what we thought was 
going on.  Such discoveries seriously raise the question:  Do we really have free will, or are human beings 
just very complex biological machines, all of whose behavior is determined in much the same way that 
the behavior of wasps, thermostats, robots, and other mechanical phenomena are determined?   
If immutable scientific laws of cause and effect govern every neural firing, thought, emotion, 
volition and choice that constitutes and shapes our experience, then all of our lives unfolding – all of our 
great efforts, deliberative struggles, moral dilemmas, torn decisions, choices, regrets, displays of courage, 
romantic encounters, brilliant ideas, creative achievements, psychological break-throughs, and so many 
other things that define who we are – could in principle be predicted with perfect accuracy by an 
omniscient being or a well-designed computer that had perfect knowledge of all the laws of nature and all 
the conditions in place before we were even conceived.  If that is so, it appears, we are like deluded 
automatons, just segments in a series of conscious dominos, each pushed necessarily and mechanically by 
the previous cause.   
On this scenario, if a God could rewind the universe like a cosmic film and then release it to flow 
forward again on its own, it would repeat exactly the same way, down to the last sneeze, infinitely many 
times.  On the other hand, if we are not determined, then our choices might be completely random, no 
different from coin tosses or the weather.  But if that is so, it seems a mistake to think (as we ordinarily 
do) that we are the authors of our decisions.  Rather, on this scenario our decisions would be better 
described as things that just happen to us, the way seizures just happen to epileptics.  Is that all we mean 
when we think that we have free will? 
This book examines the philosophical problem of free will from an unusual variety of angles, and 
attempts to raise the level of the discussion.  There are a number of ways in which the approach taken 
here promises to do so.  Let us first examine the process in which various philosophers have attempted to 
posit theories of free will, how that process has evolved, what some of the high points are that have 
emerged from that process, and what to expect as this process continues.  For my contribution comes at 
the process from a significantly different angle. 
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Most theories of free will are what I call “single-criterion” theories.  Single-criterion theories posit 
a unique criterion for what it means for an agent to possess free will.  The history of the free will problem 
in Western analytic philosophy has been marked by a series of such single-criterion theories, and 
occasionally double-criteria theories, or triple-criteria theories, at most.  A sampler of some of the more 
prominent candidates that have been proposed for such singular criteria includes: 
(i)   doing what one wants to do 
(ii)   one’s choice is not coerced, compelled, or unduly constrained 
(iii)   the ability to have done otherwise than one actually did, had one wanted to do otherwise,  
(iv)   one’s choice is not determined by antecedent conditions 
(v)   one act on reasons 
(vi)   having the will one wants to have 
(vii)   the ability to respond apporopriately to reasons   
Each such criterion, and there are others, has seemed right to some philosophers at one time or another.  
Each, in my view, is partly correct. 
The Western analytic philosophical search for understanding – not only with respect to the free 
will problem, but in general – has developed into what may be described as the art of positing and 
critiquing single-criterion theories, in almost every area of philosophical investigation.  Of course, 
sometimes two or three criteria are offered, but the fewer the better.  This trend toward theoretical 
simplicity is a function of a variety of meta-level principles both in science and philosophy, principles like 
“Ockham’s Razor”, also known as the “principle of parsimony”:  Do not needlessly multiply entities!  
Thus, if two otherwise equal theories differ in the number of kinds of beings or causes posited to explain 
the phenomena at issue, prefer the one with the lesser ontological commitments.  (Of course, the theory 
that asserts less is less vulnerable to objections than the theory that asserts more; the latter has more to 
defend.)  In other words, the simpler explanation is always preferable, other things being equal, to the 
more complex explanation.  Thus, we get singular theories like hedonism, which purports to explain the 
motivational psychology for all sentient beings as a simple function of attraction to pleasure and aversion 
to pain; related single-criterion theories of behavior are behaviorism, egoism, the selfish gene, and so on.  
Though more is better on the data side, less is better on the theory side.  Hence, the result is the trend 
toward single-criterion theories for the broadest ranges of phenomena or perhaps more accurately fewer-
criteria theories. 
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Thus, with respect to the free will issue, it is no surprise that single-criterion attempts to explain 
our apparently voluntary behavior have dominated the philosophical literature.  Each sample criterion for 
free will mentioned above has been posited by some philosopher, critiqued by other philosophers, and 
defended by the original philosopher and/or others of a similar intellectual persuasion; we will discuss 
them all in greater detail in the chapters to follow.  This process leads to the generation of increasingly 
sophisticated criteria and increasingly sophisticated objections.  For instance, an objection to (i) (doing 
what one wants to do) is that everything anyone ever does is something they want to do in some sense, but 
it is intuitive that not all actions are free.   
For instance, I may commit a crime because I want to feed my addiction, but if I am heavily 
addicted to crack cocaine, my willing of my actions, so to speak, is largely overdetermined if not 
compelled by the addiction itself, and thus it seems implausible to consider my behavior truly free.  
Likewise, if Jones empties the vault at the bank at which he is employed because Smith has his family 
tied up at home at gunpoint, Jones is not really responsible for robbing the bank, though he acted of his 
own accord in doing so (he was not drugged, sleep-walking, and so on).  These sorts of objections to (i) 
led to (ii), which is a negative criterion:  So long as none of those sorts of things are operative (coercion, 
compulsion, brainwashing, drugs, etc.), then my doing as I please counts as free.   
But that is not a complete picture, despite however intuitive it seems relative to the single-criterion 
that it just improved upon.  For a wild horse that wants to run to the left and does so satisfies (ii), as does 
a young child, but neither seems free in the sense that we typically associate with moral responsibility.  
That deeper sense of free will seems to require (iv) (the ability to do other than what we do), say, the 
ability to act against our own impulses.  Morally responsible adults have free will because they can either 
act or not act on their own volitions:  If they choose to rob the bank, they also could have chosen not to do 
so.  It seems right to think that only persons who are capable of either acting or refraining from acting on 
their strongest desires are sufficiently free for purposes of being properly held morally responsible for 
their behaviors.  Horses cannot do that, so maybe this criterion is the one that matters. 
Some think, however, that if our behavior is causally determined in accordance with universal 
laws of nature, that is, if “determinism” is true, then there is exactly one series of events that is possible in 
the universe, the set of events causally necessitated by natural laws and previous conditions.  If 
determinism is true, such critics suggest, then our choices are already pre-determined, as it were, and there 
are no real alternatives open to us; in other words, we can never really do otherwise than we do, and free 
will is just an illusion, despite however psychologically real and compelling it seems to us in daily life.  
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These critics – “hard determinists” – insist on (iv) (which says, basically, that we are free if our behavior 
is not determined), but they add that (iv) is never satisfied in a deterministic world, and our world is a 
deterministic one, in which case we do not have free will.  It is these folks who are not troubled, but rather 
are comforted, by the latest neuroscientific debunking of our allegedly special human attributes.  They 
fashion themselves to enjoy the comforts of metaphysical sobriety that attend acceptance of the truth, 
however at odds it might be with our pre-scientific folk psychology. 
Defenders of free will have responded in various ways.  “Libertarians” have either denied that 
determinism is true or else they have insisted that reasons cause actions in ways that are not determined; 
either way, they claim that we do satisfy (iv) or else we satisfy (v) (we act on the basis of reasons), and 
reasons are somehow categorically different from impulses or other phenomena that are caused.  When an 
agent acts on the basis of reasons, according to this view, he – the agent – is the cause of his choice and 
action.  This view involves a special kind of agent-initiated causation that is called “agent causation”, and 
although it seems rather consistent with commone sense, it has proven to be rather difficult to explicate, 
either philosophically or scientifically, although increasingly sophisticated attempts have been made, most 
notably by Kane (2002b).  “Classical compatibilists”, however, insist that determinism is compatible with 
free will, that is, determinism doesn’t undermine (i), (ii), or (iii).  “Contemporary compatibilists” or 
“neocompatibilists”, however, may reject (iv), the idea that for us to be free, determinism must be false.   
For instance, “mesh” or “hierarchical” theorists posit (vi) (having the will one wants to have), 
asserting that so long as one has the sort of will one wants to have, that is, so long as one’s volitions 
accord with one’s meta-volitions, one has freedom of the will.1  Surely, such theorists insist, one may 
instantiate the proper mesh between one’s will and one’s meta-will in a deterministic world.  “Semi-
compatibilists”, however, partly agree and partly disagree.2  Insisting on (iv), they think true autonomy 
implies indeterminism, but they add that we can separate the conditions for autonomy from those for 
moral responsibility:  An agent may not be autonomous in the sense of not being determined, but he may 
still be able to respond appropriately to moral reasons, thereby satisfying (vii) (being able to respond 
apporopriately to reasons), even if he is thoroughly determined to do so.  By analogy, thermostats are 
temperature-responsive, and the fact that they are determined to be only makes them more reliable as 
such.  Likewise, the fact that certain agents are determined to be responsive to moral reasons only makes 
                                                
1 Frankfurt (1971); see also Watson (1975) and Lehrer (1980). 
2 See, especially, Fischer (2006); see also Haji (2009). 
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them more reliable as such.  They may be unfree, but they are reliably morally responsive and thus they 
are appropriately considered morally responsible. 
No single-criterion theory stands a chance of being considered plausible without back-up 
assistance from a variety of auxiliary hypotheses.  However, most theories are presented first in journal 
articles, but most journal articles have space limitations that prevent authors from mapping out all the 
auxiliary features of their theories.  By the time a philosopher has responded to a stream of objections in 
the literature, often by introducing such auxiliary hypotheses, new objections have been leveled.  The 
piecemeal, single-criterion strategy therefore presents somewhat of a Catch-22 in actual practice.  The 
subject of free will is also so complex that Dennett has said that it is a misnomer to refer to it as “the free 
will problem”, there actually being so many problems of free will (1984).  Each of the candidate criteria 
above, for instance, represents a vast stream of articles that have emerged in the philosophical literature, 
together forming a highly complex dialectic.  An answer to any one thread in this multiply-complex 
metaphorical garment will necessarily pull on its interconnections with several other elements of the 
dialectical fabric, inviting resistance, revision, and so on. 
So far I have merely sketched how some of these single-criterion theories are vulnerable to 
criticisms, how other such theories may get around some of those criticisms, how auxiliary hypotheses 
may be necessary to undergird any such theory, and how interconnected all these issues are.  This sketch 
itself involves a great deal of over-simplification, and every simplification necessarily invites some 
distortion.  Nonetheless, the above sketch is sufficiently informative for purposes of stating one of the 
main ways in which my contribution to the free will discussion is unique, and that is that my approach is 
not a single-criterion approach.  I think that it is the single-criterion strategy that is ultimately most 
responsible for the fact that no fully satisfactory – counterexample-immune, criticism-free – theory of free 
will has been posited, at least not in its initial guise in a journal article.   
Instead, my approach is highly eclectic and syncretic, drawing from a variety of other fields and 
disciplines, including, among several others, evolution theory, animal psychology, philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of language, primate ethics, simulation theory, motivation theory, behaviorism, and 
Buddhism.  (In all fairness, Dennett’s theory is also highly eclectic and syncretic.3  Indeed, I have been 
influenced significantly by the complexity, magnitude, and breadth of his thought on the subject.)  My 
approach also involves elements from each of the other theories of free will, as each of them intuitively 
gets something right about free will, as far as I can tell, but misses something else.  I think it is essential to 
                                                
3 See Dennett (1984, 2003). 
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lay out all the relevant criteria, considerations, and auxiliary hypotheses together in one highly integrated 
argument in order to be able to present the relatively complete picture of a free agent, to not only detail 
each component but also to make the shape of the whole discernible – to be able to see all the trees, 
branches, roots, and leaves, so to speak, along with the entire forest. 
My theory is also unique in that it first constructs a theory of the will; only one other theory of free 
will is based upon the construction of a more general theory of the will, and that is Ainslie’s (2001).  But 
my theory of the will is more comprehensive than Ainslie’s, and includes and absorbs his theory, along 
with the four other theories of the will that he critiques, as components in a more complete form that has 
greater explanatory purchase. 
 Another way in which my approach is unique is that it promises to identify genuinely 
deterministic criteria for “soft determinism”, the thesis that determinism is true and compatible with free 
will.  (“Compatibilists” think free will and determinism are compatible, but need not be determinists.)  
Most compatibilists and even soft determinists are satisfied with merely sketching ways in which their 
criteria for free will are logically consistent or compatible with determinism, but this often turns out, on 
analysis, to mean only that determinism is irrelevant to those criteria.  That is, they try mainly to show 
that we can have freedom of the will even if determinism is true, but they do nothing explicitly to engage 
their criteria for free will with the causal/nomological features of determinism. 
For instance, all the compatibilists’ single-criterion criteria that were sketched above simply avoid 
determinism, and only the incompatibilist criterion makes any direct reference to determinism in 
requiring, in the most general of terms, that a free action not be causally determined.4  However, my 
analysis examines a variety of the so-called “Fixity” axioms of determinism – e.g., if any event or 
condition is hypothetically changed in a same-world, same-laws system, then all its antecedents and 
consequents must also be hypothetically changed (“Uniformity”) – and, relative to those axioms employs 
a possible-worlds counterfactual analysis specifying deterministic causal criteria that identify when an 
agent possesses causally effective self-regulative volitional control or autonomy.  These criteria are 
graded along a causal continuum construct analogous to the geological column, comprehensively 
identifying minimal aspects of will at one end of the spectrum and maximal autonomy at the other end.   
That is, I offer a genuinely deterministic theory of soft determinism, not a mere compatibilism, as 
we shall see.  Let us begin to spell out the contours of the problem; these shape the contours of my theory.  
                                                
4 Incompatibilists at least spell out exactly how it is that they think features of determinism undermine the very 
possibility of free will, most famously in the so-called “Consequence Argument” for incompatibilism.  See, 
classically, van Inwagen (1975); more recently, see Haji (2009). 
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Chapter 2:  Contours of the Problem 
 
Analysis of our daily experience – its concepts, language, and phenomenology – as agents deliberating, 
choosing, acting, and appraising our own and others’ actions supports the ubiquity of free will, and folk 
platitudes embed the notion deep within our conceptual/linguistic scheme.  Since context always governs 
our intuitions, we cannot entirely divorce freedom from ordinary experience, nor ignore the 
phenomenology of choice.  All our normative judgements, reactive attitudes, and normative attributive 
practices presuppose that we control and are responsible for our actions (Strawson 1962).  We excuse 
people to the extent that they lack self-control, e.g., if they are mentally ill, assuming they thereby lack 
free will.  Outside of philosophy, talk of free will typically arises only in cases of its absence. 
 Within philosophy, pessimism about freedom is due mostly to “determinism”,5 the doctrine that 
every event is the lawful result of a cause, and comes in three forms:  “Close range” doubts we control 
actions (freedom of action); “middle distance” doubts we control our wills (freedom of will); and 
“pessimism at the horizon” doubts we have ultimate control over ourselves, since we lack control over 
self formation (freedom of self) (Russell, 2002).  Determinism is usually seen as the culprit, though 
variants are God, logic, and fate:  If God knows all truths, if true propositions are timelessly true, or if 
everything is destined to be exactly as it is, respectively, then the future does not seem open. 
 I am optimistic about all three forms of freedom.  Mele (1995), an agnostic optimist, claims that 
autonomy is more credible than nonautonomy, whether determinism is true or not, as do I; but I not only 
accept compatibilism, but also promote soft determinism, as mentioned earlier.  I argue that metaphysical 
freedom is compatible with determinism, and is found in the hierarchical will’s (Frankfurt, 1971) causal 
control or “metacausal autonomy”.  My use of the “meta-” prefix is standard; e.g., a metamotive is a 
motive about one’s motive (Dennett, 1984).  I contrast “metaphysical” with “normative” (Wolf, 1990) and 
“pragmatic” (Strawson, 1962) conceptions of freedom, and use “metacausal” to distinguish the sort of 
higher-order mental causation involved in metacognition from cognitive, noncognitive, nonmental or 
purely physical causation.  With Searle (1992), I see the mental as higher-order physical, so my ideas are 
monistic, i.e., compatible with physicalism. 
 Chalmers differentiates hard and easy problems of consciousness (1996), and he identifies the 
hard ones as accounting for the metaphysics of mind, e.g., its irreducible subjectivity, and the easy 
                                                
5 For Strawson (1962), “pessimists” hold determinism and freedom incompatible, and “optimists” hold them 
compatible.  Russell discusses divergent usage:  “the ... pessimist may well be an ‘optimist’ about ... (libertarian) 
[freedom]” (2002, n.1, p.253).  I call “pessimists” non-autonomists and “optimists” autonomists. 
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problem as just that of giving a causal/functional account of its input/output – “I/O” – operations.  
Chalmers says we may never resolve the hard problems, but answers to the easy problem are available.  
These are, in fact, what the neuroscientists are accumulating each time they identify this or that center of 
the brain as the seat of this or that behavior or ability.  This pragmatic approach shifts philosophy of mind 
to the speculative background, and neurophilosophy to the empirical foreground.   
A like division of issues for free will views as hard problems metaphysical questions such as 
whether a reason is or is not completely identical with a cause or whether the mind supervenes on the 
brain without remainder, and views as the easy problem the task of giving a causal/functional account of 
our apparently autonomous behavior or I/O operations.  This shifts the philosophical stalemates (that have 
plagued the discussion of free will) to the speculative background, and empirically promising 
neurophilosophy to the foreground.  In this book, I attempt a solution explicitly only to the easy problem.  
This easy problem (causal/functional) analysis of Frankfurt-style hierarchical-will type autonomy has the 
virtue of being intrinsically causal, thus intrinsically deterministic, hence transparently compatibilist. 
 ‘Hard’ problems involve horizon level pessimism, and rest on “incompatibilist” presuppositions 
enshrined in the Consequence Argument (hereafter “CON”) advocated by van Inwagen (1975, 2008), G. 
Strawson, Pereboom, Honderich, Fischer, Kane, and others.6 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the 
remote past.  But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us 
what the laws of nature are.  Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present 
acts) are not up to us.  (Van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16; emphases added) 
The easy autonomy approach is implicitly opposed by advocates of CON, many of whom typically grant 
middle range and close range optimism (e.g., G. Strawson, Pereboom, Honderich, supra), but dig their 
heels in at the horizon level with CON-based concerns about ultimate and thus real control.  Nonnatural 
optimists – libertarians – agree on CON’s defeating ultimate control, so they reject determinism.  Thus, a 
successful attack on CON would displace all such opponents of naturalistic optimism in one move, as I 
aim to achieve in chapter 3 with my critique of CON. 
 I attempt to break the conceptual stalemate between incompatibilists and compatibilists over the 
pivotal use of such terms as “possible”, “can”, and “free” in the free will dialectic, with a critique of CON 
that renders “easy autonomy” plausible.  To begin to explain easy autonomy my causal/functional 
                                                
6 All in Kane (2002a), my most cited work, though cites are to the authors directly. 
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analysis of metamentality proceeds via a “primatological just so” story,7 an illustrative analysis of how 
these abilities may have evolved in primates.  Simulation may involve an ability to run cognitive/conative 
mechanisms “off-line”, which ability may figure metacausally in the neurophilosophy of autonomy.  The 
causal/functional features of metacausality underpin my theories of the will and freedom, and provide my 
easy problem solution. 
 My view is that agents are autonomous iff they have metacausal self control.  That certainly looks 
like a single-criterion theory, but, as will become clear as we proceed, metacausal self-control involves a 
multitude of criteria.  My model improves on Fischer and Ravizza’s semi-compatibilism whereby agents 
are responsible for their actions iff they exhibit “reason-responsive guidance control” over their “actual 
sequence” behavior, though, given determinism, they lack alternate possibilities, so they do not exhibit 
autonomous “regulative control” or ability to do otherwise (1998).  My model supports determinism-
friendly “counterfactual sequence” regulative control.  These notions, suggested here in outline only, will 
all be fully explicated as we proceed, but it is important to lay bare the rough contours of all the relevant 
issues here first, as there are so many of them, and the disposition to critique singular criteria, which 
threatens to prevent the full picture from emerging, looms large. 
 Thus, I analyze the problem in folk, phenomenological, and philosophical terms, to trace their 
progression in the debate.  This analysis reveals an ubiquity and heterogeneity of voluntary behavior, and 
so also an ubiquity and heterogeneity of the data for any theory of free will.  These data alone suggest, 
importantly, that single-criterion paradigms misrepresent, as I have already argued, albeit on other 
grounds.  The free will debate largely narrows down to a stalemate of differences between two views of 
“conditional ability”, that sense of an agent’s ability that we discussed earlier, of “could have done 
otherwise”: (a) under identical conditions (“contracausal” or “acausal” conditional ability), versus (b) 
under the different condition that one wanted to (“counterfactual” conditional ability).  Each avers the 
conditional ability to choose or do otherwise if one wishes, so each version of this view is “conditional”, 
though “conditional” is more closely associated with (b) in the literature.  But contracausalists allege the 
ability can operate contrary to the causal input, acausalists allege the ability without any causal input, and 
counterfactualists allege the ability only if one wanted  otherwise, i.e., fully conditionally.  Counterfactual 
conditional ability is consistent with determinism, but this interpretation needs to be spelled out and 
defended, as most critics will say that one never actually does want otherwise under determinism. 
                                                
7 Dennett (1984) uses what he calls “just so” stories to sketch natural ways in which some of out unusual abilities 
may have arisen, such as his just so story about thought as a development from speech sotto voce. 
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 In chapter 3, I allege three unnoticed fallacies in CON.  The first involves fixed/variable and 
attributive/referential equivocations in different stages of the argument; the second, an unjustified 
homogenizing of necessities in CON’s modal weakening rule; and the third, the alleged transfer of pre-
natal non-control.  Analysis of CON reveal a fallacious doctrine that only what is actual or entailed by it is 
possible.  I call this view of possibilia “actualism”, and argue that deterministic actualism is oxymoronic.  
These fallacies threaten compatibilist conceptions of possible, can, and control.  Exposing them breaks 
the stalemate.  Since “prenatally determined” does not rule out “agent controlled”, and counterfactuals 
need not be actualized to be licit, compatibilism is the preferred default view, since naturalism is favored 
over nonnaturalism by Ockham’s razor, related meta-principles, and the easy problem approach.  So, non-
actualistic counterfactuals and the weak, practical possibilities they ground are enough to allay CON’s 
“ultimacy” worries.  I argue next that Lehrer’s argument (1966) against conditional analyses of can 
equivocates on the capacity/ability distinction.  Lastly, I apply the criticisms of CON to fatalistic variants 
involving God’s infallible foreknowledge and bivalent logic’s unalterable timeless truths. 
 Chapter 4 is modeled on Dennett’s (1984) just so evolutionary stories of consciousness and 
freedom, according to which they are shown plausible by a sketch of how they could have arisen 
naturally.  My just so story for how metamental autonomy could have arisen refers to primatological 
studies about gaze-following (Baron-Cohen, 1995, pp. 38-43; Bogdan, 2003, pp. 16-17; Butterworth, 
1991, 1995; Byrne and Whiten, 1991; Povinelli, 1996; Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Reynolds, 1993; 
Tomasello and Call, 1997), mimicry (Bogdan, 1997, 2003; Blackmore, 1999), and other primitive forms 
of mind-reading (Bogdan, 1997, 2003; Gomez, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1994, 1996a, 1996b) that could have 
evolved into simulation, metamentality, and metacausality.  A sketch of “simulation theory” is set against 
one of the “theory theory” of folk psychology, and an unobjectionable “hybrid theory” is suggested that 
suffices for the less ambitious purposes of my just so story.  A causal/functional analysis of the simulation 
mechanism models an ability to run cognitive/conative mechanism “off-line” and that involve 
metacausation.  Analysis of other off-line and meta-phenomena such as language and dreams suggest that 
an increase in off-line metacausation makes an increase in autonomy possible.  Chapter 4’s evolutionary 
just so story also illustrates the causal/functional properties that make close range and middle range forms 
of agential control possible.   
How these elements play these close range and middle range control roles is more fully spelled out 
in chapter 5.  Chapter 5 argues that our off-line metacausal model provides a viable solution to the easy 
autonomy problem, and grounds a coherent theory of the will itself.  Analysis of Frankfurt’s theory of free 
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will (1971) and Ainslie’s theory of the will (2001) supplies the basis for adequacy conditions for any 
theory of the will, and supports the claim that the metacausal theory of the will better satisfies those 
adequacy conditions.  Our causal analysis of the will thus supports our answers to middle range and close 
range forms of pessimism. 
 In chapter 6, the metacausal theory of autonomy is developed against the competing theories 
mainly of Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Frankfurt (1971), Wolf (1990) and Dennett (2003), and soft 
compatibilists like Mele (1995).  Frankfurt’s so-called “Frankfurt Cases” use a counterfactual intervener, 
Black (hereafter, “Intervener”) to defeat “PAP”, the principle of alternate possibilities, according to 
which an unwitting agent, Jones (hereafter, “Agent”),8 is responsible iff in acting he has alternate 
possibilities open to him.  Frankfurt Cases stipulate that Agent does what he wants to do, and that 
Intervener does not intervene, but stands by ready to intervene in case Agent attempts otherwise.  Since 
Intervener removes Agent’s access to alternate possibilities, but doesn’t causally interfere with Agent’s 
choice, Agent remains responsible.  Many accept the Frankfurt Case rejection of PAP, and Fischer (2002) 
contends that it is so intuitive that a demand for an explication is equivalent to a demand for a definition 
of jazz, and, by implication, equally silly.  Many thereafter have adopted a PAP-free form of 
compatibilism that eschews causality, the conditional analysis, and conditional ability as all unnecessary 
and irrelevant to free will.  Fischer and Ravizza (1998) develop their semi-compatibilism in response:  It 
is semi-compatible because CON removes alternate possibilities and thus bars Agent’s autonomy, but 
leaves room for Frankfurt-style responsibility, which they explicate as “actual sequence guidance 
control”, however jazzy and undefined, although brought out through a variety of hypothetical cases akin 
to Frankfurt Cases, and which they contrast with CON-violating “regulative control”, which requires and 
is defined by the presence of indeterminacy. 
 I adduce a determinism-friendly variant of PAP that I label “PAPW” (emphasizing the addition of 
the word “would” in this reformulation of PAP), which has two parts.  “PAPW1” – which I consider 
“jazz” defined – explains why Frankfurt Case intuitions support the divorce of responsibility from full 
autonomy, essential to semi-compatibilism:  Agent is free iff he would have done likewise even if he 
could have done otherwise.  More technically, Agent acts voluntarily iff he would have done what he did 
in the nearest possible world in which Agent had alternate possibilities.  Thus, it is not just that Agent’s 
lacking of alternatives is irrelevant, as most compatibilists aver; indeed, alternatives are not even 
                                                
8 I shall, for economy’s sake, hereafter refer to any and all such agents that occur in  these analyses as “Agent”, as 
the analyses ought to apply in general to any such agent. 
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irrelevant.  What matters is precisely how Agent would act under various counterfactually-alternative 
scenarios.  In light of my objections to CON, PAPW1’s counterfactual terms are transparently consistent 
with determinism.  Fischer and Ravizza’s casuistic analysis of the actual versus the counterfactual 
sequence of action determines whether Agent exhibits reason-sensitivity and thus guidance control, but on 
our model the same analysis is used to reveal determinism-friendly or weak regulative control, captured in 
PAPW2, to be explained later.  Fischer/Ravizza-style cases are used here to illustrate that PAPW better 
handles the issues.  PAPW also handles Wolf’s asymmetry problem, according to which determinism 
supports praise but not blame (1988, 1990).  A more inclusive metacausal version of PAPW, “PAPM”, 
grounds desert and thereby eliminates universal exculpation. 
 Chapter 6 finalizes my responses to middle range and close range pessimists by specifying the 
horizon-level-resistant principles of middle range and close range control, PAPW and PAPM.  These 
principles identify genuinely “self-forming acts” or “SFAs” (Kane, 2002b) that are determined and 
ultimacy-generating.  This self-formation model escapes the incompatibilist’s objection that since self-
formation is determined, agents lack responsibility for character and thus for action.  A dilemma is that 
self-formation requires either an infinite series of prior selves or self-creation ex nihilo (Wolf, 1990).  
These alleged impossibilities are avoidable on my model, which adduces a natural form of self-formation 
that is immune to these objections. 
 In chapter 7, I tie up loose ends, but more importantly I set forth an error theory that explains the 
inflated intuitions of incompatibilist optimists by reference to the phenomenology of the causal/functional 
features of the cognitive architecture of metacausal autonomy.  And I suggest some applications of the 
metacausal theory. 
 Believers in free will are “libertarians” or “soft determinist” compatibilists, but a single term is 
needed for both.  I use “autonomist”; so does Mele (1995).  Ordinary folks also believe in free will, 
though they lack any explicit theory; they, too, may be called “autonomists”.  Philosophical doubt does 
not trump the presumption that lies with ordinary folks.  The burden is on pessimists when intuitions clash 
about can and related notions; without stronger, more compelling, comprehensive challenges, revisionary 
metaphysics is unwarranted for our ubiquitous experience.  In our ubiquitous experience, we associate 
many daily factors with autonomy, so we must attend to data before theory.  “Data” here includes simple 
facts like our weighing of the pros and cons of an action before choosing.  Some choices need no 
deliberation; others need lots.  Some are made under duress; some require intense struggle.  A range of 
behaviors comprises the data.  So, theory-level attempts to identify a single ability as paradigmatic (and 
 13 
 
thus to endorse a single criterion) are ill-fated:  Optimists propose one, pessimists conjure 
counterexamples, and the process repeats itself endlessly in reputable analytic philosophy journals, but 
this is all a kind of red herring, as I have already hinted earlier.   
One such proposal, again, is doing what one wants:  Shelley’s thirsty, so she drinks water.  This is 
“classical compatibilism”, held by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, Stevenson, and 
Davidson, etc.  But, as Frankfurt pivotally notes (1971), animals, children, and the mentally ill – 
paradigms of unfreedom (stipulatively, “non-persons”) – enjoy this kind of ‘freedom’.  Shelley 
successfully refrains, but Barbara binges despite trying to refrain.  Since nonpersons more resemble 
Barbara, refraining better captures our intuitions, and thus constitutes a better theory/data ‘fit’.  But 
animals also restrain hunger for safety:  A rat approaches food, but retreats from a nearby cat.  Thus, 
restraint alone seems insufficient for identifying what appears to be our uniquely human free will. 
 As we discussed above, many think the key is the ability to do otherwise.  We can refrain without 
powerful countervailing motives; animals like the above-mentioned cat-avoiding rat apparently only act 
on the strongest occurrent desire.  Our greater cognitive ability enables us to rank our desires, but we can 
also refrain for moral reasons.  The moral construal of autonomy works in cases where one must choose 
to do the right thing, despite consequences, but a metaphysical construal makes sense with amoral 
activities like athletics that merit an equally important behavioral evaluation, namely praise, which 
presupposes causal authorship, a key component in the very concept of autonomy:  Autonomous agents 
are the kinds of beings that are causally responsible for bringing about states of affairs in the world. 
 We also act at will for its own sake.  This is pure restraint, without a particular reason, for its own 
sake, an exercise of itself.  When questioned about freedom, many often raise or don’t raise their hand, to 
display their alternating power to perform or not perform bodily actions.  This shows that freedom is 
ordinarily construed as a ubiquitous motor ability, however simple or unreflective.  It is unconvincing 
because it only illustrates the ability to raise one’s hand when one wants to or to not raise it when one 
wants not to, but nonpersons can do these sorts of things, as Frankfurt made clear (1971). 
 That one can fully want to raise one’s hand at T and refrain from raising it at T is dubious; but 
raising it when one doesn’t want to at all is somewhat of a non-sensical idea.  Try the former; it’s as hard 
as it is to rotate one’s right hand clockwise while rotating one’s right foot counter-clockwise – not 
impossible (for some).  G.E. Moore famously raised his hand as a simple “proof” of the existence of the 
external world.  Those inclined to this Moorean proof construe acting without motive as acting at will, but 
‘unintentional action’ is oxymoronic if ‘action’ is intentional; ‘behavior’ does not need to be.  I cannot 
 14 
 
‘raise’ my arm without wanting to, though I can to demonstrate control over my movements; the aim 
generates the ability.  These motor-control ‘experiments’ suggest that what we are actually able to do is 
not to refrain but to alter our desires for abstract reasons, only apparently contra the Humean postulate 
against the motive-independent power of pure reason. 
 So, when we get the feel going in support of raising our arm, but prevent ourselves, according to 
this explanation, what we are really doing is just shifting between pro and con reasons and motives, 
however opaque.  Pure restraint, therefore, may be described as the ability to engage counter-reasons for 
their own sake, at will.  These abilities provide means to strengthen the will, and there are as many as 
there are categories of action.  Many practice restraint just to strengthen the power of restraint.  Many 
ascetic practices in the history of monasticism might be described as falling into this category, even if 
many also have ulterior soteriological motives.  A person might intentionally weaken his will, alternately, 
however imprudent doing so may appear. 
 Since the will’s aim here is the will’s strengthenin or weakening, this is “metateleological”.  Pure 
restraint is but one metateleological motive or “metamotive”.  Metamotives, Frankfurt (1971) argues, 
contain the keys to autonomy.  It is no problem that metamotives are caused by conditions stretching into 
the distant past.  Rather, it is problematic to claim that causation is suspended here, as if, when we 
performed act A under meta-circumstances C, we still could have done otherwise under C.  Both 
contracausal conceptions entail that though Shelley drank the water under C, she could have chosen not to 
under C.  Compatibilists, however, do not see this ability operant under identical causal conditions. 
 What makes the effective desire effective?  It cannot be merely the tautology that “the winning 
desire is the one that wins”, although there is certainly something right about that idea even apart from its 
tautological truth.  Perhaps “strongest desire” means the desire with the greatest proprioceptive 
phenomenology, that is, the one that feels strongest.  But the effective desire is often not the one with the 
greatest phenomenological force, but rather one we choose because it is in our best interests overall, meta-
interests included.  The “unconstrained desire” view is the Humean view that freedom is acting on 
unconstrained desire.  The “effective desire” view is the claim that freedom is acting on the 
phenomenologically strongest desire.  The “considered judgment” view is the claim that freedom just is 
acting on that desire that is most approved by one’s considered judgments.  Finally, the 
“metateleological”, “metamotivational”, or “meta-will” view is the claim that freedom just is acting on 
“metadesires”.  Restraint may be a rudimentary form of sophisticated metacausal ability, but only persons 
act on metadesires – key components of personhood centrally linked with autonomy.  
 15 
 
 Non-persons act on strongest desires, but lack judgment and meta-ability.  A dog wants to urinate, 
but not to be punished, so he doesn’t; a deranged man wants to shove someone, but doesn’t want to get 
caught, so he doesn’t.  Though ‘restraint’ by stronger desires is present in non-persons, what distinguishes 
us is our degree and range of restraint.  The punishments are construable as stimuli that elicit the 
behaviorists’ “conditioned response” of self-control, evidencing the utilitarian link between control, 
response-ability, and responsibility, despite some of the problematic implications of a purely utilitarian 
theory of free will and moral agency. 
 Pure restraint acts against strongest motive or for its own sake; only we do this.  It is what a strong 
will is composed of; its privation is “akrasia”, Aristotle’s term for weakness of will, volitional 
incontinence (1925).9  The athlete strengthens will against internal and external obstacles.  Because much 
goes into it, we attribute successes to his efforts, not to general causal processes.  His achievements did 
not just happen, though being born with his unique predispositions did.  The battle of self-mastery is an 
intense doing, no mere happening. 
 Since “kratic” and “akratic” beings are caused to be so, hard determinists must claim that both 
lack ultimate control.  But this view ignores the different powers of the continent and incontinent:  Only 
the continent can control their bladders.  Thus, it is a mistake to blame the incontinent for urinating 
inappropriately, but not a mistake to blame the continent for doing so.  So, autonomy is more a 
causal/metaphysical matter than it is a purely normative matter, though normative work may build a 
bridge from the metaphysics of action to the ethics of action.  Though effort to become an athlete is 
determined, its phenomenology must be taken into account.  Most professors grade students not for their 
inherited capacities, but for their exercised demonstration of such capacities in professor-structured 
performances requiring efforts even in “natural geniuses”.  These sorts of pragmatic considerations 
ground normative judgments, for we praise people because they deserve it from their doings – not because 
events happen to them, but because of their exercise of their self-controlling abilities. 
 Restraint produces another effective desire.  Although tautological, whichever desire we make 
effective wins out.  So, we cannot identify any ineffective desire as one that was ‘supposed’ to be 
effective, even if after tremendous struggle, since struggle shows that the effective desire was a strong 
motivating force.  Sometimes reason is stronger than passion.  Intelligence enables us to deliberate and 
form reasons for restraint that diverge from the strongest desire.  The mentally ill display intelligence 
without prudence and prudential insight is no guarantee against akrasia.  The will is thus distinct from 
                                                
9 Aristotle (1925). 
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both practical and theoretical reason.  Restraint is not coextensive with autonomy.  
 Again, many think that the ability to choose otherwise is needed:  The best choice A is not free if 
Agent cannot do ~A.  Say Shelley chose A under causal conditions C, but could have chosen ~A.  But if 
she could have chosen ~A because she wanted ~A, her different want entails ~C.  For C must include 
motivational set M1 that cannot be the same as M2 if a desire to do otherwise is in M2 but not in M1.  
Thus, “under C, Shelley could have chosen ~A” is a radical claim that means she could have done ~A 
even if she didn’t want to do ~A, akin to saying one can raise one’s arm without the desire to do so.  This 
is contracausality, and our earlier analysis of this peculiar ability suggests that it is implausible. 
 For determinists, C entails A, arguendo, but on the aforementioned view it does not, so it is 
incompatibilist; C may occur and ~A may follow.  Reference to CON is unnecessary to see the 
incompatibility between contracausality and determinism.  However, nothing is incompatible about the 
counterfactual claim that Shelley could have done ~A if she had different (M2) reasons for action 
(“RFAs”) ~C.   If ~C, then ~A is compatible with if C, then A, but some think they can do ~A under C.  
But, since our behavior flows from our reasons, this can mean only the oxymoron, unintentional action. 
 Contracausalists may counterclaim that determinism implies predictability, but if presented with 
clear predictions about arm-raising decisions, Agent can easily falsify them by doing the opposite.  But 
perfect predictions should factor this in too.  This gets subtle, but persons wanting to falsify predictions 
will do what they can to falsify them, and agents with such motives have one set M1, and agents lacking 
these motives have another M2.  Left-hand-raising actions require left-hand-raising desires.  Whichever 
desire one adopts is a function of other factors, like the desire to foil predictions.  “Can do otherwise” 
cannot mean that when one has an effective desire to raise one’s left hand, one is able in that precise state 
to raise one’s opposite hand.  (Please repeat the above-described motor-control ‘experiment’.)  That this is 
what is coveted in our uniquely human “freedom” is a misimpression. 
 If one’s restraint-including considered judgment is “raise the left arm”, but the right one goes up, 
that would really amount to a neurological malfunction, akin to steering the wheel to the left, only to find 
the car veering to the right – not an exceptional ability, but a case of malfunctioning.  Incontinence is 
analogous, as are some mental illnesses – not ‘abilities’.  These cases illustrate that Agent’s reasons are 
causally unrelated to his actions under this view of free will.  Contracausal views, therefore, cannot do 
justice to this causal relation between reasons and actions. 
 The metacausal theory embraces Frankfurt’s distinction between higher-order and lower-order 
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motivational states.10  I propose a causal analysis of the differences between not only motivational and 
metamotivational states, but more broadly between cognitive/conative and metacognitive/metaconative 
states.  Cognitive/conative states are basic sensory-receptor/motor-reactor states – that is, exteroceptive or 
proprioceptive – in which the organism is in stimulus/response (“S/R”) contact with its environment.  
Metacognitive/metaconative states are about other cognitive/conative states, respectively, e.g., thinking 
about thoughts or wanting a desire to be effective.  Conative states involve a cognitive feedback loop; so, 
too, for “meta-” ones.  All motivational states are intentional in Brentano’s sense of “aboutness”, that is, 
they are about something else, but the converse is false.  If one wishes to separate “meta/cognitive” from 
“meta/motivational” terms to exclude the latter from the former, this is fine, but “metamental” remains 
inclusive of them all.  Frankfurt and others identify freedom as a “mesh” between higher-order and lower-
order motivational hierarchy tiers.  These are “hierarchical” or “mesh” theories.  The metacausal theory is 
hierarchical, but more general in its concern with the larger category of metamental – not merely 
metamotivational – states, and their causal features.  The metacausal view is that autonomy involves 
causal/functional control by one’s metamental states of one’s decisions and actions. 
 Compare the metacausal view of ability with the oxymoronic causal malfunction suggested by 
contracausal views:  The ability to do otherwise under slightly different motivational circumstances differs 
radically from the ability to do otherwise without motive or under identical circumstances.  If one does 
otherwise even if one didn’t want to, that equates with the broken steering wheel mechanism case.  Thus, 
only the ‘lesser’ ability to do otherwise when we want to is desirable – acting unintentionally or 
contraintentionally is not.  Counterfactual ability requires conditions M2 counter to those factual 
conditions in place in M1.  Had M1 differed (M2), one could have done otherwise.  Contracausal ability 
permits identical conditions M1 and divergent actions.  Imagine the cosmic history on film that a 
hypothetical God can rewind.  When rewound to just before when Shelley chose A under M1 and then 
allowed to flow on its own, the film shows that she chooses B, and on the next rerun C, etc.  Any pattern 
other than A’s ad infinitum invites contracausality.  The counterfactual view requires all cosmic reruns 
yield A’s ad infinitum under M1:  Shelley always chooses A since she always has the same RFAs (in M1) 
for A. 
 Acausality is a species of contracausality, for choosing ~A under C without motive is choosing ~A 
contra C’s causal trajectory, force, and/or momentum anyway.  All determinists reject contracausality, 
though hard determinists and other incompatibilists hold that autonomy requires it.  Let me sketch reasons 
                                                
10 See Frankfurt (1971).  Dworkin made the distinction first (1970).  Shatz (1986) critically reviews that literature. 
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for and against the causal and contracausal views here, in that order. 
 (1) The main reason philosophers are drawn to the causal/counterfactual view is that it connects 
actions, beliefs and desires in a rational, scientifically legitimate way:  Beliefs and desires cause actions in 
law-like, predictably rational ways.  Since Pierre believes Adele is in Lyons, and wants to see her, he will 
– ceteris paribus – go to Lyons.  Beliefs and desires render actions rational, for different ones have 
different causal powers that account for different actions, hence identical belief and desire inputs yield 
identical action outcomes. 
 (2) The main reason philosophers are drawn to contracausality is that it captures the feel of choice.  
The phenomenology suggests we can raise our hand or not, at will, regardless of belief and desire, a 
power that elevates us beyond S/R predictability, and beyond the robotic sort of cause and effect pairs 
depicted in cases like M1/A in all cosmic reruns.  If we cannot do otherwise under identical 
circumstances, it certainly feels as if we’re not responsible for what we do, it doesn’t originate from us, 
and we are mere dominos in an ancient cause and effect series related by immutable laws of physics and 
the like.  But it doesn’t feel that way when we choose; experience seems genuinely up to us, so we believe 
we are ultimate originators of our actions.  We cause them, so we are responsible for them. 
 (1') The main reason philosophers resist the counterfactual view is that this view suggests that 
choices are nonetheless remotely determined, so they appear to be unfree.  If identical causes produce 
identical effects, then identical M-sets produce identical A-choices, so they are no more ‘free’ than a 
billiard ball is ‘free’ to roll left when struck a certain way. 
 (2') The main reason philosophers resist the contracausal view is that this view suggests that the 
ability we deploy in making decisions is not controlled by the belief-based and desire-based causal forces 
that feed into them, so it is difficult to imagine how agents can claim authorship of or responsibility for 
them.  If my action is not caused by my own M-states, then what caused it?  If it is purely random, then 
what is it about a random force passing through one at choice moment T that makes the choice something 
Agent can claim to originate? 
 Reflections on all of the above considerations mentioned in (1') and (2') feed into a dilemma posed 
by the autonomy pessimist that may be described as the pessimistic dilemma: 
 PD1. Either our choices are caused or they are random.  
 PD2.   If they are caused, then we are robots who lack freedom. 
PD3. If they are random, we cannot claim authorship over our choices and thus we lack freedom. 
 PD4.   Thus, either way, we lack freedom. 
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PD2 is hard determinism, PD3 is “hard indeterminism”, and PD4 is general autonomy pessimism or “hard 
incompatibilism”, the view that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism.  Hard 
determinists say autonomy requires contracausality, which is impossible, and thus so is autonomy; 
optimistic contracausalists are “libertarians”.  This dilemma shapes the current debate.  
 On another conception, our ability to choose freely – a manifestation of our nonphysical mind – 
makes us God-like in that we can inject novel causes into the stream of physical events (Chisolm, 1982).11  
Mind/body dualists could welcome the contracausal conception.  This suggests one’s metaphysics plays a 
role in one’s view of freedom.  Some opposing views can be adjudicated only by reference to the merits 
of competing foundation level assumptions, say, the principle of the closure of the physical domain in 
physics versus the doctrine of privileged access.   
 A similar face-off occurs between folk psychology, which might honor folk intuitions about 
autonomy, and eliminativism, which rejects the validity of mind altogether.  An argument that takes its 
lead solely from general considerations might appear strong, however, simply because its metaphysics is 
in vogue, and yet be weak because its foundation level assumptions have little else to recommend them 
than their roles in the larger belief system.  For all we know, consciousness may be pseudo-emergent 
supra-neuronal energy that does not obey known physical laws, but may still count as physical, as does 
electromagnetism.  If so, stalemates between physicalism and dualism, balanced between the closure of 
the known physical domain and the phenomenology of consciousness, might need to be rethought.  But 
changes on such a foundational level are unlikely anytime soon, involving, as they would, systemic, 
paradigm-shifting revisions in our entire conceptual framework.  This is a key reason why I have adopted 
an easy-style causal/functional approach to the autonomy problem. 
 To continue to depict the many contours of the problem, then, note that a broad spectrum of 
choices ranges from whim at one extreme to intense struggle at the other.  A model of freedom that takes 
acting on whim as its paradigm might be inclined to view contracausal ability as paradigmatic; other 
models may see this as key, e.g., when backward-looking reflection suggests better choices.  The whim 
model makes phenomenological sense only where options are equal or unimportant.  But where options 
are unequal or important, “whim power”, so to speak, is suboptimal, if at all plausible.  Here we want our 
choice to be constrained by rational factors.  In doing what he took to be the right thing, Luther said he 
“could do no other”, but that didn’t necessarily mean that he lacked autonomy; rather, it meant he was 
                                                
11 Although it is unclear whether Kant and Descartes thought this exactly, they apparently thought something very 
close to this view. 
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committed to his stance (Dennett, 1984).  It would be irrational for him to exercise brute power to refrain, 
given the importance – not the strength – of his desire.  If strength did propel actions such that we cannot 
resist them, intuition suggests we lose responsibility for them.   
Thus, what seems intuitive on one paradigm for the data is not intuitive under another paradigm 
for the data.  Thus, where one is being tracked or manipulated by someone who knows one’s motives, 
survival favors the ability to diverge from predicted patterns (Dennett, 1984).  Here, the ability to do 
otherwise despite one’s motivations seems coextensive with freedom. 
 Let us briefly mention some historical concerns with freedom.  Sophocles’ Oedipus is prophesied 
to fall in love with his mother and kill his father; attempts to avert the prophecy secure its outcome.  On 
this form of fatalism, only some events are inevitable.  Dennett calls this “local fatalism” and “global 
fatalism” the view that all events are inevitable (1984).  Many nonphilosophers espouse local fatalism; 
colloquial expressions express it:  “It was her time to die”.  Few philosophers ascribe to local fatalism, 
although certain ancient Indian philosophers, such as Makkhali Gosāla, however, were fatalists.12  In 
directly arguing with them, the Buddha explicitly rejected fatalism.13   
 Aristotle rejected “logical fatalism” in his talk of tomorrow’s sea battle (1941).  Either there will 
be a certain sea battle tomorrow or there will not be.  If there will be, then it is a fact now that, tomorrow, 
there is a sea battle; if there will not be a sea battle, then it is a fact now that, tomorrow, there is no sea 
battle.  It is a fact that there will be a sea battle or, alternately, that there will be no sea battle; we just 
don’t know yet which one is the fact.  Facts, like truths, when viewed in this way, are timeless and fixed, 
and there is nothing we can do to change them – before, during, and certainly not after their occurrence.  
Indeed, the principle of the “fixity” of the past, “Past Fixity”, seems rather axiomatic.  Of course, only 
time travelers or God can challenge Past Fixity, but the idea under fatalism is that the present and the 
future are equally fixed.  Nothing can prevent it that what happens tomorrow happens.  Que sera, sera. 
Logical fatalists argue that every event is described by a true statement, and all true statements are 
timelessly true, so they are all true ‘before’ the events mentioned in them occur along the temporal 
continuum.  If so, they are unalterable, so there is no freedom.  But this is a non sequitur, since if a 
statement is timelessly true, then talk about ‘when’ it is true not only equivocates in some sense, but 
makes no sense, all things considered. 
 Logical fatalism implies that it doesn’t matter what we try to do.  Suppose a logical fatalist 
                                                
12 See Keown (2009). 
13 See Federman (2007). 
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believed this, and had just fallen from a ship and was swept away by powerful currents.  He would believe 
it was already a fact whether he survives, one that has nothing to do with any efforts on his part.  But if he 
truly believed this, chances are very high that he would drown, despite imaginary scenarios whereby he is 
rescued by a large sea turtle or whatnot.  Belief in fatalism thus affects the future, and it is for this reason 
that the Buddha rejected it:  because it would paralyze the will, and then we would become volitional 
cripples, so to speak, unable to avoid undesirable experiences and events (Federman, 2007).  Fatalists, 
however, would say that belief in fatalism was itself fated, together with loss of motivation.  But if belief 
effects motivation, this contradicts the tenet that beliefs and desires play no role in cosmic history.  
Fatalism, an often troubling view, is a troubled view as well. 
 A more complex case involves the tension between freedom and God’s omniscience.  If God 
knows all facts throughout eternity (in the sense that God exists outside time), then God knows Shelley 
will choose A beforehand.  Since God is omniscient, God cannot be mistaken, so Shelley must choose A, 
but if that is so, then how can she choose freely?  “Theological fatalism” is similar to logical fatalism, but 
where logical fatalism sees inevitability as a logical/metaphysical matter, theological fatalism sees it as an 
epistemological function, of God’s omniscience.  There are similarities between all forms of fatalism and 
hard determinism, so we will address them together in chapter 3. 
 Determinism sees every event as determined lawfully – necessitated – by previous ones.  So, if we 
knew the exact location and trajectory of every particle in the universe at any given time – a full 
description of the universe or “state description” – together with the laws of the universe, we could predict 
with perfect accuracy the complete cosmic history.14  Consequently, every choice is the result of the 
operation of the laws upon the world states set in motion ages past.  If so, CON says, choices are unfree. 
 Determinism is not unanimously held, since quantum mechanics suggests subatomic events are 
genuinely metaphysically random.  A minority of pessimists holds out the hope that the randomness is 
merely epistemic,15 while most accept metaphysical micro-indeterminism, but hold it incapable of rising 
to the macro-level of choices.16  Hard determinists reject autonomy because pre-natal conditions 
determine each choice, whereas soft determinists deny this undermines self-control.  “Hard” and “soft” 
may mislead; hard-nosed scientists may be soft determinists, for all determinists affirm the same 
                                                
14 Using Hempel’s covering law model, let C1, C2, C3 ... Cn be initial conditions, L1, L2, L3 ... Ln the laws, and E1, 
E2, E3 ... En the events.  Given Ci and Lj, we can explain Ek, deductive nomologically.  Ci, Lj, and Ek are amenable 
to deductive inference, thus also to prediction. 
15 On the difference between ontological and epistemic readings of quantum mechanics, see Hodgson (2002) and 
Bishop (2002), especially pp. 116-118. 
16 See, e.g., Honderich (1993). 
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causal/nomological history of choice – that all cosmic reruns are identical.   
Let us contrast the logical and the factual claims involved here.  A logical claim is that 
determinism is incompatible with autonomy.  The hard determinist claims this and the factual claim, 
determinism.  These claims imply the falsity of autonomy, as seen in the following modus ponens: 
HD1. If determinism is true, then freedom is false. 
HD2. Determinism is true. 
HD3. Thus, freedom is false. 
The libertarian uses the same premise, HD1 (renamed “L1”), but, by contrast, makes a very similar modus 
tollens: 
L1. If determinism is true, then freedom is false 
L2. Freedom is true. 
L3. Thus, determinism is false. 
Hard determinism is thus the conjunction of the logical thesis of incompatibilism with the 
factual/metaphysical thesis of determinism; libertarianism agrees about incompatibility, but affirms 
autonomy.  A hard determinist, thus, is committed to logical and metaphysical claims, but also epistemic 
ones, to be spelled out shortly.  Similar observations hold for libertarians and soft determinists. 
 The debate here centers on the logical claims, but sometimes metaphysical and epistemic factors 
enter, and they complicate matters.  It would be fallacious, say, to infer incompatibilism from factual 
claims from psychology.  Another fallacy is to reject libertarianism because it is improbable for neural 
firings to be influenced by randomly emitted photons.  Suppose no randomly emitted photons ever 
actually do influence neural firings, and suppose no cannibal indigenous to New Guinea ever earns a 
Ph.D. in philosophy from Oxford and becomes a tenured full professor in a community college in New 
York City.  Both the ‘cannibal philosophy professor’ and ‘quantum neural choice’ doctrines are 
empirically possible, though perhaps they are both improbable.  Thus, the empirical improbability of 
quantum contracausality has no bearing on its logical consistency. 
 A “gnostic” has, and an “agnostic” lacks,17 a pro or con attitude (true, false, or unknown) towards 
determinism, freedom, or their compatibility, computation of which yields 27 (33) possibilities:  nine pairs 
of computations (32) for true, false, and unknown concatenations of freedom and determinism; add a 
factor of three for whether, given each of those nine positions, one is compatibilist, incompatibilist, or 
agnostic about compatibility, which yields 27 (33) views.  Logical and theological fatalism generate two 
                                                
17 There may be degrees of agnosticism and gnosticism.  See Mele (1995, 2002) on agnosticism. 
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more sets of 27 positions, for a total of 81 positions on free will.  Logical fatalists think bivalence entails 
non-autonomy; theological fatalists think God’s foreknowledge (“theological precognitivism”) entails it.  
Most theists are “soft theological precognitivists”, analogous to soft determinists, affirming both 
doctrines; similarly, “soft bivalence” characterizes most who affirm bivalence.  There may also be 
combinations of the 81 views, e.g., Richard Taylor (1983) combines hard determinism with logical and 
theological fatalism, and also other combinations defined by varying degrees of belief. 
 A Procrustean approach to the issue might ignore the heterogeneity and ubiquity of autonomous 
experience, degrees of belief, and variations in meaning – that is, it might ignore so much of what 
accounts for the many varying intuitions to be found in the different dimensions of the subject matter.  
The core notions of the subject compete, e.g., causalist/contracausalist views of possible or can.  Russell’s 
close range, middle distance, and horizon level perspectives (2002) reveal three dimensions of autonomy 
that may lack a common feature, so that what looks like a plausible feature of autonomy at one of these 
three vantages does not look viable at another.  It is important to identify and remain sensitive to such 
complications in attempting to form the most coherent, comprehensive view.  In my belaboring of the 
introductory descriptions of the contours of the issues, in defining the relevant terms, and in outlining the 
many positions available on free will, I have sought to remain loyal to these dialectical imperatives. 
 The major argument of the next chapter is that CON and other forms of pessimism have failed to 
remain loyal to these dialectical imperatives, and in so doing have given a false air of authority to 
fallacious ideas like actualism.  The dethroning of these erroneous ideas will remove the false air of 
illegitimacy that has attached to ideas like conditional freedom and PAP, and will render optimism 
plausible in advance of any of my positive arguments.  I supply positive arguments in later chapters 
sufficient to ground a more robust theory of autonomy, but without first significantly dislodging the 
foothold of CON and related forms of pessimism, no such positive account will be taken seriously. 
 Fischer and other semi-compatibilists18 agree with hard determinists (e.g., van Inwagen, 1975) and 
other pessimists (e.g., Pereboom, G. Strawson, Honderich, Smilansky, all 2002), and libertarians (e.g., 
Kane, 2002b) and other non-naturalist optimists (e.g., O’Connor, Ginet, both 2002), in holding that 
CON’s pre-natal determinism defeats ultimate control over who and what we become, choose, value, 
will, and do.  That being so, Frankfurt (1971) and other soft determinists and compatibilists (e.g., Wolf, 
1990, Dennett, 1984) have rejected PAP and the conditional theory of freedom, since CON rules out 
                                                
18 Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Campbell (2008), Fischer (2006, 2008a, 2008b), Haji (2005, 2009); for critical 
reviews, see Perry (2008), Smilansky (2008), Speak (2005, 2008), and Steward (2008). 
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alternate possibilities and permits only a single past, present, and future. 
 Instead, they (Frankfurt, Wolf, Fischer, Fischer and Ravizza, and Haji) opt for an account in which 
Agent is responsible iff he is in some sort of optimal internal relation to his will, values, character, 
choices, and/or actions in their actual sequence unfolding, typically but not necessarily some sort of 
“mesh” between higher-order and lower-order elements, which actual sequence character would render 
them consistent with determinism.  These mesh or hierarchical theories are typically internalist accounts 
that eschew causal, historical, and/or counterfactual conditions, as these threaten to invoke CON’s pre-
natal consequences.  As such, they focus on what Russell (2002) would consider middle distance and 
close range relations between Agent and his will or his will and actions.  These accounts avoid horizon-
level relations, for it is taken for granted that compatibilists cannot adequately dispose of horizon-level 
skepticism about pre-natal control over the sort of character one is determined to develop.  
Incompatibilists (e.g., Pereboom, G. Strawson, Honderich, and Smilansky, id.) have tended recently to 
unite on the common ground that middle distance and close range compatibilist senses of freedom and 
responsibility are plausible as they stand, but ungrounded at the horizon level, since the sort of control one 
exercises in close range and middle distance domains is ultimately pre-natally determined.  The view from 
the pre-natal horizon reveals no alternatives or control over who we become or what we choose, 
ultimately. 
 The latest stage in the dialectic involves a stalemate between “ultimatists”, who agree that CON-
based ultimacy worries defeat all forms of autonomy, and “non-ultimatists”, who allege that ultimacy 
worries do not defeat close range or middle distance control.  But little argument is advanced by my 
fellow non-ultimatists against CON’s ultimacy worries.  Instead, focus on close range and middle distance 
matters is assumed to reveal their intuitive plausibility.  Fischer (2002) says those who fail to get the 
intuition from Frankfurt Cases, that Agent is responsible when Intervener doesn’t intervene, never will get 
it.  I disagree, but I postpone setting forth my reasons until chapter 6. 
 Giving causal/functional specifications for easy autonomy would be insufficient for someone who 
was convinced that the causal/functional autonomy features it identifies lose legitimacy to pre-natal 
ultimacy worries.  For then the putatively autonomous agent is akin to a mere thermostat- or weathervane-
type mechanism for which every state is a mere function of ancient conditions and laws over which it 
lacks a say, which are not “up to” it, ultimately.  Thus, I argue against CON’s ultimacy conclusions in 
chapter 3, which Archimedean point provides the leverage needed to dislodge the footing of the entire 
panel of debaters mentioned in this concluding section and justifies my causal/counterfactual analysis 
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against internalist soft determinist claims to the effect that externalist, causal/counterfactual, historical 
conditions are irrelevant to freedom and responsibility.   
So, since pessimists of late adopt the stance that close range and middle distance models are 
coherent per se but vulnerable to horizon/ultimacy worries, once the latter are removed, this camp has 
reason to join ours.  Similarly, once CON’s ultimacy worries lose their sting, non-naturalist optimists no 
longer need embrace non-natural accounts of autonomy to be optimists, so they, too, have reason to join 
our camp.  Finally, once determinism is no longer a threat to the self-control soft determinists and other 
compatibilists once embraced as intuitive forms of autonomy, they no longer need to reject PAP and the 
conditional theory of freedom, so they, too, have reason to join our camp.  Thus, with my anti-ultimacy 
arguments in place, all forms of pessimism and non-naturalist optimism lose footing, as do all forms of 
soft determinism and compatibilism that reject PAP and the conditional theory; they are left standing 
without grounds for their views, and are invited to join our ranks.  The theory they are invited to embrace 
is more robust than previous attempts along similar lines.  For hierarchical, actual sequence, and other 
internalist accounts may now be enriched by PAP, conditionalist, counterfactual sequence and externalist 
criteria, e.g., causal and historical criteria, paving the way for an easy autonomy solution to the problem 
of free will.  Indeed, once CON is dislodged, the claim that all hard-problem-motivated accounts are 
otiose is overdetermined by this and the easy approach. 
 Dennett claimed (1984) there will never be ‘a’ solution to the free will problem, because there are 
many such problems.  I collect them all, link them to actualism, dislodge it, and thereby render our daily 
conception plausible.  That is my simple, albeit ambitious plan to comprehensively address the many 
problems of free will under one banner.  It is supported indirectly by a claim Wolf made (1990) that all 
standard conceptions of autonomy are incompatibilist, since she thinks they require indeterminism or non-
naturalism.  Wolf is mostly right, and it is CON that is behind this intuition, the same intuition that led 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998) to leave autonomy out of their semi-compatibilism, though theirs is a hair’s 
breadth away from an autonomy account, apparently unbeknownst to them.  (I will explain later on why I 
think they smuggle in elements from the autonomy conception into their allegedly non-autonomous 
account.)  What is unique about my account is that it is a form of compatibilist autonomism, what Wolf 
thinks is oxymoronic.  This is a mixed blessing.  If the notion is oxymoronic under the current paradigm, 
but a plausible model of that notion is instantiated here, then that is something worth knowing.  But if the 
notion is canonically viewed as oxymoronic, then my work is cut out for me, but the expected harvest is 
well worth the toil. 
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Chapter 3:  A Critique of Pessimism 
 
“Past Fixity”, “Present Fixity”, “Future Fixity”, “Laws Fixity”, and the “Uniformity” of same-
world/same-history-and-laws are axioms of determinism, together, “Fixity”.  Fixity drives van Inwagen’s 
(1975) CON, a classic expression of incompatibilism.  I argue in this chapter that CON commits several 
errors in connection with Fixity, especially equivocations, and Lehrer’s critique of conditionalism 
commits similar equivocations, as does fatalism. 
 The contracausalist thinks Shelley could have chosen ~A contrary to M1 (a subset of C) that 
caused A.  The counterfactualist thinks she could have chosen ~A only if ~M1 (thus ~C) held.  C should 
include only circumstances that contribute to A.  If all pre-A facts and laws are relevant, they globally 
constitute C, so restriction to relevance eliminates nothing.  But if causation is local, the restriction 
preserves truth.  But it is implausible that every fact and law is relevant to every other one.  Shelley’s 
thirst and water beliefs are the relevant causal conditions for A, not Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon. 
 Taylor and Dennett (2002) think causation talk is pragmatic, limited to local causes.  The Big 
Bang didn’t cause the Twin Towers’ collapse.  The hard determinist may reply that whenever the cosmic 
film reaches C, A results, ad infinitum, so Shelley doesn’t control whether A occurs.  But this ignores that 
the causal determinants in C are precisely her desires to do A under M1 that comprise C, locally 
construed.  A causal dilemma arises: 
CD1. Either C is construed globally or locally to cause A. 
CD2. If C is construed globally, it misrepresents irrelevant factors as causally relevant to A, but 
a causal factor F is relevant to E only if a change in F would bring about a change in E, 
and not all factors in globally inclusive C satisfy this causal criterion.19 
CD3. If C is construed locally, it involves M1, Agent’s beliefs and desires, in just the right way, 
such that they satisfy the causal criterion (see CD2 above). 
 CD4. Thus, either way, C’s causing A does not undermine autonomy. 
The global configuration of effects is an indirect function of the global configuration of causes, since each 
cause and effect pair has only its linkage.  C1, C2, ..., Cn cause actions A1, A2, ..., An, and laws L1, L2, ..., 
Ln relate them as pairs, not summed.  It is an agglomerative fallacy to sum local causal relations globally.  
                                                
19 See Lewis (2000) for a defense of the italics in CD2.  A similar notion is widely accepted by statisticians to the 
effect that variable F is causally relevant to variable E iff variation in F “explains some of the variance” in E, i.e., 
holding F constant reduces variation in E.  See also Lewis (2000) and Bigaj (2005) for defenses of the more general 
claim that counterfactual analyses are not only consistent with determinism, but essential to the concept of “law”. 
 27 
 
Though state descriptions entail each other under determinism, world states do not cause each other, so 
there are no world state laws. 
 There are other reasons to reject global causation.  Despite the bluff that quantum indeterminacy 
‘cancels out’ at the macro-level (Honderich, 1993), indeterminacy anywhere renders deterministic state 
description laws impossible.  Physicalist reductionism denies the causal efficacy of mental states, as if 
identifying the locus of causation at such special science levels of description constitutes a category error.  
But if true causal explanations are only atomic and there are no licit special science level attributions of 
causality or laws governing macro-level objects such as mouse traps (Schiffer, 1991) or bowling balls, 
then the implicit principle is that it is illicit to use causal/nomological language at the macro-level.  Since 
state descriptions are macro-agglomerations greater than bowling balls, they cannot be the relata of laws.  
If there are no mouse trap or bowling ball laws, then there are no state description laws. 
 Consider the alleged need to reduce folk psychological generalizations to physics.20  As Schiffer 
argues, even if there are ways in which contingent generalizations about how we reason may be reduced 
to more basic levels (to complete their ceteris paribus clauses), 
it’s by no means obvious that ... a reduction to fundamental physics, or even to neuroscience, 
would be needed to provide that explanation (1990, p. 171). 
Schiffer supports this claim by reference to 
a well-known experiment ... (Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972), which illustrates nicely the sort of 
contingent generalizations that psychologists feel a need to explain. 
 You are presented with four cards, each having a letter on one side and a number on the 
other.  The up sides show the following characters: 
  E K 4 7 
Which cards need to be turned over to test the following conditional?  If a card has a vowel on one 
side, then it has an even number on the other side.  ‘E’ and ‘7’ is of course the correct response, 
but Wason discovered that a common response is to pick only the card with the vowel.  (Schiffer, 
id., pp. 171-2).  
These results seem to show that content has something to do with reasoning, not just syntax. 
But suppose some joker tried to explain the generalization that people tend to overlook the ‘7’ ... 
by deriving it from quantum mechanics....  Even if this could be done (which I seriously doubt) it 
                                                
20 On such reductionisms, see Kim (1979, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2000); cf. Schiffer (1990, 1991), G. Strawson 
(1997); on reductionist determinism, see Honderich (1993, 2002). 
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wouldn’t yield an explanation that any psychologist cares about; the [psychologists’] questions ... 
would still be unanswered.  More pertinent, though, is the observation that it may be doubted 
whether the reduction to fundamental physics is in any sense needed to explain the generalization.  
(Schiffer, id., p.172; emphasis in original) 
There is no need for mouse trap laws or reduction of their related law-like generalizations. 
 The reductionist claims explanation is micro-level, but when it’s pointed out that the micro-level is 
indeterministic, he uses a “micro-macro prestidigitation” to shift to the special science claim that 
psychological determinism holds.  Laws that do cover global distributions of particles, e.g., of 
thermodynamics, are not about local causal linkages, not about C.  Thus, “state description” and other 
global terms cannot play the right roles in a causal account of action. 
 Slote expresses similar intuitions about necessity (1982), and despite technical objections, he is 
correct; cf. Kapitan (2002).  Causal necessity is selective and cannot be agglomerated at the level of state 
descriptions that entail each other under determinism.  What happens in a rice paddy at Tx in China, part 
of world state Px, does not influence what happens in Shelley’s home at Ty, part of world state Py.  It 
could influence her, but not in the global sense assumed here, so building what happens in the rice field 
into the cause of her behavior is gratuitous and misleading.  World states do not cause local states.  
Formally, the occurrence or non-occurrence of event E is a function f of variables v1,v2, ...,vn.  That is, 
E=f(v1,v2,...,vn).  Hence, the values of any variables other than the vi are irrelevant; thus, ~vi (a rice paddy 
event in China) is irrelevant to f, thus to E (Shelley’s drinking). 
 Focus on global reruns would distort the explanatory narratives that inform our local biographies.  
Only the film with the narrative structured around the formation of Agent’s character and experiences 
captures the relevant features of his life; a good biography places its subject within an environmentally 
sensitive rational structure.  With advances in the special sciences that explain human behavior, future 
biographies will contain more extra-agential facts, but these will be limited to the vicinity of the 
biographed person’s life. 
 Seeing such a film of our own lives invokes an initially fatalistic dread, but this proves no more 
than discoveries about the neural basis of this or that surface level behavior.  Richard Taylor (1983) 
describes a fictitious “Osmo” who discovers a book about his life, and his attempts  to avert his own death 
cause it.  Goldman (1970) and others deploy “book of life” scenarios, but these Oedipus-style fatalisms 
require a deux ex machina, and so are not useful in resolving puzzles of self-prediction, as in Newcomb’s 
paradox.  For deliberation whether to do A cannot be consistently maintained in the face of knowledge 
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that one will do A.21 
 The global rerun view reduces choice to discovery of what one will do, no matter what one may 
try to prevent that from happening.22  The phenomenology is that Shelley’s choosing is a doing, 
something she makes happen by an act of will – not a passive discovery of what determinism entails for 
her as a mere container of effects.  It is preferable that C causes A, for if C yields what should be an 
effective desire for A, water, but Shelley does B, shoves salt in her mouth, this would be pathology, not 
autonomy.  This is not “sweet lemons” (Elster, 1983), but the intuition that Agent cannot claim authorship 
of A if A is random, not caused by C.  Autonomy requires determinism, or else pathology, B, would be 
“freedom”.  Determinists agree on the necessity of identical reruns under Uniformity for authorship. 
 To circumvent the optimist’s focus on such sufficiently explanatory features as those of local C, 
the pessimist notes that C was caused by earlier C-1, in turn by C-2, C-3, back to prenatal conditions C-n.  
If her life is determined by events over which she had no control, her autonomy is illusory.  Pessimists 
insist a narrow focus on Shelley’s segment of the cosmic history clip misses the larger narrative. 
 Since prenatal C-n determined A, Shelley couldn’t really have brought about ~A, so she is unfree.  
In a sense, CON says here that determinism implies there is no autonomy under the contracausal 
conception that involves ~A, and thus indeterminism.  But determinism’s incompatibility with 
indeterminism is tautologous.  The counterfactual conception remains intact.  CON thus equivocates 
about the “freedom” it targets.  Either CON targets deterministic or indeterministic models.  CON mainly 
assumes an indeterministic model, so it doesn’t directly target soft determinism, but libertarians are 
already incompatibilists.   
 CON is supposed to support, not express, that determinism is incompatible with freedom.23  CON 
assumes freedom is indeterministic and then shows that this indeterministic freedom is incompatible with 
determinism – but of course indeterminism is incompatible with determinism!  CON presents itself as if it 
has refuted deterministic freedom. 
 Though abstracta cannot impel actions, CON suggests state descriptions and laws render Shelley 
                                                
21 Goldman (1970) resists an incompatibilist intuition:  If the book of all facts about my future were presented to 
me, I could easily falsify it.  Determinism initially appears incompatible with this ability, but my chapter 2 arm-
raising analysis suggests otherwise. 
22 Buddhist “enlightenment” involves consciousness of the flow of impersonal influences through the mind/body in 
the absence of an integrated self.  Here, the dreaded image is embraced as the epiphanous peak of a lifetime of 
soteriological inquiry.  See G. Strawson (1986, pp. 117-20) for a Zen-like version of hard determinism. 
23 Levin (2003b) says unfreedom is supposed to be an interesting consequence attendant upon considerations about 
determinism, not part of the thesis itself.  That is, it is arguable – indeed, the argument – whether to interpret 
determinism as soft or hard determinism. 
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unable to refrain from drinking that water.  Tautological egoism holds action self-interested because 
intentional by definition, what Agent thus wants, hence Agent interest, and so self-interested.  But this 
tautology doesn’t prevent the content – the aim – of a motive from being other-regarding as well.  So, too, 
abstracta about determinism don’t prevent agents’ control of specific actions.24  If Shelley cannot refrain 
from drinking water, it must be due to a brain or behavioral disorder, not abstract puzzles about modals. 
 Similarly, though Zeno is best defeated with calculus, nobody thinks logic immobilizes, much less 
proves motion nonexistent.  Just as motion is ubiquitous, so, too, autonomous actions are ubiquitous.  
Presumptive favor goes to motionists and autonomists; the evidence massively confirms both.  If we 
cannot move or control our actions, it is not due to abstracta, but to some extra-logical pathology.  Belief 
in motion and autonomy are justified, by virtue of their ubiquity alone, in laying claim to presumptive 
favor in debates about their legitimacy.  Just as Moore famously ‘proved’ there is a world by raising his 
hand, or at least gave a demonstrative reminder about the evidential priority owed to our common 
experience, so also a person can ‘prove’ his autonomy by raising his hand.  One hand movement, three 
proofs! 
 In his seminal paper, van Inwagen (1975)25 uses “P” to refer to the state description at time T 
when judge J refrains from raising his hand (to signify a judicial decision), “P0” to refer to whatever state 
description is true at prenatal time T0; and “L” to refer to the conjunction of all the laws of nature.  So, 
(1) If determinism is true, then the conjunction of P0&L entails P. 
(2)  If J had raised his hand at T, then P would be false. 
(3)  If (2) is true, then if J could have raised his hand at T, J could have rendered P false. 
(4)  If J could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of P0&L entails P, then J could 
have rendered the conjunction of P0&L false. 
(5)  If J could have rendered the conjunction of P0&L false, then J could have rendered L false. 
(6)  J could not have rendered L false. 
(7)  If determinism is true, J could not have raised his hand at T.  (pp. 52-3) 
Van Inwagen says the conditionalist thinks sentences of type (8) mean sentences of type (9), 
(8) S could have done X. 
(9) If S had chosen to do X, S would have done X.  (p. 57) 
                                                
24 Though it is doubtful hard determinists advocate it as such, the opposite view is an instance of what Whitehead 
called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (Landesman, 2003). 
25 Page numbers refer to Watson (1982).  Recent supporters are G. Strawson, Pereboom, Honderich, Smilansky, 
Fischer (Kane, 2002a); earlier, Hospers, D’Holbach, Lucretius. 
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and challenges the conditionalist with the following dilemma.  If we so substitute each sentence in CON, 
either it will remain true or, if false, that constitutes a reductio against the substitution (p. 58).  Van 
Inwagen leaves this task to the reader.  We focus on (1)-(7) first. 
 P0 has only global content about T0's state description, whereas P has local content about J’s 
action.  But the global view distorts vision in favor of hard over soft determinism.  Also, J’s refraining 
from raising his hand involves an omission, rather than a positive action, which counts as a judicial 
decision.  In other contexts, omissions typically lack this feature.26  Later CONs lack this feature, but it is 
important to note its role in original CON. 
 Here are some objections.  (1) trades in local causal matters for global entailment ones.  These 
substitutions distance intuitions.  (2) is true, but its antecedent uses counterfactuals in a way that has 
agents do other than they do, which suggests counterfactuals need to be actualized.  (3) is a non sequitur, 
since (2) does not entail (3)’s consequent, and the truth of a counterfactual does not entail ability to falsify 
the factual statement it runs counter to.  Though (2) and the conjunctive antecedent of (3) (“ca3”) (by 
exportation) are true, the consequent of (3) (“c3") doesn’t follow. 
(ca3) (2) is true and J could have raised his hand at T. 
(c3) J could have rendered P false. 
For (2) is not a factual claim that J did otherwise, and (ca3)’s latter conjunct is merely an ability 
statement, whereas (c3) asserts J’s ability to actually falsify a fact about what J is stipulated to have 
already done – that’s impossible tout court, barring time travel. 
 (4) and (5) inherit the illogic of (3), and (5) assumes ability to do otherwise implies ability to 
violate Laws Fixity, for it goes without saying that we cannot violate Past Fixity; time travel is 
conceivable, but not as a basis for autonomy.  But rather than imply a power to change the past, 
Uniformity requires that counterfactual reasoning be varied across the board, i.e., the counterfactual past 
must differ if supposing a counterfactual present.  CON implies the only possibility is that able to do 
otherwise entails able to violate the law.  Since putative ‘miracles’,27 strictly, cannot be more than merely 
highly unexpected phenomena unless they violate a law of nature, such miracles are incredible, so van 
Inwagen asserts in (6) that we lack this ability. 
                                                
26 Analogous to locutionary actions as utterances of marital “I do”, this nonlocutionary omission is an expressive 
gesture without movement and has performative force as a convention-generating action.  These complications may 
warp intuition. 
27 Miracles are impossible on that view that sees laws as exceptionless generalizations, in which case any putative 
‘exception’ would automatically invalidate any previously considered law it was seen as an exception to, and 
convert it into an ‘almost law’. 
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 Lewis says van Inwagen’s “render false” notion is ambiguous.  In the strong sense, J is able to do 
something such that a proposition is thereby made false by his act, but in the weak sense, J is able to do 
something such that a proposition is thereby shown to be false (1986b, p. 293).  On the weak sense, (6) is 
false, according to Lewis (1986b, p. 297), for there may be “divergent miracles” if at T-1 God replaces one 
set of laws with another, in which case J’s doing otherwise at T merely shows the law false (1986b, pp. 
294-95). 
 Call the different laws involved at T-1 “L*”.  Though a special attributive reading of “law” as 
whatever is an exceptionless law-like generalization requires all possible exceptions to revoke the status 
of a putative law, “law” ought not to be so defined that it is linguistically impossible to describe worlds in 
which God holds fixed, say, their initial conditions, but varies their laws.  Thus, if the laws were changed 
by God, such that J does raise his hand, then J does something such that the previous set of laws L is 
shown false thereby. 
 This weak/strong distinction can be applied to CON another way.  Only the contracausalist claims 
that J could have brought about ~P with the same history and law that entails P.  The counterfactualist 
claims J could have done otherwise if J wanted to, which assumes a different past and laws ~(P0&L); J 
doesn’t do otherwise in any same world reruns.  If J had wanted to do otherwise ~P, Uniformity implies 
things would have been different back to T0, and, under this counterfactual, P0 would be false.  There is 
no problem with P→(P0&L) and ~P→~(P0&L). 
 Call conditions acting on J at T-1 “CJ”; call Shelley’s “CS”.  For counterfactualists, if J had wanted 
otherwise, J would have been under ~CJ, entailed by ~(P0&L).  Contracausality requires the strong 
“render false” where CJ produces different reruns.  Contracausalists say ~P can follow P0&L, but since P0 
is set at T0, P0 remains fixed, so L is falsified at T.  Contracausality doesn’t violate Past Fixity, therefore, 
but Laws/Present Fixities.  
 Counterfactualists do not claim J can select from alternatives Pv~P.  All determinists accept Fixity, 
so CON cannot target counterfactualism, only contracausality.  But everyone already sees determinism as 
incompatible with indeterminism, so a CON dilemma arises: 
COND1.  Either CON targets soft determinism or libertarianism/indeterminism. 
COND2.  If CON targets soft determinism, it is irrelevant, since soft determinism is an axiom 
observing, merely counterfactual model of freedom. 
COND3.  If CON targets libertarianism, it is redundant, since libertarians already accept 
indeterminism and its obvious incompatibility with determinism. 
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COND4.   Thus, either way, CON is idle. 
J’s ability does not require strong/contracausal possibility ~P, only that J would have done otherwise if he 
wanted to – weak/counterfactual possibility.  Even given CJ, J still could have chosen otherwise if he had 
wanted to, if ~CJ, but CJ holds.  Weak/counterfactual ability doesn’t render ~P; P holds. 
 That it is determined that J didn’t want to do otherwise doesn’t rule out that J could have so 
wanted, had he wanted to want otherwise.  It’s all determined, but J’s abilities remain, without becoming 
law breakers and/or fact falsifiers.  J cannot alter P, P0&L, or Pe(P0&L).  Contracausalists alone bear the 
burden of facing these antinomological implications. 
 PAP has come under attack from Frankfurt (1969).  Given that Intervener does not actually 
interfere in stipulated cases where Agent wants what he wants, Agent acts on his own desires, so he is still 
responsible for what he does, despite the fact that Intervener bars his access to alternate possibilities.  PAP 
may be read two ways.  Strong PAP views alternate possibilities contracausally; weak PAP views them 
counterfactually.  Strong possibilities involve agent access to divergent futures in choice, thus non-
uniform reruns in the same world and violate Fixity.  Weak possibilities only involve paths that would 
have been open had different causal conditions led to choice, thus uniform reruns in the same world; these 
only appear to allow non-uniform reruns if wrongly viewed across worlds, but not within them.  So, in 
the next world in which it is the case that ~CJ, determinism entails ~P – there are no axiom violating 
possibilities within worlds, so weak possibilities are determinism friendly.  Fixity holds in all 
counterfactual worlds; these are not agent accessible. 
 In recent discussions (e.g., Dennett, 2003; Levin 2003), disagreement about the need for PAP 
among compatibilists suggests the issues have been miscast from the outset.  Some reject PAP (Frankfurt, 
1969, and Dennett, 1984), but some don’t (Levin 2003), and the split among them can be mended by my 
bifurcation.  All determinists reject strong possibilities, and since strong PAP requires them, they must 
reject it.  Hard determinists insist freedom requires strong possibilities and thus is impossible.  But all 
determinists must accept weak possibilities, since the opposite doctrine – that only what actually happens 
is possible, “actualism” – is not an option for them, I will argue.  Weak possibilities, thus weak PAP (see 
PAPW, below), are not determinism unfriendly. 
 Bok (1998) distinguishes practical and theoretical possibilities.  Any option Agent considers is one 
that would open a metaphysical path were Agent to choose it.  Given Agent’s power to determine a 
metaphysical option by selecting it, all considered options are practical possibilities for Agent, though 
only Agent’s choice is theoretically possible.  Bok’s practical possibilities are our weak possibilities, for 
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each option in the vicinity of being chosen represents a weak possibility in a nearby alternate world which 
would be available, were it selected.  For another to be selected, however, a different past had to hold. 
 The intuition behind weak/practical possibilities is captured in “PAPW”, a PAP-like principle 
highlighting the word “would”.  Here is a sketch of PAPW, which has two parts: 
PAPW1: Agent voluntarily does A iff he would have done A had he been able to do 
otherwise; 
PAPW2:   Agent freely does A iff he does A voluntarily and would have done other than A 
had he wanted to. 
PAP requires agent access to alternate possibilities; PAPW does not.  PAP focuses on normative 
responsibility; PAPW focuses on causal responsibility, authorship. 
 PAPW1 explains our willingness to hold agents responsible though they lack alternatives.  For 
they would have engaged in these actions even under strongly construed alternatives; PAPW2 captures 
both Bok’s intuitions and weak conditional possibilities. 
 CON’s (3) assumes able to do otherwise means able to actualize either of Pv~P under CJ, which 
violates Present Fixity.  This is strong contracausal ability/possibility.  If we must imagine ~P, CON 
cannot validly require us to hold P0&L fixed under Uniformity.  CON equivocates by treating P variably 
but P0&L rigidly, asks us to run our P-variable intuitions against a P0&L-rigid past, and then counts our 
failure at this task as a defeat.  But it begs the question to suppose ~P, but not to suppose ~(P0&L), to 
suppose contracausality. 
 If we treat P and P0&L symmetrically, we see that counterfactual ability only entails that if J had 
done otherwise, this would show, in Lewis’s weak sense, that J had a different history ~CJ, in which he 
wanted otherwise, which requires different antecedents back to T0, in which case P0&L would be shown 
false.  The weak sense of “render false” entails that (5), (6), and (7) fail.  (5) assumes that J cannot render 
P0 false.  But if we assume ~P while Pe(P0&L), but we are not permitting the asymmetry whereby P is but 
P0 is not varied, we cannot justify the assumption that P0 cannot be falsified. 
 The problem’s root is the very assumption that ability to do otherwise entails ability to bring about 
~P.  For if J is able to do otherwise at T, then that full range motion capacity would be instantiated in J’s 
skeleto-muscular configuration and so must constitute part of P’s content.  So, if J has the ability, P 
remains true, for P is constituted – not contradicted – by the causal functional powers J possesses at T.  
Truth conditions for P are that J’s arm is not broken and his brain is functioning normally, so if an 
intention/neural signal was formed to raise the arm, it would go up.  To count J’s not raising his arm as a 
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judicial decision requires viewing it as a non-catatonic omission, otherwise the case could be appealed on 
the ground that J’s arm couldn’t go up.  Thus, it is a non sequitur to assume that J’s doing A while being 
able to do ~A (both described in P) involves J’s being able, while P, to bring it about that ~P.  One way 
to avoid this is to go atomistically/actualistically reductive, so P is written in terms of particles and 
trajectories, but we have rejected micro/macro prestidigitation; besides, enough linked trajectories 
constitute ability (e.g., continence)28 or disposition. 
 That holding P variable but P0&L fixed is fallacious is unnoticed due to Past Fixity, which is a 
priori relative to determinism.  There is a crucial difference, however, between being able to violate Past 
Fixity and being able to imagine a different past, given a different present.29  Philosophers trying to get 
around Past Fixity fail to notice that supposing ~P violates Present Fixity.  If we alter one, Uniformity 
requires we alter the others.  CON’s equivocation smuggles in contracausality in supposing ~P in the P 
world. 
 J’s ability never falsifies P, so J does not falsify P0&L.  (5) erroneously holds P0 fixed but treats P 
as variable, which equivocation suggests J could have rendered ~L.  Now, only the stronger “render false” 
makes the past be actually changed, rather than counterfactually, changed.  The weaker “show false” does 
not violate Past Fixity. 
 Though ~P is not required, when asked to suppose ~P, it is intuitive to think the past must have 
been what was different, rather than the laws, once we insist on compliance with Uniformity.  Since the 
smallest changes in our conceptual system are always preferable, it is preferable to imagine some earlier 
move in billiards varied, than to imagine the rules varied.  To hold constant the balls’ movements in a 
game’s history while varying the rules, so that the loser would have won (e.g., the ‘winner’ is the racer 
who comes in last), defeats the purpose of counterfactual reasoning.  When someone claims he could have 
won, he means under the same rules, with reasonable variation in facts consistent with his abilities.30  The 
nearest possibility is one which preserves laws (Lewis, 1979). 
                                                
28 This power manifests differently, e.g., when CJ1, CJ2, ... CJn hold, P1, P2, ... Pn result, respectively.  This is 
confirmed through countless observations in ubiquitous experience, where different PAPW-satisfying agent 
intentions result in concordantly different actions. 
29 Past Fixity may be synthetic a priori, since its necessity rests on unidirectional temporal succession.  It is so 
entrenched that reasoning that seems to challenge it may be outlawed without a hearing.  At the end of Euthyphro, 
Socrates asks why the gods encourage piety though it doesn’t benefit them, and Euthyphro says “because it pleases 
them”.  Socrates rejects this because it is the same outlawed phrase used to define piety.  This is a fallacy, for 
homonymy is not substitutable across divergent contexts.  I call this the “outlaw fallacy”, as if a phrase, once 
designated illicit in a context, remains ‘outlawed’ in every context.  Those who invoke Past Fixity without noticing 
its mere homonymy with P0 commit the outlaw fallacy. 
30 Taylor and Dennett (2002) discuss how to use nearest-world counterfactuals to analyze abilities. 
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 Given the same laws, scientists imagine divergent initial conditions in a system, producing a 
variety of different system evolutions, de rigueur.  The experimental method’s repeatability criterion, 
scientific laws’ abilities to support counterfactuals, and scientific knowledge in general support the 
notion of counterfactuals within deterministic contexts without supposing changed laws, so there is little 
reason to think differently here.  “Had the billiard ball been struck at a different angle, it would have 
rolled in a different direction” is a paradigm of Newtonian determinism.  While conceivable, different 
laws are not what we mean when we say things could have turned out differently.  Thus, (5) fails. 
 The usual place to look for change in a system is the initial conditions, but the laws could have 
been otherwise.  Thus, if J had done otherwise, thereby merely showing P false, thereby showing P0&L 
false, L would be false if initial conditions at T0 were held fixed but indeterministic.  So, (6) fails.  Since 
(5) and (6) fail, (7) does too.  For what was supposed to entail (7) was an inference which, if simplified, 
on the stronger sense (“SS”) of “render false”, is “SS Nomic CON”: 
SS1. If J can do otherwise, then J can make it the case that ~L (can violate Laws Fixity) 
SS2. J cannot make it the case that ~L (cannot violate Laws Fixity) 
SS3. Thus, J cannot do otherwise.  MT, SS1, SS2 
SS1 is a summary of (1)-(5); SS2 restates (6), and SS3 restates (7).  But SS1 is false. 
 On the weaker sense (“WS”) of “render false”, the claim that J can render ~P – violate Present 
Fixity – doesn’t arise, but the argument would be “WS Nomic CON”: 
WS1. If J can do otherwise, then J can do something that shows ~L. 
WS2. J cannot do something that shows ~L. 
WS3. Thus, J cannot do otherwise.  MT, WS1, WS2 
If we assume that J can counterfactually render ~P, we must treat “L” symmetrically; so, WS2 is false.  
When we make explicit the enthymematic rejection of ~P0 in original CON, CON fails.  On the stronger 
“render false”, the argument is “SS Historical CON”: 
SS4. If J can do otherwise, then J can change the past (can violate Past Fixity). 
SS5. J cannot change the past (cannot violate Past Fixity). 
SS6. Thus, J cannot do otherwise.  MT, SS4, SS5 
But SS4 is false, the same as SS1.  The weaker argument is “WS Historical CON”: 
WS4. If J can do otherwise, then J can do something that shows a different past ~P0. 
WS5. J cannot do something that shows a different past ~P0. 
WS6. Thus, J cannot do otherwise.  MT, WS4, WS5 
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Again, if we assume ~P, we must also assume ~P0, so WS5 is false. 
 If asked to suppose P&~P, we’d laugh if inability to do both in the same universe of discourse 
were seen as a dialectical failure.  This would be a “2-card monte”.  In 3-card monte, target card is shown 
face up, added to two others, all are faced down and moved rapidly by dealer, and gambler’s task is to 
identify target card afterwards.  The difference between CON and 2-card monte is the number of factors, 
but CON’s complexity hides the fallacious elements like 3-card monte’s third card.  CON assumes ability 
entails ~P, then focuses on what would be falsified if ~P, but which agents cannot falsify.  P is varied, but 
P0&L is fixed.  This equivocation treats same-world-linked propositions asymmetrically,31 but Uniformity 
requires their equal valence. 
 Fixity requires that J never does otherwise.  CON assumes reruns can differ in only one part of a 
same-world series.  But Uniformity requires that if any same-world-W difference is assumed, adjustments 
must extend throughout W.  Thus, to vary P but not P0&L violates the supposition that frames the debate 
– Fixity.  J only could have done otherwise if previous segments in W differed.  The ubiquitous ability to 
carry out different actions under different intentions is Fixity friendly.  There are indefinitely many times 
in our lives when our wants change, and we do different things.  Wants matter. 
 Counterfactual supporting laws are inferred from actual sequence evolutions in deterministic 
systems in which experimenter agency – where experimenter’s actions introduce catalysts into a system – 
is bracketed off.  Scientists thus infer counterfactuals from deterministic systems by wiggling the 
variables (Taylor and Dennett, 2002) and bracketing off their own interventions (also presumed 
determined), without any Fixity violations; we may likewise infer our counterfactual powers to alter our 
wills and actions by wiggling the variables in ourselves.  Were global causal inferences licit tout court, 
experimenter interventions could not be bracketed off, local causal inferences would be illicit tout court, 
and science would collapse. 
 When we want to do different things and do them, PAPW2 is ubiquitously confirmed, but when 
we fail, we experience weakness of will; if chronically, we experience deeper privation of autonomous 
control over that dimension of our lives.  PAPW2 is violated here though PAPW1 may be satisfied, but its 
violation constitutes indirect support for its validity, for its violation explains privation as PAPW2 failure. 
 Akratic behavior is occasional PAPW2 violation; compulsion involves chronic violation.  Both 
                                                
31 That they are linked does not mean that they entail each other per se, absent laws, but with the laws, given that 
they are of the same world.  Van Inwagen insists that we must construe state descriptions as not containing 
information in them about the past or the future, but only about what holds in the universe at an instant, for “in that 
case, determinism would be a mere tautology....  This amounts to saying that the ‘laws of physics’ clause ... does 
some work: whether determinism is true depends [on] the character of the laws of physics” (1975, p. 48). 
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types are fairly local in that sufficiently autonomous agents usually maintain a background of sufficiently 
PAPW satisfying activities, such as eating when hungry.  Some psycho-pathologies involve more global 
PAPW violations, e.g., motor disturbances; these may be insufficiently autonomous.  To the extent PAPW 
is satisfied, judgments about personhood, responsibility, and exculpation fit.  PAPW satisfaction captures 
the voluntary; that it correlates with judgments of responsibility constitutes reflective equilibrium. 
 Thus, the hard determinist cannot establish the epiphenomenal point that motives are causally 
impotent, since it is precisely the extensively justified core science tenet that one local causal/nomological 
state is sufficient for the next that constitutes the content of determinism, as the global causation objection 
makes clear.  Conversely, doing different things under different wants makes determinism intuitive.  The 
ubiquity of causally effective linkage between volitions and actions constitutes massive confirmation for 
daily autonomy qua causal control of intentions and choices over actions and thus their counterfactual 
power as variables – when others are present, we do other things.  Determinism is an abstraction from 
countless counterfactuals and is made personal by countless experiential folk generalizations about human 
behavior.32  Autonomy implies no Fixity violating ability.  In suggesting otherwise, CON commits the 
straw man fallacy. 
 Let “P*” refer to the state description at time T when the 8-ball does not go into the corner pocket, 
and “P*0” refer to the state description for some pre-game time T0.  “L” has the meaning it has in CON.  
Our parallel CON with billiard balls is “BB CON”: 
 BB1. If determinism is true, then the conjunction of P*0&L entails P*. 
BB2. If the 8-ball had gone into the corner pocket at T, then P* would be false. 
BB3. If BB2 is true, then if the 8-ball could have gone into the corner pocket at T, the 8-ball 
could have rendered P* false. 
BB4. If the 8-ball could have rendered P* false, and if the conjunction of P*0&L entails P*, then 
the 8-ball could have rendered the conjunction of P*0&L false. 
BB5. If the 8-ball could have rendered the conjunction of P*0&L false, then the 8-ball could 
have rendered L false. 
BB6. The 8-ball could not have rendered L false. 
BB7. If determinism is true, the 8-ball could not have gone into the corner pocket at T. 
                                                
32 This phenomenological component of experience, Hume thought, grounds the sense of necessity in the notion of 
causation, and though he was a projectionist about it (1748, sec. 7), the point remains:  What links choice causally 
with action is that ubiquitous experience confirms the association, and when this link is broken, there is a deep 
privation of agency that exculpates. 
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BB7 says that if the 8-ball didn’t go into the corner pocket, it couldn’t have, which betrays actualism.  But 
“counterfactualism” underpins ‘law’ as what supports counterfactuals and makes determinism tenable at 
all.  “Actualistic determinism” is oxymoronic. 
 Uniformity and experimental method presuppose that objects have nomic – 
dispositional/counterfactual – properties, so uniform results follow uniform experiments.  Determinists 
cannot take a reductive view toward nomicity; nomic means counterfactual supporting.  Determinism just 
is an abstraction from the nomological character of all causation, and so cannot be eliminated without 
throwing away the baby with the bath water. 
 Even if there were good reasons to avoid them, the same notions can be expressed by putting a 
new dress on them, e.g., by talk of propensities or potential evolutions of systems, and the new terms 
would still have to house the related notions required by determinism.  Given the functional equivalence 
under determinism of such reductively modified notions and the oxymoronic character of anomic 
determinism, since maximally anomic contradicts maximally nomic, pessimists do not have the dialectical 
luxury of appealing to anti-modalism, reductionism, or any other form of actualism.  Even if not, 
actualism is more dubious than the doctrine it seeks to negate, and so begs the question.  Determinism 
requires counterfactuals; so, had an 8-ball been struck differently, it would have behaved differently.  BB7 
is contradictory and question begging. 
 Notice the move from BB2 to BB3, from supposing P* to be false to this ‘rendering’ P* false.  
Agents can ‘render’, but billiard balls cannot ‘render’ anything.  I ask the reader:  Why use “renders” 
rather than “entails”?  “Render” cloaks the strong/weak equivocation, attributes inflated powers to 
agents, and facilitates the intuition that freedom requires impossible abilities.  If “entails” were used 
instead of “renders”, there would be no such implication, for propositions entail, not agents.  If asked to 
assume a factual statement, then to entertain its denial, the mere fact that its denial entails its falsity – or 
that of propositions which entail it – would not lead anyone to think that anything peculiar was going on; 
that’s why there are no 2-card monte hustlers out there.  Thus, “renders” distorts judgment, when P0&L, 
held sacrosanct by misconstrued Fixity, appears ‘rendered’ false by J. 
 There is nothing worrisome about how an 8-ball that didn’t go into a corner pocket (P*) might 
have.  To suppose that it did (~P*) is to suppose a counterfactual that would make P* false.  
Counterfactuals entail the falsity of facts they counter, without rendering Fixity violations.  Both P* and 
~P* are suppositions in the same discussion, each has a different world history by Uniformity, and each 
entails the falsity of the other.  Thus, we begin with a supposition and then face it against its negation in 
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such a way that the variable one is expected to defeat the fixed one somehow.  But because only one is 
held fixed illegitimately, our inability to do the illogical is seen as a failure.  This impossible task and its 
dyslogia are cloaked by equivocation.  Both suppositions are of equal logical force; so long as the truth 
values of their entailments are both held fixed or both varied, they are innocuous. 
 The solution, which the weak “renders false” permits, is to eliminate equivocation by holding both 
terms equally.  If the ball doesn’t go into the corner pocket, it has one world history; if it does, it has 
another.  Shifting between suppositions – P*/~P* – doesn’t falsify anything; neither supposition has 
priority, and both require the other’s falsity and that of the other’s antecedents, but so what?  Nothing 
about this entails Fixity violating ability. 
 Master CON reifies these errors with greater formal abstraction, “a” and “b” rules, and “a” and 
“N” operators, 
a  p \ Np 
b Np, N(p→q) \ Nq 
where “ ” expresses logical necessity and “Np” expresses “the universal unavoidability of p” (Kapitan, 
2002) or “p and no one has or ever had any choice about whether p” (van Inwagen, 2002).  Some draw in 
other general rules, e.g., agglomeration (a property holds of a conjunction when it holds of both 
conjuncts), to work a, b,  , and N over at a more complex level.33  But the greater the complexity is, the 
more difficult to follow error’s scent. 
 Master CON adds a, b,  , and N, but uses the other terms from CON, L, P0, and P.  Basically, 
master CON concludes that J’s choice never was a choice: 
1.   ((P0&L)→P) determinism 
2.   (P0→(L→P)) 1, propositional logic (exportation) 
3.  N(P0→(L→P)) 2, a 
4.  NP0 Past Fixity premise 
5.  N(L→P) 3, 4, b 
6.  NL Laws Fixity premise 
 7.  NP   5, 6, b34 
Premises 4 and 6 involve implicit a priori appeals to Fixity.  Old objections that hinge on CON’s 
“renders” and J’s performative nonlocutionary omission don’t apply, but new objections add to the over-
                                                
33 See Kapitan (2002) for an extensive review of all such versions of master CON. 
34 This adaptation is from Kapitan (2002), pp. 148-49. 
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determination of CON’s invalidity.  Those old objections that do apply to master CON, I assert here in the 
abstract.  Three new objections apply. 
 Premise 1 only fortifies my Uniformity based objection about CON’s fixed/variable equivocation, 
for 1 is equivalent to its contrapositive 1', 
 1'.   (~P→~(P0&L)). 
As 1' makes clear, if ~P is assumed, then necessarily ~(P0&L) must be assumed. 
 Rule a is “ p\Np”.  Though a is seen as innocuous and most objections go to b, a is invalid:  
ap does not entail Np.  To think it does is to commit a modal fallacy.  Counterexamples to a are cases of 
necessity involving baptisms such as “This is the standard meter” or performative utterances such as “I 
do” (controlling bachelorhood), or self-indexing utterances, “ (I exist)” or “ (In uttering ‘I exist’, I 
exist)”.  Here “ p” rests on context of utterance, e.g., what speakers self-reflexively utter or baptize, 
where “Np” is false, so a fails.  
 The reply that these are hard determined, so nobody controls them, begs the question.  To defeat 
these cases non-circularly, hard determinism must be held in the wings; an independent ground must be 
used, but there are no independent reasons to reject the widely held view that certain uttered reflexives, 
indexicals and performatives are necessarily true and their truth conditions are in the hands, mouths, or 
minds of their utterers.  Since these are necessarily true ( p), yet control over their truth is in their 
utterers’ hands (~Np), a fails. 
 These are special cases, as are indexicals that constitute counterexamples to the general rule that 
willing or believing p cannot make p true, but they show a is not sacrosanct.  We have seen how easy it is 
even for the axioms in this debate to be misconstrued, so that is enough to warrant assault on a.  But there 
are other grounds on which to oppose a.  For reasoning about the actual world, state descriptions, and 
alternate possible worlds involves indexicals, and indexicals pose subtle problems in interpretation 
regarding possible world semantics, and more so in interpreting intensionality containing propositions 
(e.g., propositional attitudes) across possible worlds.35  We have seen errors in reasoning across possible 
worlds where such reasoning was supposed to be contained within each possible world.  Actions have 
quasi-intensional properties by virtue of their intended or teleological components (Davidson, 1968); 
thus, like all other performatives, they may also be things that we can control.  It is no accident that self-
indexing is linked to autonomy. 
                                                
35 See Kitcher (1987) on the indexicality of “actual” (i.e., this world). 
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 A third objection is about the detachment of the modal conclusion from master CON, but I will 
only sketch the main idea.  There is a sense in which the modally embedded proposition in the new 
conclusion is intuitively contingent, so suspicion immediately arises in connection with its modal prefix.  
The basic idea is that to the extent that the argument concludes agents have no control over their actions, 
it wrongly cuts or detaches the modal property “N” from the context of its relevance, which is the 
premises; i.e., non-control or unavoidability is not fully transitive.  In the billiard ball version, greater 
abstraction shows the illogic vividly.  With the terms from BB CON, but also master CON’s “a”, “b”, 
“ ”, and “N”, we have BB' CON: 
BB1'.  ((P0*&L)→P*) determinism 
BB2'.   (P0*→(L→P*)) BB1, propositional logic (exportation) 
BB3'. N(P0*→(L→P*)) BB2, a 
BB4'. NP0*   Past Fixity premise 
BB5'. N(L→P*)  BB3, BB4, b 
BB6'. NL   Laws Fixity premise  
BB7'. NP*   BB5, BB6, b 
The conclusion is that the 8-ball doesn’t go into the corner pocket and “nobody has ever had any choice 
about [it]”, which is false, for the pool player’s pool stick did. 
 Past Fixity of P0* only entails NP* (b) under the assumption that no control (N) was present, but 
in proximal cases it is, so the move is suspect.  Control may be transitive; non-control need not be:  A 
husband may not control his wife, and she may not control her daughter, but he may still control the 
daughter, and whether he does depends on their relationship, not on modal transitivity or determinism.  
Thus, b fails.  I didn’t play earlier in the game, so I had no control over the first few moves my partner 
and our opponents made, but when it is my turn, I do control where the balls go, depending on where I 
strike them, how hard, etc.  As with agents, 8-balls have legitimate causal powers.  When they strike other 
balls, they move them in lawful ways.  Striking a ball a certain way controls how it moves, despite 
everything in its past being out of the range of control.  An 8-ball never needs to go into the corner pocket 
for it to be true that if it were struck a certain way, it would. 
 Indeed, Newtonian physics – the paradigm of determinism – uses examples such as these as its 
paradigm cases.  It is no different with J.  If the causes feeding into J’s decision yield J’s not raising his 
hand, then different causes acting on him could have led him to raise his hand, equivalent to the billiard 
ball’s being struck differently and so moving differently.  Determinism requires that people and 8-balls 
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have counterfactual features.  The falsity of actualism is more an intuitive consequence of determinism 
than hard determinism is, rather than something hard determinists can use to reject soft determinism.  
“N” operators and the like only reveal CON’s fallacious components more vividly.  Contrary to 
actualism, a grain of salt is soluble even if never placed in liquid.  The claim that it can dissolve, contrary 
to the fact that it is never placed in liquid, does not entail that it has Fixity violating ability. 
 Rather, L guarantees that it dissolves if placed in liquid.  Counterfactuals about solubility provide 
the content for L and L provides the content for determinism, so hard determinism cannot reject 
counterfactuals.  Conversely, since actualism denies nomic generalizations – laws – about solubility, it 
must equally deny the more global agglomerative generalization – L – summing all laws required to cover 
all state descriptions, which latter is the core content of determinism.  The snake eats its tail.  Thus, 
actualism is a reductio ad absurdem entailed by CON:  If actualism is true, determinism is false.  
 Scientific reasoning and common sense concur:  Salt need not be placed in water to be soluble, 
billiard balls need not go into corner pockets to be able to, and agents need not lift their hands to be able 
to.  If one could consistently embrace it, actualism is still in need of more support than hard or soft 
determinism, and so may be rejected on that ground alone. 
 What justifies “N” with P0&L is the idea that P0&L be held fixed.  But deterministic reasoning has 
no such implication.  Whatever sense in which P0&L is necessary, if any,36 is irrelevant or wrongly blends 
necessities, in which case master CON cannot get off the ground by way of a, and so neither by b.  It 
doesn’t matter whether a and b are valid though neither is, despite much debate over b and 
agglomeration, since neither is invited unless “a” is, but “a” isn’t.  The whole “technical turn” in master 
CON just pushes intuition out of reach.  Np is just false.  Countless true counterfactuals identify agents’ 
control over their actions without requiring agent access to alternate worlds, as PAPW shows. 
 A more fine grained analysis suggests CON shifts between attributive and referential senses of its 
terms, to borrow Donnellan’s (1975) distinction.  If one points at Jones, the suspect at Smith’s murder 
trial, and utters “Smith’s murderer is depraved”, but Jones did not murder Smith, then one uses a definite 
description to pick out Jones which is false of him.  This use of the term is referential, to refer to Jones.  
One may use the same term to attribute to whoever it is (that could have done such a thing) the property of 
being depraved.  In this usage, the definite description is used to attribute depravity to whomever it is that 
satisfies the description.  When used referentially, “Smith’s murderer” rigidly designates Jones in all 
                                                
36 The idea that the necessity in CON isn’t transitive, in Slote (1982), defeats CON, in my view, though objections 
to the technical part of Slote’s argument have postponed its funeral. 
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possible worlds in which he exists; the attributive usage is non-rigid, and applies to whoever satisfies the 
description. 
 Under the coarse grained analysis, P is varied while P0&L is held fixed.  Under the fine grained 
analysis, “actual”, an indexical, plays a role in determining the world for which “P” and “P0” are the state 
descriptions.  To suppose ~P is to refer to a non-actual world in which ~(P0&L) is true unless one 
confuses attributive and referential uses for “P” and “P0&L” and loses track of the properly indexed 
world.  “What happened at T0” can referentially designate P0, or attributively designate P0 in the P-world 
or ~P0 in the ~P-world.  So, the supposition ~P is in the non-actual ~P-world, and in that world, the 
supposition ~(P0&L) is true by Uniformity.  “P” first referentially picks that state description determined 
by J’s omission at T, and “P0&L” first attributively picks whatever state description and laws are true at 
T0.37  But once this attributive use is employed, P0&L is thereafter taken to refer rigidly to that unique 
conjunctive proposition, heeding Past and Laws Fixities, while P is treated variably as ~P, ignoring 
Present Fixity. 
 Using both terms attributively, “what J does at T” picks out whatever J does at T; “P0&L” picks 
out whatever was true at T0, both in the same world, in which case no matter what world we entertain at 
T, T0 is in that same world, by Uniformity.  Using both terms referentially, P picks out J’s actual 
omission, and P0&L picks out the unique past and laws that obtained at T0 in that same (actual) world.  
Our unproblematic symmetrical usage here proves equivocation. 
 CON implicitly assumes Fixity for P0, and its apriority is persuasive, but masks an error.  Adler 
(1995), for example, insists P0 is unfalsifiable because it is an arbitrarily selected prenatal (non-rigidly 
identified) state description with no content, as if it means ‘whatever state description is true at T0’ – 
ignoring van Inwagen’s remarks about its rigidity.  On his view, P0&L would be analytically true, because 
no matter what else is varied, P0&L picks out whatever is true at T0.  I call this faulty blending of 
necessities, contrary to Slote’s caveat, formalized in a, the “fallacy of homogenizing necessities”.  a 
seems innocuous because it involves modal weakening from ap to Np, analogous to weakening from ap 
to p, which seems indisputable; but it is noxious. 
 Holding “P0&L” tautological/unfalsifiable commits the fallacy of persuasive definition.  “P0&L” 
                                                
37 Van Inwagen says:  “It should be emphasized that ‘P’ does not mean ‘the proposition that expresses the state of 
the world at T’.  Rather, ‘P’ denotes the proposition that expresses the state of the world at T.  In Kripke’s 
terminology, ‘P’ is being used as a rigid designator, while ‘the proposition that expresses the state of the world at 
T’ is perforce non-rigid.”  (1975, p. 53; footnote omitted)  See Kripke (1972).  In my terminology, the former is 
referential, and the latter is attributive.  Oddly, van Inwagen makes this distinction, yet fails to see his equivocation. 
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is then held synonymous with “whatever form Fixity requires”.  But if we also held “P” analytic so it 
remains true though J does raise his hand, contracausalism is unfalsifiable, and freedom is analytic too, 
for – necessarily – doing otherwise violates no Fixity rules!  When only P0&L is seen as fixed, but J’s 
ability to vote for or against is seen variably as mapping onto P or ~P, P is seen in the end as fixed, as if 
proof that ~P and freedom are seen together as impossible. 
 It is not sensible to attribute depravity to whomever murdered Smith while supposing Smith lives.  
The attributively identified murderer cannot exist as such in the same world in which Smith lives, since 
Smith’s murderer’s existence as such entails Smith’ murder.  Likewise, we cannot attribute to P0&L that 
it is whatever entails P in a world in which ~P is supposed.  For Smith’s murderer can exist (though not 
as such) in a world in which Smith is not murdered, but P0&L cannot exist or hold in the ~P-world.  
Because “P” and “P0&L” are so indefinite and their world selecting functions are so subtle, the 
equivocation is opaque. 
 Since “P”, “~P”, “P0&L”, and “~(P0&L)” have been treated ambiguously, lets’s tag actual and 
counterfactual alternatives for each with distinct symbols: 
Let R1,R2,...Rn denote actual world state descriptions; and 
Let S1,S2,...Sn denote counterfactual world state descriptions (say, in the nearest possible world), 
all in parallel with T1,T2,...Tn, which model temporal succession. 
Let L1 denote the actual world set of all natural laws previously denoted by “L”;38 and 
Let L2,L3,...Ln denote counterfactual world sets of natural laws. 
Let the order of L2,L3,...Ln denote increasing distance from L. 
Let W1 denote the actual world; and 
 Let W2,W3,...Wn denote counterfactually possible worlds. 
Let the order of W2,W3,...Wn denote increasing distance from W1. 
We stipulate that “P” attributively picks out Ri at T, and “P0&L” also attributively picks out R1&L1 at T0; 
both are true in W1.  Now, suppose J raises his hand at T.  If so, J is in W2.  Observing Uniformity, such 
that both “P” and “P0&L” attributively pick out whatever state descriptions are true at T and T0, 
respectively, in W2, we stipulate that the state description at T in W2 is Si, which entails ~Ri in W1, and at 
T0 it is S1&L1,39 which entails ~(R1&L1) in W1.   
                                                
38 “L” becomes “L1" so the subscripts will all match for ease of bookkeeping. 
39 This is so if the pragmatic aversion to varying the laws is cogent.  But if not, the same apparatus could be 
modified by altering the nomic component but holding fixed the historical component, e.g., R1&L2, or by altering 
both.  Only pragmatics hinges on this. 
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 Now, if P and P0&L in W1 denote Ri and R1&L1, respectively, and R1&L1 entails Ri, then to 
suppose ~P is to suppose ~Ri, which by Uniformity takes us into W2, where J’s act is represented by Si, 
for which the prenatal antecedent is S1&L1.  If we read both P and P0&L attributively as we switch from 
W1 to W2, there is no problem, since the claim that S1&L1 entails Si is Uniformity equivalent in W2 to the 
claim that P0&L entails P, i.e., that R1&L1 entails Ri, in W1.  There is no problem with the symmetrical 
referential reading.  The problem arises when we shift from one reading to another across worlds – illicit 
by Uniformity. 
 CON shifts from one reading to the other, as if two worlds’ state descriptions were in the same 
world.  First, “P” referentially picks state description Ri (about J’s omission) at T in W1.  Second, P0&L 
attributively picks R1&L1, the state descriptions for whatever is true in W1 at T0, and then R1&L1 is 
referentially rigidified by Fixity.  Third, supposing J can do otherwise, we shift from Ri (from “P”, about 
J’s actual omission) at T in W1 to Si (to “~P”, about J’s counterfactual action) at T in W2, another world.  
Finally, here J’s doing otherwise – Si in W2 – is seen as impossible because it entails W1's ~(R1&L1), the 
referent of “~(P0&L)”, seen as impossible by Fixity, rather than as an error in worlds bookkeeping.   
 For here we end up with state descriptions from different worlds in the same domain of discourse, 
R1&L1 from W1 at T0 and Si from W2 at T, proof of equivocation.  Since Si entails ~Ri, but R1&L1 entails 
Ri (master CON sanctified as “ (R1&L1)→NRi” (by a’s modal weakening from   to N), ~Ri (and ability 
to do otherwise) seems impossible.  Again, CON’s error is to pick R1&L1 as whatever state description at 
T0 in W1 entails (as with P) Ri at T, rigidify R1&L1 by Fixity, shift from W1's Ri (J’s omission) to W2's Si 
(J’s action), and then rule out Si because R1&L1 (from W1) – held fixed across worlds by Fixity – entails 
the contradiction ~Si.  Si and thus conditional ability are seen as impossible, but the contradiction rests on 
equivocation. 
 An adjustment to our notation might help clarify my claims.  Let us use “S” as a variable whose 
values are either P or ~P; which value S takes depends on the context of utterance.  If in a given context 
the subject of discussion is world W1 (which is the same as our world, W), then S is P; if the world is W2, 
then S is ~P.  Let “P0” be a variable whose values are P0,1, P0,2,..., Pn.  Depending on which world is under 
discussion, P0,i is the state of the world at time 0 in world Wi.  Let “L” be a variable whose value is fixed 
by context; when in a context we are discussing world Wi, the value of “L” is Li.  Li are the laws of nature 
in world Wi.  We may refer to the laws of a world as “L” when greater specificity is not required.  We 
may assume the same times in all worlds, to avoid complications.  Thus, my claim is that “ (P0&L)→P” 
is always true if the context is constant – if a single world is discussed.  But CON shifts the context for P 
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by moving to W2, and when it does so it faithfully treats the consequent, P, like the variable it is, as an 
attributive designator, but when it gets to the antecedent, P0, it keeps the context fixed at W1, thus 
treating “P0&L” as if it rigidly designated P0,1&L1.  This is asymmetrical, equivocation. 
 This analysis plays a role in a determinist account of possibility that comports with PAPW.  I will 
spell it out in full in chapter 6, but sketch it here.  When we talk about Agent’s ability to do otherwise, we 
do not mean he has access to W2 or can bring about ~P in W1, as if in choosing he is determining, of 
many worlds he has access to, that world which he shall by his decision make actual; Fixity rules that out.  
We only mean that had he wanted otherwise – which would put him and his past in, say, W2 – he’d have 
done otherwise, since he’d have been in W2, and there he must do otherwise, given Uniformity.  His 
actions are just as necessitated by his different past in W2 as they are in W1.  PAPW2 implies only that to 
discern whether it is true that had he wanted otherwise (i.e., in W2), he’d have done otherwise (in W2), we 
– not Agent – need to refer to W2, and maybe W3 and W4, where we suppose altering the variables:  
opportunity and motive.  We are supposing the use of Mill’s methods across worlds.  To do that, we refer 
to the nearest possible world and vary, say, only his motive, and ‘see’ – infer from counterfactual 
reasoning – whether in that world he does otherwise; if so, he was free to not do what he did, had he 
wanted not to do it (PAPW2); alternately, we vary only his opportunity (PAPW1).  Agent accesses no 
alternate worlds.40 
 We may say that PAPW puts at least three possible worlds in play:  W1, the actual world in which 
J does what makes it the case that P (i.e., J doesn’t want to and so doesn’t raise his hand); W2, in which an 
opportunity that was blocked in W1, so that J can raise his hand if he wants to, given different antecedent 
conditions, i.e., P0,2&L2, but in which he still does not want to, hence does not raise his hand; and W3, if 
the removal of the previously blocked opportunity and the new antecedent conditions (P0,3&L3) make it 
such that J can raise his hand and J wants to raise it, and J does raise it, then ~P is the value of S in W3, 
satisfying PAPW2.  Three worlds are minimally necessary to specify PAPW satisfaction, but more may 
be needed to identify more complex motive/opportunity pairs and failures. 
 In both W2 and W3, the new antecedent conditions include the removal of the previously blocked 
opportunity, but in W2, J still doesn’t want to raise his hand, whereas in W3, J does want to raise his hand; 
in this way, we isolate external bars to the expression of J’s intentions, and test J’s behavior in 
hypotheticals with and without those external bars in place.  This is a hypothetical version of a Millian 
                                                
40 This is just a thought experiment, analogous to the one Nozick (1981) imagines performing on cognizers to see if 
their beliefs are truth tracking.  I defend this view in chapter 6. 
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causal analysis, and it may be developed to isolate J’s internal bars to the expression of his intentions as 
well as his internal ability to refrain from their expression. 
 J need never 1st-personally access alternate worlds, not even in thought, though he may entertain 
them in Bok-style deliberation.  Likewise, a knower need not know he satisfies Nozickian truth tracking 
conditions to satisfy them, though he may.  Rather, we simply 3rd-personally consider, from an externalist, 
counterfactual perspective, whether J’s intentions are effective under the counterfactuals described so we 
may infer whether he is or isn’t externally or internally blocked in the expression and/or effectiveness of 
his intentions. 
 So, to identify the causal role of a blocked opportunity in W, we need to look at worlds Wi and Wj 
in which the previously blocked opportunity in W is now open.  J doesn’t want to raise his hand in Wi, 
and he does want to in Wj.  We use these worlds to determine whether his desires are effective under 
world conditions in which their expression is not blocked externally.  To test the role of opportunity, we 
need at least three worlds, where actual world W is included in the count.  To number these worlds, in W2, 
an opportunity is open that was closed in W1; if he still does not want to, and doesn’t do so, the fact that 
the newly opened opportunity did not result in his raising his hand evidences that the blocked opportunity 
in W1 was not the cause of his non-raising of his hand in W1. 
 I wish to avoid giving any impression of the very thing I do not want – accessibility to the 
impossible.  I do not want to lapse into saying “if the world had been different, he could have done X” 
without the same analysis for “could have done” in the new possible world as the analysis for “could have 
done” in the actual one.  So, we must imagine the initial conditions and laws changed to P0,3.  So, by “in 
W2 he could have done what brings about ~P”, I mean that, if the state of the world as it was at an earlier 
time is varied in W2 so that we are in a world W3, where P0,3&L3 hold, then in that world J does raise his 
hand, and ~P holds.  That is consistent with saying in W3, P0,3&L3 hold as well, by Uniformity.  This is 
just what is needed to defeat CON. 
 PAPW1 refers to W2 to ‘test’ the nearest world where Agent is able to do otherwise, i.e., where an 
opportunity is open there that is closed here, but he has the same motives in W2 as in W1; PAPW1 refers 
to W2 to see whether he does the same thing when given the opportunity.41  If he does the same thing in 
W2 though able not to, then his act in W1 is voluntary.  But if in W2 he does do otherwise, then we may 
infer that his lacking that option in W1 was causally responsible for his action in W1, so he did not act 
                                                
41 The nearest world in which these conditions hold may not be the nearest possible world, but we call the nearest 
world in which they do “W2”.  In the application of these principles to real agents, the distance between the actual 
and nearest possible world in which the conditions hold matters, as we’ll see in chapter 6. 
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fully voluntarily in W1. 
 Technically, “able to do otherwise” in W2 requires us to refer to W3, where not only is the 
opportunity present, but also his altered desire.  PAPW requires that we consider – not that agents have 
access to – at least a triplet of worlds: 
W1: the actual world, where the alternative possibility is blocked (by Frankfurt-style 
counterfactual interveners or simply by determinism), and he does X; 
W2: the nearest possible world in which the alternative is unblocked (by absence of a 
counterfactual intervener or by different history and/or laws), but not used (he does X, and 
he doesn’t want otherwise, though he is able to do otherwise, should he want to); and  
W3: the next possible world (represented by the unblocked alternative in W2) in which the 
unblocked alternative is taken (he wants to do otherwise and does otherwise). 
This externalist analysis identifies agential causal efficacy.42  Master CON suggests non-control due to 
prenatally transitive inability, but is also fallacious because PAPW shows how agents have control 
without agent access. 
 Little remains to say about CON.  Van Inwagen challenges the conditionalist to replace statements 
of form (8) with those of form (9), claiming that either no sentence in CON would turn out to be false or, 
if it did, that would itself disprove the translation (1975, p. 57).  But the (9)-like version of (7), 
(7')  If determinism is true, if J had chosen to raise his hand at T, J could not have raised his 
hand at T. 
is false, for choices are not impotent, but potent, under determinism – choices, e.g., A, are what determine 
state descriptions, e.g., P.  So, van Inwagen’s “let the reader do it” bluff fails. 
 One final challenge to our view comes from Lehrer (1966), who argues that conditionals cannot 
capture the meaning of “can” because the following, which I call “Trio”, is consistent:  
1. If C, then S X’s. 
2. ~C. 
                                                
42 Fischer (1987, in Pereboom, 1997a, p. 236) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 53) defend a similar view with 
“actual sequence” reason-responsiveness.  On their view, Agent need not access an alternate world if his 
deliberative mechanism is reason-responsive.  We imagine varying the circumstances; e.g., were a stronger reason 
present that should defeat Agent’s choice on the assumption that Agent is rational, either Agent’s mechanism would 
or wouldn’t respond to it.  If yes, then Agent’s mechanism is reason-responsive; if no, it is not reason-responsive.  
Testing for reason-responsiveness doesn’t require that Agent access alternate worlds, just the judgment whether the 
mechanism would respond differently under better or worse reasons.  Fischer and Ravizza hold reason-
responsiveness necessary and sufficient for responsibility without requiring alternate possibilities.  Hence, theirs is 
“semi-compatibilism”:  Determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not with alternate possibilities. 
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3. If ~C, then S cannot X. 
Lehrer’s argument is not taken to target ordinary cases of ~C, where S’s not wanting to raise his arm is 
what keeps S from doing so, but unusual cases in which, say, the motor nerve from S’s brain to his arm is 
blocked, but would open upon S’s wanting to X; normally, the nerve is open regardless.  This unusual 
case is “finkish” (Martin, 1994), and applies to dispositions such as solubility:  Imagine a spoon of 
insoluble ‘salt’, and an angel standing by ready to change its structure if it is immersed, enabling it to 
dissolve.43 
 This ‘salt’ lacks inherent solubility, though the conditional, “If this salt is immersed in water, it 
will dissolve” is true, thanks to the angel.  This divorces the antecedent from the conditional for the 
disposition.  Satisfaction of the antecedent is taken to obliterate the disposition:  “If this salt is immersed 
in water, it will dissolve” is true, but “this salt is soluble” is false.  But ‘salt’ is not salt if not soluble, but 
is functioning as salt-like only in a purely philosophical fiction – “phi-fi” – sense less innocent than that 
of Twin Earth scenario counterparts.  There, a functionally equivalent chemical structure for “tsalt” – 
analogous to Twin Earth ‘twater’ – is soluble.  But our phi-fi salt – “phsalt” – plays a mischievous role. 
 Tsalt and salt (“t/salt”) are naturally soluble, but phsalt is naturally insoluble, so cannot function as 
a dialectical foil for intuitions about dispositions of naturally soluble substances like t/salt.  To treat phsalt 
as if it functions this way presupposes that the phsalt/salt relationship is like the tsalt/salt or twater/water 
ones, where internalist or “narrow” epistemic strategies cannot distinguish cognitively identical cases only 
distinguishable externally or “widely”.  But these pairs are disanalogous:  The phsalt/salt pair is not 
cognitively identical, for both tsalt and salt are naturally soluble, but phsalt is supernaturally soluble.  It 
doesn’t matter that phsalt is not soluble except under an additional angelic condition, for other substances’ 
dispositions also have more than one condition of exercise.  With phsalt, we need to include the exercise 
condition, “and an intervening angel is standing by determined to transform it on contact with water”, in 
C.  We can say that t/salt is naturally soluble, and phsalt supernaturally soluble.  The problem is the result 
of treating phsalt’s and t/salt’s solubility conditions inconsistently in interpreting Trio – an equivocation. 
 Phsalt cases are not tsalt/salt cases, and phsalt is phi-fi soluble or “phsoluble” anyway, so long as 
the angel’s disposition to render phsalt soluble is part of C and is as reliable as salt’s micro-structural 
configuration is in its disposition to dissolve on contact with water.  The supernatural and natural 
conditions must be applied consistently. 
                                                
43 It should be noted that Lehrer is not here challenging compatibilism, per se, but more specifically conditional 
compatibilism.  Lehrer is a compatibililist, just not a conditional compatibilist.  See Lehrer (1980, 2004). 
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 A distinction between “ability” and “capacity” may be described as ability in narrow or wide 
senses, to avoid ordinary language connotations.  Usually, both abilities coincide, but in phi-fi cases, they 
may diverge.  I argue that when – note temporal indexing – not immersed in water, phsalt lacks narrow 
ability to dissolve, but possesses wide phability, since if dunked in water, it acquires narrow ability, and 
even when not dunked can acquire the narrow ability implicit in phi-fi fink cases.  Salt lacks neither 
narrow nor wide ability.  If we are consistent about which sense of ability is being used, we can conclude 
that Lehrer equivocates between the different senses in interpreting his premises.  He also fails to index 
time consistently in terms of when C is or isn’t satisfied and/or when C includes phabilities or just 
abilities.  Consider “example A”: 
A1. If a student gets a 90 or above, then he gets an A. 
A2. The student does not get a 90 or above. 
A3. If the student does not get a 90 or above, then he cannot get an A. 
As Lehrer’s challenge is generally interpreted, he is imagining a case in which failure to achieve a 90, 
let’s say, finalizes a precarious phi-fi state of the student’s nervous system that leaves him incompetent to 
understand philosophy.  But the student still retains the phability to get an A.  Lehrer’s puzzle applies 
only to phi-fi cases, but fink cases are non-representative of what goes on when we distinguish between 
abilities in broad and narrow senses, which is enough if not under the spell of actualism.  Conditionalists 
need only note that Lehrer equivocates on what the relevant ability or disposition is:  If the disposition is 
ordinary, then the consequent of A3 is false; if it is extraordinary, like the power to dissolve under the 
auspices of an angel, A1 is false if taken to express non-phi-fi ability. 
 Ph/salt can dissolve when in liquid, when C – with or without angelic content – is satisfied; and it 
cannot dissolve when not in liquid.  Salt cannot dissolve midair.  It requires contact with a solvent, but it’s 
still widely soluble; aluminum is not.  The phi-fi take on this is that when phsalt is in midair it is 
insoluble, for phsalt-extrinsic angelic agency alone can transform it.  I’ve agreed that phsalt is narrowly 
insoluble when in midair, and acquires ordinary narrow ability when in water.  But even in midair it has 
the extraordinary narrow ability to “phissolve” – to dissolve if put in water and touched by an angel – and 
the extraordinary broad ability to acquire the narrow ability; it will acquire the capacity to dissolve, and 
dissolve, if put in water.   
 This applies to my capacity to raise my arm.  I am narrowly able to raise my arm when I want to; a 
paralyzed person is not when he wants to.  Salt can dissolve on contact with water; aluminum cannot.  A 
light bulb can go on, but only if the switch is on and current flows into it.  It cannot go on per se, 
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unconditionally, when the switch is off, or the wires are damaged; a dead bulb cannot go on under any 
conditions.  Some abilities are phabilities; others are finkish in natural ways, e.g., grades involving 
plagiarism; others are ordinary.  So? 
 This can be put in either of two ways:  Either (1) given that the angel has interceded, it has narrow 
ability, or (2) even before the angel intercedes, it has broad capacity because, if the angel intercedes, then 
it would dissolve.  (1) is consistent with actualism; (2) implies non-actualist counterfactualism.  I may not 
have the independent power to teleport myself, but should a sci-fi hand-held teleportation device transmit 
that power to me, I may.  Supposing the hypothetical, I have the power counterfactually.  A rock cannot 
dissolve in water, but should a ‘phalchemist’ transform its structure just as it makes contact, it will; 
supposing the hypothetical, it has the counterfactual power.  Some objects might lack even the 
counterfactual powers, say, if their elements are not amenable to phalchemy or if God made a 
counterfactually insoluble rock.  If Lehrer objects that we are supposing too much, my reply is that we are 
entitled to the same dialectical privileges.  Supposability is tricky, but not only for us. 
 Capacities for capacities complicate matters, but not much:  Infants lack the capacity for 
continence as infants, but not the capacity for the capacity later on.  The way continence as a developed 
capacity is determined is heterologous with respect to the way its exercise is determined.  To blend both 
due to mere deterministic necessity, as if both equally imply N (by a), is to commit the homogenizing 
necessities fallacy.  The more complex the ability is, the more relevant it is to freedom.  Some capacities 
involve restraining motivational subsystems, say, primal desires.  Consider “example C”. 
C1. If S wants to restrain his otherwise runaway desires, then S so restrains them. 
C2. S does not want to restrain his runaway desires. 
C3. If C2, then S cannot so restrain his runaway desires. 
Though C3 is analogous to being unable to raise one’s hand when one doesn’t want to, here is a 
complexity absent in the arm raising case.  I may want very strongly not to refrain from acting on my 
runaway gustatory or sexual desires, because refraining will prevent great pleasure, yet my Kantian 
commitments to my diet buddy, to whom I have sworn an oath, or my life partner, may be sufficient for 
me to refrain despite the fact that I don’t want to refrain.  Here, my not satisfying C1's antecedent is 
insufficient to defeat even my narrow ability.  C1 and C2 are consistent with my restraining my runaway 
desires.  And that is inconsistent with C3, in which case Trio is in error to place a modal in 3, for there are 
false instantiations of 3, e.g., C3. 
 I speak English effortlessly, but Italian only with effort; bilinguals speak two languages 
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effortlessly.  Some capacities require more exercise conditions than others, and some are linked; the Kant 
example above links with the capacity to act on duty.  The more complex the capacity, the less sense 3 
makes.  But 3 even makes no non-phi-fi sense with simple solubility, so long as 1 is held true only when 
its antecedent is causally sufficient for its consequent.  Freedom involves many capacities like those 
illustrated in example C.  There it is clear that agents may not want to restrain their desires, but that is not 
a good reason to think they cannot do so.  Lehrer might agree, but insist on the rare case in which not 
wanting to restrain desires is sufficient for being unable to restrain them, for instance, because a desire to 
restrain one’s desires is necessary for a finkish state of the nervous system that gives one the capacity to 
refrain.  That’s the counterexample. 
 But this case is not phi-fi, for something like it occurs in a penumbral range of akratic cases where 
agents feel powerfully seduced by the immediate prospects of the gratification, and experience inability in 
the absence of countervailing occurrent reasons:  Were countervailing occurrent reasons in favor of 
restraint vivid, they might tip the neuromuscular scales and trigger the ability, but in their absence, Agent 
experiences the proprioceptive cognitive/conative phenomenology of inability.  Here, the inference of 
narrow inability is very intuitive, but there is no threat to the capacity/ability distinction here nor to the 
idea that the narrow ability would appear if its conditions of exercise – normal, phi-fi finkish, or just plain 
finkish (as here) – were present.  Let us simplify this interesting but unproblematic case, a ‘plain finkish’ 
instance of Trio: 
PF1.  If I want to refrain, I will. 
PF2.  I don’t want to refrain. 
PF3.  I can’t refrain. 
PF1 shows that I have the ability in the broad sense; if I want to refrain, that sends my nervous system 
into the state that normally subserves the ability to refrain.  But since I don’t want to refrain my nervous 
system remains in an akratic state that does not subserve the ability.  This requires no reference to my 
other ideas.  Lehrer equivocates on which ability is being referred to. 
 I have taken pains to identify the homogeneity fallacy in a, the erroneous transitivity of non-
control in b, actualism, CON’s needlessly strong view of possibilities, and CON’s equivocations.  These 
flaws are implicated in both theological and logical fatalisms.  Since my primary concern is easy 
autonomy, I only sketch the connections between hard determinism and its fatalistic cousins here. 
 It’s easier to dismiss fatalism, since it is more tautologous than hard determinism.  As for God, our 
choices determine God’s beliefs about them, as J’s choice determines P.  Supposing we control our 
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choices, this determines God’s beliefs, not vice versa:  “Theodoxastic Fixity” doesn’t undermine choice, 
but is a function of omniscient truth tracking, not truth determining.  That is a problem for hard, not soft, 
theological precognitivists.  The logical fatalist, e.g., Bernstein (2002), likewise, cannot square the 
timeless view of truths, “Alethic Fixity”, with the fact that those truths contain information about how 
agents control their actions.  If agents control actions, this determines what the timeless set of truths will 
say about them, not vice versa, just as the fact that J’s psychoneural states determine the content of P at T, 
not vice versa.  Both fatalisms are 2-card montes, unlike hard determinism’s 3-card ones; determinists’ 
fatalistic leanings at least rest on substantive confusions about the doctrine’s causal/nomological content. 
 Hard determinists reason backward to Past and then back to Present Fixity, but logical fatalists 
reason outward to tenseless truths and thus to Alethic Fixity (by a), and then back to Present  and Future 
Fixity.  This is analogous to hard determinists’ ostrich psychology, viewing local facts from the global 
vantage, from which angle causal control is not visible.  Theological fatalists, e.g., Zagzebski (2002), 
either reason backward to God’s precognitive states and thus to Theodoxastic Fixity (by a), or outward to 
where God’s timeless omniscience accesses logical fatalism’s timeless truths and thus Alethic Fixity (also 
by a).  But Alethic Fixity’s entailment of Present and Future Fixity, and their entailment of N (by b), is 
what allegedly robs us of freedom, yet we have shown a and b invalid.  Present and Future Fixity are 
consistent with autonomy, if actualism is false. 
 The fact that both Theodoxastic and Alethic fatalisms share these features with hard determinism 
is a dialectical embarrassment, for this reveal that these errors have nothing to do with causation, whereas 
we began with the concession to hard determinists that their grounds for confusion might be excused by 
reference to substantive matters having to do with causation.  That ground is removed.  All three 
pessimisms are multiply fallacious.  
 CONs formed with P0 for God’s belief or timeless truth, supported by Theodoxastic or Alethic 
Fixity, equally fail.  In the original fatalist CON, we begin with P and the supposition that ~P representing 
J’s ability to do otherwise, and then show how that violates Theodoxastic or Alethic Fixity of P0, and so is 
impossible.  In the master fatalist CONs, a implies that God’s belief/timelessly true proposition  P0 
entails NP0, which by b entails NP.  Original and master CON are both invalid, and since both fatalist 
CONs share their essential features, they are also.  Thus, agents need not violate Present Fixity, bring 
about ~P or access other worlds to establish their control over their actions, and fatalistic actualism – 
theological or logical – doesn’t change this.  There is less reason to think God or logic constrains actions 
than to think causation does, so both fatalistic CONs are idle – more than both deterministic CONs.  But 
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that CON’s illogic applies to both fatalisms proves CON’s errors are not deterministic, per se. 
 This chapter has sought to dispel horizon level pessimism.  I conclude that all forms of pessimism 
are either false or implausible, and libertarianism is unmotivated.  This leaves only soft determinism 
and/or indeterminism.  Like Mele (1995), I think autonomism is more credible than either determinist or 
indeterminist non-autonomism, though I need argue only for determinism for easy autonomy; absent 
strong empirical evidence, I need not appeal to indeterminism.  Since hard determinism poses the greatest 
threat to autonomism, to dispel that threat on as minimalistic grounds as are necessary, it suffices to show 
that no questionable assumptions are needed to dispel pessimism. 
 The arguments in the remaining chapters, then, are limited in scope, mostly internal to soft 
determinism, to the easy problem of autonomy.  Let us turn to them now. 
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Chapter 4:  The Off-Line Metamental Architecture of Autonomy 
 
Chapter 4 identifies a certain feature of metamental states constitutive of easy autonomy, namely, their 
relatively off-line character, and models their causal/functional properties in illustrative cases drawn from 
a variety of sources.  Certain primate simulation skills are one possible evolutionary source of these 
abilities; others include mammalian dreaming and language use.  In a contrastive sense to be explained, 
the organism engaged in these activities operates its usual I/O, S/R, cognitive/conative mechanisms ‘off-
line’ – and thus partly endogenously – relative to their typically unmediated on-line engagement with the 
environmental causal stream, which latter involves directly exogenous determination.  It is only relatively 
off-line, and is still ultimately on-line, for everything physical is on-line relative to global determinism.  I 
argue that relative off-line status is sufficient for autonomy. 
 The appearance of any ability to go off-line or metamental counts as an evolutionary watermark 
for the beginnings of “organismic self-regulation” (Perls, 1947), the maximum of which is autonomy.  
Any off-line or metamental functions involve elements on the spectrum of abilities we associate with 
autonomy, i.e., the ability to act on or refrain from acting on one’s own desires, or to reflect on and alter 
one’s own mental states and dispositions.  Organisms that can intentionally alter their I/O states possess 
causal self-control powers lacking in organisms that cannot, but who, instead, are limited to immediate 
S/R behaviors. 
 The behavior of organisms limited to unmediated S/R, organism/environment interactions is fully 
causally controlled by exogenous forces, whereas that of self-adjusting organisms stems from mediated 
I/O processes that loop through the conscious, off-line circuitry of the organism, and is thus more 
endogenous.  Compare woman W, who knows she has difficulty regulating her emotional states and takes 
serotonin re-uptake regulating pills to regulate them, with woman W', who has the same problem but 
lacks W’s knowledge of the pill.  W exhibits self-regulating powers W' lacks.  An organism that can 
condition its own S/R pairs – through biofeedback, auto-hypnosis, or by hiring a behavior modification 
therapist (Mele, 1995) – has some endogenous self-regulative control and is at an advantage over one 
entirely exogenously S/R determined. 
 The difference between organisms with and without endogenous powers is as concrete as that 
between locomotory and non-locomotory organisms.  Let us call the behavioral model whereby future 
expectations lure organisms the “pull”, “teleological”, or “forward looking” model.  If sentient beings 
never controlled their movements, the pull model would never apply to them.  Instead, a “push”, 
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“hydraulic” or “backward looking” model would, such that their muscular contractions were pushed by 
propulsive forces, as is a person shoved by a crowd.  To avoid stronger connotations, I stipulatively use 
“hydraulic” only in the sense adumbrated, only similar to propulsive liquid flow through pressurized 
systems.  If a hydraulic model were correct here, most sentient beings would suffer from universal motor 
paralysis, contradicted by the most basic data and theories in biology.  Yet, hard determinism suggests 
this hydraulic model.44 
 We are aware of much of what moves us, W’s awareness of this brings its possible control.  As 
Chalmers’ “bridge law” states, consciousness brings with it the power (1) to verbalize its contents, and (2) 
to act on its contents (1996).  Consciousness brings with it other powers implicated in our self-regulative 
ability.  Consciousness of the causation in one’s system brings the possibility of its control, and its control 
is a functionally distinct kind of causation that enables us, as Locke noted (1690), to stand back, 
disconnect our I/O, and self-regulate.  Nonhuman animals lack this endogenous causal ability. 
 We reject with CON the idea that endogenous actions being ultimately exogenously caused is 
sufficient ground to infer that endogenous organisms are not self-controlling.  Autonomy just is self-
control, so caused behavior is free if it is self-controlled.  Natural selection favors organismic self-
regulation; thus, evolution favors autonomous organisms.  Dennett (1984) gives a “just so” story of 
evolutionary developments that may have made reflexive powers, thus autonomy, possible.  My just so 
story suggests their possible development from primate simulation mechanisms, for which there is much 
evidence. 
 Since the evolutionary component of my theory suggests its off-line element may have arisen from 
primate simulation skills, I call it “the off-line theory”.  Since the off-line element is a well defined feature 
of simulation theory, an account of simulation theory will provide apparatus to explain ‘off-line’.  There is 
a debate in folk psychology between the “theory theory” and simulation theory, but I sidestep this with a 
hybrid theory.  The simulation mechanisms we possess, even on the weakest hybrid theory endorsed by 
Stich and Nichols (1993), involve ability to take cognitive/conative systems off-line.  This ability figures 
in the self-regulating powers folk psychology takes us to possess. 
 Call the claim that the viability of the notion of an off-line function is independent of simulation 
theory the “independence thesis”.  Though I suggest primatological just so origins for off-line abilities, 
and support them empirically, they are independent of simulation and simulation theory.  Simulation 
                                                
44 See Stelmach (1976), McGuigan (1978), and Langer (1967, chapters 11 and 12) on the biological bases of pull 
model capabilities of locomotory organisms. 
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theory is popular in philosophy of mind, so the off-line theory simply draws on the illustrative 
explanatory currency in which it trades. 
 For the same off-line concept in simulation is found in computer science, hydraulics, and other 
systems models.  The off-line/on-line distinction involves relative terms, for a computer may be on-line 
relative to a local area network, but off-line relative to the Internet.  Similarly, a thermostat may be on-
line relative to its thermometer and the boiler to which it is wired, but off-line relative to the computer 
system connecting it to a larger climate control system if it is in manual overdrive mode.  Off-line 
relativity comes in degrees; e.g., runner R1 thinks about a race calmly, but R2’s muscles tense as he 
thinks about it. 
 Given that off-line functions are relatively off-line, no Fixity violations arise.  In rejecting b, we 
opened the possibility of caused control.  Off-line status explains how it may be functionally possible; it 
is the key to the possibility of self-reflexive functioning.  Thus, when an organism intentionally 
disengages its causal ‘roots’ from the environmental causal nexus, it goes off-line for purposes of 
conscious self-regulation.  Autonomy is organismic self-regulatory ability, evolved naturally from off-line 
metamental abilities.  Simulation is an ability of mind – conceived non-dualistically – to replicate non-
occurrent mental states – one’s own and others’ – off-line relative to their usual on-line S/R engagement, 
so it is a metamental ability.  The birth of metamental abilities made possible self-reflexive ones, which 
made possible self-controlling ones, and autonomy just is self-regulation. 
 “Monkey see monkey do” may have led fortuitously to autonomy.  The off-line element of 
metamental behavior and its novel looping through consciousness makes reflexivity and thus metacausal 
control possible.  The present analysis concerns observable behaviors, is evidentially pure, takes minimal 
theoretical risk, and uses the behaviorist’s functional concepts of S/R, I/O, and other simple 
causal/functional concepts that admit of simple cause and effect flow chart diagraming.  Thus, the 
analysis suffices for easy autonomy:  It identifies brain and behavioral, causal/functional features of 
autonomy. 
 Simulation theorists account for our folk success as an evolved ability to simulate minds.45  There 
is a graded scale of simulation skills, with brute mimicry at the primitive pole and counterfactual 
reasoning at the sophisticated pole,46 with gaze following, pretense, and supposition somewhere in the 
                                                
45 For an introduction to the literature on simulation theory, see Mind and Language 7(1992). 
46 Walter has stated:  “To express it somewhat more technically, we mentally simulate counterfactual situations.  
The prefrontal cortex generates these scenarios of future events....  Simultaneously the amygdala and hypothalamus 
(hormone control center) also affect one’s body, particularly the visceral functions.  The body reacts as it has in 
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middle.  In simulating, I simply need to recreate the target’s state in myself; no theory or mentalistic 
vocabulary is necessary, for example, for mimicry.  We may understand, predict, and explain other minds 
by taking our decision making system off-line, feeding it hypothetical inputs/intentions we lack, and 
seeing what our system outputs; these might serve as the basis for prediction and explanation. 
 Gordon (1992, pp. 87ff.) objects to equating “off-line theory” and “simulation theory” because the 
off-line element of simulation is ancillary.  We may engage the mechanism on-line on one side and not 
the other (pretense), vice versa (in hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, and in predicting our own 
behavior), and on-line on both sides (in our own decision making).  We may generalize from Gordon’s 
observation.  Not all the relevant behavior is off-line; nor is all off-line behavior simulational.  Let us look 
at some examples of simulation, to illustrate their applicability to the issue of autonomy. 
 Suppose I pretend that, like Fred, I desire x and believe I cannot get x unless I y, so I “pretend 
decide” to y.  My pretend decision to y is the basis for my prediction that Fred will do y.  Assuming 
explanation works as retrodiction, a simple adjustment explains Fred’s doing y:  When I simulate wanting 
x and believing no x without y, I do y. 
 When hiker B is walking behind A, why isn’t B amazed that A turns, moves, goes left, up, right, 
etc., just as the hiking path calls for?  Gordon suggests: 
You aren’t puzzled ... when he raises his leg high ... when there is an obstacle to step over....  
When we are aware of others – ... as others – we are constantly, automatically projecting onto 
them our own beliefs about the environment.  (1992a, p.16) 
The above is a simulational model of disengaging one’s decision mechanism from one’s beliefs and 
desires on the input side, and from one’s action control systems on the output side.47 
 We want to know why Pierre went to Lyons.  The theory theory says that we believe that Pierre 
went to Lyons because he believed his lover, Adele, was there, he wanted to see her, and his belief and 
desire are nomologically sufficient – in his tacit theory of mind – for his going to Lyons.  Simulation 
theory says we can know why Pierre went by simulating him:  If I believe that my lover is in Lyons and I 
desire to see her, then I will go to Lyons.  In simulating him, we take our own I/O mechanisms off-line, or 
else we would really go to Lyons; the output – what anyone with Pierre’s input would get – is the 
simulated decision to go to Lyons.  Since we all would get that output under that input, Pierre’s behavior 
seems intelligible, predictable, and explainable. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
similar past situations and via feedback loops it reports its state back to the brain.”  (2002, p. 571; emphases added) 
47 Cf. Stitch and Nichols (1992), figures 1 and 3, pp. 40, 53. 
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 In a boxing match, a warning is given for a move we did not observe.  We come to grips with 
referee R’s call by supposing R could see what we could not.  To evaluate R’s warning to boxer B, we 
imagine ourselves in R’s position with the inputs that likely went into R’s I/O mechanism, and see what 
outputs arise.  We might form a belief that R’s locus permits a perception of an illegal elbow strike by B 
not directly observable from our location. 
 When a motorist appears to rudely cut me off, to judge whether there is an objective basis for 
Strawson’s ‘reactive attitude’ of resentment, I simulate being in her shoes, and wonder whether there are 
any inputs she might have, e.g., an emergency, such that, were I to have those under similar 
circumstances, I might behave as she does.  If I would not normally feel shame for that sort of excused 
rudeness, I will not normally resent her driving. 
 In basic simulation, a 1st-personally described simulator “S” simulates a 3rd-personally described 
target “T”.  In a variant, e.g., the rude motorist case, S imagines Is motorist T may or may not have; or S 
may simulate T’s simulations of S.  Simulation may operate off-line on either end:  S may have T’s actual 
sensory input, but disengage the efferent circuits, or else S would jump up, say, and perform the locutions 
that constitute R’s warning to B, as some do when totally absorbed in sports events.  Here, imaginary 
input leads to actual motor output.   
In these and other ways, one may simulate one’s own and others’ future states and also the future 
reactive attitudes to the future selves appearing in such deliberations.  Combining several I/O 
mechanisms, on-line and off-line, forms a complex intentional architecture, a rich hierarchy of on-line and 
off-line elements.  Those who can take their I/O causal mechanisms off-line have greater control over 
their I/O causal relationships with the environment than those who cannot. 
 I review some arguments between simulation theory and the theory theory by Gordon (1992a, 
1992b, 1992c), Stitch and Nichols (1992, 1993), and Schiffer (1992), just to illustrate and explicate the 
features of the off-line model.  Developmental evidence (Baron-Cohen and Cross, 1992) suggests a tie 
between simulation and nonintentional (mimicry, gaze following and other ‘dumb’) processes; intentional 
processes may be finessed as later developments, with an error theory for the intentional language, but no 
eliminative version of simulation theory has been developed.  Schiffer has developed a plausible “no 
theory theory” (1987, 1991); simulation theory is also such a theory.  Simulation is plausibly just an early 
jump-start stage in a developing tacit folk theory of mind.  It is intuitive:  We simulate first, and we form 
theories later; in the more primitive developmental stages, primate and human infant mimicry precede 
theorizing. 
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 Simulation theory accounts for our tendency to ascribe mental states to others by our ability to 
simulate.  Note that Gordon rejects the ‘model’ model of simulation (1992a, p.11), in which we use 
ourselves as models of others.  Gordon’s move avoids objections based on the logic of model based 
inference, by analogy with models of airplanes in wind tunnels (1992a, p.27). 
One general objection here is that the simulator himself must have a theory because ... to project 
one’s mental states ... one first has to discriminate them, and this requires that one already have .... 
a theory.  (1992a, p. 26) 
Quoting Paul Churchland regarding a model of the universe, Gordon adds, 
Even if my miniature unfailingly provided accurate simulations of the outcomes of real physical 
processes, I would still be no further ahead on the business of explaining the behavior of the real 
world.  In fact, I would then have two universes, both in need of explanation.  (1992a, p. 26; 
citation omitted) 
Gordon replies, “a manipulable model can be used to model counterfactual conditions” without a theory; 
to test explanations, we vary conditions without a theory (1992a, p. 27). 
 Another version of the ‘model’ model involves ‘empathetic understanding’ or verstehen (Gordon, 
1992a, p. 31).  Gordon rejects “putting oneself in the other’s place” because it assumes one is not already 
in the other’s place (1992a, p. 13).  Rather than take a third-personal view, when asked to put oneself in 
another’s shoes, “what is implied is that you shouldn’t just project your own situation and psychology on 
the other” (1992a, p. 13).  He calls projection without “patching up” (making the relevant adjustments) for 
differences between self and other “total projection”, the default setting for simulation.  The reason hiker 
B is not amazed by A is that “we are constantly projecting [onto others] our own beliefs about the 
environment” (1992a, p.16). 
 Another attractive feature of simulation theory is its ability to account for the felt primacy of 
simulations in contrast to the aloof computational character of beliefs and desires under the theory 
theory.  Suppose T is being approached by a bear, and S sees this and wants to understand T.  On the 
theory theory, S supposes T has certain attitudes and uses attitude-mentioning laws which, in Fodorian 
practical syllogism form, yield the proposition that T should do something to avoid danger.  On 
simulation theory, in simulating T, S gets simulated fear. 
Probably the most important use of this capacity ... is to reveal, not what the other perceives, but 
how he perceives it.  For example, the grizzly that is approaching, not you, but your friend, who is 
some distance away, must be seen as an approaching grizzly:  that is, one you might describe as 
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‘approaching me’.  (Gordon, 1992a, p.19; emphases added) 
Successful simulation uses “patching up” to account for differences between S and T.  Without adopting 
the belief that the bear is approaching me, S isn’t inputting T’s belief. 
 The method of patching up handles “mother-in-law” objections that conflate elements of 
explanation and justification.  As Gordon, paraphrasing Perner, says, 
Assume you learn that your colleague’s mother-in-law has just died.  How does he feel?  It will 
not do to imagine that your mother-in-law has just died ....  Because your relationship ... may be 
quite different from your colleague’s ....  Your simulation must be informed by some ‘theory’ 
about which ... relationships are ... relevant.  If you love your mother-in-law but your colleague 
hated his, then your simulation will be more accurate if you imagine the death of one of your foes.  
(1992a, pp. 21-22; citation omitted) 
But in such a case, we would ask, “Were you close to her?”  We know from experience – not from a 
theory – that family role does not infallibly predict a standard relationship.  It is circular if the objection is 
that “it must be a theory”.   
The problem is that we lack the information needed to grasp the specific relationship, but 
inadequate information is an epistemic issue confronting both theories.  Whether simulation theory or the 
theory theory better explain this is irrelevant to our ends; again, my review of elements of these debates is 
just to illustrate off-line elements. 
 Let the epistemologist worry about justifying information derived from brute simulation 
mechanisms.  Principles of epistemic justification are irrelevant to identifying psychological processes, 
such as “How do we predict, explain, ascribe intentional states?”  One may object that what we are 
concerned with is not just brute skills, but their success, and that invokes questions of justification, but the 
origins and justifications of our beliefs about others are distinct issues.  We assume we’re all getting it 
right, not that the debate hinges on who gets it right more often, tacit theorists or simulators – irrelevant to 
us anyway.  S has the relevant information on T’s relationship with his mother-in-law or not:  If not, S 
will not get it right; if so, he will. 
 Developmental evidence does not favor the theory theory, though drawn from a research paradigm 
designed to establish the theory theory (Harris, 1992, p. 123).  Let us turn to the evidence.  Developmental 
studies were designed to support the “child’s (tacit) theory of mind” used to grasp mental states.  Though 
child pretense is central to the data itself, simulation theory is only a recent alternative.  Much evidence 
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was amassed from tests designed to age-isolate skills by means of false belief tasks.48  In the initial model, 
the subject is shown two puppets, P1 and P2.  P1 places candy in a box and leaves, P2 moves it to a 
concealed location, and P1 returns; the child is asked about P1's (false) belief, “Does P1 know where the 
candy is?”, and about P2's (true) belief, “Does P2 know where the candy is?”  But the tests presuppose 
ability to trade in the language of belief and pretense projection onto puppets! 
 Most 2- and 3-year olds err, thinking P1 thinks the candy is in the new location (though P1 would 
be ignorant of this).  Some 4- and most 5-year olds rightly think P1 thinks the candy is in the old location.  
How should we interpret this?  Does the younger child’s inability and the older’s ability indicate a 
development in a theory of mind, or in the ability to simulate?  A shift from inability at age n to ability at 
n+1 can age-isolate these skills, but cannot type-isolate them.  Our theories are like rabbit stage and part 
theories under Quine’s radical translation restrictions – not that there is no fact to the matter, but these test 
design restrictions just aren’t telling as such. 
 No contributor to this discussion has noted that the test’s basic condition, the use of puppets, 
presupposes a child’s understanding of pretense, thus of belief and make-believe, and their projection onto 
puppets.  The child must grasp that puppets perceive, believe, etc., before any question of false belief even 
arises – before the tests are run.  So, the ‘research finding’ that younger children are not yet versed in false 
belief is undermined a priori.  This basic design flaw forestalls any theory selection – long before test 
conditions are made even more complex.  The theory theory cites age-isolated skills involving the 
complexity of false versus mere belief as evidence of mastery of folk theoretical posits such as belief, but 
these are already presupposed. 
 Simulation theory cites the same skills as steps in the developing ability to patch up total 
projection:  The younger children get the false belief task wrong because they’re employing total 
projection, e.g., “if I were him, I’d know the candy wasn’t in the box, but in the cupboard, as I now 
know”; they fail to patch up, to adjust for relevant differences.  The older children get it right because 
they’re not just projecting, but also taking the other child’s vantage point into consideration, and 
disengaging the relevant beliefs of their own; e.g., “if I were her, I’d still think, as she thinks, that the 
candy was in the box, because I wouldn’t have seen it being moved to the cupboard”.  The test design 
obviously presupposes that children already have the knack of attributing beliefs.   
This presupposition can be given a theory theory gloss, or a simulation gloss.  Ideally, the test 
                                                
48 See Wimmer & Perner (1983); Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985); Stitch and Nichols (1992); Perner and 
Howes (1992); Gordon (1992a, 1992b, 1992c); and Goldman (1992). 
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design itself shouldn’t tell us which, and the interpretation of the results will rest on which gloss is 
adopted.  So, at best, the experiment can decide nothing.  But things are not ideal, especially for the theory 
theory.  For, on little reflection, it is obvious that the test design requires subjects to use pretense – make-
believe, a clear hybrid of simulated belief.  We begin and end in a stalemate that supports my adoption of 
a hybrid view according to which we at least sometimes simulate, and that is enough for purposes of 
illustrating off-line activity without being vulnerable to the fallacious though popular objection properly 
called “attacking the illustration”. 
 Even if developmental data showed children wielding a theory, adults may still be simulators or 
vice versa.  Yet none of the data supply any reason to rule this out, nor to rule out the possibility of 
starting or finishing with a hybrid mechanism, or of going hybrid from start to finish.  But a hybrid theory 
is most plausible, since mimicry means nothing if not already taken to be (Brentano-style) intentional.  
This is true even if later-developing, more mature, and thus greater understanding, which involves more 
fully transparent intentions, dovetails earlier and thus lesser mimicry, which involves opaque, pre-verbal, 
and thus pre-intentional psychological content.   
Tests are not needed to see that we begin with mimicry and other brute simulational mechanisms, 
as primate jump-start mechanisms that data-feed our growing understanding of mind.  We accumulate 
knowledge both from simulations and from inductive and theoretical cogitation, confirmed by ubiquitous 
experience. 
 Gordon suggests that adults use simulational counterfactual reasoning to fill the gaps in ceteris 
paribus clauses in folk psychological generalizations (1992b, p. 91), which, if true, grounds the possibility 
of adult hybrid theories.  Walter (2002) gives neuropsychological grounds for the idea that counterfactual 
reasoning is simulational.  In talking about the emotional and neuro-physical basis of our pro-attitude 
identifications as a way to stop a regress problem facing hierarchical accounts like Frankfurt’s, Walter 
states: 
There are concrete neurobiological hypotheses about this mechanism.  The dorsolateral section of 
the frontal cortex is important in simulating future counterfactual situations.  The ventromedial 
section admits mental sample actions into the evaluation circuit.  This center joins emotional 
centers, the body, and its neuronal representation.  (2002, p. 575) 
Counterfactual simulations ground our deliberative entertainment of practical possibilities in a naturalistic 
mechanism, and support the chapter 3 claim that we need not access alternate worlds; for the functioning 
of this mechanism is an actual world cognitive phenomenon.  Thus, simulation’s determinism friendly 
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causal/counterfactual properties help explain the phenomenology of autonomy.   
Deliberation may involve simulating our own possible desires and choices as I/Os; with these 
choices as further inputs, we simulate our and others’ reactive attitudes towards us for outputs about the 
expected effects on our lives and characters.  We juggle simulata, select from the overall set of resultant 
counterfactuals (e.g., “if I choose this, that will happen”), and then go on-line, and our doing so is what 
causes that choice.49  As Levin says, the causation moves through us in just the right way; we are 
essential, not superfluous (1979).  Though the functioning of the black box mechanism is determined, it is 
in control generating, rather than control losing, ways – favored by evolution for maximal self-regulation 
– by the reflexive cognitive/conative centers of our brains.50 
 Let us turn to Schiffer’s counterexample.  The notions of justification in mother-in-law cases and 
Schiffer’s case differ.  Schiffer’s involves normative rationality:  An action is justified by its link with 
Agent’s beliefs and desires.  His counterexample (1992), which may not indicate his view, is that he may 
know some molester M has certain propositional attitudes, e.g., M wants to molest a certain subway 
passenger.  On simulation theory, knowledge of M’s attitudes explains why M molested, for if Schiffer 
were to simulate M’s attitudes, he should get the same choice to molest, and this would explain M’s act as 
what anyone in M’s shoes would have done.   
Schiffer sketches the sorts of attitudes that might cause M’s choice, e.g., M believes M will not get 
caught, M strongly desires that sort of pleasure, etc.  Schiffer objects that his M-simulation would not 
yield the molestation choice in Schiffer’s own off-line processing of M’s attitudes. 
 Why would Schiffer not arrive at the decision to molest, whereas M would?  Schiffer is supposed 
to adopt whatever states M has when M molests, excluding his own intentions when they diverge.  
Schiffer’s simulation should not diverge from M.  That it does diverge suggests failure to properly 
simulate.  Compare:  A concentration camp prisoner asks a Nazi, “put yourself in my shoes”; the Nazi 
replies “If I were a Jew, I’d kill myself for Hitler”.  Schiffer and the Nazi fail to fully engage with the 
terms of the experiment.51 
 Schiffer’s claiming to adopt all of M’s intentional states but not be led by them to the same act 
                                                
49 Of course, the more reflective among us, like Hamlet, stay off-line longer and process simulata more and with 
greater iterative loopings than the rest of us do. 
50 Indeterminists, with Mele (2002, 2003), think the generation of reasons for consideration is optimally 
indeterministic.  That evolution designed this black box argues against more than a modicum of pseudo-
randomness in a mechanism we do not fully control:  Reasons for consideration are optimally determined by 
salience-stamping processes in long-term memory. 
51 On the dialectical use of thought experiments, see Stalnaker (1984) and Sorensen (1992). 
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entails that M’s intentional states are causally insufficient for his act.  If two agents with identical, widely 
construed intentional states can be led to divergent decisions, we need not worry about determinism, for 
we would have contracausal freedom.  But Schiffer’s account of mental causation (1991) includes a 
causal/counterfactual component in which mental states are causally sufficient for actions.  Indeed, all but 
eliminativists and acausalist libertarians, e.g., Ginet (2002), agree that intentional states are causally 
sufficient for intentional behavior, so this suggests a failure on Schiffer’s part regarding faithfulness to the 
terms of the experiment. 
 Simulation theorists may cite a failure on Schiffer’s part to “patch up for deficiencies in total 
projection”, i.e., correct S’s errors in excluding S’s intentions or including T’s.  Someone psychologically 
type-identical with M would do what M does under type-identical circumstances; so, if S correctly 
simulates T, S will arrive at type-identical output as T.  Thus, “patching up” eliminates all such 
counterexamples and grounds an error theory about them:  They are simply functions of only partial 
projection.  Normative and epistemic notions of justification are distinct, though related here.  Normative 
notions here are about what it is rational to do given M’s I/Os.  If left out of the epistemic context – the 
selection of input – needed for a correct simulation, we’ll get the same sort of counterexamples as in 
standard epistemic (mother-in-law) cases.  Schiffer’s failure to input relevant data for M, including M’s 
distorted behavioral norms, is a case in point. 
 The off-line theory may avail itself of the intellectual generosity of simulation theory’s formidable 
critics.  Stitch and Nichols (1993) reply to criticisms leveled against their earlier critique of simulation 
theory (1992), though they have backed away from the adversarial enthusiasm which marked their earlier 
paper.  They contend that while simulation theory and the theory theory seem to be the only two games in 
town, it is an empirical question which one better accounts for our folk psychological skills or whether 
both account equally well for separate skills.  As they generously put it in their conclusion, 
[We distinguished] different versions of the simulation theory....  [These] distinctions are both 
more interesting and more valuable than the various polemical points we’ve tried to score.  For 
they indicate that the dispute between theory theorists and simulation theorists is much more 
complex than has hitherto been recognized.  It may well turn out that some of our folk 
psychological skills are indeed subserved by simulation processes, while others are subserved by 
processes that exploit a tacit theory.  Whether this is the case, and, if so, which skills rely on which 
processes, are matters that can only be settled by doing the appropriate experiments.  It looks like 
there is lots of work to be done before we have a good understanding of how people go about 
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attributing mental states to each other and predicting each other’s behavior.  (1993, pp. 28-29.) 
Their concluding perspective is all we need for our weak, off-line illustrative purposes. 
 There are neural reasons for thinking counterfactual, deliberative reasoning involves simulation 
(Walter, 2002).  This grounds the empirical – non-speculative – character of the off-line theory.  That 
simulation subserves some folk skills, even if theorizing does also, is the basic idea of the hybrid theory.  I 
doubt anyone familiar with primate and human mimicry and gaze following would deny that simulation is 
an evolutionary endowment of higher primates that humans use in developmental stages.  Simulations 
may be instinctive mechanisms that jump-start processes leading to a theory of mind which results from 
reflection on its results over time.  This innocuous hybrid theory is enough to support the off-line theory 
claim that we can take our cognitive/conative systems off-line, which is all that is needed to empirically 
ground, motivate, and naturalize the off-line theory. 
 The more important feature illustrated in simulation that supports autonomy is its off-line 
metamental component – part of mind operates on other parts of mind.  This off-line feature was vividly 
illustrated in connection with simulation, where its features are more transparently visible, but it is 
attributable to metamentality in its own right, rendering the causal/functional ‘off-line’ concept fully 
independent of simulation.  Two other ways to illustrate causal/functional features of off-line metamental 
states and also the independence of ‘off-line’ and ‘simulation’ are by identifying other off-line 
metamental behavior that is not simulational. 
 Some off-line metamental behaviors not explained by simulation theory are first-personally 
activated mind altering techniques like meditation and sensory deprivation, or third-personally activated 
behavior altering techniques like Classical and Operant conditioning, brainwashing, or hypnosis.52  
Others are dreaming, language, and possibly memory.  The mammalian brain is an off-line brain, since it 
dreams (Winson 1997).  These metamental functions link to form an off-line I/O manifold. 
 I define a yogi as a practitioner of an Asian meditation discipline.  The yogi engages in off-line 
behaviors that do not require simulation, though some techniques may.  The yogi’s eyes are closed, taking 
the primary orienting element of the sensory nervous system (visual perception, our primary mode of 
exteroception) off-line; his body is “locked” in a motionless posture, taking elements of the motor nervous 
system off-line.  The yogi slows his heart and respiratory rates by artificial breathing rhythms, taking the 
cardiopulmonary system off-line from its sensorimotor cued oxygenation processes.  Attention is 
disengaged from its usual exteroceptive and proprioceptive links and directed to a mental target, such as 
                                                
52 See, for example, Schultz (1965), Madow and Snow (1970), and Stelmach (1976).   
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the flow of thoughts.  As these fade, brain waves slow down, and consciousness is taken off-line from its 
usual cognitive and conative environmental links and redirected into a brainwave state that is type-
identical to a dream state. 
 Yogis enter these brainwave states while fully alert and awake, exhibiting the alpha, delta, and 
even theta brainwave state patterns associated with just falling asleep, rapid eye movement (REM) 
dreaming, and dreamless sleep, respectively.  Yogis coordinate off-line behaviors under complex 
methodologies, producing off-line trance-like states whose corollaries have been empirically detected.53  
The yogis’ off-line states provide a dramatic case of the simple off-line states posited for ordinary agency 
by the off-line theory, but both have freedom properties in common as a function of their off-line 
metamental operations. 
 Let us next consider Classical or Pavlovian behavioral conditioning as possible cases involving 
off-line functioning of some sort. 
In classical conditioning, one stimulus is associated with a second stimulus so that the first one 
comes to stand for, predict, or signify the second.  The important result of this association is that 
the first stimulus is then able to elicit the same response as the second stimulus.  (Olton and 
Noonberg, 1980, p. 35; emphases added) 
“Stand for” and “signify” suggest semantic relations, though more at proxy, which need not be linguistic.  
But language use parallels conditioning:  Words substitute for things, and parallel the way stimuli are 
replaced by stimuli in conditioning.  Language use and conditioning both involve substitutions, and these 
involve off-line elements. 
 Language use thus involves off-line interaction with linguistic substitutes (simulations) for things.  
By contrast, pre-linguistic species only interact on-line with non-linguistic things.  Deliberators’ 
interactions with the environment are mediated by linguistic simulata, thus at a further causal remove 
from the sort of lower-order, on-line causal engagement with the environment that is typified by the 
immediately determined behavior of pre-linguistic animals. 
 Let us now take a closer look at how actual experiments are typically structured in Classical 
                                                
53 For empirical evidence in favor of these and related brain and behavioral phenomena connected with meditation, 
see Benson, Kornhaber, Kornhaber, LeChanu, Zuttermeister, Myers, and Friedman (1994), Benson (1996), 
Valentine  and Sweet (1999), Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, and Posner (2002), Davidson, Kabat-Zinn, 
Schumacher, Rosenkranz, Muller, Santorelli, Urbanowski, Harrington, Bonus, and Sheridan (2003), Lutz, 
Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, and Davidson (2004), Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005), Austin (2006), Lau, Bishop, 
Segal, Buis, Anderson, Carlson, Shapiro, and Carmody (2006), Begley (2007), Jha, Krompinger, and Baime (2007), 
Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson (2008), Lutz, Slagter, Dunne and Davidson (2008), and Shapiro, 
Brown, and Astin (2008). 
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conditioning. 
 At the start of an experiment one of the two stimuli elicits an obvious response.  Because 
this stimulus-response relationship was not developed through conditioning (at least in this 
experiment), this stimulus is called an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) and the response it produces 
is called an unconditioned response (UCR).  The second stimulus does not produce a response, or 
at least not one similar to that produced by the UCS.  If this second stimulus is always presented 
just prior to the UCS, it will eventually produce a response very similar to the UCR.  The new 
stimulus is called the conditioned stimulus (CS) because it attained the ability to produce the 
conditioned response (CR) through conditioning.  (Olton and Noonberg, 1980, p. 35; emphases 
and acronyms in original) 
I adopt Olton and Noonberg’s standard terms.  Note that the UCR and CR are identical. 
[C]onsider [Pavlov’s] procedure ....  A tube was placed in the dog’s mouth to measure ... saliva. 
[M]eat powder was presented to the dog for a few seconds [to see and smell].  In response..., the 
dog salivated, and the saliva was collected in the tube.  Then a second stimulus, a bell, was 
presented by itself.  [W]henever the bell was sounded, food powder was presented immediately....  
After a few pairings..., only the bell was presented; some salivation occurred, but not as much....  
The bell and food powder were presented together for more trials and then just the bell again.  As 
the ... trials increased, the ... salivation in response to the bell alone increased until the bell 
produced almost as much salivation ... as the food powder had....  As a result..., the bell became 
able to produce a response that initially was elicited only by the food powder.  (Id.) 
In Skinnerian (Operant) conditioning, by contrast, instead of UCRs (from the autonomic nervous system), 
voluntary or “skeletal” Rs are manipulated by positive (feedback) reinforcements.  So, a pigeon’s 
voluntary pecking at a button is “rewarded” by the feedback of a food pellet, reinforcing that pecking.  
Research manipulating Rs led to the discovery that feedback mechanisms may link operant (voluntary) 
and classical (autonomic nervous system) conditioning, as in biofeedback. 
 These techniques dissociate and re-associate S/R pairs.  UCS/UCR pairs may be viewed as 1st-
order cause and effect pairs, for they are the unconditioned modes of unmediated causal interaction 
between organism and environment; they are on-line behaviors in that the environment-to-organism 
interaction is unmediated, the organismic R is a UCR, and the organism has no control over its R (no 
elbow room between S and R).  Thus, conditioning takes S/R causal pairs, alters them (off-line relative to 
ordinary functioning), and puts them back in new concatenations. 
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 The failure of behaviorism is eclipsed by the success of conditioning, where modification 
techniques target phobias, compulsions, and other forms of paradigmatically unfree behavior often used 
as litmus tests for theories of freedom.54  These techniques take apart S/R pairs, in effect, and re-pair them 
in new combinations.  The rearrangement of S/R pairs under artificial conditions involves an off-line 
element, for the original S/R interaction mechanisms – usually engaged in unmediated, 1st-order causal 
operations – are rerouted off-line.  There is normally an unmediated stream of S-causes flowing from the 
environment into the organism and immediately back from the organism as R-effects into the 
environment, which unbroken causal stream completely controls the organism.   
On a hydraulic model, conditioning closes causal flow valves, disconnects pipes, installs new 
plumbing, reconnects the organism to the causal flow in a control generating way, and then opens the 
flow valve.  Therapeutic conditioning, with or without therapist assistance, increases self-control, as do 
K’s pills, e.g., arachnophobics use techniques to alter and thus control their spider S/R pairs.  
Deprogramming, hypnosis, and other forms of conditioning may also involve off-line elements, though 
illustrations from conditioning are less vivid than those from simulation or meditation practices.  Again, 
‘off-line’ is a relative concept. 
 In Classical conditioning, innate Rs (salivation) are manipulated by introducing artificial 
associations in artificial environments, producing new causal (S/R) pairings.  The organism’s I/O pairs are 
exposed to artificial conditions, taken apart, and concatenated in novel pairs.  The I/O rewiring is akin to 
S’s running S’s I/O mechanism off-line by introducing T’s inputs, yielding T’s outputs, for S’s inputs are 
set aside and replaced by T’s inputs, yielding outputs that are novel for S.  This is certainly not as clear a 
case of taking a mechanism off-line as in the case of S simulating T, but there is sufficient functional 
resemblance to warrant the application of the on-line/off-line functional heuristic to the conditioning 
model. 
 In Operant conditioning, voluntary Rs are reinforced.  Biofeedback links both conditioning forms, 
and converges upon the same phenomena the yogis have manipulated for millennia.  That these off-line 
behaviors converge confirms the off-line theory.  One link is the inverse relation between the degree to 
which a behavior is conditioned and the degree to which it is likely to be free.  Spontaneous expressions 
are not highly conditioned and habitual behaviors are, but both may be controllable by Agent, i.e., 
changed if they do not comport with his higher-order intentions.  Rather, the claim contrasts behaviors 
                                                
54 Ainslie (2001) uses behaviorism as part of “the data” for a theory of the will, since its research data is empirically 
rich, and theology, since its folk data is phenomenologically rich. 
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one is highly conscious of with volitions that operate without full awareness.   
Intuitively, the more conscious an act is, the more it is intended, and vice versa; cf. 
somnambulism, an interesting case of unconscious but possibly intentional behavior that is intuitively 
unfree and amoral.  Consciousness of what moves you is the key to liberation.  This inight informs both 
the method and goal of Buddhism (Keown, 1996),55 hence its emphasis on daily meditation practice, 
particularly mindfulness  meditation – paying close attention to all the fluctuations in one’s volitional, 
perceptual, and affective states. 
 Another parallel is the relationship between long-term meditation practice and how much control 
one has over one’s emotions, how conscious one is of the causes of one’s actions, and how conscious one 
is of one’s own stream of consciousness.  The long-term meditator may therefore be said to self-effectuate 
behavioral modification regarding his personal behavior.  Empirical findings support these claims 
(Goleman, 2003).  Increased consciousness of one’s mental states and actions is metacognitive and 
enables their increased control; intuitively, these are increases in autonomous functioning, i.e., freedom. 
 The knowledge of how to control future experiences is contained in countless conditional 
imperatives, e.g., “if you want x, then you ought to do y”, so increasing knowledge of these conditionals 
can increase autonomy.  Simulation of desires and their outputs can generate knowledge of conditional 
imperatives from the simulated I/O pairs.  Suppose one simulates a novel desire together with related 
beliefs about its associated behavior, and then certain output decisions occur that diverge from one’s own 
behavioral norms.  A conditional imperative may be formed from this simulation experience, e.g., “if I 
want to become a divergent sort of person x, then I ought to do action y”.  Thus, simulation can yield 
knowledge about self-cultivation. 
  Similar insights inform doctrinal lore about wholesome (and unwholesome) mental states that 
may be cultivated (or weakened) in Buddhist meditation (Goleman, 1988).  The thoughts, emotions, and 
mental states that arise spontaneously may be attended to with aversion, attraction, or neutrally; we also 
may step back and witness our natural aversion, attraction, or neutrality, and identify with the witnessing 
stance, thereby inculcating some detachment from the intentional currents that normally move us to act.56  
Wisdom about what mental states lead to what virtues and vices results from this off-line practice, not 
                                                
55 For Buddhist accounts of free will, see Goodman (2002), Gier and Kjellberg (2004), Harvey (2007), Siderits 
(1987, 2008), Wallace (2008), Federman (2010); for a Buddhist theory of free will specifically constructed on an 
analysis of Buddhist meditation methodology, see Repetti (forthcoming) and Repetti (2009). 
56 For some general discussion of these sorts of abilities in connection with Buddhist practices, see Harvey (2007), 
Wallace (2008), and Federman (2010); for explicit discussion of the relationship between Buddhist meditation 
practices and these abilities, see Repetti (forthcoming) and Repetti (2009). 
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unlike the simulational one just described. 
 A meta-level insight from the results of many such simulations might be to understand is to 
forgive, since in simulating the causes of others’ characters and actions, we see that we would be and act 
the same way, were we in their shoes.  This sort of insight can defuse many reactive attitudes that rest on 
the assumption that we are better than others, suggested by Schiffer’s assumption that he wouldn’t get the 
same output as molester M.  Thus, a conditional imperative drawn from this is that if one wants to be 
more compassionate, he ought to look more deeply into the impersonal causes of behavior and character.  
A similar insight arises from meditation practice.  This doesn’t threaten the reactive attitude web that 
constitutes our way of life, for to the extent one approaches maximal autonomy, he is an appropriate 
target for reactive attitudes. 
  Some think meditation entails an impossibility, i.e., pure introspection, but this is not so.  To 
understand the possibility of meditation without pure introspection, consider an interventionist theory of 
observation:  The mere act of observation affects the nature of the thing observed (Hacking, 1983).  This 
was one reason Ryle thought introspection was impossible, since one cannot observe rage without 
interfering with it.  But Buddhist meditation aims to change the mind through introspection. 
 The Rylean should accept meditation as a way of affecting one’s mental states – “interventionist 
introspection” – while disallowing the possibility of passively or purely introspecting them, that is, 
without observer interference or intervention.  Indeed, Freud, Chomsky, Fodor, and most other 
contemporary philosophers of mind generally deny that consciousness is identical with intentionality.57  
The Rylean fact that the mere act of observing one’s mental states tends to alter them constitutes evidence 
for the difference between consciousness and intentionality, but also for freedom through cultivation of 
awareness.  The off-line theory claims that metacognitive awareness leads to freedom, and thus fits nicely 
with the Buddhist theory of freedom (Keown, 1996).  The interventionist model of instrospection 
endorsed by Buddhist methodology is certainly consistent with the quantum mechanics tenet to the effect 
that the observer can never be totally isolated from the observation. 
 Nozick pumps intuition against the idea that there is any merit to meditation techniques and their 
                                                
57 See Fodor (1992).  Certain philosophers favor sophisticated versions of that view; see, e.g., Searle (1992), 
chapters 7 and 8.  Searle’s view is not that consciousness and intentionality are actually identical, but rather that S 
is an intentional state iff S is in principle accessible to consciousness (the “connection principle”).  Chalmers comes 
close to the connection principle in his discussion of the bridge law relating consciousness and its powers (1996).  
Searle’s view is one of the closest to a full identity theory (for intentionality and consciousness) that I am aware of 
in the recent literature, but even his view leaves just enough of a gap between the two to allow for the possibility of 
interactionist introspection. 
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associated ineffable states, but his attack will prove useful to the off-line theory.  Let us call his argument 
the “soundless stereo” argument. 
Consider a phonograph system as an apparatus of experience....  Now let us do the equivalent of 
quieting thoughts, namely, removing the record, perhaps also turning off the speakers and the 
turntable.  When only the amplifier is on ..., what is the experience like?  We do not know; 
perhaps infinite.... It would be a mistake to think there is an unusual reality being encountered....  
None of the literature I know describes what ... the procedure would produce in the absence of an 
unusual reality or self, so we don’t know whether [it] is a revelation of an unusual reality or self, 
or instead an artifact of an unusual procedure of experiencing wherein most but not all functions 
are damped down.  (Will this debunking explanation have more difficulty in explaining the 
surprising and often momentous changes in the people who have the experiences?)  (1981, pp. 
158-9) 
Nozick’s intuition pump critiques the yogi’s interpreted experience, its metaphysics, not the assumption 
that the yogi can disengage conscious awareness from its ordinary functioning – take it entirely off-line.  
Thus, Nozick’s critical analogy – despite its debunking intent – is enough for our purposes. 
 In both Buddhist and Yogic philosophy, out of which Buddhism emerged, meditation is the path to 
liberation, construed as freedom from deterministic conative chains (karma).  The Buddhist doctrine of 
“dependent origination” is a form of determinism; it says that everything that is emerges from, and is 
dependent on, everything that was according to essential (karmic, causal) connections.58 Theravada 
Buddhists practice vipassana, “insight” or “mindfulness”, which suggests freedom through insight.  
Mindfulness is alert witnessing of what I describe as the 1st-order contents of consciousness.   
In basic mindfulness practice, one first develops some concentration by focusing on one object of 
consciousness (Goleman 1988).  After proficiency in “one-pointedness” is developed, one practices 
attentiveness to one’s entire experience with no attempt to direct awareness, but rather to track one’s 
conscious states wherever they lead without interference or control.  Zen practitioners extricate awareness 
from the 1st-order stream of occurrent thoughts, emotions, sensations, by simply sitting still and observing 
the stream of 1st-order mental contents.  This can create enough distance between the active (content 
generating) and the passive (observing) components, though the ‘passive’ component interferes (Ryle, 
                                                
58 Some Buddhists resist the idea that the doctrine of dependent origination constitutes a “rigid” determinism, e.g., 
Rāhula (1959), Gómez (1975), Story (1976), Kalupahana (1976, 1992, 1995), and Gier and Kjellberg (2004).  On 
analysis, however, their arguments are unpersuasive for the simple reason that there is no mid-point between 
determinism and indeterminism.  Some Buddhists, for example, Wallace (2008), reject the idea that dependent 
origination involves a linear determinism, and might actually embrace some sort of complex indeterminism. 
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Hacking), which interference is what tames the mind and prevents the content generating component from 
overcoming the ‘passive’ component. 
 By the practice of motionlessly witnessing the spontaneous arousal and cessation of mental states 
without interfering, but just attending carefully to the emergence of intentions, one develops an awareness 
of the spontaneous and thus impersonal character of their emergence, and thereby gains greater control 
over the otherwise pre-conscious levers that guide our acts.  This is the essence of the Buddhist theory of 
freedom, akin to Freudian and other forms of insight-through-awareness and liberation-through-insight 
psychologies.59  Mind seeing mind – mindfulness – is the key to vipassana.  As Freud might put it, 
awareness of psychological state x is thought to be the best route to insight about x.  Vipassana, zen, and 
other forms of meditation have the common function of training attention by tracking the meditator’s 
mental states.  Proprioceptive tracking of kinesthetic states, which we share with other animals, need not 
be intentional, though metacognitive awareness of such states constitutes a hybrid kinesthetic/intentional 
state, and so is intentional. 
 We need not sort out all meditation-tracked phenomena, and just refer to them as mental states, 
though some may be intentional only insofar as they are mental (say, sensory) states of which one is 
mindful, since at least metacognitive awareness of (presumably non-intentional) sensations renders the 
meta-component intentional.  Conative intentions are ‘intentional’ in Brentano’s sense, in that they have 
an aboutness to them, as do thoughts, sentences, or other meaningful items that are about things.60  But 
                                                
59 Locke (1690) remarks about stepping back in awareness to gain control over intentions; Hampshire sees 
awareness of the causes that move one as the key (1975).  It has been suggested that Spinoza has a stronger view, 
that consciousness alone is free, though his intuition pump about the conscious rock strongly suggests illusionism.  
See Richard Taylor (1983) on Spinoza’s claim about the rock.  Krishnamurti (1962) and the Zen tradition advocate 
choiceless (non-contracted) awareness, as did Perls (1947), who also called his gestalt psychotherapy 
“concentration therapy”.  For a functional analysis of all major forms of meditation, see Goleman (1988); see also 
Goleman (2003), which narrates a convention on controlling emotion, involving Owen Flanagan, the Dalai Lama, 
and other interesting figures. 
60 There are penumbral edges to intentionality.  Imagine an infant that experiences heat, sound, etc., but with no 
interpretation of their source, or that they are about anything.  Yet, they are impressions in consciousness, however 
opaque.  After many same and different impressions are registered, pattern recognition occurs; later, interpretation 
is activated, and the infant senses the impressions are of something, some unknown x.  Mothers tacitly capitalize on 
these processes by reproducing repeated word/object associations, but this alone couldn’t transmute purely non-
intentional impressions into intentional ones, were it not for the infant already being in a position to seek meaning 
or aboutness in these patterns.  A way to conceive the difficulty clearly would be to try to program a computer to 
receive photo-impressions without pattern-recognition capabilities; if we add pattern recognition, we solve the first 
problem, but what do we need to add to encode the ability to interpret them with the sort of understanding Searle 
alludes to in his famous Chinese room case?  What is added to pattern recognition so that an infant at a certain point 
knows its mother’s word noises have meaning?  Simulation theory can explain this:  Innate primatological 
simulation mechanisms, e.g., gaze following and mimicry, set in motion redintegrative processes that bring 
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they are also ‘intentional’ in the teleological sense that they involve intent, motive, purpose.  We may say 
that these forms of meditation are cognition tracking and/or intention tracking, and thus metacognitive. 
 We may compare cognition tracking or conation tracking with Nozick’s truth tracking as a 
condition on knowledge (1981, pp. 172-78), value tracking as a condition on goodness (pp. 317-31), and 
Wolf’s notion of reasons tracking as a condition on responsibility (1990).  Wolf’s and Nozick’s notions 
are questionable, since truth and value are abstracta that may lack ontological substance, and they cannot 
literally be the object of inspection, but intentions certainly exist, and we can concretely inspect them.  
The parallels nonetheless suggest the utility of cognition tracking and conation tracking (hereafter, 
“intention tracking”) as a condition on self-control and freedom from the bonds of (habituated, 
conditioned) self, for without knowing one’s intentions intimately, one cannot help but be pushed and 
pulled by them.61  Recall K’s emotional incontinence and her pills. 
 One-pointedness attention-training may be functionally defined as attention training and intention 
training, for it is designed to train conscious attention, of what one dwells on, thinks about, attends to, is 
aware of, etc., and these are all objects of one’s interests, intentions, etc.  The instrumental utility of the 
notion of intention training ought to be clear:  Attention training fosters intention tracking, and vice versa, 
and leads to intention training (conative control).  Together, intention training and intention tracking 
contribute to the formation of higher-order mental states involving an observer (tracker) and controller 
(trainer) of lower-order mental states:  The 2nd-order tracker may attach a pro or con 2nd-order label, say, 
“desirable” or “undesirable”, to any spontaneously arising 1st-order state.  Buddha, meet Frankfurt’s 
hierarchy! 
 In fact, in canonical Buddhist psychology, mental states are wholesome or unwholesome insofar 
as they tend or do not tend toward the maintenance of the meditative state of quiescence (Goleman, 1988).  
Aristotle and his followers, e.g., MacIntyre, ground ethics in human nature; Buddha grounds ethics in 
soteriological utility, rendering it a pragmatic system of hypothetical imperatives of the form, if one 
wishes to increase freedom, one ought to cultivate certain mental states and avoid cultivating others, i.e., 
those that foster meditative equilibrium or disequilibrium, respectively.  Both approaches avoid the 
naturalistic fallacy.  Buddhist soterial ethics is thus a variant on ethics grounded in self-interest, geared 
entirely toward mental freedom, and increasing autonomy along the way. 
 Buddhism defines the virtues as states tending to sagacious growth through meditation; as Ryle 
                                                                                                                                                                     
intentions to life experientially as an infant matures.  I apply this line of thought to the Gricean model of 
communication in chapter 7. 
61 See Hampshire (1975), and also (1987) (on Spinoza) for a similar view. 
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said, rage is not amenable to introspection, so the theory defines rage as unskillful, poor techne, as 
Aristotle mightput it.  Although I have no burden of formulating a moral theory, these definitions allow 
highly pragmatic value rankings of mental states and tendencies (virtues or vices) in terms of their 
propensities toward greater or lesser autonomy.  This is a form of causal knowledge philosophy. 
 Second-order intention training may use one-pointedness to focus on and select or reject an 
intention, thereby making it occurrent or non-occurrent and further contributing to hierarchical self-
design.  The result is a self-conscious, self-designing, self-controlling intentional hierarchy managed by 
higher-order intention monitoring and intention training functions, a top-down, Platonic, reason-over-
desire, as opposed to a Thrasymachean, bottom-up, Humean structure, under which reason is (and ought 
to be) controlled by lower-order (unconscious) intentions.62 
 In line with the quantum mechanics tenet to the effect that the observer cannot be separated from 
the observed, Ryle and Hacking offer interventionist accounts of observation that suggest that observing 
one’s mental event changes its nature; so, intention training techniques alter content.  This insight implies 
the possibility of self-control via awareness, which alters its mental contents.  These higher-order mental 
functions work well together, as well as with the hierarchical intentional psychology in Frankfurt’s 
account of freedom and personhood (1971). 
 Meditation typically involves several means of going off-line:  shutting down the senses (e.g., 
closing the eyes), locking the body in a nonmoving posture, and withdrawal from the ordinary I/O causal 
interaction stream.  This automatically takes the practitioner multiply off-line from her ordinary 1st-order 
causal involvement in the world.  Higher-order mental states are at a causal remove from those of unfree 
creatures and so they are freer simply by virtue of this distance.  Additionally, simulation occurs in some 
meditation practices, e.g., visualization, and accounts for an additional increase in freedom.  (That not all 
meditation is simulational supports the independence thesis.) 
 There is ample empirical evidence that meditation techniques can be control enhancing.63  When 
successful, they lead to heightened awareness of and control over the forces that propel practitioners to 
action.  Higher-order mental states are automatically at a causal remove from the unmediated cause/effect 
sequencing characteristic of animals, young children, and the deranged.  Thus, meditative states increase 
freedom to the extent they lead to a vantage point – in terms of distance or dissociation – functionally 
                                                
62 This pro-Platonic view goes against Hume’s view of reason as mere slave to the passions, but without denying 
the necessity of passion for the possibility of action.  Buddhists insist there can be no action, not even the 
movement toward enlightenment, without passion (the karmically conditioned – hence tainted, but “golden” or 
“noble” – desire to be rid of suffering). 
63 See Benson (1996) for an extensive explanatory bibliography on these studies; see also Begley (2006). 
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removed from the characteristically unfree causal chain typified by unmediated S/R relations at the 1st-
order on-line level of animal causation. 
 This is a theorem, and its consequences are predictions, of the off-line theory:  We should expect 
these higher-order off-line states to be correlated with increased self-regulation.64  That they are correlated 
constitutes empirical confirmation of the theory.  Thus, in virtue of the causal role of off-line mechanisms 
in consciousness-altering techniques, off-line mechanisms generally lead to added freedom.  Locke and 
Spinoza, meet the Buddha! 
 The root skill in meditation is concentration.  This is developed by detaching the part of awareness 
normally focused on and identified with the ‘stream of consciousness’ – thoughts, desires, images, 
sensations, etc. – and redirecting it to a “primary object”, target, or focal point.  One may object that there 
is a facial tension in the appearance of awareness in both the role of subject and object of consciousness, 
as per Ryle, but this is only a facial tension.  For if I notice where my awareness is directed, my 
awareness is (simultaneously) in one sense – that of my noticing – subject, but in another sense – that 
which I notice – object, though both are interdependent according to Buddhism (Kasulis, 1985; Wallace, 
2008).  As the ancient Indian Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna put it: 
Action depends upon the agent.   
The agent itself depends upon action.   
One cannot see any way  
To establish them differently.  (1995, 8.12). 
The objection entails meta-awareness, which fits nicely with this analysis, for then meta-awareness, as in 
the meditative mind, is the most liberating among all the other meta-abilities:  A metamental power to 
consciously direct lower-order cognitive/conative processes.  This is just what the Buddha prescribed as 
the main liberation-oriented discipline, the cultivation of the meditative mind (Keown, 1996). 
 Being carried off by the push and pull of one’s stream of (1st-order) mental contents, and drawing 
one’s focus back to the primary target, develops concentration power – a (2nd-order) volitional power (to 
have some control over what objects of attention one will have) – with less effort over time.65  The shift 
from being led about by whatever mental contents occur to using one’s volition to direct one’s mental 
contents themselves is like the shift from involuntary to voluntary breathing.  This increases freedom, like 
                                                
64 See Mele (1995) for an analysis of the development from self-control to autonomy. 
65 Csikszentmihalyi (1991) cites evidence for lesser neural activation (in brain centers correlated with attention) in 
the use of learned skills.  Evolution favors organisms capable of attention training, for lesser neural work for skilled 
attention frees neural energy for greater monitoring and processing of peripheral environmental stimuli, a clearly 
adaptive ability. 
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the shift from non-prehensile to prehensile digits, which led to our ability to restructure our environment.  
When we learn to maximally control our minds, environments, and genetics, we will control what 
controlled us. 
 In meditation, pulling in the reins on 1st-order functioning is a 2nd-order mental exercise, and each 
repetition, as in resistance training, is freedom training; practice makes perfect.  One practices freedom 
while being pushed by one’s 1st-order desires and, more particularly, pulling back against their currents.  
Since one is sitting cross-legged with eyes closed, not actually led by one’s intentions to act while open-
eyed in the external world, meditation is a practice behavior. 
 Practice sessions, drills, or rehearsals are off-line in the sense of not being the real thing; consider 
the difference between shadow boxing and a real match.  By practicing in this way, one extricates oneself 
from the ordinary stream of consciousness (by disengaging attention from the impinging cogitation, 
sensations, etc. and returning one’s attention gaze to the intended target).  This trains the ability to go off-
line, not only from 1st-order cognitive/conative engagement with the external world, but also from higher-
order cognitive/conative states.  The simulation theorist may try to bag some of these phenomena, given 
their facial affinity, but the affinity is only facial. 
 There is a parallel between attentional and resistance training.  Body size, strength, agility, and 
overall physical prowess improve with resistance training; likewise, general mental powers improve with 
meditation training:  alertness, attention, concentration, visualization, focus, and self-control.  The yogi’s 
brain improves, as we might expect, given its plasticity (Goleman, 2003, chapter 8; Begely, 2006).  
Consider the differences between those who do no attention training, those who do some, and those who 
do a lot.  These differences yield quantifiable differences in off-line powers.  Those who try harder to be 
free can develop greater self-controlling powers than others.  The implications for self-cultivation and 
responsibility for self ought to be clear. 
 There is a facial conflict between standard Western and Buddhist views on the relationship 
between self and freedom.  On Frankfurt’s view, personhood is a necessary condition of freedom.  On the 
Buddhist view, though not on the other yogic or “Asian” views, self is an illusory entity, an ignorance-
based obstacle to freedom that vanishes before the liberated, enlightened mind.  But a greater 
commonality is visible in the fact that the off-line and most Asian models agree on two soft determinist 
points:  the inverse relationship between freedom and lower-order conative determinism, and the 
consistency between global determinism and freedom.  
 Buddhists view mind and self as mere clusters of transient physical factors; cf. Hume, Ainslie 
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(2001), Parfit (1986), and G. Strawson (1986) for no-self views of mind.  On my account, self is an off-
line construct with psychological, causal, and ontological significance, albeit fully determined by and 
interdependent with all of its features.  Self-creation involves identification with simulated projections 
about the sort of person one prefers to become:  One develops 2nd-order pro or con attitudes towards the 
projections, and identifies one’s character as one’s 2nd-order preferences; the self emerges as a causal 
power possessing byproduct of the hierarchical architecture of the off-line mind.66  Thus, as the self 
matures, it takes on an integrated hierarchical structure with its own causal powers and thus its own life.  
Similar things may be said for autonomy.  There are quantifiable and thus ontologically significant 
differences between the causal powers of the mind of the accomplished Zen master and the non-meditator, 
as there are between the rational deliberator and non-deliberating creatures. 
 Drawing some of these ideas together now, I outline a model of deliberation, decision, and action 
that extends simulation’s off-line mechanisms.  Simulation mechanisms operate by taking some 
cognitive/conative (I/O) system off-line, feeding it pretend inputs, and letting the system produce 
simulated outputs.  Suppose simulator S disengages his belief/desire/action system; it functions off-line.  
Were we unable to control on-line/off-line system functions, as in the boxing example, we would have a 
difficult time adjusting beliefs and behavior in truth-sensitive ways.  It follows that we can operate our I/O 
mechanisms off-line in ways not immediately belief-forming or behavior-producing, as they are when on-
line.  When on-line, as with animals that cannot go off-line, I/Os are immediately connected by on-line 
functioning of the system, despite an intervening nervous system that makes the behavior more complex 
than the simple Hobbesian transference of motion, say, from one billiard ball to another. 
 Thus, if an I/S is provided to a non-off-line-capable animal, say, a torch is flashed before the eyes 
of a snake, it will produce a certain behavioral O/R, say, it will spring backward and hiss. Though the I/O 
is mediated by the snake’s nervous system, we distinguish between the snake’s nearly immediate I/O and 
simulator S’s highly mediated I/O. 
 The objection that both behaviors are ultimately S/R explainable, ours being more complex, 
parallels the hard determinist’s objection that both behaviors are ultimately determined.  But this ignores 
the features of the complexity that render the distinction one with a difference greater than mere 
complexity.  And that is that off-line reflexive awareness of how one’s and others’ I/Os operate within 
                                                
66 For Perls (1947), the self is a homeostatic (self-regulating) process forming the system of identifications and 
alienations as the organism defines itself through its “gestalts” (figure/ground relationships) – personality functions.  
Frankfurt (1977) and Nozick (1981) say similar things.  Perls says organisms are equilibrium-seeking and growth-
seeking, homeostatic, or self-regulating. 
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one’s on-line/off-line system generates the possibility of elbow room selection from among I/Os and 
control over them, control developed through exercise.  Whether the I/O for on-line/off-line systems is 
still amenable on some level to a highly complex S/R type description is not at all obvious.  For the 
behavior visible in off-line capable organisms seems facially of a different type than that caused by simple 
S/R pathways, just as the micturation visible in continence capable organisms seems of a different type 
than simple micturation.  To insist that S/R type causation must apply to all behaviors a priori is to beg 
the question here.  Continent and incontinent behaviors are both caused or determined, but only one is 
additionally controlled by Agent in observable, causal/functional terms which, while explainable in a 
lower level vocabulary, remain causally distinct nonetheless. 
 S’s simulation consists of a simulated input of T, and a simulated output.  S may come to believe 
on-line as a result that T’s output is reasonable in light of his input.  This illustrates the connection 
between ability to go off-line and to control ourselves.  Without S’s on-line desire to understand T, S 
would not have engaged in off-line activity.  This models how the initiating causes of off-line behavior 
may be on-line.  As a result of the off-line activity, S wound up with an on-line belief about T.  Thus, 
some causes of on-line behavior are off-line.  Off-line behavior may cause other off-line behavior.  
Causation may move through the hierarchy in any direction. 
 This is no reason to suppose that on-line/off-line operations are type-identical.  Nor is this ground 
for the CON-type claim that since the causes of both off-line and on-line behavior are ultimately 
prenatally on-line, none of the primary causes of human behavior are controlled by Agent.  To the 
contrary, the difference between off-line and on-line behavior – between causes primarily in and out of 
Agent – is of so great a degree that it warrants being treated as a virtual difference in kind.  This claim, 
that off-line or higher-order mental functions are a virtually distinct kind of determinism friendly agent 
causation, but a subspecies of ordinary causation nonetheless, is an Archimedean point. 
 There are many arguments in the literature in support of the claim that mechanisms-based 
explanations are genuine forms of scientific explanation (e.g., Cummins, 1983), and simulation is a 
mechanism.  Fischer and Ravizza (1998) take their reasons-sensitivity mechanism, implicitly qua 
mechanism, to be compatible with determinism though quite capable of causal/counterfactual 
dispositional powers; they assume mechanistic phenomena are intuitively deterministic.  If that 
assumption is correct, then simulation mechanisms are equally determinism friendly; they are more 
genuinely mechanisms than reasons-sensitivity is, for reason is a ‘mechanism’ only figuratively. 
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 Our meta-ability to take mechanisms off-line is an evolutionary development,67 peculiar to us in 
degree, but not in kind.  The differences in degree between brute mimicry and deliberation are so great as 
to qualify as a virtual difference in kind.  Our ability to take our mechanisms off-line (from ordinary 
causal I/O operations) in deliberating warrants the view that we author our actions endogenously even 
though the causes of off-line behavior are ultimately exogenous.  Since authorship is central to free action 
and responsibility, this model grounds a wide range of intuitions about freedom and responsibility. 
 Since freedom involves the meta-ability to take I/O mechanisms off-line, and comes in degrees, 
the off-line theory grounds the intuitions that (1) the amount of freedom depends on the satisfaction of 
physical conditions; (2) freedom admits of degrees; (3) freedom is an evolutionary trait of higher 
mammals; and (4) young children and most animals are generally not free.  It also suggests an empirical 
direction for the lines of demarcation. 
 The higher-order architecture of our minds supports an account of the difference between us and 
Sphex, Dennett’s tropistic wasp.  The meta-structure depicted by the off-line theory can help to fill in the 
details of what makes for the possibility of more “elbow room” in our case.  The off-line theory accounts 
for our ability to be flexible rather than locked in mechanical sub-routines, making it reasonable to call us 
“Flex” rather than just complex Sphex.  Agents need not go off-line, nor need they choose consciously, to 
act voluntarily or freely.  But insofar as we are skilled in doing so, we need not react immediately to every 
S, for we are able to go off-line and create a good deal of elbow room between S/R, when appropriate.  
We can refrain from responding instinctually, habitually, or out of unconscious conditioning.  When we 
can and ought to go off-line or refrain, but do not, we are responsible for our actions. 
 The elements of life describable from the intentional stance seem jeopardized by determinism:  
Since we’re determined to choose what we do, rationality need not bear on our thought, choice, or action.  
But the off-line theory accounts for the relevant practices in terms of our abilities to engage any and all of 
our I/O systems in on-line/off-line operations of our systems for purposes of interpreting or controlling 
behavior.  On this model, we are the authors of our actions, inferences, etc.  For we can disengage these 
mechanisms from the environment, and thus set in motion off-line processes under our causal control, 
even though both on-line and off-line processes are ultimately caused on-line.  This gives substance to 
Hume’s contention that it’s not the fact that things are caused that makes them free, but how they are 
                                                
67 Why natural selection favors mimicry is revealing.  Given the nomological relations between emotions, facial 
gestures and pre-verbal utterances, such as shrieks, etc. (Baron-Cohen and Cross, 1992; Bogdan, 1997, 2003; 
Conniff, 2004; Reynolds, 1993; Tomasello and Call 1997), it follows that organisms that mimic have redintegrative 
access to other organisms’ intentions.  Such mind-reading creatures make for good predators and poor prey. 
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caused. 
 One may worry about attributing intentionality here to animals.  There is a difference:  Though it 
involves mentality, animal mimicry need not be intentional.  Thus, the off-line theory doesn’t attribute it 
to mere mimicry-capable beings.  It is reasonable to mark the difference in causal mediation between the 
immediate S/R pairing in on-line animal functioning and the mediated I/O relationship in simulating 
agents by calling the former a 1st-order causal function and the latter a metacausal function; there may be 
more than one meta-level.  The causal/metacausal distinction is more important than the off-line/on-line 
one.  All that matters is that we have metacausal abilities, and exercise them in deliberation. 
 The metacausal functioning of agents’ I/O mechanisms constitutes only a mediated engagement 
with environment, and so is at a causal remove from the animal’s full engagement.  Thus, off-line activity 
is aptly described as disengaged from immediate causal interaction.  Thus, we have the elements of a 
cognitive architecture – an off-line causal hierarchy – for the off-line theory:  Insofar as agents’ 
deliberative and decision making mechanisms involve metacausal functions, they are at a causal remove 
from the on-line causal nexus that strips beasts of elbow room and causal authorship of their actions.  
Insofar as agents operate at higher levels of metacausal complexity, to that degree the pertinent causes of 
their behavior are properly located within their cognitive/conative architectures. 
 Since practical reasoning is metacausal, the reasons/causes dichotomy is replaced by a model that 
(1) grounds their distinctness, and (2) reconciles them because reasons are metacauses.  The meta-level 
distinction for off-line mechanisms is causal, but enjoys the benefits of hierarchical theories per se, such 
as Frankfurt’s meta-desire model (1971).   
 Frankfurt’s model has been accused of being overly intellectual.  Since freedom rests in his 
analysis on iterated intentions, it requires sophisticated intellectual development and places a top heavy 
emphasis on higher-order as opposed to lower-order mentality, or lofty as opposed to base motives 
(Stump, 1993).  But the off-line theory is less vulnerable to the top-heavy or “overly intellectual” 
objection, since the off-line mechanism is a brute, evolved primate ability.  His model is also open to an 
infinite regress (Watson 1975).  For it rests on the tacit formula that agent A’s desire d is free at level L1 
iff A approves of d at L2.  But the same formula for transmuting unfree d at L1 by viewing it from the 
next level up L2 may be applied to the L2 approval, which is viewable from a yet higher-up level L3 as 
unfree, and so on.  There seems to be no principled reason to stop the regress up the hierarchy. 
 Frankfurt’s attempt to stop the regress, by almost stipulating that Agent stops the regress by 
making a decisive 2nd-order commitment that he identifies with, is unconvincing.  I said “almost 
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stipulating” because Frankfurt claims that the case is analogous to cases in which an arbitrary decision is 
superior to no decision, as in, say, the Buridan case.  This seems both ad hoc and inapplicable here.  But 
even if it is neither of these, it seems unconvincing because it leaves open the brute fact that at the very 
peak of a model that looks upward for freedom, there is none. 
 The off-line theory is immune to the regress objection, for its hierarchy is not generated by 
iteration of intentional features, but from causal/functional reflexivity.  So, its hierarchy is purely causal, 
non-intellectual, and non-iterative.  Thus, the off-line theory lacks a formula analogous to d is free at L1 
iff d is approved at L2 that would be subject to iteration.  My theory is deeply concerned with the same 
meta-abilities as is Frankfurt’s.  I deploy a causal/functional analysis of autonomy, but Frankfurt 
explicitly eschews causal consideration, so our theories are distinct, and mine, being causal, categorically 
escape the regress problem his theory faces. 
 Metamental functions may operate off-line.  Simulation and other I/O mechanisms may be taken 
off-line.  It is a non-intellectual fact that cognitive processing mechanisms function well only at lower 
levels of hierarchical organization, due to data processing limitations.  There is only so much complexity 
that can be cognitively managed in a mental operation, e.g., what A thinks that B thinks that C thinks, etc.  
The same is true of any off-line mechanism.   
 For Frankfurt (1971), L1 desire d is rendered free at L2 iff we form a pro attitude d' about d at L2, 
but the pessimist can ask about the justification of d', generating a regress.  But the detachment of on-
line/off-line connections is what realizes our self-regulating abilities, and it is at root a serendipitous 
biological process with natural processing limits that non-arbitrarily terminate its functions (Walter, 2002, 
p. 575); only a few iterations can occur.  Frankfurt needs a principled way to stop the regress; given my 
model, I have no regress to stop.   
 Frankfurt does not say what makes metaintentions possible, or how we form them.  Wantons are 
stipulated as those for whom no inter-order conflict is possible, and persons as those for whom it is 
possible.  This is an incompleteness in Frankfurt’s account.  It is also a confusion that the heroin addict 
who lacks a 2nd-order intention about his addiction is a wanton, for he must possess the ability to form a 
2nd-order intention about his addiction which he has not exercised.  We can imagine one with a 2nd-order 
desire to be a heroin addict (say, borne of her days as a flower child, who romanticizes drug culture).  
More dubious is that the addict is also a wanton with respect to everything else, that she lacks any 2nd-
order intentions about anything. 
 The off-line theory has no such problems.  Simulation is one mental function on other mental 
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states; there are others.  This cognitive architecture allows us to form 2nd-order desires.  This is achieved 
by the virtual stepping outside of the 1st-order causal stream when the system goes off-line and creates a 
wedge between the 1st-order desire inputs and their usual action outputs, and makes possible a division 
between mental states in which 2nd-order desires may be formed.  The division enables one mental 
component to have a pro or con attitude toward another. 
 We may view our ability to dissociate from simulated output as the first stage in the development 
of pro and con attitudes – identification and alienation – towards our own intentions.  Given the 
dependence on this ability of both Frankfurt’s theory of the person (1971) and Perls’ theory of the ego 
function (1947), this ability may enable autogenous self-creation and thus responsibility for self.  Natural 
selection, on our just so story, may explain this mechanism. 
 Consider what might happen when the deliberation mechanism is taken off-line and used for 
simulation purposes.  Suppose S’s output from simulating target T’s input is a 1st-order desire L1(d*) to 
do action A, but S has a con attitude L2(~d*) toward d*.  S must be able to detach from L1(d*).  If not, S 
might automatically adopt T’s pro attitude L1(d*), and, if stronger than S’s con attitude L2(~d*), S might 
actually do A.  Dissociation from simulated desires generates higher-order pro and con attitudes toward 
the simulated intentional output or simulata within one’s own psychology, and thus realizes the general 
ability to form metaintentions.  This is the sort of just so account of how metaintentions may have evolved 
that Frankfurt needs, but lacks, in my view. 
 This may be seen as a same-order desire conflict.  The difference is that the system’s off-line 
functioning safeguards against S’s identification with the T-simulation.  S knows the system is operating 
off-line on T’s intentional I/O, and thus S does not identify with output L1(d*).  This makes possible, 
indeed requires, identification with some mental contents and alienation from others.  (Of course, 
pathologies, e.g., schizophrenia, may involve cross-wired errors in these and other mechanisms.)  This 
model also applies to self-formation. 
 I spell out a model of self-development later, but sketch it here.  Perls (1947) analyzes the 
personality as a function of our identifications and alienations – what Frankfurt claims is more crucial to 
our motives than their source, history, or cause – that emerges from the organism/environment contact 
boundary over time, individuating the dynamic self process.  On the element of our model just 
adumbrated, when S develops the ability to trade in pro and con meta-attitudes about simulated intentions, 
he also develops the ability to form 2nd-order intentions of his own, and to identify with some of these 
over others.  In so doing over time, S forms his own self. 
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 This gradual process has stages, with its earliest stage giving birth to, say, a mini-self that sharpens 
its initial boundaries with the environment through its initial pro and con attitudes toward features in its 
environmental field, typically a function of its genetically and environmentally determined hedonic states, 
e.g., proprioception of pleasant stimuli associated with its mother/caretaker and unpleasant ones 
associated with the latter’s absence.  It does this until it becomes a larger and sharper self, which self then 
refines its boundaries more, becoming yet sharper, larger and more autonomous. 
 Of course, much of it is directly exogenously determined in the self’s early stages.  But once the 
self reaches the stage where reflexive awareness of its own operations occurs, these are then subject to the 
self’s own reflexive self-sculpting, which is significantly endogenously determined, even if it is all 
ultimately exogenously determined.  This is analogous to the exogenous determination of continent 
micturation, which remains importantly distinct – in terms of causal powers – from the merely directly 
exogenous determination of incontinent micturation. 
 To turn to the mechanics of alienation, Schiffer’s molester M case (1992) illustrates this point.  
Suppose Schiffer did get output O that he should molest the nearby woman W now.  Unless he could 
detach himself from O, he would molest W.  Schiffer’s claim should be that he can detach himself from 
O, and refrain from molesting W.  If we can do so with motives we recognize as not our own, it is a tiny 
step from there to ability to do this with motives that arise in us naturally, once we have a reason to 
develop a con attitude toward them.  And herein lies the possible natural genesis of autonomy – the ability 
to redesign our own wills from the meta-level. 
 Thus, S can detach from O; he can prevent simulated I/Os from entering straightaway into their 
belief/desire/action “boxes”.  This generalizes to any I/O from any off-line mechanism, and accounts for 
our ability to generate, and distinguish between, intentions and meta-intentions of various types, which we 
may think of as possessing subscripts representing our identification with, endorsement of, or other form 
of value-embedding or weighting-embedding for, those intentions and meta-intentions.  Consider where 
T’s belief and desires lead to an off-line result S considers desirable, but S lacks some of T’s inputs.  As a 
result of seeing the effectiveness of T’s 1st-order intentions (in terms of the actions they produce), though 
S lacks them, S develops 2nd-order pro intentions toward T’s 1st-order intentions. 
 Suppose T is a lawyer and S’s boss, and responds to S’s questions about how T became a lawyer.  
T believed he had what it takes intellectually, loved to study the law, and wanted more than anything else 
to be a lawyer.  Suppose S is an undergraduate philosophy major who, prior to this, had no great love of 
the law, but looked admiringly upon the profession, believed he had the intellectual talent and wanted 
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very much to be a lawyer.  As a result of simulating T, S develops the 2nd-order desire to have the 1st-
order love to study the law, since S believes T’s 1st-order desire to study law is instrumental in success at 
lawyering.  This result might lead S to study the law with an attitude of discovery, looking for ethical 
principles and other jurisprudential underpinnings which might help him learn to love the law.   
Thus, by simulation, S develops a 2nd-order intention lacking a 1st-order parallel, but which 
contributes to its development.  (Here, simulation yields a meta-desire to develop a 1st-order desire S 
lacks, which causes the formation of the lower-order one over time.)  The directions of these relationships 
between S and T, and between S and S himself (engaging any mental mechanism off-line), across 
hierarchical levels, opens a rich set of possibilities that includes all the tools needed for autonomy, and 
much more. 
 This ability to identify with or detach from 1st- and 2nd-order beliefs and desires is a predictable 
byproduct of the partitioning and distancing generated from the functioning of the off-line mechanism.  
This ability may first function only interpersonally, when S simulates third-personally described person 
T, but extends to all intrapersonal and interpersonal combinations and directions.  Here lies the inter-
personal basis of our ability to detach from our own 1st-order intentions, and identify with some over 
others as a result of off-line deliberation processes.  This is our architectural model for self-regulation, 
i.e., autonomy, and it is an important advance beyond Frankfurt’s formulaic (L1/L2) metaintentional mesh 
model.  Ours also connects with the Wittgensteinian idea that an individual’s inner life is largely parasitic 
on his relations to others. 
 This analysis suggests that autonomy may be a byproduct of social animals for which evolution 
has endowed mind-reading or “heteropsychological” instincts for mimicry, linguistic representation, and 
other mimetic means of redintegrative access to other minds.  These instincts, inclinations, and skills are 
clearly favored for smart social animals.   
 I call “primate emotivism” the tendency of primates to express pro or con attitudes toward 
attractive or aversive social behavior through instinctive teeth displays, facial gestures, body language, 
shrieks, and other pre-linguistic forms of intentional communication (Bogdan, 1997, 2003; Byrne, 1995; 
da Waal, 1982, 1989; Gomez, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1994, 1996a, 1996b; Kummer, 1995; Povinelli, 1996; 
Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Singer, 1994, pp. 57-112; Tomasello and Call, 1997).  The ability to regulate 
one’s behavioral tendencies by way of the ability to identify, then to identify with or dissociate from, 
socially approved or disapproved behaviors is clearly one that is favored by sociobiological natural 
selection.   
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 Our mimetic instincts may provide the basis for our high level of skill with these interpersonal 
exchanges.  Goldman (1993) argues simulation is the primatological basis of empathy, since it enables us 
to experience each other’s experiences from the inside, which likely trigger self-discovered insights about 
our commonality.   
 Simulation may also subserve language comprehension and communication in a Gricean way:  
When I simulate sentence X, I experience mental state Y.  If so, these and many related factors operate 
within and largely define the parameters and contours of the developmental environment in which smart 
social animals like us are cultivated (Bogdan, 1997). 
 Recall Wittgenstein’s point that many of our intrapersonal psychological states are importantly 
heteropsychologically interdependent.68  Our analysis identifies their many interconnections in ways that 
exceed the sort of connections visible under competing models. 
  Let us spell out some of the further mechanics of our analysis.  Let Dnm be the mth desire of level 
n.  Suppose off-line deliberation produces the result that a 1st-order desire input, D11, has negative value 
(consequential or otherwise) and another 1st-order desire input D12 has positive value.  Together with the 
psychological wedge created by going off-line, this output ranking makes it possible for the results to be 
fed back into the (metaphorical) desire box, so that D12 is now preferred over D11.  Perhaps the result is 
not fed into the desire box straightaway, but is first embedded in a belief sentence about the 2nd-order 
preferability of D12 over D11, and perhaps then registered in the desire box, or in a higher-order desire 
box, e.g., B[D2(D12>D11)]. 
 As the lawyer case illustrates, having the 2nd-order desire D21 for D11 does not entail having the 
corresponding 1st-order desire D11.  Thus, the off-line model distinguishes 2nd-order desires and volitions, 
the latter of which are simply those 2nd-order desires that succeed in engaging their corresponding 1st-
order desires (Frankfurt, 1971).  2nd-order volition is made possible on the off-line account by virtue of 
the meta-level wedge or psychological distancing that is generated by the off-line functioning of the 
simulation and other off-line deliberative mechanisms.   
Identification and alienation are explicit and crucial in Frankfurt, but not what makes them 
possible.  This is shown on the off-line model.  Identification makes it possible for a desire to become 
effective and alienation makes it possible for a desire to be restrained.  The off-line architecture grounds 
the possibility of iterated desires, and also meta-volitions, the voluntary, restraint, and other autonomy 
                                                
68 On the primatological origins of the social interdependence of psychological states, see Bogdan (2003), p. 18, 
Bowlby (1982), Dunn (1988), and Travarthen (1993). 
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abilities. 
 By taking their 1st-order desires off-line and putting their 2nd-order desires on-line, or by running 
their 1st-order desires through off-line deliberative processes in which their 2nd-order desires displace their 
1st-order desires, agents can dissociate from 1st-order desires.  Dissociation allows the psychological 
distance – elbow room – between desires and volitions to act needed to prevent unendorsed 1st-order 
desires from issuing in action.  Only with conflict between levels of desires, Frankfurt argued (1971), is it 
possible for freedom to be a problem, for only under this scenario can Agent want to do one thing but do 
another, as with the resistant heroin addict;69 the wanton is no more ‘unfree’ than a worm.  Since off-line 
functioning provides for iterated volitions, and these account for the problem of freedom, the off-line 
model accounts for the problem of freedom, and thus for akrasia. 
 We can account for akratic action as an occasional hierarchical conflict in which some 1st-order 
desire not endorsed at the 2nd-order level is stronger than a 2nd-order endorsed 1st-order desire.  One 
formal difference between unfreedom and akrasia is that akrasia is local, occasional, whereas unfreedom 
is global, constant.  No animal lacking metadesires can act akratically, for mere 1st-order desire or 
Buridan struggles cannot generate the phenomenology of akrasia, e.g., identification with a weaker desire, 
regret that the weaker desire lost, judgement that the winning desire should not have won, etc.  The details 
of a satisfactory account of akrasia need to be spelled out, but it is plausible to hold that they may be 
developed along these lines. 
 The off-line analysis suggests a probable – mostly inchoate, but empirically and conceptually 
pregnant – relationship that may be seen in what I call the “distance principle”: 
The greater the distance between a higher-order and the 1st-order on-line state, the greater the 
potential degree of freedom attached to the higher-order state. 
The greater the functional distance between the off-line, higher-order states characteristic of free agents 
and the virtually unmediated on-line I/O sequences of 1st-order states characteristic of plants, Sphex, and 
other unfree beings, the greater the potential freedom. 
 Distance between hierarchical levels may be measured in simple quantitative terms as the number 
of levels in a hierarchy, e.g., a distance of one between the first and second levels (“hierarchical distance 
1" or “HD1”), of two between the first and third levels (“HD2”), etc.  With this measure, the principle 
                                                
69 Frankfurt argues rocks don’t suffer freedom’s privation; thus, we only adjust the criteria for autonomy by beings 
for which freedom can be a problem.  Shatz ignores the contrapositive of this privation restriction, like calling 
rocks blind because not sighted; he objects that rocks satisfy the conditional criterion (if they wanted to do 
otherwise, they would) (1986).  Surely the main trouble with this objection is that the antecedent is too fantastic to 
take seriously. 
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may be expressed formally as an ordinal scale (“Distance”): 
  Distance:  (x)(y){[(Mx&My)&(Hdx>Hdy)]®(Fxy)} 
where “Mx” means x is a mental state component, “HDx” means x is at a certain hierarchical distance 
from the 1st-order on-line state, and “Fxy” means x has a greater degree of freedom than y.  While the 
value of the formula is obscure, since its predicates are highly complex, it is designed only to capture the 
inchoate intuition that factors such as the ones it mentions make it the case that HD2 is likely freer than 
HD1.  The greater the distance between hierarchical levels, the greater the causal/functional break from 
the 1st-order causal stream.  Each level, being at a causal remove, functions as a wedge or gate between 
Agent and the 1st-order causal nexus. 
 Distance may be measured spatio-temporally.  Spatially, it can be the literal – spatial – distance 
between S/R.  In phobia treatment’s “stimulus hierarchy”, the target stimulus S (i.e., the S that causes the 
greatest anxiety) is placed physically at the most distant point on the cognitive horizon, and Ss that cause 
less anxiety are arranged so that the less anxiety associated with an S, the closer to the patient S is placed 
(Olton and Noonberg, 1980, p. 39).  Alternately put, this is the distance between the aversive S when 
situated by a behavioral therapist and the negative R.  Temporally, it can be the lag time between S/R, in 
two ways.  One way parallels the spatial sense:  The lag time taken to close the gap between patient and 
target S.  The other measures lag time between S-occurrences and R-occurrences; one subject takes .5 
seconds to respond to S, another takes .75 seconds to respond.  These spatio-temporal distance principles 
may be sketched formally: 
Spatial Distance:  (x)(y)(z){[(Sx&Ry&Rz)&(Gxy>Gxz)]→(Fyz)} 
where “Sx” means x is a stimulus, “Ry&Rz” means y&z are responses to S, “Gxy” means x is at a certain 
spatial distance from y, and “Fyz” means y has a greater degree of freedom than z. 
Temporal Distance:  (x)(y)(z){[(Sx&Ry&Rz)&(Txy>Txz)]→(Fyz)} 
where “Sx” means x is a stimulus, “Ry&Rz” means y&z are responses, “Txy” means x is at a certain 
temporal distance from y, and “Fyz” means y has a greater degree of freedom than z. 
 These formalizations only seek to approximate the principles needed to render transparent the 
underlying inchoate intuitions here, but no need for their more specific development presses here.  These 
distance principles coalesce.  They may also be correlated as temporal and spatial distance are in the S-
hierarchy of behavioral medicine:  The farther away S is in space, the more time needed to close that 
spatial gap.  Other off-line activities can operate in tandem, each contributing its own measure to the 
distancing equation.  These coalescent processes may form a manifold of integrated off-line processes, 
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different by virtue of the summing of distance factors, and by virtue of novel kinds of higher-order 
functioning.  Some concatenations may be more significant than others in terms of metacausal powers.  If 
distance principles hold, the more complex the metastructural state, the more distance factors increase, 
and thus the more freedom. 
 While lag time helps but is no guarantee of freedom, LeDoux’s remarks about the different 
temporal distances involved in the almost immediate brain processing of emotionally significant 
phenomena and those of emotionally neutral processes are relevant (1997).  Conscious processing is 
wired by natural selection to take longer.  Ainslie’s (2001) major concern with “hyperbolic discounting” 
is the hyperbolic shape of the discounting curve – distinctive of Ainslie, not just the fact that the present is 
valued more highly than the future.  That is, it is the variable rate at which the temporally distant future is 
discounted which is important.   
The idea that the hyperbolic tendency is the default for most organisms is instructive:  Temporal 
distance can work against us, when distal rewards are less salient.  But this itself supports my distance 
principle:  The distance between Ss and Rs decreases the causal momentum of the Ss and increases 
autonomy thereby; this also works for anticipated Ss or what utilitarian behaviorists and economists call 
“reward”, what philosophers call the forward looking or pull model features of motives, opposite 
hydraulic, push model, or backward looking features. 
 There are exceptions, but these sketches constitute initial elements of a system of distance 
principles that may be construed as “metacausal distance laws”,70 laws of self-regulation, and agents who 
know how to manipulate them can increase their autonomy. 
 There is behavioral evidence for the correlation of hierarchical distancing with what on my 
analysis is a Humean freedom.  Consider counterconditioning, used to cure phobias. 
 First the person is trained to relax.  Then stimuli which originally elicited anxiety are 
paired with this relaxation.  A critical step in counterconditioning is the use of a stimulus 
hierarchy....  The anxiety associated with a phobia is usually so great that it will completely 
overwhelm any state of relaxation, at least initially.  Thus the therapist establishes a hierarchy of 
stimuli, all of which are similar to the target stimulus (the one which evokes the greatest anxiety) 
but sufficiently different from it that they produce less of a response.  One means of establishing a 
                                                
70 Ainslie (2001) discusses “transcendance” (p. 80) and other distance principles (about how the distance in time 
between expected reward and its reinforcing behaviors diminishes its effect), and some explicitly spatial distance 
principles.  Behavioral modification certainly incorporates distance hierarchies in its manipulative techniques, 
altering the distance between S and R as a way of controlling it (Olton and Noonberg, 1980). 
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hierarchy is to vary the distance between the person and the target stimulus or the length of time 
before which the person must interact with the target stimulus.  These spatial and temporal 
gradients form the hierarchy; as the distance/time between the individual and the target stimulus 
increases, the amount of anxiety decreases.  (Olton and Noonberg, 1980, p. 39; emphases in 
original) 
Olton and Noonberg hold distance in time and space causally relevant to establishing a (phobia-based) S 
hierarchy, and inversely correlate these with anxiety.  Generalizations like these from behavioral science 
would fill in the gaps in the metacausal theory of autonomy.  Olton and Noonberg’s description of phobia 
treatment illustrates their medical application. 
After the stimulus hierarchy is established, relaxation is conditioned to stimuli farthest away from 
the target stimulus.  This ... generalizes to all other stimuli in the hierarchy, lowering the ... anxiety 
produced by them and making it easier ... to relax in the presence of them.  Relaxation is then 
paired with the next stimulus in the hierarchy until the anxiety response to it disappears.  This 
procedure is continued until the person is able to relax in the presence of the target stimulus itself.  
(Olton and Noonberg, 1980, p. 39) 
The test subjects are trained to relax through biofeedback, a mix of conditioning and meditation – two 
forms of off-line behavior.  Biofeedback’s increase in voluntary control over autonomic nervous system 
functions is evidence of off-line effects.  That these off-line elements converge in behavioral science, 
particularly with the treatment of behaviors that render agents unfree in a broadly Humean sense, is 
predicted by, and so empirically confirms, the metacausal theory. 
 Platitudes support distance laws.  Consider the platitudes that one should take a deep breath to 
calm down, count to 10 before reacting, or “sleep on it” before a major decision.  The mere distance in 
time creates enough psychological space between I/O for Agent to escape spur of the moment reactions 
that may be cause for later regret.  Any psychological mechanism that operates off-line contributes to the 
liberating effects of causal distancing that attend their causally removed, 2nd-order functioning.  Time lag 
platitudes capitalize on the fact that a temporal gap must obtain between the point at which any 
mechanism goes off-line and then comes back on-line.  Taking extra time – temporal distance – enables 
one to run the troublesome decision through more simulations, thus making the R more mediated, more 
likely rational, etc. 
 One more thought on distance is in order, about neural distance.  Walter (2002) discusses the role 
of the prefrontal cortex in simulation, but also in the mental Darwinist theories of Changeux and Dehaene 
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(1989, 1995).  According to Walter,  
They distinguish three types of neuronal representations: (1) percepts, (2) images, concepts, and 
intentions, and (3) prerepresentations.  Percepts consist of a correlated activity of neurons that is 
determined by the outer world and disintegrates as soon as external stimulation terminates.  
Images, concepts, and intentions are actualized objects of memory, which result from activating a 
stable memory trace....  Prerepresentations are multiple, spontaneously arising unstable and 
transient activity patterns that can be selected or eliminated.  (2002, p. 569) 
What is interesting about this is that neuronal percepts are directly exogenously determined, whereas the 
other two neuronal representations are at least endogenously mediated:  Intentional objects require 
neurosignatures in memory, and pre-representations are the sort of potential pattern elements that go into 
linking the other two through a process of “resonance” (id.), analogous in our brains to what Dennett 
(2003) refers to as evolutionary “free-floating rationales”, like “memes”, the cultural analogues of genes.  
 More important is that our metacausal analysis may be extended beneath the purely mental to the 
neuronal level.  That is, the neuronal representations that are directly exogenously caused – ‘percepts’ – 
are close to the bottom of our causal/cognitive hierarchy, way below what we have been calling 1st-order 
desires or 1st-order mental states.   
Two speculations arise here:  Perhaps the free-floating ‘prerepresentational’ states are even more 
rudimentary, though endogenous; perhaps the percepts are what Kant would say are sensory contents 
caused by outer sense receptors, and the prerepresentational neuronal states are what he would say are 
their inner forms or category repositories.  We may call the former “1st-order psychoneural states”, and 
the latter “2nd-order psychoneural states”, for the former are exogenously determined, and the latter 
endogenously determined, and ours is a causal hierarchy.  Both have what Fodor (1992) and Searle (1992) 
have called “aspectual shape”, meaning they neurally instantiate the sort of mental state elements or 
building blocks that go into things like qualia or intentionality. 
 These rudiments of mentality are psychoneural bridges between mind and brain.  Other neural 
states, by contrast, do not subserve mentality, i.e., they have no aspectual shape and do not contain any 
representational, sensory, or other phenomenological content, but are involved in lower-order biological 
functions, say, respiration, digestion, etc.  The third kind of neuronal representations directly instantiate 
mental states, “images, concepts, and intentions”, and so may be called “3rd-order psychoneural states” or 
“1st-order mental states”.  1st-order desires, then, are either 3rd-order or 4th-order psychoneural states and 
metadesires are 4th-order or 5th-order ones, etc. 
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 The conclusions I have been setting up may now be made clearly.  The distance between the on-
line exogenous environmental determination of lower-order psychoneural states and the off-line 
endogenous determination of higher-order mental states admits of a causal hierarchical, metacausal 
analysis of the sort I have described.  That distance is greater than previous descriptions suggested.  The 
architecture for this is evolved off-line processes.  Off-line processes break the causal/functional chain of 
exogenous psychoneural determination of mentality and volition, loop functions endogenously within 
reflexive centers of consciousness and will, and enable organisms to access psychoneural free-floating 
rationales and long-term memory encoded preferences.  Simulational processes would augment these 
abilities in intuitive ways. 
 These are concrete neurophilosophical claims with straightforwardly testable empirical 
consequences, the applicability of which to a theory of autonomy is obvious.  Self-regulating organisms 
are organisms with off-line psychoneural and higher-order meta-abilities.  These abilities are natural, 
observable, quantifiable, and amenable to theoretically minimalistic causal/functional/behaviorist 
analyses, and their psychoneural bases are supported by the latest evolutionary theories in brain and 
behavioral science.  This is our major addition to Dennett’s “just so” story of autonomy and our major 
causal/functional addition to Frankfurt’s model. 
 This is a concrete metacausal self-regulation or autonomy power we possess and animals lack.  
We can form metadesires by simulating belief and desire inputs, seeing which action outputs they yield, 
and evaluating them.  We can also form Frankfurt’s (1971) “2nd-order volitions” – effective 2nd-order 
desires – by running the metadesires through deliberation-oriented 2nd-order simulations, which may 
assign some metadesires a higher motivational value as a result of their being favored outputs of such 
simulations.71   
An alternative, adapted from Watson (1975), would be to assign evaluative weights to the output 
or products of off-line deliberation on 2nd-order desires.  This model provides for a hierarchy with 
different causal powers at each level.72  With the distancing between levels that fits with platitudes about 
self-control, it makes not only agency but a conflicted hierarchy possible, and thus supports Frankfurt’s 
                                                
71 Our greater imaginative powers are arguably simulational, and arguably make not only prudence, but altruism, 
possible.  Nagel (1970) claims that the key to altruism is our ability to see others as equivalent with ourselves as 
persons; simulation makes this equivalence first-personally accessible and thus psychologically real (Goldman, 
1993). 
72 Rosenthal (2000) makes the claim that it is uncontroversial that the causal powers of mental states must be a 
function of their contents.  If so, and this seems right, then metacognitive states must have metacausal powers by 
virtue of their metastructural content. 
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distinction (1971) between problematically unfree agents and wantons. 
 While there is a link between freedom and metamentality, metamentality doesn’t guarantee 
freedom.  For compulsions may rise from lower-order to higher-order states.  Frankfurt’s model permits 
2nd-order junkies (Watson 1975).  Folks like Hamlet or Woody Allen seem highly reflective but equally 
neurotic.  If metamental states can be dreamed, then freedom doesn’t always result from metamentality.  
But the off-line theory does not claim that greater awareness is sufficient for greater autonomy, but only 
that greater awareness of the causes of one’s actions is necessary for greater autonomy. 
 The general form of the theory is more important than these auxiliary principles; it is enough to 
lay out the theory without them.  I defend specific metacausal principles in the next two chapters, PAPW 
and PAPM, that rule out counterexamples like “dreamed, thus ineffective metacausality” by restricting the 
idea that metacausality is necessary and sufficient for freedom, to the narrow claim that metacausality is 
necessary for freedom. 
 Deliberation involves a combination of off-line processes, and its reflective character places it at a 
temporal distance between its I/Os.  It also may involve simulations or off-line functions of emotive, 
evaluative, and other states of ours or others, and of others’ simulations of ours.  These may arise under 
simulated I/Os falling under any of these categories, whose outputs have weighted values – attached 
higher-order pro and con attitudes. 
 This manifold of off-line functioning constitutes a meta-structure that accounts for images of 
freedom we associate with the pre-philosophical phenomenology of deliberation.  Consider the image of 
the rational thinker, removed from the causal stream, engaging in counterfactual and other imaginative 
projections, weighing options, RFAs, and probabilities without being pulled or pushed by internal or 
external forces.  Our model accounts for this and other inflated, phenomenologically-based, pre-
philosophical or folk impressions. 
 Reactive attitudes, like regret, may also be explained on this model.  I can simulate others in 
circumstances similar to mine to see if they would feel regret, by adding and subtracting conditions 
peculiar to me, such as that I attended Catholic grammar school.  Related to this, the reactive attitudes 
may be rationally reconstructed and revised in a similar fashion.  Take cross-level half-heartedness, e.g., 
desires at one level, repression at another, nonidentification with the repression at another.   
Stump’s lapsed Baptist (1993) may have a 1st-order desire for an occasional social drink, but a 2nd-
order aversion based on religious upbringing, and a 3rd-order wish that she could overcome the resilient 
2nd-order aversion, given the weakening of her religious beliefs.  Thus, if she has a drink and feels shame, 
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she can simulate others who have or lack the intentions she has at each level, and compare whether or not 
they result in equal shame, and use these simulations to rationally reconstruct her reactive attitudes 
towards herself (whether she ought to have shame).  Similar moves may be used for the other reactive 
attitudes. 
 Awareness of the bases and natures of our beliefs, desires, values, characters, and choices – their 
formation, the processes leading to identification and alienation, their plasticity, etc. – is clearly a first 
step toward their control or modification, just as in biofeedback awareness of the heart rate is a first step 
toward its control, however indirect the control over such an autonomic nervous system function that may 
be.  Reflexive feedback systems don’t guarantee it, but make control possible.  They may have evolved 
from primate simulation mechanisms that made both metamentality and off-line states possible.   
 We have reflexive, self-altering abilities; animals don’t.  Some of us are more aware of the control 
levers in metamentality than others, are more autonomous.  Autonomy is a matter of degree of control.  
Some have great control over appetite, but not emotions, or vice versa.  It is determined that some are 
more self-determined than others.  So? 
 That off-line behaviors are not all equally off-line is irrelevant, for ‘off-line’ is relative.  
Importantly, our causal powers are concrete, and they are sufficiently off-line relative to on-line animal 
causation for the purposes of the off-line theory.  There are degrees between involuntary, voluntary, and 
maximally self-regulating behavior.  Most animal behavior is presumably involuntary, though the 
voluntary/involuntary distinction is relative.  Most people, by stark contrast, usually act minimally 
voluntarily, and have a degree of autonomy sufficient for responsibility.  This holds though most have 
gone through habituation processes that form stabilized character, thereby limiting the range of options 
found salient or desirable.  But most can alter behavior enough to be responsible for who they are and 
what they do.  Some are more or less free. 
 These judgments are highly contextual.  In the next two chapters we formulate a theory of the will 
and of free will designed to explicate our divergent intuitions in the broad range of cases that constitute 
the data to be explained by any theory of the will or of freedom. 
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Chapter 5:  The Metacausal Will 
 
Let me first apply the causal/functional cognitive architectural model more closely to the issues in the free 
will debate, then to the construction of a theory of will itself.  Our task was to identify the abilities that 
comprise autonomy, how we have them, and why some think we don’t.  To tell a “just so” story of how 
they could have arisen naturally is to show that they are compatible with determinism.  Dennett’s just so 
story traces complex phenomena like thought to tropisms, and identifies language, reflexivity, and 
metacognitive phenomena as crucial in the development of powers distinctive of autonomous persons.  
My addition to his just story is the suggestion that our off-line metamental abilities may have evolved 
from primate simulation, but I also add metacausal analyses of these same powers, regardless of how they 
may have arisen.  I also add the claim that autonomous agents have metacausal control over their actions. 
 Like Searle (1992), I view mind as a higher-order neural state.  This easy approach to mind 
sidesteps the mind/body problem in one move (1992).  G. Strawson has also argued that if materialism is 
true, it follows that the mental is physical (1994, 1997).  The plausibility of these views further justifies 
my rejection of the notion of the impotence of the mental.  I will argue that autonomous or narrow 
metacausation is top-down, from mind to body, and autonomy is a metacausal power of the metamental 
features of the brain that enable agents to significantly author their actions.  Agent is free iff he acts 
narrowly metacausally.  A sketch of this type of autonomy may be garnered from Levin’s adequacy 
conditions on an account of freedom: 
We need adequacy conditions, neutral with respect to all competing analyses, on proposed 
explications of [freedom]. [Freedom] is whatever, if anything, satisfies these conditions, and the 
claim that we are free is the claim that something about us does satisfy these conditions.  I suggest 
the following two claims as just such a neutral statement of what we are talking about when we 
say ‘man has free will’: 
(1) Man’s causal influence on the world differs from that of other things. 
(2) We are sometimes in control of what happens to us.  (1979, p. 237) 
Metacausal control satisfies these conditions.  Animals, young children, and dysfunctional adults lack this 
ability, so it is grounds for excluding them from the class of free agents, and for including ordinary adults.  
While competing criteria are open to counterexamples, autonomously functioning adults do not suffer 
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from, say, indoctrinated religious repression of healthy sexual desires.73  Competing criteria are open to a 
regress problem, but since the control identified by our theory is top down from Agent’s own conscious 
will, the very notion of a downward causation regress from higher levels is incoherent.  Thus, narrow 
metacausal compulsion is oxymoronic.  Other forms of compatibilism, e.g., the reasons-sensitivity 
account,74 appear incomplete. 
 Free actions standardly involve consciousness, construed by Rosenthal as a thought about a 
thought – a higher-order thought (“HOT”) (1991b, 1997, 2000).  The HOT theory holds conscious states 
metaintentional, as opposed to metasensory, because there is no sense organ for discerning our own 
mental states, and the only alternative is that we are conscious of them by having thoughts about them 
(Rosenthal, 2000).75  This dichotomy is false, for there is no need for eyes in a dream; sensory states need 
sense organs only in their etiology.  Conscious “sensing” need not require sense organs to be 
nonconceptual. 
 I agree with Rosenthal that consciousness is metamental.  Any and all metadesires or metathoughts 
are “metaintentions”.  But consciousness need not be metaintentional, for either mental state level may be 
purely qualitative; e.g., a purely qualitative awareness of the sensation of red.  But all metamental states 
are metacognitive, for they are cognitive states that are of or about sensory, conative, or emotional states.  
So, properties attributable to metacognition need not be attributable to metaintentionality. 
 The mental functions that matter are causal – not, as Frankfurt holds, motivational.  Syntax alone 
differentiates between the metacausation in metacognition and the causation in cognition, since the causal 
powers of mental states are a function of their content (Rosenthal, 2000), and only the content of the 
former are tiered.  The metacausal analysis, however, is independent of a particular analysis of causation.  
Similarly,  
the kind of position I want to advocate here concerning macrocausation is largely independent of 
the particular views concerning the analysis of causation.  Moreover, I do not wish to tie the fate 
of my general views about macrocausation too closely to the fate of my proposal regarding a 
proper construal of the relation between macroproperties and the microproperties on which they 
                                                
73 To be fully metacausally functioning is to not be cognitively and conatively “stuck”, which is why metacausality 
may subsume reasons-sensitivity as a species of autonomy, and not the other way around.  On the relevance of 
being “stuck”, see Sober (1995), pp. 326-335. 
74 See, for example, Fischer (1994), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), and Wolf (1990).  Shatz (1986) attributes 
“reasons-sensitive” to Levin (1979), but Levin doesn’t reject autonomy (1979, 2003); Fischer and Ravizza and 
Wolf do. 
75 Cf. Güzeldere (1997).  “Intention” may involve one of two distinct senses:  Brentano’s aboutness, or teleology 
(goal orientation).  All actions involve an element of “aboutness”, but not vice versa. 
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“depend”.  (Kim, 1984, 263) 
Nevertheless, I simply grant the pessimist’s strongest version of determinism, viz, the 
Laplacean/Newtonian form, the nomological model assumed in CON and amenable to the Hempelian 
covering law model.  My strategy is to show that determinism, even in its most rugged cloth, is autonomy 
friendly.  Chapter 3 rendered this compatibility plausible. 
 Hobbes thought the voluntary was motion in the imagination; metacausality is causal motion in 
metamentality, either laterally or downward, as when the metadesire to have the desire to love the law 
causes the desire to love the law.  Metacausality thus permits determinism friendly ‘agent causation’ as 
top down metacausation.  Hierarchical accounts are considered compatibilist, even by their critics. 
For the most part, advocates of hierarchical accounts see themselves as continuators or 
rehabilitators of classical compatibilism.  (Shatz, 1986, p. 451) 
One reason is that there is nothing inherently indeterministic about metastructural properties. 
 Hume held that unconstrained desires are caused but free; hierarchical accounts attempt to explain 
why and how they are free.  Hierarchical features that might be the basis of a caused free will are (1) 
accord between levels, (2) accord plus some special relation between levels, or (3) absence of inter-level 
discord (Shatz, 1986, p. 453).  The unique feature in my account is higher-order causal control over 
lower-order causal elements.  Since my hierarchical account is intrinsically causal, it is compatible with 
causation.  Since Hume advances an account in which some causes are free, and since my account is 
intrinsically causal, it is neo-Humean.76 
 If freedom is a species of causation, it is empirical, not speculative.  Some think nothing empirical 
can bear on freedom, and laugh at theorists like Libet (2002) who think otherwise, as if the idea is on par 
with empirical tests for Cartesian mind or elan vital, say, weighing a person before and after death.  Some 
hold a Kantian anti-metaphysical view about freedom, as a paralogism, or for other reasons.  But, as 
Hume showed, freedom may be treated empirically by referring to causal differences between folks with 
and without compulsions.  His model is proto-empirical, but empirical work in metacognition is relevant 
here.77 
 A ‘geologic column’ illustrating epochs in geologic time is not an actual column cut into the 
geological layers to be found stacked together in the Earth.  Rather, it is an interpretive construct 
                                                
76 Most accounts focus on features of intention relative to which causation is extrinsic.  Katz’s ‘new intensionalism’ 
focused on intrinsically intensional features of terms, claiming most forms of intensionalism focus on extensional 
(extrinsic) features (1997).  Soft determinism ought, by analogy, to be intrinsically causal; metacausality is 
intrinsically causal. 
77 See Rosenthal (1997, 2000) for a review of empirical research on metacognition. 
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informed by data from astrophysics to chemistry.  Likewise, a ‘causal column’ illustrating stages in causal 
and metacausal history is not an actual column cut into the layers of causation to be found stacked 
together in, say, the mind/brain, or inscribed into its historical record in the metaphorical ‘rings of the 
trunk’ of the evolutionary ‘tree of life’.  Rather, it is an interpretive construct informed by data from 
evolutionary biology to conditioning theory.  This column reflects causal strata:  At one end are purely 
mechanical types, such as that involved in Newton’s billiard balls; at the other end are free actions; and in 
between are life,78 homeostatis, locomotion, brains, mental states, and metamental states.79  Empirically 
significant co-varying properties map onto the causal column; informative generalizations result.  Though 
topically scattered, many empirical studies cited herein support the idea that metacausation is central to 
freedom. 
 Chapter 4 focused on the functional features of off-line states, seen in simulation and other 
phenomena.  Their causal properties are brought out by analysis of metamentality, as in Frankfurt’s 
metadesires and Rosenthal’s HOTs.  Metacausation is a counterfactual causal power to engage off-line 
functioning, a power that need not manifest as action in every case.  Not all off-line activity is metacausal.  
Dreams are off-line, but not necessarily metacausal. 
By destroying neurons in the brain that inhibit movement during sleep, researchers found that 
sleeping cats rose up and attacked or were startled by invisible objects – ostensibly images from 
dreams.  (Winson, 1997, p. 59)80 
This on-line response to off-line stimuli suggests a neural switching system that toggles on-line/off-line 
functions.  Research suggests dreams serve an economizing processing purpose. 
For higher capabilities to develop, the prefrontal cortex would have to become increasing large – 
beyond the capacity of the skull – unless another brain mechanism evolved. 
 REM sleep could have provided this new mechanism, allowing memory processes to occur 
‘off-line’.  Coincident with the apparent development of REM sleep in marsupial and placental 
mammals was a remarkable neuroanatomical change: the prefrontal cortex was dramatically 
                                                
78 Paul Taylor (1986) marks life off as unique in nature, and refers to the novel, unique axiological property of 
living things by calling them “teleological centers of life”. 
79 The points of significance that will turn up on the causal column will be similar to those that appear on the 
emergentist’s history of the world, leading from lifeless matter to consciousness.  See Langer (1967); cf. 
Humphreys (1997).  As Kim points out, however, a deflated version of emergent, namely resultant, poses no 
problems for physicalism (1989). 
80 Hobbes’ hydraulic model of motions in the imagination applies to dreams, a function of “diminishing” sensory 
motions in through the system.  Their diminished power is a function of spatiotemporal distance.  McGinn (2003) 
endorses a hydraulic, Hobbesean view of dreams. 
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reduced in size.  (Winson, 1997, pp. 63-4; emphasis mine) 
Hallucinations, fiction, memory, and language-dependent thought involve off-line elements.  Otherwise 
identical 1st-order mental contents/states with different 2nd-order attitudes about their on-line/off-line 1st-
order status generate radically different causal powers.  Seeing a hallucinatory state as on-line – ‘real’ – 
leads to psychosis; seeing it as off-line can be empowering, as when a schizophrenic realizes a 
hallucination as such.81 
 Though not all off-line processes are metacausal, narrow metacausal power is power to control 
the levers that place lower-order mental/causal sequences on-line/off-line.  Decision and its executive 
power to initiate action are functions of the ability to go on-line after deliberation, and restraint is the 
ability to stop an on-line process from functioning, to take it off-line.  ‘Off-line’ and ‘hierarchy’ are 
contrastive, relative to the on-line processes and n-tuples upon which their meanings are parasitic, 
respectively.  Thus, some off-line functions and hierarchies will more transparently instantiate those 
concepts than others, particularly more isolated off-line functions and more stacked hierarchies.  Though 
we began our just so story with simulation as illustrative, these abilities may have arisen through any 
variety of evolutionary processes, such as language, memory, or dreams, each of which has enabled some 
ability to engender a metacause. 
 Compare the causal differences between the wills of animals and people.  An animal’s will is 
nonhierarchical:  1st-order intentions are directly determined by genetic and environmental factors.  An 
animal is genetically predisposed to aversions, attractions, etc., and congruent objects and events directly 
engage its intentions in immediate S/R sequences.  Since the direction of the transference of motion is 
from environmental S to mental/behavioral R, it is bottom-up causation.  The world/mind contrast need 
not be dichotomous for the bottom up notion to stand, for the determinative locus of such behavior is 
nonmental, exogenous.  There is no psychological space between an S/R pair for an animal to ponder.  
The strongest motivational potential simply issues immediately in behavior.  Such a will is fully on-line 
with the environmental causal nexus.  Animal causation is lower-order, exogenous, but agent causation is 
higher-order, endogenous. 
Agent causation is a rather mysterious doctrine....  Can we find a naturalistic account of the self ... 
that avoids this “obscure and panicky metaphysics” while distinguishing agents sufficiently within 
the causal fabric?  (Dennett, 1984, p. 76, quoting Strawson (1962)) 
                                                
81 Lower-order animal states lack judgement – a deficit that explains those who “freak out” on LSD as lacking the 
higher-order cognitive ability to view the hallucination as off-line. 
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The metacausal theory does that, so it avers a form of determinism friendly agent causation. 
 Dennett says an attribute is natural if evolution could have produced it; this is a “just so” story.  
Dennett gives just so stories for language, consciousness, and other meta-abilities (1984; cf. Humphrey, 
1982).  Since metacausation arises with these abilities, he indirectly showed it is natural.  Folk ascriptions 
that involve mental states (the ascriber’s) about mental states (the target’s) involve some off-line 
metamental functioning.  In Dennett’s just so story, the emergence of thought dovetails with that of 
language as a kind of talking to oneself sotto voce in which the brain’s formerly partitioned 
speaking/hearing functions are linked for the first time (1984, pp. 38-43); he says consciousness may have 
arisen thus, in tandem (1984, p. 42, n. 25).82  Thought and consciousness would be intrapersonal 
communication with dual (sender/receiver) functions on single representations, hence metacognition.  
Apart from psycholinguistic history, most animal mental states are of or about objects and events in their 
immediate environments.  Once an animal acquires a language, however, it is empowered to have mental 
states about objects and events not immediately perceived.83 
 Searle (1994) argues that language-lacking animals need only lack language-dependent mental 
states.  Call mental states that do require language “linguistic states”; examples include those about 
language (e.g., translation), linguistically constituted (e.g., “I have $20”), whose complexity requires 
language (e.g., thermodynamics), that link the thought to an arbitrary system (e.g., April 30, 1993), or that 
represent facts so remote as to require language (e.g., that Napoleon ate good food) (1994, p. 213).  
Language permits states not about the vicinity, e.g., the thought that Superman is from Krypton.  Pains, 
vision, and fear do not require language, so we may ascribe these to animals.  States immediately 
dependent or not on the environment are, respectively, on-line and off-line.  All language involves 
metacognition, a stand in associated with the state in which one is conscious of its referent.  This supports 
the causal column claim that higher mammals have some metacognitive powers, and that humans have 
more.  It is no surprise we are autonomous, for within the off-line space of language, thought, and 
                                                
82 This is inconsistent with his denial of the ‘Cartesian Theater’ as that place in mind in which mental experiences 
occur.  But there can be no unmediated communication, so the medium for intrapersonal communication can be a 
Cartesian Theater, one that makes elbow room built into the very structure of thought (which, for Dennett, is lateral 
– mental/mental – mental causation). 
83 There are alternatives, e.g., memory.  Nonbaptismal language requires memory – recognition of the meaning 
relation.  Recognition of any sort, arguably, involves a metacognitive element.  All our concepts rest on re-
cognition, thus on patterns in experience; see Price (1953).  If so, meaningful experience involves metacognition: 
identifying this experience as the same as that one (true in all linguistic mentation), however preconscious.  As our 
ability to store 10,000 words in computers facilitated complexity of thought, so also did the appearance of 
language. 
 102 
 
consciousness we find the final specs for elbow room.  Endogenous mentality and action is built into the 
metastructure of metamental causation.  In downward causation, intentions result in neuromuscular 
activities. 
 Consider LeDoux’s research:  The fear of seeing a snake is processed faster than the sight of it, 
which traverses a longer path.  LeDoux calls the former “emotional memory”, the latter “declarative 
memory” (1997, pp. 74-5).  Emotional memory is optimally unconscious, but “[d]eclarative memory 
involves explicit, consciously accessible information” (p. 72). 
Pathways originating in the sensory thalamus provide only a crude perception of the external 
world, but because they involve only one neural link, they are quite fast.  In contrast, pathways 
from the cortex offer detailed and accurate representations, allowing us to recognize an object by 
sight or sound.  But these pathways, which run from the thalamus to the sensory cortex to the 
amygdala, involve several neural links.  And each link in the chain adds time.  (1997, p. 74; 
emphasis added) 
The more environmentally significant the less mediated – the less temporal distance in – the neural 
processing.  Metacognition is more metamentally looped, so more neurally mediated than cognition.  
More mediation means more temporal distance, more time for reflexive choice.84  Metamentality loops 
neural functions, so it should be traceable in off-line, distance-rich looped neural networks that realize 
self-regulative consciousness – the grey matter of elbow room.85  Consciousness is unnecessary for 
rapid/unmediated processing of the fight/flight response, yet it empowers one to restrain instinctive in 
favor of rational responses.  Deliberation is rational review of alternatives, weighing short-term and long-
term goals, the ranking of action/outcome pairs.  Even on a Hobbesian model (cf. Ainslie, 2001), it 
involves the ability to transmute animal-type conative propensities and environmental inputs. 
 Frankfurt states that whatever intentions are effective are “volitions” and that freedom involves 
meta-volitions; he fails to give a substantive account of them.  But conflict between intentional orders is 
not the only way to exercise the will,86 for anything that exercises the metacognitive mind may exercise 
the metacausal will.  Meta-volition is not the only route to autonomy; metacausality is more all-inclusive, 
                                                
84 Hamlet aside, factors we are aware of are brought within the “horizon” (Levin, 1979) of options.  Dennett (1984, 
p. 69, n. 31) says there is a point of diminishing returns in competitive contexts like evolution, which favors 
limited-range meta-thinking, “heuristic” deliberation. 
85 Crick suggests the seat of autonomy is “in ... a region receiving many inputs from the higher sensory regions and 
... at or near the higher levels of the motor system” (1994, pp. 267-8). 
86 Though inter-level conflict is vivid, the will is conflict-free and thus less vivid in its ubiquitous appearance; cf. 
the vivid sense of disequilibrium with the mostly unnoticed (ubiquitous) sense of equilibrium.  Moral-conflict-
oriented theorists like Kant, Campbell (1967) and Kane (2002b) ignore its daily (heterogenous) functional abilities. 
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and sheds light on personhood. 
 The structure of the will is embodied in idiolectical psychoneural pathways that instantiate the 
labyrinthine configuration of the metacausal mind.87  Autonomy links to identity because persons are 
individuated by conative identifications and alienations (Frankfurt, 1987), and their value rankings 
(Watson, 1975) are soft-wired into the metacausal structure of their will, and its associated wet-wired 
neural underpinnings (Benson, 1996).  As Frankfurt (1987) put it, 
[T]hese acts of ordering and of rejection – integration and separation [of approved and 
disapproved motivations – ] create a self....  They define the intrapsychic constraints and 
boundaries with respect to which a person’s autonomy may be threatened....  (p. 170-1) 
The self-creation of approving of one’s desires links freedom, identity, and value. 
The normative component of reason-sensitivity gives some substance to the metaphorical 
identification of a man with his values.  A man embodies his conception of what he ought to be to 
the extent [that] his desires are his because they have passed the test of his reason.  He is, to that 
extent, a self-created self.  (Levin, 1979, p. 249) 
Frankfurt further develops this link between the hierarchical will and personhood: 
[A] function of decision is to integrate the person both dynamically and statically.  Dynamically 
insofar as it provides ... for coherence and unity of purpose over time; statically insofar as it 
establishes ... a reflexive or hierarchical structure by which the person’s identity may be in part 
constituted.  (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 175; italics added) 
Our deepest values and ends – static normative and motivational structures – are realized via dynamic 
decision making in the psychoneural configuration of reflexive mind.  Metacausality is central, but only 
top down metacausality is autonomous; this is strong/narrow metacausality. 
 Like Goebbels or Pharaoh (Stump, 1993), suppose fanatic “Q” wants to harden his own heart 
against uncharacteristic compassion for his enemies.  If indoctrination is internalized and Q uses it to 
sculpt himself as such, he displays the sort of self-regulation my account identifies as autonomous.  But Q 
seems intuitively unfree; his beliefs are overdetermined by indoctrination with which he identifies.  The 
genesis of the indoctrination is the key:  Did Q elect it as a young idealist as prescriptivists say we choose 
ultimate values, or was it spoon fed at a pre-agential stage?  Was Q brainwashed, or socialized by 
community?  Causal history matters – what Fischer and Ravizza call ‘tracing’ (1998).  How much 
                                                
87 I highlight “psychoneural” to dispel the implicit dualism that would separate mind and brain.  See Searle (1992) 
and Northoff (1999) for a defense of mind/brain monism. 
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uncoerced sculpting came from Q’s agential or pre-agential “self-forming” stages matters to 
compatibilists (Mele, 1995) and incompatibilists (Kane, 2002b) alike. 
 If another agent controls Q, Q lacks agential self-control.  Even if some self-control is present, if it 
is surreptitiously or insidiously manipulated by another agent, it is then not Q’s agency that is responsible 
for his behavior.  If there is no agency behind Q, but bad luck, then Q is just unfortunate.  If Q was 
brainwashed, changed, and basically restructured as an agent, he loses some responsibility for self, but 
maintains responsibility as an agent with minimally sufficient metacausal powers.  Metacausal beings 
author some of their mental states,88 and so sculpt themselves.  They consciously hold the reins to their 
modes of being and acting; they are autotelic.  Wantons’ modes of being and behaving are fully 
determined by lower-order mental states, and these are fully determined by genetic and environmental 
conditions. 
 It is productive to focus on metacausal states; once we isolate their functional properties, we may 
look for neural links with activities such as simulation, as foreshadowed in Locke (1690): 
For, the mind having ... a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires ... is 
at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.  
In this lies the liberty man has....  (Essay, II, XXI, p. 48) 
The power to suspend or execute is to go off-line or on-line; it covers most cognitive processes.  Akrasia 
is noncontrol over conations, failure to keep sub-optimal conations off-line.89 
 Skilled meditators illustrate control over autonomic nervous system functions and can uncouple 
cognitive/somatic processes.  Trance-invoking techniques inhibit somatosensory responses to 
environmental stimuli (e.g., proprioception), which “neurophysiological habituation” explains the 
phenomenology of transcendent experiences (Anand et al., 1961).  This top down ability disengages mind 
from lower-order, S/R type causation.  Nozick’s soundless stereo example describes meditation – in 
deflated terms – as “an unusual procedure of experiencing wherein most but not all functions are damped 
down” (1981, p. 159).  Even on such a deflated reading, however, meditation thus involves the ability to 
switch cognitive/conative functions on/off, to go on-line/off-line. 
                                                
88 Non-voluntarism is tautological for purely alethic beliefs, whose content is not constituted by the believer’s 
mental states.  But not all beliefs are purely alethic, so some may be voluntary.  But we can indirectly alter even 
alethic beliefs; see, e.g., Elster (1979). 
89 Recent popular studies link addictions and kleptomania – paradigms of unfreedom – to serotonin re-uptake 
failure and related neurotransmitter problems.  This suggests inability to switch between on-line/off-line 
functioning is due to a blown neural fuse.  Analogy:  The driver hits the brakes, but the car doesn’t stop, a 
psychoneural, top down mental causation linkage problem. 
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 If the neuronal body matrix theory designed to account for phantom limbs is correct, then perhaps 
meditators just inhibit this neuro-matrix.  In discussing phantom limbs, Melzack states, 
In essence, I postulate that the brain contains a neuromatrix, or network of neurons, that, in 
addition to responding to sensory stimulation, continuously generates a characteristic patterns of 
impulses indicating that the body is intact and unequivocally one’s own.  I have called this pattern 
a neurosignature.  If such a matrix operated in the absence of sensory inputs from the periphery of 
the body, it would create the impression of having a limb even after that limb has been removed.  
(1997, p. 87; emphases added) 
The brain seems to map perceptions onto a body matrix neural construct that explains phantom limbs and 
also yogis’ extra-corporeal experiences, confirmed by the homologous brainwaves of meditators and 
sleepers.  The yogi takes the body construct off-line, as the sleeper’s brain does. 
 Of dreams, Winson (1997) asserts that the ability to take somatosensory and other 
cognitive/conative processes off-line serves a simple survival purpose:  to inhibit movement in dreaming 
animals.  On his analysis of the somatosensory dissociative process that occurs during dreams, the brain 
in REM/dream sleep inhibits motor neurons associated with locomotion and proprioceptive mechanisms 
normally operative in the feedback loop for orientation, or else the organism would engage in locomotion 
while unconscious in response to dream content – as occasionally happens when a dog is seen kicking in 
its sleep.   
 Recall Winson’s remarks (above) about the evolutionary purpose of dreaming in allowing memory 
processing to occur ‘off-line’ and the reduced prefrontal cortex it requires (1997).  Greater attentional 
ability is correlated with lesser neural activity, ability to narrow down cognitive functions to essentials 
(Hamilton, 1976, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1977, 1984); this is top down, metacognitive-to-neural causation.  
Epileptics who use biofeedback to produce any alteration in brainwave patterns decrease the frequency 
and duration of seizures (a paradigm of constraint) (Olton and Noonberg, 1980).  This suggests that any 
increase in metacausal control might decrease the frequency and duration of constrained states, but this 
is an empirical matter. 
 Since organisms are locomotory, they are off-line relative to billiard balls and objects that are only 
directly and immediately subject to laws of motion, and as such are entirely exogenously determined.  The 
causal difference between entities only subject to laws of motion versus other forms of determination 
maps onto the difference between living and non-living things.  Billiard balls are globally on-line and 
lower-order determined; organisms are not equally on-line, not entirely lower-order determined.  The 
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more evolved, the more local the relevant causal nexus, and the less on-line relative to global (Newtonian) 
determinism.  This confirms the causal column and supports my objections against global “L” in CON. 
 World/mind causation involves exogenous stimuli that immediately determine an organism’s I/O 
states, whereas mind/mind causation involves endogenous stimuli that mediately determine an organism’s 
I/O states.  The causes of metacausal states are mental; the causes of lower-order states are not.  Persons 
are non-superficially metaphysically responsible for actions that they metacausally author; they are 
“deeply” responsible (Wolf, 1990), not just superficially – merely causally – responsible.90  Our account 
of deeply causal responsibility can ground an account of moral responsibility and related attributive 
practices. 
 When objects stimulate the senses, they cause Walter’s ‘percepts’ (2002); this is exogenous, 
lower-order, bottom up mental causation, as in Descartes’s perception of wax’s sensory qualities.  Non-
sensory intentional states need not be, and so are at a causal remove from the more immediately 
exogenous determination of sensory states.  A non-sensory state might be about wax substance, not given 
in perception.  Even if intentional states are genetically related to sensory states, they are still at a causal 
remove from sensory states.   
 This causal remove warrants a hierarchical construal of the distinct kinds of mental causation 
involved (sensory, intentional), though these need not be dichotomous.  Sensory states are caused almost 
entirely and directly exogenously; intentional states are not.  So, beliefs with purely mathematical, logical, 
or tautological contents (e.g., 2+2=4, Pv~P, or A=A) have fewer immediately environmental factors, in 
their etiology,91 than perceptual beliefs. 
 The less environmental the etiology – the more distance between environmental causes and agent 
effects – the more metacausal, and vice versa.92  Distance entails that a state’s off-line status entails 
greater neural processing distance from environmental causation.  LeDoux’s (1997, pp. 74-5) studies 
support this.  If intentional states are interdependent,93 even lower-order ones are more removed than 
purely sensory states.  Even the non-cognitive higher-order neural processes that subserve mentality, e.g., 
                                                
90 Davidson’s sort of deviant linkages between reasons and causes (1968) involve superficial causal responsibility; 
nondeviant links involve deep causal responsibility. 
91 This holds on a Quinean/holistic view of the a priori as centrality in our conceptual framework, for the more 
central the beliefs, the further their causal distance from the “contact boundary” (Perls, 1947) with what Quine 
(1953) calls “the tribunal of experience”. 
92 The more basic the science, the lower the causation type on the causal column; the higher on the column, the 
more local the relevant causal nexus referred to in correct explanations. 
93 Intentional content is a function of the inferential roles a belief plays in the system; so, it must be partly holistic, 
as must be the neural functions that subserve it. 
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that go into binding, involve greater systemic distance if inherently holistic.  If each intention functions 
systemically, none is directly bottom-up determined, but even if not holistic, metacognition is integrated 
in indexical apperception. 
 Propositional attitudes involve an extra functional step, for there is surely more elbow room in 
attitude Ap than with p – whether the attitude is de re or de dicto.94  The more elbow room from the 
greater neuro-complexity built into metacognitive states, the more metacausality.  Rosenthal’s HOTs 
model puts conscious states’ higher-order components at a remove from lower-order ones relative to 
which they derive hierarchical status.  Akratic states are objects of consciousness.  Thus, though all 
higher-order qua mental states about others, not all conscious states are strongly metacausal.  Some are 
about perceptual states, such as being aware that one is looking at an object, still a mental state even if the 
latter component is de re.  There is little within one’s power about being in a state of being aware that one 
is looking at an object:  The awareness seems a brute fact, as does the perceptual object.  And that would 
make it appear that the state is environmentally determined, a kind of bottom up causation in which 
environment causes perception and the consciousness of the perception too – de re or dicto.  If so, then 
there would be metacognition without metacausality, or metacausality without autonomy. 
 But experience reveals that the mere fact that one is conscious of perceptual states enables one to 
redirect one’s consciousness elsewhere, and that makes consciousness metacausal.  Chalmers’ bridge law 
is that consciousness involves the ability to verbalize and act on the object of awareness, and vice versa 
(1997, p. 36).95  Thus, it makes sense to hold that conscious perceptual states are metacausality 
empowering, one important causal step away from perceptual states that aren’t conscious.96  So, 
consciousness of mental states – metacognition – is a metaphysical condition for the ability to alter them, 
even if all that involves is verbalizing it or looking away.  Attention training can thus enhance autonomy.  
Ability to avert eyes is ability to alter perceptual states, aided by attention.  Ability to stop drifting in 
daydreams requires that one ‘catch oneself unawares’; this contrasts with the lack of attention and control 
that attends dreaming.  Attention is the empowering variable. 
                                                
94 All (pro, con, neutral) attitudes toward p are mental states about p; p is a representational state; ergo, all attitudes 
are metamental, whether the object state signified by “p” is construed de re or de dicto.  Animal mentality lacks 
room for judgement:  Content arises automatically, as if the pro attitude is hard-wired without any mediation 
between attitude and content.  Animal mentality is attitude-poor, so elbow-room-poor.  The attitudes enhance elbow 
room. 
95 Pre-linguistic beings are counterexamples to the verbalizing component, but this can be fixed by dropping the 
biconditional for a one-way conditional (verbal to conscious only). 
96 Searle’s connection principle says mental states are accessible to consciousness.  If joined with Chalmers’ bridge 
law, the range of autonomous control covers all mentality. 
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 The metacausal view of akrasia is similar to hierarchical views in terms of higher-order over 
lower-order mental states.  Where Agent succeeds, the agency is metacausal; in akratic cases, it is not.  If 
there are compulsive metaintentions, they are not metacausal; atypically, bottom up causation exceeds its 
usual parameters.  One can calmly and knowingly just eat the negatively valued cake, but this is just what 
makes it akratic, since it is negatively valued – otherwise it wouldn’t be a problem at all.97  Meta-powers 
are voluntary, so one may not use them effectively or at all.  It is the meta-power to stop the cake eating 
sequence that makes it plausible that Agent is “allowing” herself the cake; she can refrain, but doesn’t.  
Without the meta-power to refrain, her responsibility is diminished, as is the child’s or dog’s, who lack 
metacausal control altogether. 
 If the causation is not top down controllable, it is not narrowly metacausal, autogenous, or 
autonomous, so there can be no compulsive metacausal hierarchies.  Not every metacognitive state is 
strongly metacausal, but every strongly metacausal state is headed by consciousness, in line with the idea 
that consciousness is central to freedom.  In the conscious, metacausal space of deliberative rationality, 
1st-order options are reviewed, selected, and engaged from a higher-order (Lockean) vantage; this is the 
metacausal model of elbow room. 
 For Rosenthal, consciousness is a thought whose content is another mental state.  But 
consciousness is often intuitively a qualitative or non-intentional awareness of another mental state, not a 
“thought”.  Awareness would be analogous to sensory qualia – not necessarily intentional.  Intention is 
inessential to the conscious side of conscious states, regardless of its object, so it does not require a that-
clause, e.g., grief about severe pain.  Consciousness may function as a field in which thoughts and 
sensations are registered, which would explain why the sensory and intentional are not reducible to each 
other, and have only consciousness in common, or as Searle says, the disposition to consciousness 
(1992).98 
 If consciousness is not just another level in an intentional hierarchy, then this provides an 
additional functional difference between sensory and intentional hierarchies and the conscious states that 
top them.  If the top element of a metacausal state is conscious, it is different in kind from the element 
linked with the environment, and so at a causal remove.99  This provides a non-arbitrary reason to stop 
                                                
97 It is doubtful that the experience would not itself reveal an element of negative value, e.g., feelings of self-
loathing, alternating between hurrying and interrupting the eating, etc. 
98 G. Strawson (1997) says for all we know consciousness may function as a “field of forces”; cf. Kinsbourne 
(1992).  This idea undermines Dennett’s arguments against the Cartesian theater, grounds a Kane-style account, and 
undermines Rosenthal’s senses/thoughts dichotomy. 
99 The idea that sensory states are more immediately determined than intentional ones helps explain the 
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iterating intentions, for a hierarchy may be topped simply by consciousness. 
 Consciousness is the control lever fed by what long-term memory (“LTM”) and its neural grooves 
identify as salient, forming cognitive/conative gestalts from sensory experience before slow-moving 
conscious attention arrives.  Agent’s dynamic consciousness and static will stops the regress.  Kane 
(2002b) calls this the “self system”, whereby present choices are not unfree, though they appear so, so 
long as they result from Agent’s prior “self-forming actions”.  This is fine, but Kane is an indeterminist, 
and a determinism friendly version will do. 
 There are nonarbitrary limits to attention and the number of reflexive loopings that can be held in 
consciousness.  Dennett’s arguments in favor of “heuristic” – time-limit sensitive – deliberation, as 
opposed to the “perfect” deliberation that would kill Buridan’s donkey (1984, p. 69, n. 31), show 
evolution favors a limited range of meta-thinking.  And so for our “last stop: consciousness” reply to the 
regress problem.  The metacausal mind is topped by the ‘Elbow Room’,100 the conscious, functional 
control tower for executing decisions and actions. 
 For Dennett, agent-based control is just tropisms joined over evolutionary time.  He is impressed 
that we can “go meta-” with feedback loops, but – like Frankfurt – doesn’t specify the causal/functional 
features of looped processes as the bases of autonomy.  The metacausal model does:  Reflexive causation 
leads to metacausation, which allows integrated conscious control of the subsystems of agency.  This is a 
causal/functional ability wasps don’t enjoy. 
 Metacausation comports with Hobbes’ idea that actions are voluntary iff their causes are in the 
imagination, which is metacognitive.  In the Leviathan, exogenous motion is transmuted into endogenous 
motion in the imagination – “diminishing sense”.  Compare our idea that environmental inputs may be 
redirected, as in diverting one’s gaze.  Hydraulic ‘force’ is “diminished” the more it moves through mind.  
Thus, consciousness of exogenous forces diminishes their effect.  As exogenous causes work their way 
into the hierarchy they are “diminished” or transmuted by Distance within Agent.101 
                                                                                                                                                                     
phenomenological intuition of acausality in deliberation, lacking in animal causation. 
100 Dennett calls the psychological space of visual experience the “Cartesian Theater” and “argues on theoretical 
grounds that it does not exist” (Crick and Koch, 1997, p. 25).  But the Elbow Room may be located in the Cartesian 
Theater – not to imply a literal field onto which experience is projected (like film), but there must be a functional 
equivalent.  The brain schematizes a body matrix onto which it projects proprioception (Winson, 1997); perhaps 
this is how it maps experiences in a functional Cartesian Theater.  If so, brain constructs experience – 
constructivism, not reductionism.  If so, autonomy has been constructed by natural selection as the brain’s reflexive 
control tower from which conative control levers are accessible. 
101 This transmutation from psychophysical micro-level contact with the perceptual environment to macro-level 
metacausation virtually cancels out micro-level determination the way micro-indeterminacy cancels out at the 
macro-level.  But a transmutation of causation at the meta-level is not a break with causation. 
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 Autonomy involves the metacausal ability to engage or disengage lower-order systems, and 
explains why ability to raise one’s arm is seen as a proof of freedom, and why libertarians and others 
reject the equation of motive with intention.  We can raise our arm intentionally but without any motive 
other than the intention to do so.  This grounds the idea that efforts and willings are causal factors in 
action, and explains why we are impressed by great works, deeply authored by Agent efforts. 
 Chalmers’ (1997) bridge law supports the link with autonomy:  Metacausal consciousness forms a 
gestalt of higher-order self-regulative control over the lower-order cognitive/conative abilities and 
systems accessible to consciousness that make up agency. 
[C]onsciousness ... is a matter of having certain sorts of ability.  To be conscious is, for instance, 
to see and hear.  Whether somebody can see or hear is a matter of whether he can discriminate 
between certain things, and whether he can discriminate between certain things is something that 
we can test....  (Kenny, 1972, p. 43; emphasis added.) 
Kenny’s view of consciousness as an ability links consciousness and autonomy, for autonomy is an 
abstract collection of cognitive/conative abilities, the levers of which are integrated in consciousness.  
Akrasia is more general than just the inter-level motivational failure hierarchicalists say it is.  For if 
continence is control over all cognitive/conative or sensorimotor behavior, e.g., micturation, then 
incontinence is the lack thereof.102  
 Causal/metacausal control/noncontrol is the appropriate category for continence/incontinence, and 
extends beyond motivational continence/incontinence, and beyond issues of responsibility, to the artistic, 
intellectual, and the athletic, explaining how they are deeply attributable to us, and why they are also 
appropriate targets for reactive attitudes.  Consciousness is more on the cognitive/input side, autonomy 
more on the conative/output side, but without a dichotomy, for they are integrated:  We have control over 
what we are conscious of.  Frankfurt states, 
A creature engaged in secondary responsiveness is monitoring its own condition; [thus, it is closer 
to being in a position] to do something about [it].  (1987, p. 163) 
Feedback aids teleological reorienting; consciousness is a feedback mechanism linked to motor ability, a 
combination with survival value.  These are zoological facts of organismic locomotion (Langer, 1967; 
Stelnach, 1976).  Consciousness and autonomy integrate the I/O interactions of intelligent negotiation – 
organismic self-regulation – on the evolutionary road of survival.  Some issues are so survival basic as to 
                                                
102 Compare the incontinence of a disabled person and a dieter with sweet tooth.  The former lacks motor control 
and the latter does not, but the latter has diminished control over the motivational inputs to her motor activity with 
respect to seeking, grabbing and eating the sweets. 
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bypass consciousness (LeDoux, 1997), but most benefit from being looped through consciousness.  I/O-
integrated conscious autonomy makes for good predators and poor prey. 
 This undermines epiphenomenalism, for consciousness homeostatically navigates threats to its 
functional integrity.  Twin Earth zombie replicas are impossible:  Determinism and materialism entail that 
there must be a physical difference between otherwise identical twins only one of which has mental – 
higher-order neural – states. 
[W]orlds that are microphysically identical are one and the same world....  Even those who would 
reject this universal thesis of microdeterminism might find the following more restrictive thesis 
plausible:  worlds that are microphysically identical are one world from the physical point of view.  
(Kim, 1984, p. 263)103 
Rather than debunk consciousness, the zombie hypothesis begs the question against determinism. The 
problem is in the hidden dualist presupposition that the mental is not physical.  For instance, 
If the pain is to play a causal role in the withdrawal of my hand, it must [make] use of the usual 
physiological causal path to this bodily event; it looks as though the causal path from the pain to 
the limb motion must merge with the physiological path at a certain point....  But at what point 
does the mental causal path from the pain “merge” with the physiological path?  If there is such a 
point, that must be where psychophysical causal action takes place.  The trouble, of course, is that 
it is difficult to conceive the possibility of some nonphysical event causally influencing the course 
of physical processes.  (Kim, 1984, p. 266; emphasis added) 
If mental states are higher-order physical ones, and we can make sense of downward causation; 
metacausation just is downward causal control. 
 Most of the empirical evidence cited earlier helps to show how downward (psychoneural) 
causation is possible and so supports the physicalist view of mind. 
[T]he only direct way of explaining why a general supervenience relation holds ... is to appeal to 
... appropriate correlations between specific supervenient properties and their subvenient bases.  If 
these specific correlations are themselves explainable, so much the better; but whether or not they 
are, invoking them would constitute the first necessary step....  These correlations are logically 
contingent and empirically discovered; though they are not further explainable, they constitute our 
                                                
103 Physicalism entails minds are higher-order brain states (Searle, 1992; G. Strawson, 1997).  Thus, some 
mind/brain states cause other mind/brain states, and the causing/effected brain states each may be higher or lower.  
Physicalism thus implies any atom-for-atom replica of mine is conscious, since I am.  Thus, there can be no 
unconscious zombie replicas. 
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ground, both evidential and explanatory, of the supervenience of the mental on the physical.  
(Kim, 1989, p. 159) 
Chalmers’ bridge law is a way to conceive specific supervenience correlations, and to support the idea 
that Agent need not be in an occurrent metacausal state to be free, e.g., when reading, since consciousness 
brings with it a disposition to control.  This is counterfactually metacausal voluntariness, and makes 
nonreflective mental states candidates for responsibility. 
 Compare K and K'; both do x:  If K does x because he wants to, but lacks ability to want 
otherwise, K’s behavior is minimally voluntary – an improvement over Sphex’s, but not fully free.  If K' 
is identical except K' has causal/counterfactual control over his wanting to x, K' is more free than K.  In 
Frankfurt’s example (1969), agent A cannot (because of mad scientist B) do otherwise, but is responsible 
because he doesn’t want to anyway.  But A lacks causal control over his wants, so A is not fully free, even 
if responsible.  Since B will prevent A in the event A intends to use his powers, A is equivalent to K 
under B’s control, unbeknownst to A.  But since A normally enjoys the causal/counterfactual abilities of 
K', and none of A’s choices other than x are affected, his inability to not x seems innocuous, but if he 
lacked such control over all his choices, it wouldn’t seem so innocuous anymore.  A background of full 
agency matters. 
 A is not fully free, and conditionalism stands.  Frankfurt adduced this case against the idea that 
freedom requires strong possibilities, access to forking futures.  His counterexample suggests that absent 
strong possibilities, A chose x without B’s interference freely.  But if A would have chosen x had he had 
the ability to choose not x, then he voluntarily, but only partly freely, chose x, but is responsible for x.  I 
argue later that the impression of freedom in this case only makes sense because A is not normally K-like, 
but K'-like.  Inability to do otherwise is inability to causally control one’s doings.  Thus, full autonomy 
still requires ability to do otherwise, not just to do what one wants when there are no alternatives. 
 Were an Intervener ready to prevent motor execution of a choice to move one’s body, that would 
illustrate why metacausal control over one’s entire system – not just the formation of one’s intentions – is 
necessary for full autonomy, and why in Frankfurt Cases intuitions linger to the effect that Agent lacks 
full autonomy though he is still responsible.  One could satisfy the metacausal criterion in general without 
satisfying the conditional one in particular if one exhibits full metacausal control over every feature of 
one’s life except one instance of x that Intervener stands by ready to alter, if necessary.  Again, if that is 
the only one, and Agent would have done it with or without Intervener, there is little threat to autonomy, 
but if most or all actions are so, there is a big threat to autonomy.  Given PAP-inspired worries about 
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alternatives under determinism, satisfaction of the weaker metacausal condition would be enough for 
compatibilism.  Put differently, PAPW1 suffices in a given case if PAPW2 is satisfied in one’s overall 
system. 
 Chalmers’ bridge law helps explain the relations between voluntarism, full autonomy, and our 
attributive practices.  Premeditated acts merit deeper attributions of causal responsibility, thus deeper 
normative ascriptions.  The metacausal account is thus an ontological account, unlike Wolf’s normative 
account (1990) on which freedom is a function of reasons-sensitivity.  Folks sensitive to and able to act on 
reasons are free and responsible.  Wolf adopts Nozick’s (1981) truth tracking idea – that S’s beliefs are 
epistemically competent iff S would believe p if p, and S wouldn’t believe p if ~p – and applies it to 
sensing and acting on reasons.  The result is reason-sensitivity as the criterion of agent competency or 
responsibility – S’s acts are reasons-sensitive iff S would act on R if R is the best available reason, and S 
wouldn’t act on R if R isn’t.  Paradigms of unfreedom, from kidnap victims to addicts, stuck with the 
reason that moves them, unable to grasp or act on better ones, are not reasons-sensitive. 
 Wolf (1990) rejects autonomy as either subject to vicious regress or unattainable: 
[F]or [Agent] to be autonomous ... not only must [Agent’s] behavior be governable by her self, her 
self must in turn be governable by [her deeper self] and this must in turn be governable by her 
(still deeper?) self, ad infinitum.  If there are forces behind [Agent]..., making [Agent] what she is, 
then her control of her behavior is [superficial].  But if there are no forces behind [Agent]..., then 
her identity seems to be arbitrary....  But this would seem to exhaust not just the empirical but the 
logical possibilities:  Either something is behind [Agent], making [Agent] what she is, or nothing 
is.  The idea of an autonomous agent appears to be the idea of a prime mover unmoved whose self 
can endlessly account for itself and for the behavior it intentionally exhibits....  But this idea seems 
... impossible.  (p. 14) 
Wolf’s dichotomy ignores alternatives in which degrees of autonomy and self emerge gradually,104 as in 
our discussions about the link between autonomy and personhood as a gradual ego function of higher-
order toward lower-order preferences.  Autonomy is not unattainable or subject to regress. 
                                                
104 Her dichotomy ignores gradations in the causal column and idiosyncratic self-stylings that form a metacausal 
agent.  The “self network” (Kane, 2002) or “self system” (Dretske, 1988; Velleman, 1992) consists of those 
characteristics Agent identifies with and alienates himself from through his “self-forming actions” (Kane, 2002).  
Since there is no need for indeterminism here, as actualism has been shown implausible, this self system suffices on 
the determinism friendly Frankfurt/Perls model I have defended.  For potential links between the self system 
concept and cognitive neuroscience, see Walter (2001, ch. 3), Flanagan (1992), A. Damasio (1994), and Damasio, 
Damasio, and Christen (1996). 
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 Wolf calls “Reason” the ability to track “the True and the Good”, and adds value tracking to truth 
tracking.  Rational compulsion may be desirable in purely alethic contexts, for we want our beliefs to 
track reality, but not in evaluative or decision-theoretic contexts, for that is where we expect and want 
some ‘play’ – elbow room – between reasons and actions.  Davidson sees this same space between 
“theoretical” and “practical” reasoning as what makes akrasia possible (1980). 
 Wolf’s rejection of autonomy expresses a strained Cartesian and Kantian idea.  Wolf (1990) 
avoids this with Dennett’s (1984) Luther, who is so morally good that he must do good, as an acceptable 
case of rational compulsion.  Acting under Reason is offered as a normative alternative to autonomy.  
What she adds to the Nozickian, Cartesian, Kantian elements is value tracking:  Responsible and free 
agents’ values and actions are sensitive to and determined by the Good and the True.  Value tracking is 
epistemic, not metaphysical.  But since truth tracking entails alethic non-relativism, it is inconsistent with 
alethic relativism; relativistic value tracking is oxymoronic.  Although she attempts to back away from 
strong ethical cognitivism in the last chapter of her work (1990), Wolf’s True and Good tracking model 
remains sufficiently pluralistic, but it remains normatively top heavy.  Self-regulation is not beholden to 
metaethical theory. 
 Wolf says autonomy adds nothing to reason-sensitivity; but there are concrete benefits to 
autonomy seen in, say, attention training.  Indeed, reason-sensitivity can be constrained, e.g., an insistence 
on rationality in arational contexts.  Ability to disengage ratiocination is useful; so is ability to simulate 
reason.  One’s beliefs and desires may be licit, but 1st-order determined, e.g., K, who cannot operate 
metacausally.  Such angelic beings lack psychological structure.  For Frankfurt, 1st-order beings – even 
reason-sensitives – are wantons, neither free nor unfree.  The ability to take any psychophysical 
mechanism off-line is a form of autonomy; several such abilities form the psychoneural structure of our 
autonomy.  Martians with twice our sensorimotor systems – e.g., prehensile tails, digitized vocal chords – 
could double our autonomy, as could species with greater metacognitive abilities.  Each is worth having, 
if for no other reason than in its capacity as an amplifier of our elbow room.  As Dennett (1984) says, 
[I] do have a reason for a modicum of ‘radical freedom’, if it will protect me from the wily 
advertisers out there who are always trying to ‘read my mind’....  [O]ur meta-level control thinking 
may lead us to want to eschew tactics or control strategies that run the risk of being too fully 
understood, and hence anticipated, by a competitor....  (p. 66) 
Dennett says “poker face unpredictability” has evolutionary merit (1984).  Mele (1995) discusses 
scenarios with reason-sensitives as the easiest marks for a type of ‘covert non-constraining controller’ 
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(“CNC”) who manipulates his prey by manipulating its environment (p. 179).  Since autonomy over 
reason-sensitivity adds to ‘poker face’ against CNCs and other pattern studying predators, evolution 
grounds autonomy, particularly in intelligent social species.  Reason-sensitivity is just another autonomy 
amplifier. 
 Since mental states are accessible to consciousness,105 and can be verbalized and acted upon, they 
are dispositions to autonomy.  This captures the link between freedom and consciousness.  Some think 
autonomy is inconsistent with determinism and physicalism.  Two incompatibilist responses to this 
tension are counterintuitive.  The first is hylephobia, Dennett’s term for fear of materialism (1984, p. 91), 
and leads philosophers to accounts that flout physicalism, e.g., libertarianism, dualism.  The second is 
hylephilia, my term for what Sapolsky calls “physics envy”, which leads philosophers to think that if 
something cannot be given a reductive explanation in the vocabulary of physics, then it must be false.106  
A third response is compatibilism; its burden is to show how autonomy arises naturally but supports 
incompatibilist intuitions.  This constitutes an adequacy condition on our error theory. 
It is clear that if such a positive account can be given, it will have to declare the intuitions that 
support [the] vision of the self as unmoved mover to be a sort of cognitive illusion....  It does seem 
somewhat as if we must be unmoved movers; if it only seems to be so, what makes it seem to be 
so?  (Dennett, 1984, p. 76) 
My account shows the features of autonomy that make it seem to be so – why agents feel exempt from the 
causal/physical realm, free to do otherwise under identical circumstances. 
 Autonomous agents have a metacausal ability that feels like an acausal version of Locke’s “power 
to suspend the execution” (1690, p. 48) of lower-order conations.  Metacausality explains these intuitions.  
Metacauses are higher-order states attended and mediated by consciousness, itself a higher-order state 
(Searle, 1992) that shifts organismic control to a looped, conscious feature of the brain.  This control shift 
transmutes lower-order causation at the higher-order conscious level, and that makes it 
phenomenologically akin to a break with causation, though there is no break.  Since we usually do what 
we want, but aren’t conscious of how our wants are determined, we feel like prime movers unmoved.  But 
                                                
105 This is Searle’s connection principle (1992).  Fodor proposed a “counter-connection” principle (1992), saying 
any conscious state could become unconscious, but that violates the unidirectionality of causality in dispositional 
claims.  Chalmers (1996) supports this idea, for any information state, even one with only pain as content, is 
capable of being acted on. 
106 Sapolsky says this is the cause of reductionism in special sciences.  Studies show excess testosterone causes 
aggression, minimal amounts are necessary, but in middle range other factors engender a “permissive effect” (1997, 
p. 47); so, aggression cannot be reduced to testosterone. 
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Ockham’s razor favors soft determinism, for one can solve the easy problem without indeterminism. 
 Mele (2002, 2003) favors a touch of indeterminism in the deliberative process where it would 
appear rational to want it, in the creative mechanism that generates reasons for deliberative consideration, 
which might produce a greater range of considerations.  If determinism is true, Mele will fall back on his 
nearly identical soft determinism (id.).  We want greater elbow room, and a theory-level reason for 
wanting this is that if determinism is false, CON collapses.  But pragmatic reasons for wanting elbow 
room are mere Pascalian hopes (cf. Honderich’s “life hopes”, 1993), and we have defeated CON without 
indeterminacy.  Mele has no evidence that the mechanism feeding deliberation is indeterministic, but all 
that recommends the hope is its desirability if indeterminism might increase elbow room.  Indeterministic 
accounts have been charged with serving no desirable purpose, so the mere desirability of indeterminism 
is relevant, but does not support the claim that indeterminacy exists or is superior to pseudo-randomness.  
The easy problem approach rejects any need for indeterminacy.  Dennett shows (1981, 1984, 2003) 
pseudo-randomness renders genuine randomness unnecessary on all relevant counts. 
 However, I reject the bluff that quantum indeterminacy does not bear on freedom.  For if a single 
event in world history, other than the first, was metaphysically random, CON fails independently of my 
arguments, for then initial conditions and laws do not jointly entail P.  The bluff is that even if micro-
indeterminacy holds, it is of such vanishing magnitude as to “cancel out” before reaching the macro level, 
where psychological determinism still holds.  But any indeterminacy defeats CON.  Even if macro-
determinism holds, CON fails, since what grounds the claim that determinism undermines freedom is the 
idea that decision is caused by the forces of physics.  Remove the explanatory power of physics and its 
nomological closure, and CON falls, as would reductionism absent the closure of the physical domain.  
Without CON’s global/nomological closure, psychological determinism fails, for there are non-
psychological determinants of behavior.  So, too, for other forms of determinism – each is likewise 
defeated by the others in the absence of the unifying power of physico-nomological closure to integrate 
them under the all-encompassing L that pushes world state instants in fatalistic fashion. 
 Mele argues for agnostic autonomism (2002), and in this his account approximates my own, but he 
does not advocate a metacausal theory of autonomy.  The metacausal model can work either way, but the 
easy problem’s dialectical simplicity favors determinism.  Thus, I have a theory-neutral reason for an 
agnosticism that favors determinism; by contrast, Mele prefers indeterminism, but he lacks a sufficiently 
neutral account that supports his preference.  Intuitions about the spontaneity of will are insufficient to 
support indeterminism. 
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 The heterogeneity of the will, recall, fosters diverse paradigms of freedom:  Whim supports an 
acausal model; deliberation, a reasons-sensitive one.  Few address the question of what “the will” consists 
in per se.  Frankfurt (1971) distinguishes freedom of will from freedom of action, and Ainslie (2001) has a 
comprehensive theory of the will, but little to say about freedom.  Frankfurt’s model informs mine, but 
Ainslie’s informs my strategy, for he lays out what I take to be adequacy conditions on a theory of will, 
which I adopt with modifications.  In my view, the will is real, something to be explained – not explained 
away – by reference to (1) its substance (components), (2) its form (structure), (3) its function (the 
operations it performs on its components), and (4) its causal powers (the causal relationships possible 
among these three factors in the production of Agent’s behavior).  This view of the will is resultantism 
(Kim, 1989) or “pseudo-emergentism”, not panicky metaphysics. 
 Autonomy is a conative/motor-nerve-involving ability of evolved species.  Though sensory ability 
is essential to orienting, world tracking aspects of action, distinctive of conative will is its doing, world 
altering component.  I distinguish species’ abilities to respond.  Watermarks are:  tropistic, S/R, 
teleological, prudential.  Chemical features are absent at the atomic level, and at the organic level lies an 
increase in structural complexity – life.  If we map kind of responsiveness to kind of entity, the same 
increase attends shifts from mineral to plant, insect, mammal, primate, and human.  Increased 
causal/functional powers and structural complexity co-vary and define the causal column.  The kind of 
causal interactions between hydrogen and oxygen – a function of valence structure – are not the kind 
between a chess player and a computer – a function of algorithm structure.  We may reduce design to 
mechanism, but the explanation is often lost thereby (Schiffer, 1990). 
 Contrary to macro-level-eliminative reductivists (e.g., Kim 1992, 1999, 2000), piles of rocks have 
pile-level (“L2”) causal powers that their members (“L1”) lack; e.g., they are impenetrable by other L2 
structures.  These L2 powers pseudo-emerge naturally from the relational arrangements of L1 
constituents, not from their collection.  Sand castles may be able to hold up frisbees in ways in which 
other collections of sand may not.  Absent L2 configuration, L1 collections lack those powers.  Bowling 
balls roll; their components in other configurations cannot.  L2 properties do not obtain at L1; nothing 
about resultant L2 properties is mysterious.  The mere location of each L1 constituent relative to the 
others lacks the causally/holistic binding effect that results at the macro-level or L2 level, as with 
perception.  The holistic macro-element is not merely the collection of atomistic coordinates for L1 
constituents. 
 Since causal/functional powers increase with configurational complexity, it is pseudo-
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emergentism.  Just as the hard determinist’s actualism is self-contradictory, science is up to its ears in 
pseudo-emergents and top down causation (Kuppers 1992, Kauffman 1995, Gilbert and Sarkar 2000).  
Recall that CON seems to assume, but not to argue for, incompatibilism, as if non-autonomism is entailed 
by determinism, if not one of its axioms, as opposed to an interesting consequence of auxiliary arguments 
from determinism (Levin, 2003).  Similarly, reductive physicalists often seem more to assume than argue 
for anti-resultantism, as if this were also entailed by physicalism, if not one of its axioms, rather than an 
interesting consequence of auxiliary arguments from physicalism.  Just as determinism does not entail 
hard determinism, physicalism doesn’t entail hard physicalist non-resultantism.  To assume otherwise, 
however, would be circular. 
 Just as CON wrongly interprets Fixity as axiomatically ruling out counterfactuals and ability to do 
otherwise as involving strong possibilities, hard physicalism wrongly interprets the mental as nonphysical 
and the closure of the physical domain as axiomatically ruling out the mental qua nonphysical, and so as 
ruling out resultantism.  But if mind is thoroughly physical, then a robust downward mental causation and 
pseudo-emergentism are perfectly compatible – ‘soft physicalism’.  What constitute most of L are special 
science laws that locate causation at the macro-level, either as lateral or downward causation, e.g., 
psychological affects hormonal (Sapolsky, 1997).  With greater complexity come resultant 
causal/functional powers:  Life, homeostasis, and self-locomotion are such powers.  The more complex, 
the less they are directly determined by their constituents and the more by their configurational properties. 
 With multiply resultant holistic systems, the macro-properties may be metaphysically irreducible, 
e.g., the binding/unity of perception.  But we may divide the problem of emergence into a hard and an 
easy one, ala Chalmers.  The hard one serves as the repository for the metaphysical issues; we can solve 
the easy one by identifying the causal/functional properties that result at L2 from L1 objects, properties, 
etc.  For easy autonomy purposes, the easy problem of emergence validates our notion of pseudo-
emergence.  The pseudo-emergentist, then, can take advantage of whatever the emergentist proposes, but 
in pseudo-emergent form. 
 The easy problem of emergence is to trace what novel higher-order properties are generated by 
what combinations and arrangements of older lower-order ones, while the hard problem is to state just 
what the metaphysical nature of the relationship is between the new and old properties.  The former 
amounts to offering a causal/functional analysis of the ways in which the old properties give rise to the 
new ones, and the latter amounts to a metaphysical/ontological analysis of these cross-level relationships.  
We can ignore the latter here.  Consider the Brussels-Austin nonequilibrium statistical mechanics model: 
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If a system of particles is distributed uniformly in position and momentum in a region of space, 
the system is said to be in thermodynamic equilibrium (like cream uniformly distributed 
throughout a cup of coffee).  In contrast, a system is far-from-equilibrium if the particles are 
arranged so that highly ordered structures appear (for example, a cube of ice floating in tea).  
(Bishop, 2002, p. 120) 
Nonequilibrium statistical systems are identified by the presence of the following: 
large number of particles, high degree of structure and order, collective behavior, irreversibility, 
and emergent properties (id.).  
The explanatory elements of conventional physics models are particle trajectories in physical systems, 
from which system behavior is derived and reversible, i.e., previous states are deducible from current 
ones.  But the explanatory elements of Brussels-Austin models are distributions, i.e., arrangements of 
particles, and are irreversible.  Complexity matters! 
 Bishop argues that features of this model support genuine macro level or system level 
indeterminacy, without the difficulties found in conventional quantum mechanics. 
This implies that a system acting as a whole may produce collective effects that are not reducible 
to a summation of the trajectories and subelements composing the system (Petrosky and Prigogine 
1997).  The brain exhibits this type of collective behavior in many circumstances (Engel et al., 
1997), ... and this approach offers both an alternative for exploring the relationship between 
physics and free will and a possible new source for exploring indeterminism in free will theories.  
(Bishop, 2002, p. 121) 
The claim that macro-indeterminacy is a feature of nonequilibrium systems like the brain would defeat 
CON and the ‘cancels out’ bluff.  Here is a respectable model of complex-systems-level emergence in 
contemporary physics.  For easy problem purposes, it is enough to appeal to a pseudo-emergent, pseudo-
indeterminist version of the Brussels-Austin model.  Pseudo-emergentism is innocuous, so we may say 
that metacausal agents are complex nonequilibrium systems, whose components are nonequilibrium 
systems, e.g., consciousness, intentionality.  The dialectical superiority of easy problem and pseudo-
version approaches may be applied to all the issues of freedom, e.g., reasons explanations, self-formation; 
we may place all the hard ones aside, and retain their strongest features in easy, pseudo-forms.  The easy 
problem and pseudo-version approaches are more data driven, evidentially basic, and less metaphysically 
speculative compared to all the hard and non-pseudo-version approaches. 
 Thus, the causal/functional properties of autonomous systems are the complex evolutionary 
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powers identified by the metacausal model, i.e., metacognition and metaconation.  While Dennett (1984, 
2003) has contributed to the idea that freedom is an evolutionary phenomenon identified with functionally 
complex meta-abilities, he does not say enough; neither does Frankfurt (1971), whose hierarchical 
account of the will and of freedom informs mine.  But Frankfurt rejects the causal factors needed for the 
easy problem of autonomy. 
 Metamental abilities increase with primate development and growth from infancy to adulthood, 
peaking in counterfactual, prudential, and other imaginative reasoning.  Off-line functioning involves the 
evolved ability to take cognitive/conative systems off-line.  Such organisms are freed from hydraulic, 
push model forces that move organisms lacking these abilities.  Thus, they have contra-hydraulic causal 
power, a natural but relative form of contracausal power.  They can act contrary to hydraulic causal 
forces operating on them.  As with the other pseudo and easy strategies, we need to concern ourselves 
only with easy contracausality, pseudo-contracausality.  Persons are pseudo-contracausal enough for easy 
autonomy purposes. 
 The hydraulic momentum of on-line causation is not escaped by merely going off-line.  The annals 
of meditation lineages are rich with phenomenological generalizations on the discipline required to tame 
the wild monkey or mad elephant, metaphors for the ordinary mind.  Western theology is replete with its 
version of the struggle, but characterized in polarized – if not Manichean – terms as the battle between 
angelic spirit and animal flesh.107  The Yoga Sutras (Patanjali, 1953), the authority on yoga philosophy, 
revolve around the premise that meditative union results from the control/cessation of mind waves. 
 Asian attention training arts have levels of discipline we associate with athletes, and studies show 
their adepts score high on instruments that measure the effects of their efforts (EEG, EKG, etc.), revealing 
an extension of control into the autonomic nervous system inaccessible to most.  In biofeedback, somatic 
information is looped to consciousness; by trial and error, agents learn to alter these stress indicators.  The 
otherwise uncontrollable adrenal response, part of an on-line fight/flight S/R sequence, may be controlled 
by biofeedback.  An agent takes that process off-line repeatedly increases conscious control over 
unconscious functioning.  What brings the process under control is somatic information being fed back to 
consciousness, and practice. 
 Dreams, imagination, and similar states are intuitively off-line, as are language and simulata.  A 
simulator who can entertain belief and desire inputs and choice and action outputs without acting on them 
                                                
107 Ainslie (2001) includes theological lore in “the data” for a theory of the will, for it is the richest source of folk 
psychological and phenomenological evidence on akratic features of will.  The annals of Asian meditative 
traditions, likewise, count as a rich source of data for our theory. 
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instantiates a novel form of control over one’s I/O.  Biofeedback, meditation, language, simulation, and 
other evolutionary boons are disparate, but share in off-line function, metacognition, and metacausality, 
and so have common causal/functional features that reveal what autonomy is.  I defined autonomy as 
strong/narrow metacausation.  The weak sense involves any metacognitive causation, and the strong sense 
involves only top down causal control of higher-order over lower-order sequences.  Since strong 
metacausation is inherently causal, there is every reason to think it is compatible with determinism. 
 Compare our model with Frankfurt’s.  For him, Agent’s desires about other desires are 2nd order.  
The junkie has a 2nd-order desire not to act on her 1st-order desire to take drugs.  When she succeeds, she 
acts freely; when she fails, she displays weakness of will.  But unless she engages in downward causation, 
her success is not attributable to her 2nd-order desire.  But someone indoctrinated with religious values 
against sex may have a 2nd-order desire not to act on 1st-order sexual desires, succeed at abstinence, and 
yet not make for an intuitive instance of freedom.   
 As Frankfurt pointed out, contrary to Hume, animals, young children, and other models of 
unfreedom typically have and are moved by primitive 1st-order desires; free agents typically have and are 
moved by meta-desires.  Though tacitly causal language drives many intuitions in Frankfurt’s analysis of 
the effectiveness of 2nd-order over 1st-order desires, he explicitly eschews its relevance (1977).  But not all 
metadesires are strongly metacausal. 
 Hierarchical intentional accounts are subject to regress problems, e.g., 2nd-order compulsion.  The 
metacausal theory has no regress problem.  As a causal hierarchy, it is different in kind from intentional 
hierarchies, so it is not subject to problems endemic to intentional hierarchies.  Since we define autonomy 
as downward metacausation, and compulsion involves bottom up causation, there can be no metacausal 
compulsion.  The top level in a metacausal hierarchy is defined as conscious, and there are brute cognitive 
parameters for an empirically possible state of consciousness. 
 Finally, given that we are discussing a type of neural organization, there need be no undue concern 
regarding the classical problem of ... the infinite regress.  Given that one part of the nervous 
system has the function of monitoring other processes, there is no difficulty in principle in having 
hierarchical levels of monitoring....  The limitation would not be one of logic but of diminishing 
gains in processing capacity, which would rapidly lead to regression if infinite.  (Weiskrantz, 
1992, p. 197) 
If consciousness is not narrowly metaintentional as opposed to broadly metamental, then conscious states 
may be different in kind from lower level states.  The causal factor common to metamental states is that 
 122 
 
they are endogenous, mind-to-mind – not world-to-mind – engaged.  Autonomous acts have endogenous 
metacognitive etiologies, authored or controlled top down from the conscious level; ergo, there cannot be 
metacausal compulsion. 
 Autonomous action need not be off-line in the occurrent sense, so long as Agent can go off-line.  
The will is heterogenous, so each such counterfactual ability adds to its hegemony.  Mundane actions 
such as itch-scratching need not be consciously engaged, and need only involve counterfactual 
metamentality to count as autonomous; e.g., had Agent had meta-volition against it, he would have 
refrained.108  Any cognitive/conative ability that can operate on itself recursively involves feedback-
looped off-line mechanisms functioning at a remove from the hydraulic causal nexus and makes guided 
control of response – a key feature of autonomous functioning – possible.  Guidance is causal power to 
regulate the causal stream between I/Os to the sensorimotor system. 
Control is a topic of much discussion in the literature on autonomy.  Sometimes it is claimed that 
agents have no control at all if determinism is true.  That claim is false.  When I drive my car 
(under normal conditions), I am in control of the turns it makes, even if our world happens to be 
deterministic.  I certainly am in control of my car’s movements in a way in which my passengers 
and others are not.  A distinction can be drawn between compatibilist or “nonultimate” control and 
a species of control that might be available to agents in some indeterministic worlds – “ultimate” 
control.  (Mele, 2003, p.1) 
Mele cites Fischer’s distinction between guidance and regulative control (1994, pp. 132-35).  
 Fischer’s guidance control is Mele’s nonultimate, compatibilist control illustrated in the driving 
example; Fischer’s regulative control is Mele’s ultimate control.  It is considered ultimate because if 
determinism is true, there are no strong alternatives or divergent cosmic reruns, so we cannot steer the 
course of our actions and events in a direction other than the one entailed and caused by ancient prenatal 
conditions, though it is we who do steer its actual sequence.  Mele says we might possess ultimate control 
in an indeterministic world, for if in such a world there are strong, non-actual-sequence type alternatives 
lacking in deterministic ones, we could steer the stream of our actions and events in ways not constrained 
by Past Fixity and Laws Fixity, which leave open only one path. 
 Fischer argues that while we possess weaker guidance control, determinism rules out stronger, 
ultimate, regulative type control.  Fischer apparently accepts the CON equation that if determinism is true, 
                                                
108 Many uses of counterfactuals have been entertained in the hierarchicalist literature; see Shatz (1986) for a 
critical review.  But these affect only metaintentional accounts. 
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there are no possible worlds other than the one determined by P0&L, no alternate possibilities, and so 
agents cannot drive their cars in other directions – they guide the direction they go in, but cannot regulate 
it.  This conflates ability to drive otherwise – given different motives – with Fixity violating ability.  
Absent CON, the idea that agents are not what regulate and shape the stream of their actions is unfounded.  
The guidance/regulative control distinction is unmotivated because we don’t need the kind of control 
CON says we lack – to produce divergent reruns – to have ordinary causal powers. 
 Agents possess pseudo-regulative control when they satisfy PAPW2.  CON does not undermine 
this control, sufficient for autonomy:  An easy problem solution need only specify weak control.109  Thus, 
we have pseudo-regulative control, absent CON, since our deliberative mechanisms access pseudo-
randomness (Dennett, 1981, pp. 294-99) and, since Fischer and Mele agree indeterminism permits 
regulative/ultimate control, pseudo-randomness permits pseudo-regulative control.  Causal/counterfactual 
control is pseudo-ultimate or pseudo-endogenous enough, yet determinism friendly.  If it turns out that we 
possess non-pseudo abilities, we cannot be harmed thereby, but it is easy to prove – and enough for the 
easy problem to show – that we do possess all the easy or pseudo-abilities needed for a robust autonomy. 
 The key to the metacausal theory is its easy, pseudo-style analysis of configuration level, 
emergent, causal/functional guidance control and regulative control generating meta-powers.  These are 
the self system’s abilities to cause, initiate, originate, guide, or shape its own I/O mechanisms.  At the 
inputs stage are exteroceptions, proprioceptions, beliefs, desires, and apprehensions of RFAs.110  At the 
operations stage are deliberating, assigning weights, predicting, simulating, counterfactual reasoning, etc.  
At the outputs stage are decisions, act initiations, exertions of will, resistance against temptations, 
omissions, etc.  These divisions are not exact.  The operations stage may contain simulations of all three 
stages, for self and others in any combination.  If Ainslie’s model of will and self is correct (2001), agents 
engage in some form of future-self simulation in all deliberations, irrespective of whether the ‘self’ is 
integrated. 
 Perception of danger is part cognitive, part conative – survival orientation.  Neely (1974, p. 47) 
says subjective reasons matter, not reasons “out there” (cf. Bond, 1983; Mele, 1995).  For, were Crito’s 
                                                
109 Fischer makes a similar case for what I call “pseudo-responsibility” where PAP fails, e.g., Frankfurt Cases, 
based on weaker control, but doesn’t see the option for weaker autonomy.  Fischer’s arguments for guidance-based 
responsibility – the “semi-” in semi-compatibilism – can be modified in a weakened version of autonomy, thus full 
compatibilism, as in my account. 
110 LTM shapes input by the unconscious selectivity of attention, what is stamped as salient before consciousness 
arrives, as the fight/flight response identifies what is survival-salient before cognitive processing feeds the 
information to consciousness (LeDoux, 1997). 
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reasons valid, Socrates’ remaining in prison couldn’t be free.  But subjective reasons are also determined.  
Events, epistemic styles, preferences, etc. determine the reasons I apprehend subjectively.  These feed my 
deliberation, which feeds my decision and action, which effectuate a change in the state of the world 
(Levin, 1979).  Any interconnection may succeed or fail.  Successful control by Agent at every stage in 
the I/O process is coextensive with total or ideal autonomy (Mele, 1995); noncontrol at any stage involves 
some privation.  Maximal autonomy is not necessary for responsibility or personhood, though metacausal 
control over some subsystems of voluntary behavior suffices for minimal personhood, responsibility and 
autonomy alike. 
 Metacausal powers are arguably conditions for the possibility of autonomy, but I do not adduce 
them by means of a transcendental deduction, but by means of data level, easy problem oriented 
observation and analysis.  This runs counter to a strong tradition in which the key adequacy condition for 
freedom is responsibility (e.g., Kant, Campbell, Frankfurt, Watson, Wolf, Fischer, Fischer and Ravizza, 
and Haji).  But conditions of responsibility (axiology) and autonomy (metaphysics) are not coextensive, 
much less synonymous, given the plausibility of normative pluralism, even if they are mutually 
informative or even conceptually interdependent.  Thus, I may be deeply causally responsible for X-ing 
and hence morally responsible on our desert theoretic view of responsibility,111 but not on a Martian blend 
of utility and, say, some alien value, or a Venusian view that requires maximal metacausal control for full 
responsibility.  Most think we are responsible only for things for which we deserve to be held responsible, 
as opposed to what will bring about utility. 
 The metacausal conditions for autonomy are pseudo-emergent abilities that solve the easy 
problem.  Their description is sensitive to the literature on control, on external manipulation, and on 
Frankfurt Cases, and they handle the problem cases better than the competitors.  I replace PAP by PAPW, 
a weaker, pseudo-version that removes the need for strong alternatives and is justified by the dialectics of 
the easy problem and by the work it can do with Frankfurt Cases. 
PAPW1: Agents are self-guiding with respect to their X-ing iff they would have X-ed had 
they been able to not-X. 
PAPW2: Agents are pseudo-self-regulating with respect to their X-ing iff they satisfy 
PAPW1 and wouldn’t have X-ed had they not wanted to X. 
PAPW is supplemented by PAPM, the metacausal PAP principle, roughly, as follows. 
                                                
111 Some adopt a utility view, believing CON undermines desert, but CON is implausible.  Only desert-based views 
respect the supervenience of normative on metaphysical facts. 
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PAPM: Agents are autonomous (and, to the extent responsibility rests on autonomy, 
responsible) with respect to their X-ing iff they satisfy PAPW and metacausally 
control both this X-ing and their acts in general. 
PAPM is left intentionally vague here.  Its vagueness is removed later, but its informality is justified by 
the inherently vague and heterogenous features of the data. 
 Just as the Frankfurt literature unanimously accepts that Intervener need not causally interfere in 
Agent’s decisions to qualify for control status, metacausing one’s x-ing need not require Agent to 
causally interfere in his decisions to qualify for control status.  Metacausing is pseudo-regulative control.  
Fischer and Ravizza’s case of regulative control is of the “Instructor” whose car enables Instructor to 
override “Driver’s” turns, etc. (1998).  Instructor possesses this control whether or not he exercises it.  If 
Intervener and Instructor have unexercised counterfactual control, then so do Agents, for they can 
intervene if their 1st-order interactions with the environment steer them in directions not endorsed. 
 In Mele’s driving example, I argue, one metacauses his driving even when he exerts no efforts on 
the control instruments, so long as their operation is under his conscious control, and he satisfies PAPW; 
he would continue to exert no muscular pressure on these control mechanisms were he able to do so, and 
were he to want to do so, he would do so.  To think he cannot is to embrace actualism and conflate 
unexercised ability with inability.  There need be no alternate futures or worlds for it to be true that if he 
wanted otherwise, he could or would do otherwise.  He is autonomous while driving, whether 
determinism is true or not, if he satisfies these conditions. 
 We stated the conditions that constitute metacausing one’s X-ing; they involve natural abilities.  
These are causal powers of the will, so it will be useful to have a theory of the will itself, something 
overlooked by most writers on free will.  Ainslie proposes a theory of the will (2001), more general than 
free will, so Ainslie’s account provides the larger structure of issues against which background a theory of 
freedom may rest.  Ainslie calls “picoeconomics” the study of micro-microeconomics, the same sort of 
relations as occur interpersonally between self-interested agents, but at the intrapersonal, micro-
microeconomics level (“picoeconomics”) level within Agent.  Ainslie argues that the will is a functional 
process involving inter-temporal bargaining among a population of motives in a disintegrated self, and he 
uses this model to explain prudential, akratic, and related intentional behaviors.   
 Toward this end, Ainslie utilizes the following strategy:  He uses 11 forms of evidence, identifies 
eight attributes of will, deploys three thought experiments to test his theory, and compares four theories of 
will with his own, relative to these other considerations.  His goal is to show that his picoeconomic theory 
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both accounts for the identified attributes of will and handles the selected thought experiments better than 
the alternative theories of will do on these fronts.  It is a concise and intelligent argument form, with many 
merits and few defects.  I adopt a similar strategy.  My theory of freedom presupposes a theory of the will 
that falls roughly under the rubric of one of the alternatives with which Ainslie competes, viz, the ‘organ’ 
model, so I disagree that his theory better accounts for the attributes of will or the problems of will as 
represented in his thought experiments, though I otherwise adopt much of his analysis. 
  Ainslie considers 11 forms of data to show that his model is better than the alternatives:  
behaviorism, cognitive psychology, economics, philosophy of mind, psychoanalysis, bargaining research, 
chaos theory, sociobiology, neurophysiology, theology, and “folk psychology”.  I agree with Ainslie on 
their relevance to an account of the will, though I cannot repeat his reasons here.  I add to his list.  I draw 
evidence from attention training, biofeedback, evolution, computer science flow charts for on-line/off-line 
functioning, developmental psychology, athletics, and related areas involving normative attributions 
regarding amoral notions of causal authorship. 
 Extending folk psychology, any human activity is relevant if it involves voluntary behavior.  The 
ubiquity of the will in human life entails that there will also be found behavior-evaluating attributive 
practices, norms, principles, discourse, and a body of accumulated wisdom in every significant domain of 
human activity.  This is the ubiquity of “the will”, rather than “the voluntary”, since in some akratic 
behavior it is unclear whether it is fully voluntary. 
 His eight attributes of will involve: its being a force distinct from the impulses with which it is 
engaged; its apparent application of its strength to the weaker side in a conflict; its action to unify actions 
under principles or ends; its strengthening by repetition; its asymmetrically greater sensitivity to 
weakening by nonrepetition; its nonrepression and nondiversion of attention; its resolve not depending on 
single choice except in special cases; and its variability with respect to failure in one sphere affecting 
failure in others.  Other attributes need to be added to Ainslie’s list. 
 One is a reflection of a key attribute of mental states identified by Searle (1992), namely, the fact 
that it is in principle accessible to consciousness.  Two major, related additional attributes of will are 
mirror reflections of key attributes of consciousness identified by Chalmers (1996, 1997), namely, the 
ability to verbalize any conscious state and to act on it.  Thus, any act of will is one in principle capable of 
being accessible to consciousness, verbalized, and acted upon by will itself.  Thus, any act of will is 
capable of becoming the lower-order content of a hierarchical will.  Of course, it is a contingent, 
zoological fact that not all animals are metacognitively sophisticated enough to have the capacity for these 
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higher functions or to develop them through fortuitous experience.  Shatz (1986, pp. 465-66) says animals 
could have a higher-order preference, and that this undermines hierarchical accounts, but not our account. 
 The three ‘thought experiments’ he identifies involve:  Kavka’s problem, free will, and 
Newcomb’s problem.  Each exposes assumptions about intentions.  Kavka’s and Newcomb’s problems 
are logically equivalent. 
 Kavka’s problem involves the issue of whether genuine intention is something we can move about 
at will, absent a forecast of whether the intention will be carried out.  Consider an offer to receive a large 
sum for forming the intention, but only the intention (detectable by a sophisticated brain scan), to drink a 
noxious fluid.  A similar case is Elster’s (1983), where Ulysses knows the Sirens will overpower his 
intentions if his intentions are unaided by intention-overpowering prophylactics, such as his ear-plugged 
crew’s binding him to the mast.  If intention requires realistic forecast, then our toxin-consuming-
intending test subjects cannot intend to drink the toxin, and Ulysses cannot intend to sail past the sirens 
unaided.  (Ainslie, 2001, p. 126) 
 The free will problem as he sees it is the issue we grappled with in chapter 3.  We will not address 
Ainslie’s ‘solution’, for this problem was rejected with CON, and his solution is thin, i.e., picoeconomic 
determinism is consistent with determinism. 
 Newcomb’s problem involves the thought experiment in which a choice will be rewarded based on 
correct prediction in one of two ways, such that if Agent is correctly predicted to select two boxes, then 
box A will contain $1000 and box B will contain nothing, and if Agent is correctly predicted to select 
only box B, then box A will contain $1,000 and box B will contain $1,000,000.  If Agent could get the 
$1,001,000 somehow, that would be optimal; the next best thing is the $1,000,000.  If Agent fully intends 
to select only box B, then the prediction will function to produce $1,001,000 in the two boxes, but if 
Agent could, after the prediction, select both, she would get the optimal amount.  Agent cannot do this 
unless Agent is capable of changing her mind at the last moment, but to the extent that this is her 
propensity, the perfect prediction should include it.  But there is no reason why Agent should not try for 
both boxes. 
 These thought experiments are designed to isolate features of will such as intention, prediction 
about intention, and the link between intention and action, and to help us sort out our understanding of the 
will and intention thereby.  I appreciate the utility of requiring an account of will to be able to solve 
known problems of will, particularly the differences between free will, free action, compulsion, weakness 
of will and other privations of will, e.g., catatonia, and perhaps the normative differences that dovetail 
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these, but I do not see the special relevance of the Kavka or Newcomb problems as tests of adequacy 
conditions on a theory of will in general.  These two problems seem to be highlighted because Ainslie’s 
theory proposes clever solutions to them, but that virtue doesn’t translate into an adequacy condition on 
any theory of will.   
 Ainslie’s solution is his picoeconomic inter-temporal, intrapersonal bargaining model on which a 
person is the intrapersonal equivalent of an interpersonal bargaining unit or marketplace of competing 
interests.  Just as a stable market economy emerges by sociobiological evolutionary processes, Ainslie 
proposes a stable internal economy is forged in the free market of a person’s competing interests, which 
have in common only the fact that they share in the operations of the same organism or body.  As such, 
Ulysses-like agreements among the ‘crew’ emerge naturally from their collectively rational self-interests 
the same way other facially altruistic arrangements do on micro-, economic, and macro-levels.  That is, 
they develop what Dennett (2003), following John Maynard Smith, calls “evolutionary stable strategies” 
or “ESSs” (p. 149) from out of “benselfishness” (p. 194), the sort of enlightened self-interest Ben Franklin 
is said to have exhibited in his remark to John Hancock at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
“We must indeed all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately” (p. 193).  I find 
Ainslie’s proposals for these problems rich, but unconvincing in that they involve eliminativism about 
personhood, which he reduces to an internal marketplace of motives. 
 More pertinent are problems of will connected with its range, from full functionality and maximal 
autonomy to total privation:  chronic motivational impotence, e.g., catatonia.  Compulsion and catatonia 
mark the lower limit on the spectrum of will, and autonomy the upper limit; the Kavka/Newcomb 
problem is a special case situated in the mid-range of the spectrum.  It would thus be a mistake to rest the 
plausibility of a theory of will on how well it handles these problems.  If there are logical impossibilities 
associated with certain self-indexing predictive paradoxes, then we just lack those abilities.  Since most of 
what we do does not involve these putative abilities, nothing is lost.  I have little motive to address the 
Kavka/Newcomb problem here, except to merely acknowledge them as special instances of the prediction 
paradox that affects soft determinism.  Newcomb, at any rate, is often presented as a predictability puzzle, 
and this is not an intrinsically deterministic issue.  These puzzles are unnecessary as tests of adequacy 
conditions – which is the only reason I have drawn in Ainslie’s analysis to begin with. 
 The four alternative accounts of will Ainslie contrasts with his own are:  the null model, the organ 
model, the resolute choice model, the pattern seeking model.  The null model sees the will as superfluous 
relative to the impulses which compose it:  There is no will apart from the collection of conations.  “The 
 129 
 
will” is analogous here with Hume’s “self”, a linguistic convenience – the “I” of speech.  The organ 
model sees the will as a motor faculty analogous to an arm, something distinct from its components 
though made up out of them the way an arm or organ is made up out of its components.  The resolute 
choice model says that the will acts by inhibiting reconsideration of plans; it is a selective function on 
elements which, once selected, are protected by the will against competing interests.  The pattern seeking 
model sees the will as an innate aversion against breaking up long-term motivational patterns for the sake 
of short-term ones, so it may be characterized by its habituated tendencies over time. 
 The metacausal theory resembles the organ model, but I resist the rubric as a set-up for a straw 
man.  The metacausal theory subsumes the other models, for it views all features of the will under an all-
inclusive spectrum of will; I call this the “subsumption thesis”.  What is true of behaviors exhibited 
clearly under one model of will may not be true of behaviors described well under another, but this is 
merely a function of these behaviors falling at different points along the spectrum of will.  Models for 
behaviors in one range of the spectrum make sense for those behaviors, but not for others.  The 
metacausal theory explains all of the behaviors that constitute the ubiquity of the will and its 
heterogeniety, i.e., its irreducibility to one motive type, e.g., hedonism or libido, and why failing models 
are intuitive:  They capture features of will in their ranges along the spectrum. 
 Hedonism explains most animal motivation, but in human psychology attempts to reduce all 
motives to one type are not data driven, and so are empirically implausible.  Ainslie (2001) presents the 
utilitarian version of hedonism as an all-encompassing explanatory model, one that comes close to being 
sound for most behavior.  But minimally data driven attention to the data simply doesn’t support any all-
encompassing or monistic theoretical views of human motivation. 
 The major problem with Ainslie’s model is its view of the person as a disunified collection of 
competing motives.  A condition of adequacy on a theory of will is that it comport with basic intuitions 
about personhood.  Ainslie’s model doesn’t, not that this is devastating, and not that disunified models of 
the self are contradictory or absurd; Buddha, Hume, and others have endorsed them with some good 
reasons, and they may be true, but they may be too revisionary to embraced just yet. 
 If freedom can only be saved by losing our selves, so to speak, then this is no easy triage.  It is 
better to save both self and autonomy; these are intimately linked (Frankfurt, 1971).  The meta-will is a 
sine qua non of selfhood.  If there were no agent authoring actions, but only an agreement among a 
temporally-extended population of competing interests within a mind, then whenever the population 
reached a different agreement – temporally extended or momentary – or experienced significant change in 
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its membership of interests, the person would count as a different person.  But if there is no entity that 
endures change in its motive set and controls the behavior of the motive population, no agent apart from 
the behaviors of the collectivity or motives “market”, then who or what is responsible? 
 Were Ainslie’s agent-eliminating model correct, it would be wrong for person P2 at T2 to be held 
responsible for what P1 did at T1, even if P2 occupies at T2 the same body P1 occupied at T1, so long as 
there is a different motive set.  So, P2 need not repay P1's student loans, since P2 no longer shares the 
interests that prompted P1 to undertake education.  Here, if anything is to even resemble an agent, were 
Ainslie to construct some functional equivalent, it would have to be the sort of entity constituted by the 
long-term interests of the motive set.  But if that were so, then the ‘agent’ could not be responsible for 
akratic behavior.  Perhaps the interests that broke off from the agreement and gave into akratic forces 
would be specifically responsible, but the only way to hold specific motives responsible without 
punishing the entire person/population would be to engage some sort of selective behavior modification.  
And that seems highly implausible, not only pragmatically, but conceptually.  That would be analogous to 
the not-long-forgotten practice of severing the hand of a thief, or removing some other offense-
committing organ.  The problem is that many non-offending members of the motive population need to 
use these organs too. 
 This atomistic motivational model would also make it impossible to test whether behaviors are 
voluntary or causally controlled.  For motivational agreements cannot be run coherently through the 
counterfactual principles – PAPW and PAPM – used to determine voluntariness and control.  It would be 
impossible to run the tests in a way that captures intuitive judgments on bargaining agreements that vary 
over time and aren’t responsible for short-term behavior.  Thus, despite its rich ideas, Ainslie’s model 
cannot be adopted in its current theoretical dress.  Ainslie’s work is best viewed as in progress; its goals 
and methods are inadequate for our purposes, but it is revealing in terms of depicting many features of 
motivation that need to be taken into account in any theory of will, thus informing our set of adequacy 
conditions.   
While Ainslie’s no-self theory seems problematic, it should be pointed out here that the Buddha’s 
view is somewhat distinct in that it doesn’t reduce the agent to motivational atoms, but it does reduce the 
agent to all its atoms, so to speak, cognitive and conative.  But while the Buddhist view of the no-self is a 
function of a larger view about the insubstantiality of all phenomena, it also involves a form of part/whole 
mereological reductionism (Siderits, 2008), and there is also a complex sense in which it asserts a holistic 
interdependence between action and agent (Kasulis, 1985), a sense some Buddhist scholars have 
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described as metaphysically real on each of its levels (Garfield, 2001).  Thus, the Buddhist no-self 
doctrine is much more complexs than Ainslie’s.  Consequently, objections to Ainslie’s no-self model do 
not necessarily apply to Buddhism. 
 Ainslie’s model is motivational, conative; Fischer’s is rational, cognitive.  Each represents flaws 
in the other:  Judgment alone, Hume insists, is impotent; motive alone, Kant insists, is blind.  Clever 
concatentations overcome their deficiencies; e.g., Ainslie’s model shows how unity of rational and 
utilitarian purposes emerges from a population of self-interested motives.  Fischer’s model absorbs wants 
as RFAs, and accounts for the link between reasons and actions by treating actions as reactions to reasons, 
and thus undermines the will/judgment dichotomy.  But neither wants nor judgments are actions, though 
choices are.  The will is distinct from both, but is more wants-theoretic than judgments-theoretic, since 
wants move us but reasons alone cannot, and the will moves us.  But it is distinct from wants as an 
executive power with control functions on and over wants.  It also plays a role in propositional attitude 
formation – there is some doxastic autonomy, limitations noted, contrary to Descartes.  The will has 
greater immediate power over wants than judgments, but since it has executive power over both, it is 
distinct from, though shaped by, both. 
 Selection of the ‘volition’ from among its input is an action the will performs, and so falls on the 
executive, motor-theoretic, reactive side of the equation.  Choice – and the willful initiation of teleological 
action that it originates – is distinct from motivation and cognition, though informed by both, as even 
libertarians hold.  Pseudo-regulative control enables Agent to alter his behavior regardless of how 
conscious or deliberate its origins.  (The President, in this version of the popular analogy, need not author 
the legislation he endorses or vetoes.)  The character of agency seen in this control is primarily executive, 
causal/originative power. 
 Some self-regulate; others don’t.  One reason reason-responsiveness is insufficient is that not all 
who control their wills are reason-responsive.  But note that wants-responsiveness is not equivalent to 
reason-responsiveness, for a want is not necessarily a reason:  A push-theoretic force, e.g., proprioception 
of hunger, is not a reason by itself, though it propels (conation) action.  To convert a want to a reason, 
what is necessary is the formation of a pro attitude or judgment of the form that the want is worthy of 
pursuit.112  Thus, wants need judgments to become or count as reasons.  But propositional contents are 
transformed by the formation of pro and con attitudes.  Thus, even pro attitudes or judgments that convert 
                                                
112 On judgments that a want involves a good to be pursued, see Bond (1983), Watson’s Platonic version (1975), 
and Stump’s reasoning (1993), citing Aquinas; cf. Nagel (1970). 
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wants into reasons involve the will:  Forming a pro attitude toward a want is a meta-will activity. 
 Reason-responsiveness is a condition of moral – not causal – responsibility.  Fischer developed 
this model for purposes of semi-compatibilism:  to account for the compatibility between determinism 
and moral responsibility while rejecting autonomy as incompatible with determinism.  One who is aware 
of his actions and can interfere in them should his wants change has pseudo-regulative control.  A 
machine could have this power, but be incapable of recognizing moral reasons, a further condition Fischer 
and Ravizza place on morally responsible reason-responsive mechanisms (1998), yet still be causally 
responsible for its behavior, so long as it is capable of sensing and altering its behavior.  The same holds 
for a sociopath.  Free will is thus a motor-nerve-involving, self-regulating, executive causal power over 
one’s actions.  The more sophisticated one’s motivational systems and the more intelligent, the more 
options to select from, and the more extensive the range of one’s will becomes.  Beings with lesser 
motivational sets and minds have less sophisticated and less intelligent wills, but these are extrinsic 
features of will. 
 A nickel is non-zero currency, as is a fortune.  They differ, but both are money.  Likewise, a being 
with few wants and sensorimotor skills, say, a rat, has a small will, and a being with many wants and 
judgments and refined sensorimotor skills has a greater amount and range of will.  Free will, then, is more 
than just will, but the ability to control one’s will, as Frankfurt almost said.  It is an executive power one 
can exercise over one’s wants, judgments, and even itself, as will inclines in a direction one wishes to 
alter.  That executive meta-will function is self-regulative causal control, autonomy. 
 Ainslie’s model is interesting because it instantiates an empirically possible soft determinism, as 
his brief discussion reveals, and it suggests what an adequate theory of will should do.  Extracting from 
his strategy, an adequate theory of will should: 
 (AC1)  account for the known attributes of will, and 
(AC2)  deal with known problems of will better than the alternatives do. 
In my view, an adequate theory of the will must do at least two other major things.  It must: 
(AC3)  comport with a theory of the self or personhood, and  
(AC4)  comport with a theory of responsibility. 
Levin’s conditions of adequacy are for a theory of free will (1979); they are adopted in our theory of free 
will as well, together with conditions AC1-AC4.  Ainslie mentions eight attributes of will, but there are 
others, e.g., its ubiquity, heterogeneity, accessibility to consciousness, reflexive accessibility to itself, 
susceptibility to reason, privation relative to diminished intellect, pivotal role in artistic or athletic 
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accomplishments.  The Kavka and Newcomb problems are inessential to an account of the will, but there 
are problems he doesn’t mention, e.g., privation cases, those in Frankfurt-style cases, and machines 
capable of Ainslie’s intertemporal motivational bargaining. 
 A theory of will also ought to account for:  phenomenological intuitions, such as its being up to 
Agent to manipulate the will one way rather than the other; the grounding of normative attributions in 
these powers of the will; the grounding of exculpation in the absence of these powers; the distinctiveness 
of these powers to persons; and those intuitions connected with Levin’s (1979) adequacy conditions. 
 The metacausal theory rejects the null model on zoological grounds.  Sentient beings comprise the 
class of beings with will.  This class is problematic only at its penumbral edges.  If biologists held that 
cellular photosensitivity is a primitive form of stimulus-cognition and thus of sentience, but tropistic 
response doesn’t count as sufficiently motor-theoretic to house auto-motive response-conation, then only 
most sentient beings comprise the class of beings with any form of will; the converse, that all beings with 
will are sentient, is less risky.  While paraplegics have sentience without motor control, it is doubtful any 
will-possessing being can be fully insentient.  Brain and behavioral research supports the claim that 
willful, motor-theoretic behavior is funneled through the consciousness centers of the brain for orientation 
purposes.  Barring penumbral cases, the sentience/will equivalence holds.113 
 Behavioral evidence supports the view that the motives in primitive sentient beings involve 
attraction to life-promoting and/or health-promoting pleasant-sensation-producing stimuli (positive 
reinforcement) and aversion to death-promoting and/or illness-promoting pain-producing stimuli 
(negative reinforcement), and though there are penumbral cases between these and tropisms that only 
appear to involve hedonistic sentience, once we are clearly dealing with hedonistic sentience, we are 
dealing with the lowest form on the spectrum of will, and that is cognitive.  The line may be less than 
straight, but we can draw it clearly enough:  The will is thus hybrid, cognitive-feedback-looped conation, 
inherently sensorimotor-theoretic, and thus inherently metamental, involving, as it does, two mental state 
– cognitive/conative – elements about the same object (telos). 
 There may be non-penumbral exceptions to the claim that primitive motivation is hedonistic, e.g., 
bees whose instincts propel them to death for the queen.  The empirical question is whether these 
behaviors are a function of expected reward.  Lab chimps self-medicate on cocaine until they die.  It is 
                                                
113 Somnambulism and other exceptions are explainable on the basis of an error theory about blown neural 
fuses/switches for nocturnal akinesia.  In sleep, motor responses are taken off-line, or we would really run when 
chased in dreams.  Sleeping animals often exhibit damped down motor activity indicative of fearful dreams.  On 
studies favoring this view, see Winson (1997). 
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more reasonable to the pleasure principle over the death principle.  More complex cases involve smoking, 
obesity, and other self-defeating behaviors tied to the pleasure motive.  But all animal behavior seems 
hedonistically oriented, reward/expectation-driven, and most of it is well correlated with survival.  To the 
extent that mankind is not equally constrained by the ordinary operation of natural selection, our behavior 
is exceptional regarding failure to exhibit survival orientation, apart from its exceptional character on 
other grounds. 
 To the extent that a motive is a kind of “willing”, a positive response or movement toward an 
expected reward as its goal, then, even the most elemental motive expresses some form of will; this is so 
also for any attraction or aversion, e.g., infant crying.  On this analysis, one might hold that complex will 
reduces to details about complexity, so there is no need to treat the will as if it is a whole that is somehow 
separate from the sum of its parts, as if motives are the atoms and the will is just the collection of those 
atoms, or as if some of those atoms of will are less relevant or even ‘less will’ than others of them.  But 
this misses a distinction.  It threatens to collapse at the border between positive responses toward stimuli, 
which tropistic behavior involves, and attempts to repeat the stimuli, which minimally involve associative 
learning and characterize teleological motion, absent in mere tropisms.  But assuming a clear line may be 
drawn to distinguish teleological responses from nonteleological tropisms, at the base level of teleological 
motions are such beings as slugs that apparently act on elemental motives, but lack any structure to their 
motives.  The more complex that a species is, the greater is its learning mechanism (for example, more 
complex orientation/feedback mechanisms) and the structure of its will.  It is only as we move up the 
evolutionary scale of complexity to cases where there can be a conflict in hierarchically-configured will 
enabled by hierarchical mind that we are willing to make unhedged ascriptions of will. 
 As Frankfurt says (1971), the child and animal act on the stronger of two or more motives, but 
only persons exhibit deep conflicts of will.  Thus, though “will” may be applied inclusively to all forms of 
motivation, it is more intuitively associated with its less inclusive usage evidenced by most of Ainslie’s 
attributes of will, which refers to a relation within a motivational set, and features of the relation are what 
account for the possibility of differentiating between intended and unintended actions, or behaviors that 
express true preferences and those that don’t, even though in all four cases the behaviors involve motives.  
Thus, the exclusive will involves relations between sets and subsets of motives; thus, the null model is 
false. 
 The alternative requires that the will involves relations between motive sets and subsets.  The will 
is structured and divided, whether it is an organ that selects or maintains the subset of motives, a function 
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that resolves to maintain the subset in the face of reconsideration of members in the larger set, a tendency 
to maintain whatever pattern long-range reward/expectation has designated as the proper subset, or 
Ainslie’s intertemporal relation among bargaining members of the larger set.  On the metacausal theory 
the will is comprised of causal/functional relations between motive set and subsets, and it is consistent 
with the view of motivational atoms discussed under the null model. 
 The resolution to ignore reconsiderations of non-subset motives is like the tendency to maintain 
long-term subset motives, so they may be grouped together as instances of “subset individuation and/or 
maintenance criteria”.  Ainslie’s model may be subsumed under this rubric.  The individuation of a subset 
of motives provides the content of the will, but at any given moment Agent can endorse a single motive 
and make it his will, even if it runs counter to any and all indications that favor long-term subset 
maintenance (willed ignorance of reasons for reconsideration, preference for long-term pattern-approved 
subset members, subsets identified by intertemporal bargaining).  Thus, each model identifies a unique 
ability of the will not only to individuate its contents by that model’s criterial selection process, but as a 
method of will-content-formation to override the other models’ types of process for the formation of the 
will.  Thus, willed ignorance toward reasons for reconsideration is a process the will can deploy to subvert 
the tendency toward intertemporal bargaining or its tendency to maintain a long-term pattern.  Thus, all 
non-organ models collapse into fingers on the more inclusive hand of metawill.  The metacausal model 
absorbs every attribute of will and accounts for all intuitions associated with intentional action. 
 The understanding is a high level faculty with no organ; though the parts of the brain that subserve 
it may be an organ-like scattered individual linked by neural networks, understanding is more a higher-
order functional state of the brain than a mere constellation of neural parts that might be required for an 
‘organ’ of ability, e.g., visual memory.  By analogy, the will is subserved by brain parts, but it is not the 
parts of a neural network ‘organ’ that form the will, but the functional relations they subserve.  Given 
brain plasticity, multiple realization, the variable nature of higher-order faculties such as understanding 
and will, and the heterogeneity of the will, ‘organ’ is misdescriptive.  Though the supplementary motor 
area of the cortex has been identified as a candidate seat of the will (Northoff, 1999), it cannot be ‘the 
will’, given plasticity and neural looping through other brain centers.  If a mental state must be subserved 
either by an organ or by metamentation, then the will must involve metaconations, since there is no organ 
of will.  
 If the subsumption thesis is correct, then the metafunctional character of the will (data) makes the 
metacausal model (theory) most appropriate.  The meta-ability to activate a motive in one’s overall 
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motive set, for any or no reason, is what constitutes the will as a functional power over and above, and 
capable of operating upon, all its components and their subsets.  This meta-ability comes in degrees.  The 
more inclusive “will” that applies to any motivation does not constitute “the will”, the more exclusive 
meta-ability to act on or activate any motive.  So, to reject exclusive will by reference to inclusive will is 
to equivocate. 
 The metafunctional model captures the experiential character of the will as an ability to do or not 
do what a motive impels one toward (Locke), what one pleases (Hume), what is rational (Kant), and to 
not do what one wants now because one wants something greater later (Ainslie).  All these cases involve 
exclusive will acting on inclusive will, so exclusive will – the will – is metaconative; inclusive will is not.  
The heterogeneity and ubiquity of the will supports the subsumption thesis and the metafunctional 
character of the will, and thereby the metaconative – hence metacausal – model.  Freedom comes in 
degrees, and its upper boundary is metacausal autonomy; weakness of will, conversely, is also graded and 
bounded. 
 As Frankfurt argues (1971), only beings capable of conflicts of will are candidates for weakness of 
will, and slugs do not seem so capable.  If so, then we ought to say slugs have no exclusive wills, though 
they have inclusive ones.  Non-structured wants are better called “wants”, and “will” is better restricted to 
the narrow sense.  Most animals possess wants, and thus some freedom of inclusive will, which is what 
Frankfurt has in mind about freedom of action (the horse wants to run to the left, and does); most of us 
possess some freedom of exclusive will (Frankfurt’s free will) and plenty of inclusive will (Frankfurt’s 
free action).   
 While there is a link between freedom of inclusive will and freedom of action, these may come 
apart.  Fidelity to the data suggests inclusive and exclusive will both be treated as forms of will, for an 
animal may have inclusive wants and be free to act on them without doing so; its inclusive will is free 
counterfactually, for it can act on its wants, should it want to.  Circumstances may be manipulated so that 
though the animal enjoys freedom of inclusive will, its actions are all foiled.  Frankfurt’s taxonomy needs 
revision.  Conceivably, a smart manipulated beast may develop a structured will by its learning 
associations from this conditioning process. 
 Animals have freedom of action, since they act on wants, but not of will, since they cannot alter 
their will (Frankfurt, 1971).  Frankfurt should say they typically enjoy freedom of inclusive will, whether 
they also enjoy freedom of action.  To the extent that maximal metaconative ability is coextensive with 
freedom, and restraint is metaconative ability, rats have some freedom of exclusive will, for they can 
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avoid cats though there is rat food near the cats which attracts them.  
 Consider the contrast Ainslie makes between two models for decision making, one based on 
wanting and the other on judging: 
Models based on wanting say that people weigh the feeling of satisfaction that follows different 
alternatives and selectively repeat those behaviors that lead to the most satisfaction.  Models based 
on judging take a hierarchy of wants as given and focus on how a person uses logic – or some 
other cognitive faculty – to relate options to this hierarchy.  (2001, p. 13) 
Want-based models are “hedonistic”, “economic”, or “utilitarian”; judgment-based models are 
“cognitive” or “rationalistic” (id., p. 14).  The Socratic question about akratic behavior shows the 
dichotomous character of these models:  Either judgment succeeds but will is weak, or, with Socrates, 
judgment fails, but perfect will is misguided. 
 I am concerned not with the Socratic question, but with want and judgment models.  Wants may 
be viewed hydraulically, as “motions” or pressures built up in the organism and seeking release, as 
Hobbes, Freud, and others (e.g., McGinn, 2003) seem to view them.  Most animals, many young children, 
and some adults seem driven by wants, but many adults seem guided by judgments.  I place hydraulic 
wants on the animal side of the spectrum and nonhydraulic judgments on the person side, with 
overlapping in the middle range.  Call this the “want/judgment animal/person spectrum”.  Restraint may 
involve some wants overriding others, e.g., stronger occurrent or prudentially ranked wants overriding 
immediate wants triggered by environmental stimuli.  Restraint may also involve nonprudential or 
immediate judgments overriding immediate wants, e.g., judgments about the immediate consequential and 
moral implications of satisfying the wants.  Competing immediate costs have competing hydraulic 
quantities, e.g., the rat’s food/cat equation, but moral implications may also have greater hydraulic 
qualities. 
 Thus, one may treat want and judgment in terms of two-tiered hydraulics, qualities and quantities, 
akin to Mill’s treatment of pleasure.  Hard determinists would be sympathetic to this Newtonian 
mechanical view, but the plausibility of Ainslie’s distinction between push/pull models of motive types 
undermines attempts to reduce motives to hydraulics.  Some motives propel as a force from behind, a 
pressure that pushes us forward from the rear; others pull us forward with attraction toward desired goals.  
Hydraulic motives are push model, but most of what motivates people are pull-model motives, and these 
are not hydraulic.  These are blended, and opaquely so. 
 Even on the hydraulic model, restraint (exclusive will) involves the novel causal power to 
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disengage the evolved organism from its otherwise total (hydraulic) functional/operational connection 
with the “organism/environment field” (Perls, 1947).  Organisms unable to disengage are “on-line” with 
the S/R stream that deterministically feeds hydraulic force (inclusive will) through the I/O mechanism; 
organisms that can disengage from the S/R stream of inclusive will put a causal/functional wedge between 
the ordinary S/R causal pairs, and are “off-line” from the hydraulic deterministic stream (inclusive will) 
that necessitates primitive behavior.  This counts as a novel break in the chain of hydraulic determinism – 
pseudo-emergentism. 
 Even if restraint (exclusive will) can be reduced to purely quantitative, hydraulic want model or 
push model terms, as opposed to qualitative, judgment model or pull model terms about the good to be 
pursued, the off-line organism is at an advantage over the on-line organism, for the former has options the 
latter lacks.  But if judgment-model restraint is not reducible to the quantitative hydraulic model, then it 
constitutes a greater off-line power than the more base, want-theoretic form of restraint, still off-line, 
exclusive will. 
 Absent reasons favoring one model, wants-based and judgments-based decisions are distinct 
enough to place animality and wants on the low end of the spectrum, and personhood and judgments on 
the high end.  Both forms of restraint empower their possessors with a degree of autonomous off-line 
functionality over on-line organisms, though judgment theoretic restraint is a greater boon on the 
want/judgment animal/person spectrum. 
 A key reason that judgment-model restraint is superior to want-model restraint is that the 
understanding can reassign values to wants (inclusive will), rearrange the hierarchy (exclusive will).  
Want-model restraint is just a function of hydraulic (inclusive will) forces, characterized as equal in the 
Buridan case.  And judgment-model restraint can bring considerations to bear on a decision that it expects 
to incline the will one way rather than the other, as in the pragmatic self-orientation of attention in 
attempts to form health-promoting beliefs; it can ignore considerations having an adverse expectation, as 
in the tenacious maintenance of a dogma or an unforgiving attitude, as with Goebbels (Stump, 1993); and 
it can call off or continue reconsideration of the factors as it sees fit, as Ainslie’s resolute choice model 
suggests.  Sophists’ and Pyrrhoneans’ abilities to juggle reasons come to mind.  To the extent that it can 
juggle competing wants, reasons, values, and judgments, it has plenty of elbow room and off-line power – 
the resultant power to transmute hydraulic forces striking the border in the organism/environment field.114 
                                                
114 See Perls (1947) for a rich analysis of the causal/functional relations at the “contact boundary” in the 
“organism/environment field”.  Based on earlier theoretical work in the gestalt theory of perception, Perls et al. 
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 Autonomous agents can intentionally equalize the determinants of their behavior; they can reduce 
addictive responses by avoiding addictive stimuli, as Ulysses did with the Sirens (Elster, 1979).  
Analogously, Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” strategy schematizes a technique agents can use to screen out 
undesirable influences (1971).  Agents who wish to select principles of action can follow any number of 
analogues of this decision procedure to escape from what Kant calls the heteronomous causation of the 
will.  Science may enable us to equalize what evolution has given us.  Cyborg persons of the future can 
autotelically rewrite their genetic sequences and their neurosignature sequences at will from among a vast 
array of internally apparent programs, some involving random number generators, both pseudo-random 
and fully random.  These beings have greater autonomy than we do, but we need not make it to the fully 
autotelic, autogenous cyborg level to see that we are much closer to that than we are to the animals, even 
now.115  The more autonomous among us are virtually there already.  Freedom admits of, and comes in, 
degrees. 
 This off-line power enhances the intensity and ambit of the will, which are in turn enlarged by 
repeated use, as a muscle is so enlarged (one of Ainslie’s attributes of will, supra), and by any and all 
functions that engender restraint.  Reflexive operations typically involving feedback oriented cognition 
are restraint-empowering factors, as evidenced in biofeedback (Olton and Noonberg, 1980) and 
meditation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). 
 We possess novel judgment theoretic abilities.  We can engage deeply reflexive cogitations and re-
valuational operations on motivational atoms and the hierarchical structures that distribute them within 
the valuational array of our awareness, deploy Buridan case tie-breaking pseudo-random and reason-
alternating operations to incline and disincline the will, and shift figure/ground configurations in our 
awareness.  We can do all this while functionally disengaged or off-line from interactive involvement at 
the contact boundary in the organism/environment field.  Surely these are emergent causal autonomy 
powers, powers over the hydraulic determinism of mere animal wants and their on-line, immediate S/R 
functioning.   
 We can engage the hydraulic force of animal wants to overthrow reason, by guzzling down 
alcohol to fuel rage, so the will seems to have access to – and thus to be distinct from, to transcend – both 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1951) identify attention and its ability to determine the figure/ground relationship or gestalt as key determinants of 
healthy organismic functioning. 
115 Ironically, these considerations suggest that the first fully autonomous beings will likely be futuristic hybrid (part 
biological, part synthetic) persons (cyborgs) or “wet” AI machines.  Here is where one may appropriately embrace 
a reductio ad absurdem to the effect that one’s model of freedom entails that machines can be free, and say “So 
what?” in response. 
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wants and judgments.  So, in its transcendental function the will involves a hybrid of reason and desire in 
that it is the wants-informed (inclusive will) intelligent ability (exclusive will) to direct the attention,116 
and thus to direct the figure/ground relationship, and so to move the organism in its total functioning, on-
line/off-line, at will.117  Driving this whole process is the attention, consciousness, as depicted 
metaphorically in the role of the soul as charioteer over the horses of passion, both in Plato’s Phaedrus 
and in the Bhagavad Gita.118 
 Attentive consciousness – meta-awareness – holds the reins of exclusive will more than any part 
of Agent.  LTM determines what elements of the perceptual field become figural in the figure/ground 
gestalten that emerge in consciousness.  Exclusive will rankings cultivated over time into habits largely 
determine what LTM selects.  LTM thus embodies the residual hierarchical structure of what Kane 
(2002b) and others call the self system; Frankfurt (1971) and Perls (1947) might agree it is a system of 
identifications and alienations.  Our voluntary behavior of yesterday forms our character of today and 
shapes what seems to arise in awareness spontaneously, not only in the selectivity of perceptual attention 
from the influences of LTM, but in the generation of the sorts of reasons that will count as “live options” 
(James) that we will consider when deliberating, etc.119  Since each time we repeat an action we reinforce 
it (Ainslie), we are responsible for our self-formation, for what sorts of urges, ideas, etc. occur to us 
‘spontaneously’, and partly for our brain structures.120 
 These are more a function of our idiosyncratic exclusive will patterns than they are of ancient 
causal streams that may have culminated in the raw materials that constitute the inclusive will inputs that 
fed into our early exclusive-will-engaging behaviors.  Since exclusive will brings so much more self-
                                                
116 On the control powers of attention, see Austin (1998), Benson et al. (1990), Chalmers (1996, 1997), 
Csikszentmihalyi (1991), Forrest-Presley et al. (1985), Goleman and Thurman (1991), Hamilton (1976, 1981), 
Hamilton and De la Pena (1977), Hamilton et al. (1984), Marcel and Bisiach (1992), Metcalf and Schimamura 
(1994), Nelson (1992), Olton and Noonberg (1980), Perls et al. (1951), Robbins (1997), Umlita` (1992), Weinert 
and Kluwe (1987). 
117 “At will” refers to inclusive will in beings that possess exclusive will.  Thus, it sounds odd to say a bird flies ‘at 
will’ (or ‘freely’), since there is no contrast against the background of which its flying is distinct (compared to 
everything else it does).  “At will”, then, is a hybrid of exclusive and inclusive will that doesn’t apply to beings 
with nonhierarchical wills. 
118 Phaedrus, 246a-b, 253c ff; see Zaehner (1966) for a good translation of the Bhagavad Gita.  A similar model is 
in the state/soul analogy in Plato’s Republic (1941):  Reason informs will, which controls passion.  This model is 
critically reviewed in Blackburn (1998). 
119 Mele (2002, 2003) places indeterminism in the generation of deliberative reasons, but that would have little 
effect if what is identified as salient is a function of past performances; but if it were effective, it might repeatedly 
threaten to change Agent’s character. 
120 Since there are neurosignatures created in the elastic brain from each repeated experience (Benson, 1996), we 
significantly create our own brain structures by our choices and habits. 
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sculpting and inclusive-will-transcending power and largely determines what inclusive-will type RFAs 
will even appear as triggered spontaneously by conscious experience, CON ultimacy arguments fail on 
any close examination of the relevant details. 
 These intuitions about self-formation link with libertarian views of Agent as acausal or 
contracausal, but without any appeals to indeterminacy or any other unnatural, hard doctrine.  The ability 
of the will to transcend both wants (inclusive) and judgments (exclusive) accounts for the 
phenomenology, as if it is beyond the causal stream altogether.  Just as pseudo-random processes are 
virtually random enough, so also the transcendental nature of exclusive will is pseudo-acausal, and thus 
virtually contracausal enough.  This power, though consistent with deterministic causation at more global 
levels, seems contracausal because it can literally override the base hydraulic determinism (inclusive will) 
that impels animals.  Thus, it is contracausal relative to hydraulic causation, though only pseudo-
contracausal relative to determinism simpliciter. 
 What is the character of this higher will, is it more want theoretic (inclusive will) or judgment 
theoretic (exclusive will), or something else?  What distinguishes us from other animals in terms of will is 
our exclusive (hierarchical) will and their inclusive (nonhierarchical) will.  Action involves teleological 
(wants involving) movement (or restraint, however slight, in intentional omissions), distinct from the 
deliberative process, though guided by it.  Aristotle’s model of the practical syllogism, whereby the 
conclusion of deliberation is a judgment about the good to be pursued, which issues in the related action, 
is phenomenologically false.  The will is capable of halting the action or executing the judgment after the 
decision is made.  While reflection on the Kavka/Newcomb problem suggests intentions cannot be 
properly individuated independently of forecasts about the likelihood of their being carried out, in 
representative cases, decisions and choices can be defeated, though in some cases we view them as 
success terms. 
 Are decisions distinct from choices?  Intuition differentiates them, though usage often joins them.  
I can study the menu and decide to order the filet of sole, but choose to change my mind in the presence 
of the waiter, having just seen something more appealing served at the next table.  Or I may be unable to 
choose it if the waiter says they have no more filet.  These cases suggest decision is more tied to bringing 
deliberation to an end, but choice need not involve deliberation.  “Choose a card from the deck” is a 
phrase that supports this, for there is no deliberation in this case; “decide on a card, any card from the 
deck” is grammatically awkward. 
 The difference between exclusive willings supports cases like deciding to vote Republican but 
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choosing in the booth at the last moment to change one’s mind and vote Democratic.  Some cases turn on 
the  point where intervention makes sense or not; e.g., “flicker of freedom” theorists argue that the 
slightest effort in the direction of a choice is a different choice than the one Intervener would bring about, 
were that flicker evident (Fischer, 2002).  Choosing is about actual sequence selection from alternatives 
and decision is more about the final ranking of deliberated options, which need not be instantiated to 
count as a decision.  Fischer and Ravizza’s distinction (1998) between reason-receptive, reason-reactive, 
and reason-responsive behavior supports this.  Deliberation is reason-receptive, decision is reason-
reactive, and choice is reason-responsive. 
 In its highest form, exclusive will is the ability to transcend and equalize hydraulic and 
teleological determination, or both, and these are often opaquely intertwined.  This novel dual ability puts 
agents causally/functionally above both the hydraulic stream and the stream of rational compulsion, e.g., 
by truth.  Compared to the S/R causation of on-line behavior, off-line powers are virtually acausal, and all 
such powers strengthen and extend the range of metacausal power.  So, the power to use reason over want 
or vice versa, or any other form of restraint, adds to the virtual supracausal power of the meta-will, 
compared to the will of animals, just as the hydraulics of animal wants are a leap over the tropisms of 
plants, and the latter an improvement over the even more purely hydraulic causation of Newtonian 
mechanics seen in the collision of two bodies.  The metacausal will is, virtually speaking, uncaused, 
though only pseudo-uncaused.  This view naturalizes the teleological rejection of reasons as causes put 
forward by libertarians.121 
 Decision may sometimes be a success term.  I can choose the fish on whim, exhibited by the 
convention that I am willing to pay for it if it is delivered, only to be disappointed when the waiter returns 
with the bad news.  Here, choice seems to involve a commitment component related to a success criterion, 
but both fail as success terms when I decide or choose to win the election, since it is not in my power to 
bring that about.  I can decide or choose to run for office, even if it turns out that I fail to get the needed 
signatures.  One can decide to spend the afternoon playing handball with a friend, but sprain an ankle on 
the way to meet the friend.  Kant’s reasoning about motives being crucial for moral evaluation is 
insightful to the extent that actions and consequences are partly outside the range of our full control, but 
erroneous to the extent that it ignores the fact that reasonable expectations or forecasts about success 
(Kafka/Newcomb, Ulysses) also play a key role in our evaluations of decisions, in addition to our 
evaluation of RFAs.  For it is appropriate to hold someone blameworthy if we reasonably expect he 
                                                
121 See Collins (1984), Davidson (1968), Ginet (2002), Grice (1980), and Parfit (1986) on reasons as causes. 
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should not have attempted an action with little likelihood of success, which entails that we judge him able 
to have perceived this and to have succeeded in doing otherwise.122 
 Wants and decisions differ, whether the latter involve success or not.  Wants involve expectations 
of reward, often hedonic, and we associate hedonic rewards with the stimuli that have generated them, but 
there is a difference between anticipating that a pleasant experience will arise if one X’s, the yearning for 
that sensation which inclines one to X, and being actually driven by that hoped-for sensation to do X.  
The latter may or may not involve bodily (proprioceptive) sensations of its own, as with hunger, lust, and 
other powerful emotions; these often have a phenomenologically transparent hydraulic character, but not 
always a first-personally transparent one, as per Freud.  Part of this is a hedonistic craving for a certain 
pleasant sensation, part of it is a judgment that X generates that sensation (and part a judgment that this 
sensation is a worthwhile pursuit), and part of it is the moving toward the good to be achieved by X-ing; 
again, part of it may involve proprioception of hydraulic force.  It is complex. 
 Metacausal power enables Agent to rise above hydraulic and non-hydraulic will in an off-line 
meditation about RFAs and their goals, and it can value or devalue and activate or deactivate any 
motivational atoms/wants or RFAs/judgments, in transcendent pseudo-homunculus form, with all 
want/reason causal feeds so stripped of hydraulic force as if to be uncaused, though still causal.  This 
accounts for the phenomenology involving S/R-free, hydraulics-free will, similar to God’s acausal, 
transcendent freedom to choose from among possible worlds, as a prime mover unmoved.  Contrary 
intuitions are explained by locating them on the lower end of the spectrum. 
 The metacausal model handles the want/judgment, reason/passion dichotomies and subsumes their 
features as evidence for its comprehensive explanatory power.  It provides the causal/functional 
metamental architecture on which the principles of voluntary, guidance, and determinism friendly 
counterfactual/regulative control, PAPW1 and PAPW2, and PAPM-enriched versions of the same, may 
be grounded.  Let us turn to these. 
  
                                                
122 Widerker’s “PAE” principle (2002) formalizes a general version of this intuition. 
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Chapter 6:  The Metacausal Principles, PAPW and PAPM 
 
Let us begin with a review of PAPW, which comes in two forms:  PAPW1, the principle of voluntariness, 
and PAPW2, the principle of weak conditional ability. 
PAPW1: Agent performs an action voluntarily iff in acting he would have so acted had he 
been able to do otherwise (had he had access to alternatives); 
PAPW2:  Agent has weak conditional ability in performing an action iff in acting he satisfies 
PAPW1 and would have done otherwise had he wanted to do otherwise. 
PAPW1 requires, in other words, that Agent would have done likewise – would have acted identically – 
even if he actually was able to act otherwise.  PAPW2 requires, in other words, that Agent could have 
done otherwise if he actually had wanted to do otherwise.  Both versions of PAPW therefore require 
counterfactual analyses.  In Locke’s secretly locked room, Agent stays voluntarily though he cannot 
leave, under PAPW1, iff he would have stayed had he been able to have gotten out – that is, if he would 
have stayed even if the door had been unlocked.  But he lacks weak conditional ability, since PAPW2 is 
not satisfied:  He wouldn’t have left had he wanted to, because the door was locked.   
 In a Frankfurt Case, Agent cannot vote Republican because Intervener is ready to block him from 
wanting to, though he wants to vote Democratic on his own.  I used to think Agent fails PAPW2, and 
agreed with the majority that Agent cannot vote Republican, thanks to Intervener, but votes Democratic 
voluntarily, since he would have voted Democratic anyway, had there been no Intervener or neural 
monitoring implant.  I was content to be able to differentiate PAPW1 and PAPW2 to account for the fact 
that he acted voluntarily while being unable to do otherwise.  But a valid question is:  Would he have 
voted Republican if he had wanted to?  Like many, I thought “no”, he cannot want to, for Intervener will 
not allow him to want otherwise, which is fine, for in otherwise analogous cases lacking Interveners, 
Agent satisfies PAPW2, and that suffices for non-phi-fi autonomy. 
 I have come to think the answer is only “no” in the sense that he cannot want to; whereas, if there 
is some sense, or some world, in which he could want otherwise, it is plausible that he would vote 
otherwise if in the actual world his wanting otherwise in the range of relevantly similar cases is usually 
effective in his doing otherwise.  I have been influenced in this line of thought by Levin (2003), who 
argues that what the Intervener or implant prevents is his wanting to vote Republican, not his voting 
Republican, in which case he might still have some weak conditional ability to act on his wants, to do 
otherwise were he to want to do otherwise, though in the present phi-fi case he lacks some weak 
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conditional ability to alter his will, to will otherwise, due to Intervener.  So, if he counterfactually wanted 
to vote Republican, it is plausible that he would have done so.   
 I had assumed this interpretation goes beyond what is necessary and that it might entail an 
unnecessarily strong conditionalism.  But Levin’s argument comports with the weak alternatives 
argument applied to CON:  Though Agent cannot want or do otherwise in the actual world it remains 
possible that he could want or do otherwise in the counterfactual world with different world history or 
laws.  Though determinism leaves no actual world alternatives, it is perfectly consistent with 
counterfactual world alternatives, as was made amply clear in Chapter 3.  Thus, though Intervener leaves 
no actual world alternatives, his presence is consistent with counterfactual world alternatives, though, in 
Frankfurt Cases, his presence bars some very nearby counterfactual alternatives ex hypothesi.  All we 
need to do is to factor whether in the nearest world in which there is no active-Intervener-interference-
disposition and Agent wants to vote otherwise, he does so.  There should be plenty of such worlds nearby 
for most agents in non-phi-fi worlds.  The counterfactual in which Agent wants to vote Republican is a 
back-tracker, in that the supposition that he wants to vote Republican implies that there is a possible 
world in which Intervener failed to function some time in the past.  Surely we can imagine worlds in 
which Intervener does not function, unless Intervener is a Cartesian demon whose will is necessitated.123  
Absent a necessitated will that is fixed across all possible worlds, a notion that exceeds credibility for a 
merely human manipulator like Intervener,124 it begs the question here to build necessity into the 
description of Intervener’s will, for that would define away this otherwise coherent logical possibility, and 
thereby prove nothing. 
 We cannot get caught up in the exaggerated phi-fi powers of what Dennett calls “bugbears” 
(1984).  Human Intervener is not an omnipotent, omniscient cosmic demon, so he cannot control all 
possible defeaters of his control over Agent.  There are nearby possible worlds in which a black-out 
disables the implant, a meteor shower interferes with transmissions governing the remote control, or a 
heart attack renders Intervener unconscious.  Such contingencies permit Agent to form such an intention.  
So, Agent can do otherwise if he wants to.  Levin’s view may be fitted into my account.  His point hinges 
                                                
123 That an all-good God could act as a manipulative Intervener is self-contradictory on most interpretations of God, 
so even theists seem untouched by this option.  The closest to this role that could be played by God is that of a CNC 
(Mele, 1995), by choosing to create that world in which he knows that circumstances He sets in motion will lead to 
Agent’s freely making a specific choice, say, one that God wishes to be freely made.  But this is not manipulative. 
124 Arguably, only a being like God could possess such a necessitated will, and it is doubtful even God could, for 
then the doctrine of God’s (necessary) goodness would conflict with the doctrine of God’s omnipotence, which 
implies limitless will.  Indeed, if God’s will is necessitated by God’s goodness, then God arguably lacks free will. 
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on the sort of Frankfurt Case in which Intervener blocks the desire to want otherwise, but we need not 
engage in exegetical work on how to read this or that of Frankfurt’s examples or on the many Frankfurt 
Cases that have arisen in the literature.  For Interveners may conceivably be situated at just about any 
point in the process leading to or from an action, from prenatal times to times after which the 
consequences of one’s doings are well beyond the sphere of one’s volitional control.   
Likewise, as in the so-called “Mind argument”, mechanical but non-agential versions of these 
Interveners may be substituted for each of them, as may be natural/biological processes, the succession of 
which substitutions is intended to tend toward slippery slopes of lost intuitions (cf. Mele, 1995).  
Pereboom (2001) develops a powerful “four case” version of this argument that has come to be called the 
“Manipulation Argument”.125  This argument moves through four cases:  first, a case of apparent free will, 
one in which Agent is manipulated intentionally, one where Agent is manipulated by mechanical means, 
and finally one in which Agent is simply determined.  Pereboom challenges the compatibilist to identify a 
principled distinction between any of the four cases.  This challenge is particularly pressing insofar as it is 
difficult to distinguish between cases that do and do not involve manipulation in the form of what Mele 
(2006) calls “unsheddable” beliefs, the sort of beliefs that may have been acquired by brainwashing.  For 
such unsheddable beliefs may be acquired by an analogous form of credal conditioning that occurs prior 
to the point at which Agent is capable of evaluating those beliefs rationally, but which seems to involve 
no intentional manipulation.  Culture alone might do the trick, and so might any number of more general, 
equally if not more impersonal causal factors that may be summed up under the rubric of determinism, but 
which lack a manipulator altogether.  If there is no principled distinction that may be introduced to 
differentiate between these cases, then it appears that the attributes of non-autonomy and non-
responsibility that obviously adhere in the case of blatant manipulation may be extended to simple cases 
of deterministic causation, from which it follows that determinism does undermine autonomy and moral 
responsibility.  The Manipulation Argument is powerful. 
My analysis not only distinguishes between cases of manipulation involving sheddable and 
unsheddable beliefs in a principled way, thereby rebutting the Manipulation Argument, but also provides 
counterfactual backtracking or “tracing” criteria that account for a broad array of divergent intuitions in 
the full range of such cases.  These tracing criteria will be brought about below, through casuistry upon a 
series of hypothetical cases that span Pereboom’s “four case” spectrum.   
For now, it is enough to note that the locus of Intervener’s counterfactual manipulation may be 
                                                
125 See Haji (2009) for a critical review of the Manipulation Argument. 
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situated anywhere along the spectrum of agency.  Thus, in some Intervener cases, wants may be blocked; 
in others, choices; in still others, actions; in some, self-formation is manipulated; and in others, the 
consequences of well planned, well meaning actions are manipulated, after the actions themselves are 
performed under reasonable predictive circumstances otherwise reliably correlated with rational, 
prudential, or moral outcomes.  It all depends, but wherever the bump appears in the rug, it may be 
smoothed out through careful reasoning.  My analysis supports the adjustments at any and all such 
Intervener aperture locations, and makes clear when we may and may not infer that Agent has Levin-style 
weak conditional ability even when Agent seems to fail PAPW2, thanks to Intervener. 
 PAPW focuses on causal authorship, which is a metaphysical notion of agential, causative 
responsibility for bringing about action.  But PAPW may also be used to account for moral responsibility: 
PAPWR1: Agent is weakly morally responsible iff he satisfies PAPW1. 
PAPWR2: Agent is moderately morally responsible iff he satisfies PAPW2.126 
The differences between weak and moderate responsibility explain cases where necessary and sufficient 
conditions for autonomy diverge when PAPW1 is satisfied, but not PAPW2.  Perfect autonomy and 
responsibility parallel Nozick’s treatment of perfect value tracking in moral judgment, analogous to his 
treatment of perfect truth tracking in epistemic judgment:  Both extremes are unnecessary for minimal 
satisfaction in their domains.  PAPW1-satisfaction is sufficient for minimal autonomy; PAPW2-
satisfaction is sufficient for moderate autonomy.  PAPWR1-satisfaction is sufficient for minimal 
responsibility; PAPWR2-satisfaction is sufficient for moderate responsibility.  Minimal autonomy is 
sufficient for minimal responsibility; moderate autonomy is sufficient for moderate responsibility.  
PAPW1 makes principled why Frankfurt Cases preserve the intuition that agents without alternatives 
remain responsible, contrary to PAP:  Agents act voluntarily if they would have still done as they did had 
they been able to do otherwise. 
Since Agent’s actual sequence behavior occurs without Intervener interference, Frankfurt and 
others hold Agent responsible though he lacked alternatives, so PAP is false.  If we subtract Intervener, 
nothing about Agent would change.  If Intervener alters nothing, Agent is responsible though he lacked 
alternatives.  This is “subtraction argument 1”.  This argument is flawed.  A Frankfurt Case only adds 
possible intervention, for actual intervention would defeat Agent responsibility outright.  Next, it notes 
that intervention wasn’t actualized, that if it was it would remove Agent responsibility, but that non-
                                                
126 “Moderate” is left vague to fit the nature of the subject.  “Strong” is reserved for indeterministic versions.  
Fischer and Ravizza (1998) distinguish “weak”, “moderate”, and “strong” reason-responsive mechanisms; they also 
cite vagueness as reflective of the subject, a move first made by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics. 
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intervention is non-removal of Agent responsibility.  So, by introducing the possibility of a responsibility-
defeating condition, then subtracting it, responsibility seems to remain.  Something has been 
miscalculated here, however.  When I was a child, my father would put up both hands and display 10 
fingers, remove one finger at a time from one hand, saying “10, 9, 8, 7, 6" as each was removed, then say 
“6+5=11", where “6” was used to refer to the removed fingers, and “5” to refer to the fingers left visible.  
Subtraction argument 1 commits an “11 fingers” type fallacy. 
 Here is why subtraction argument 1 is fallacious.  Nothing in Frankfurt Cases shows that there was 
ever any non-zero amount of responsibility to begin with, but only that if Intervener would have removed 
responsibility, he leaves whatever amount of responsibility there was in the original case untouched by 
not intervening.  But this doesn’t imply that the amount of responsibility that was already there in the 
original case was a non-zero amount.  Indeed, skeptics of compatibilism will insist that if determinism is 
being assumed, then the amount of responsibility in the original case is exactly zero.  Thus, not lowering 
an original value of zero simply leaves that original value at zero.  The Frankfurt argument thus commits 
a fallacy; just because there would be no responsibility if Intervener acted, it does not follow that there is 
responsibility if Intervener doesn’t act.  We cannot move from zero to non-zero responsibility by an 11 
fingers move.  Thus, subtraction argument 1 is guilty of an 11 fingers type fallacy. 
Libertarians object that Intervener smuggles in determinist notions required to see a “sign” of 
movement toward the alternative, required to control Agent, which begs the question against 
indeterminism.  Much ink has been spilled over whether there is a “flicker of freedom” to be identified in 
that sign, properly construed.  But opponents of Frankfurt-style compatibilism can more easily and 
forcefully object that determinism entails zero pre-Intervener responsibility, a view shared by hard 
determinists.127  But indeterminists insist that freedom requires alternatives, so Frankfurt Cases are just 
what may be used to help decide whether alternatives of any kind are required for freedom and 
responsibility.  Careful bookkeeping is needed about who is begging the question, but incompatibilists 
cannot simply object to Frankfurt Cases on the ground that there is an antecedent assumption of zero 
responsibility, since soft determinists do not share that assumption.  Claiming prior responsibility is one 
thing; using 11 fingers to ground it is another.  Opponents of PAP cannot just assume non-zero antecedent 
responsibility, left untouched by Intervener in subtraction argument 1. That’s 11 fingers.  But they have 
offered only an ipse dixit that antecedent non-zero responsibility is intuitive. 
                                                
127 See, e.g., Ekstrom (2000, 2002) and Widerker (1995, 2002) for versions of these libertarian objections; see also 
Mele and Robb (1998) for a defense against the objections. 
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Allowing that Agent would not be responsible if he is Intervener’s puppet does not entail that he is 
responsible otherwise, simpliciter, or independent of the hypothetical.  That’s just 11 fingers.  Fischer not 
only commits such an ipse dixit, but actually defends the move. 
The first step is to argue [in Frankfurt Cases] that intuitively ... alternative possibilities are 
irrelevant to ascriptions of moral responsibility.  One is supposed to see the irrelevance of 
alternative possibilities simply by reflecting on the examples.  I do not know how to prove the 
irrelevance thesis, but I find it extremely plausible intuitively.  When Louis Armstrong was asked 
for the definition of jazz, he allegedly said, “If you have to ask, you ain’t never gonna know.”  I 
am inclined to say the same thing here:  if you have to ask how the Frankfurt-type cases show the 
irrelevance of alternative possibilities to moral responsibility, “you ain’t never gonna know.”  
(2002, p. 292; emphases in original) 
But Fischer loses his footing, for the mere presence of the non-zero intuition in the subtraction case does 
not imply that it holds in the non-subtraction case.  The intuition needs justification.  But the non-zero 
impression only seems intuitive relative to the 11 fingers subtraction maneuver. 
 That nobody intervened is consistent with Agent’s responsibility, but consistency alone is 
insufficient here; 11 fingers cannot supply what’s missing.  Enter PAPW1, with its analogue of a 
definition of jazz.  The idea in PAPW1 is that Agent does what he wants to do whether or not he has 
alternatives.  He usually has alternatives – a ceteris paribus assumption for all intentional behavior – and 
selects from among them.  One may object that he merely believes he has alternatives, but the claim may 
be made metaphysically, for Intervener represents the blocking of metaphysical (counterfactual) 
alternatives, since if any are entertained, he will block them.  PAPW1 factors for Agent’s intention in the 
nearest world in which Intervener fails and Agent has alternate opportunities or RFAs he can act on, to 
determine if Agent still acts on the same reason he acted on in the actual world.  If Agent performs the 
same action, then the action based on that reason was not performed against his will; thus, it was 
sufficiently authored by him.  If he does otherwise in the nearest world in which all his intentions remain 
fixed but Intervener is absent, then this “subtraction argument 2” indicates that his acting in Intervener’s 
presence was influenced in a responsibility-undermining way by Intervener; thus, it was not sufficiently 
authored by Agent.  PAPW1 thus renders subtraction argument 1’s jazz effable, and explains why agents 
still seem responsible though lacking alternatives:  They are acting on their own volitions, in ways that 
may be counterfactually substantiated. 
 If Intervener’s presence implies the removal of alternatives, then his absence, either simpliciter in 
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non-phi-fi cases or post-subtraction implies the presence of alternatives.  This “subtraction argument 3” is 
a possibility-symmetry demand.  Determinism entails that there are no strong (indeterministic) 
alternatives in Intervener’s absence, only weak (counterfactual) ones, so Intervener’s presence cannot be 
what explains the absence of strong alternatives, for Agent is not exempt from determinism.  Strong non-
alternatives are over-determined by Intervener and determinism.  Either the absence of Intervener entails 
strong alternatives or not.  If it does, Frankfurt Cases support PAP in non-phi-fi cases.  If it doesn’t, 
because determinism is true, then mere absence of Intervener tout court, simpliciter or post-subtraction 
argument 1 does not guarantee the presence of strong alternatives, for determinism and Intervener simply 
overdetermine non-alternatives.  Intervener’s addition and then subtraction (11 fingers) has no effect on 
the underlying determinism-based non-alternatives.  But if so, then anti-PAP proponents of subtraction 
argument 1 cannot assume non-zero responsibility to begin with, which is required for subtraction 
argument 1 to go through.  That Agent is responsible independently of subtraction argument 1 needs 
support.  But determinism and PAP are taken to undermine that support. 
 Subtraction argument 1 is motivated by the worry that determinism removes alternatives, whose 
absence threatens responsibility, and aims to show that non-alternatives do not entail non-responsibility.  
But that only works by antecedently assuming that agents are already responsible.  But if one thought 
agents already were responsible, one would not need subtraction argument 1.  If one thinks subtraction 
argument 1 provides Fischer’s jazz, one has lost count of a metaphorical finger.  But PAPW1 explains 
why agents can remain responsible absent strong alternatives.  I do not press the idea that requires equally 
strong possibilities in Intervener’s absence, since determinism entails absence of strong alternatives 
independently.  I press the weaker possibilities claim that in Intervener’s absence the nearest world in 
which Agent is able to do otherwise is closer than the world located by moving outward from an actual 
world defined by the Intervener’s presence.  That is, in phi-fi Intervener cases we must go much further 
out from the actual world to test PAPW1 than in non-phi-fi cases of no Intervener. 
 In the nearest world where Agent would want otherwise, he is blocked by Intervener.  No Fixity 
violation is implied by entertaining such a possible world, for we already must entertain that world when 
we grasp the claim that Intervener would counterfactually block Agent.  We have to go some way out to a 
world in which Intervener is absent.  In non-phi-fi cases, the nearest world to be entertained is one in 
which Agent wants to do otherwise, and in that neighboring world he typically can do otherwise, ceteris 
paribus.  The Fixity Axioms of determinism guarantee that this is so.  PAPW1 only asks whether in the 
nearest world in which Agent can do otherwise, he does do otherwise or sticks with the same 
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reason/action pairing.  Sober’s weathervane metaphor (1995) suggests that if he does stick with the same 
pair, then he is literally volitionally stuck.  Levin might insist that since Intervener is supposed to block 
his wanting otherwise, he does not even really block Agent’s doing otherwise.  If he wants to do 
otherwise, however, hasn’t Intervener already failed?  Again, depending on where we stipulate 
Intervener’s disposition of intervention, we may apply PAPW differently.  Perhaps Locke’s unwitting 
prisoner better illustrates how weak and moderate versions of PAPW may come apart, on Levin’s 
interpretation of Intervener. 
 These differences matter more when we shift from strong to weak possibilities.  Agent has no 
strong (indeterministic) alternatives under determinism, irrespective of Intervener, but has weak 
alternatives, Bok’s “practical possibilities” (1998), which are, importantly, what he loses with Intervener.  
Types of non-alternatives (necessities) cannot (validly) be homogenized, contrary to modal fallacy a.  
Bok’s practical/theoretical and our weak/strong distinctions overlap.  For Bok, any option that Agent 
considers would open a metaphysical path were Agent to choose it.  (On our counterfactual analysis, this 
idea is determinism friendly.)  So, from the vantage of Agent’s power to open a path by selecting it, all 
such options are real possibilities, though only the selected one is metaphysically open, given 
determinism.  It is analytic that I will do whatever I will do, from which it follows that I cannot do other 
than what I ultimately do.  Que sera sera.   But this entails no loss of control over – ability to select from 
– available options.  Each practical possibility in the vicinity of being chosen represents a path in a nearby 
world which would be open, were it endorsed.  For it to be endorsed, Uniformity requires a different past, 
but this entails no inability.  By analogy, every point on the ‘equator’ of a billiard ball adjacent or close to 
the point at which it was struck represents a path in a nearby world that it would traverse, were it struck at 
that point.  As BB CON made clear (back in Chapter 3), determinism guarantees that. 
 Agent’s weak/practical possibilities may be blocked by Intervener’s preventing Agent from 
considering them.  When Intervener is absent, therefore, weak/practical possibilities and related 
counterfactuals remain, in what may be described as “10 fingers” fashion – that is, as a matter of valid 
inference.  Intervener’s blocking of epistemically accessible, entertainable practical possibilities causes 
the blocking of the related counterfactual possibilities that Intervener controls, but these differ 
importantly, and must be kept apart.  We may therefore distinguish between practical possibilities 
epistemically and metaphysically.  If Intervener permits practical possibilities to appear in Agent’s 
deliberations, but only appear, they are merely epistemic; if so, then they are not linked with the non-phi-
fi counterfactuals with which they are otherwise typically linked.  Intervener allows the option to pop up 
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in the subject’s mind, but makes sure that it is never chosen.  Levin would agree that this is consistent 
with the following:  If the subject chose the dangled alternative, he would have done it.  But I do not need 
to press Levin’s point to make my own. 
 A tacit assumption is that Intervener permits epistemic possibilities to enter into Agent’s 
deliberations, but stands by ready to sever their non-phi-fi link with their counterfactuals, but this 
assumption is not at all innocuous.  The epistemic/metaphysical ambiguity of Intervener’s removal of 
alternatives has been overlooked, but it is crucial here, for Intervener cannot remove only metaphysical 
alternatives.  I’ll say why later, but if that is correct, it proves on another ground that subtraction argument 
1 is invalid.  The loss of practical alternatives – as if one could only select from one alternative – bears on 
culpability in light of the Kantian point that motive (RFA) is key in assessing behavior.  Though 
strong/metaphysical possibilities are irrelevant to PAPW1 responsibility ascriptions, subtraction argument 
1 doesn’t establish this.  Nor does it follow that weak/practical possibilities are irrelevant to responsibility 
ascriptions.  For non-phi-fi Agents have practical alternatives – a background condition on all intentional 
behavior – and typically select from among them, thereby opening that path by the one they select.  (The 
fact that their choice to select that option was determined does not render their causal input in choosing 
that option causally superfluous, any more than the fact that a fire was determined renders the striking of 
the match that ignited it causally superfluous.)  Analysis reveals that there are highly subtle temporal-
indexing problems here, for in selecting “RFA1” Agent either went through some process prior to 
Intervener presence and had practical possibilities or he didn’t.  If Agent did not go through some such 
process prior to Intervener presence, then Intervener does reduce Agent’s alternatives before Agent 
‘selects’ RFA1, which entails Intervener contamination, for there are no other entertainable RFAs to 
select from.  If Agent did engage in some process of practical reasoning prior to Intervener presence, then 
his having had access to practical possibilities and his having selected from among them prior to 
Intervener’s presence is what accounts for the intuition that he is responsible. 
 To clarify these claims, we may divide the deliberative process into three stages.  The formative 
stage is when Agent entertains alternatives.  The selecting stage is when Agent selects the RFA that will 
determine his action; this is Frankfurt’s ‘volition’ and Davidson’s ‘primary RFA’.  The executive stage is 
when Agent initiates the RFA-guided process that leads to action.  Fischer and Ravizza (1998) treat my 
threefold process as two-fold.  Since Agent can be receptive to a best reason, yet select a different one, 
recognizing reasons involves reason-cognition/receptivity, but selecting reasons involves reason-
conation/reactivity.  Reason-responsiveness involves both an inner mechanism of reason-receptivity and 
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an outer-directed reason-reactivity that involves bodily movement and the “outer” path leading from 
bodily movement, say, pulling a trigger, to an external event, say, shooting the Mayor (1998, p. 107).  
This division figures in responsibility for external events:  Agents are responsible for the consequences of 
their inner mechanism behaviors iff the outer path from inner mechanism to event exhibits appropriate 
responsiveness to inner mechanism (pp. 107 ff.).  To trace outer events to inner mechanisms, they use an 
analysis of causal/counterfactual conditions similar to ours, although it is not explicitly described as such, 
but rather brought about through casuistry upon a series of hypothetical cases, many of which resemble 
Frankfurt Cases.  Since an RFA other than the best-recognized RFA may be selected, selectivity divides 
into recognition of best RFA and adoption of primary RFA. 
 With these divisions in mind, we may revisit the logic of apertures for Intervener.  Intervener 
cannot be around in the formative stage, or else he must remove all alternatives but one from the 
epistemic menu, or cognitive horizon (Levin, 1979), of practical possibilities that shapes both receptivity 
and selectivity stages.  This type of Intervener contamination suggestion runs afoul of the tacit assumption 
in Frankfurt Cases that Agent possesses a spectator-like epiphenomenal detachment toward his options, 
present up to the choice point.  But deliberative phenomenology and physicalism suggest a deterministic 
Kane-type process where one is “of two minds” that necessarily engage different psychoneural elements, 
creating conflict in the mind/brain (2002b).  Here, Agent actively considers moving toward entertained 
alternatives, but for each alternative other than Intervener-preferred alternative, Intervener must intervene, 
ex hypothesi.  If Intervener is around only at the selectivity stage or choice moment, he is functionally 
equivalent to determinism, but only in the que sera sera fatalistic sense that determines that Agent selects 
just the one thing which is whatever he will ultimately select – something that may be true, recall, even in 
indeterministic worlds.  But this is not a control-undermining factor, and so even Intervener cannot 
undermine control on this Intervener-aperture option.  If Intervener is only around just prior to the choice 
moment, and Agent inclines toward any alternatives, as one might be nearly-viscerally pulled to order 
shrimp right up to when one orders steak, Intervener must remove alternatives.  We will discuss the 
contamination issue further when we discuss the internal, subjectively available character of RFAs in 
Agent’s cognitive landscape. 
 Another assumption of Intervener-aperture logic that needs rethinking is that Intervener presence 
implies Intervener controls Agent, though he doesn’t intervene.  First, if the assumption that control need 
not manifest as interference is correct, the argument fails outright, for if control is present whether or not 
he intervenes, then his presence cannot be so easily subtracted.  Mere non-interference is what is 
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considered the equivalent of the subtraction of his presence, according to subtraction argument 1, but that 
fails if mere non-interference doesn’t remove his control.  Second, if the assumption of non-intervening 
control is valid, then, by parity of reasoning, whenever there is any typical non-phi-fi Agent, that Agent 
may be said to possess non-intervening counterfactual control over his own person.  But that sort of 
counterfactual control over oneself sounds precisely like autonomy.  This is “subtraction argument 4", and 
the sort of control it validates may be described as “Intervener-style self-control”.  And here’s the 
dilemma:  If Agent possesses Intervener-style self-control antecedently under determinism, then there is 
no need for any anti-PAP argument whatsoever, much less anti-PAP subtraction argument 1.  So, either 
subtraction argument 1 fails or it is otiose. 
 Intervener-style self-control is intuitive and doesn’t need much support.  For if having the option 
of intervening but not exercising it unless such exercise is called for by behaviors deviating from the 
putative controller’s plan equates with control, then Agent typically possesses such control when his 
action sequences and willings conform to his action plans and will preferences.  And he exercises such 
control when his action sequences and willings begin to deviate from his action plans and will preferences 
and he steers them back into line with the plan and preference.  A fortiori, ubiquitous experience confirms 
this kind of factual and counterfactual control, and PAPW satisfaction establishes it.  This is autonomy. 
 For instance, runner “R1” plans to run 5 miles, but exhaustion threatens to stop the run 
prematurely.  Upon identifying these “signs” that controllee part of R1 is about to deviate from controller 
part’s plan, controller part exercises control by intensifying efforts against controllee part, placing R1 
safely back on course.  The metaphysics of intrapsychically-divided self appear problematic first blush, 
but they too are divisible into hard/easy problems, and our Frankfurt/Perls/Kane model intuitively solves 
the easy problem of self, as would the Buddhist’s interdependent model; even Ainslie’s picoeconomic 
model would, but in Chapter 5 I have given reasons to think my model absorbs Ainslie’s.  Since controller 
wants to do other than what controllee is doing, he changes his action in accordance with his desire to do 
otherwise, and thus R1 satisfies PAPW2.  This constitutes actual sequence, actual world confirmation of 
Intervener-style self-control – relative to R1’s actually manifest motives.  Without actual world 
manifestations of successful will contrasted against occasional failures and a background of successful 
intention/action sequencing under R1’s control, mere counterfactual testing would lack inductive support.  
All of R1’s will activity, therefore, provides the inductive data or reference base against which 
counterfactual judgments are more or less probable for R1.  This holistic model intuitively dispels 
Austin’s objections against the conditional analysis of “could have done otherwise”, brought out by his 
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famous counterexample of the golfer who claims, unconvincingly, that he could have putted a hole in one 
(1961). 
 PAPW2 takes into account that Agent more identifies with the fact that he wants to want to run, 
say, given his long-term commitment to marathon training, despite his not wanting to run now, which 
Agent views as an alien or deviant want, so he puts himself back on course.  The part of Agent that has a 
2nd-order want is akin to Instructor who wants to regulate Driver, who begins to drive the wrong way, 
whereas the part of Agent that wants not to run is akin to the driving student who starts to drive the wrong 
way; this is an intrapersonal control analogue of an interpersonal control scenario. 
 The counterfactual in PAPW2 here is only visible in the actual sequence across the time span 
during which R1 struggled with his desires at different orders.  In other words, he has at T a strong 1st-
order desire not to run, but also a momentarily weaker 2nd-order desire to run, and the former is slowing 
him down; at T+n he has an effective 2nd-order desire and so he picks up the pace again.  This is an actual 
sequence modeling of what is normally seen only by comparing actual and counterfactual sequences:  In 
the actual sequence, the appearance of deviant desires is like counterfactuals where Agent wants to and 
does otherwise; here, Agent wants to and does otherwise by picking up the pace in the actual world.  That 
is akin to Instructor’s removing control from Driver.  This is internal control of identified desires over 
alien desires within R1. 
 To the extent Intervener-style self-control is an ability Agent possesses to redirect himself, it is 
superior to the guidance control Fischer holds sufficient for responsibility (1987), and sufficiently so to 
count as a genuine autonomy power of the sort Fischer erroneously thinks is only possible under 
indeterminism – that is, one sufficient for thinking we possess genuine free will.  For Fischer to insist that 
it is insufficient solely on the grounds that it is not indeterministic would be to beg the question against 
competing conceptions of autonomy.  And he cannot rule it out on the ground that he has stipulated that 
only indeterminism-involving “regulative” control can count as autonomy in this domain, for one cannot 
stipulate one’s way out of a problem by defining the key term in the dispute in such a question-begging 
fashion.  For that would amount to a case of the fallacy of persuasive definition. 
Driver exhibits Fischer’s guidance control when his muscular efforts and intentions control the 
direction in which the car moves; Instructor’s apparently regulative control can override Driver’s 
guidance control, and whether it is indeterministic or not does not appear to be relevant to assessing it as a 
distinct kind of control Instructor but not Driver possesses.  Fischer considers regulative control the 
ability to actually do otherwise, thought to require Fixity-violating strong alternatives in a deterministic 
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world, but that amounts to a stipulation that regulative control is indeterministic.  But Intervener-style 
self-control doesn’t involve ability to do other than what one ultimately does, but, rather, an ability to alter 
what one is doing.128  This intermediate Intervener-style self-control is “pseudo-” or “weak” regulative 
control, “ability to do otherwise” naturalized, “weak conditional ability”, not ability to do other than what 
one ultimately will do.  It does not require indeterminism. 
 If Driver is not in contact with cruise control and other levers that guide the vehicle, he lacks 
hands-on guidance control, but he exhibits some regulative control if it’s true that he can contact and 
manipulate the levers, should he so wish.  This is counterfactual control; Intervener exhibits this vry same 
kind of counterfactual control over Agent.  This control is proved whenever control levers are contacted 
or manipulated in ways that fulfill controller-intended teleological patterns, but they also exist when not 
being exercised. 
 Fischer’s hands-off control is regulative; he thinks determinism implies that since we can never do 
otherwise, we lack regulative control129 – freedom.  But this confuses inability to do otherwise under 
different intentions, “mundane conditional inability”, and que sera sera inability.  We need not violate 
“que sera sera Fixity” to possess weak regulative control.  Viewing inability to violate que sera sera 
Fixity as a weakness invites a form of fatalism.  The question is whether control requires access to 
divergent futures.  Our analysis does not require this. 
 Hard determinists might demand that if Intervener did not intervene, intervening was not an 
option, but that move commits one to oxymoronic actualism.  One cannot say both “if Agent tries to X, 
then it’s determined Intervener blocks X” and “if Agent doesn’t try to X, then it’s determined that 
Intervener doesn’t block X”, nor also “Intervener can block Agent” (simpliciter), not if there are no “if’s” 
or “can’s” tout court.  ‘Unexercised control’ begs the question whether ‘could’ is sensible when it is 
determined that it not be exercised.  In other words, Intervener is given powers the very advocates of the 
argument deny are possible.  Given determinism, pessimists insist, intervening was never an option, so 
neither is Intervener’s counterfactual regulative control over Agent.  So, one cannot claim by a subtraction 
argument or symmetry thesis that Agent must equally possess regulative control in Intervener’s absence.  
                                                
128 Not even a God can do other than what he ultimately does, for the reflexive attributive indexicality of “whatever 
happens” makes this analytic; erroneous equation of this tautology with Present Fixity is analogous to erroneous 
equation of Past Fixity with ~(P0&L). 
129 Animals possess mundane conditional ability (Shatz, 1986); they can act on variable intentions (Frankfurt, 
1971).  Since conditional ability to do otherwise is insufficient for freedom, Frankfurt proposes ability to will 
otherwise.  But the will that inclines toward food is one the rat can restrain in light of the nearby cat.  Most 
voluntary behavior involves mundane conditional ability, but not conditional ability to will otherwise.  PAPW 
captures both. 
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“0x0=0”, he may add. 
 Frankfurt Cases were supposed to constitute conditional proof against hard determinism:  If we 
suppose a case without alternate possibilities, we can still have responsibility and freedom.  What was 
supposed to make the non-alternatives plausible was a case where alternatives are absent even under soft 
determinist models involving agents with control being removed from them by other agents who can 
control them.  But the details of the thought experiments presuppose not that alternatives do not exist, but 
that they do – in fact, not only that they do, but that they constitute the ubiquitous background of agency 
against which they are artificially removed by another agent who also has illicit alternatives.  But 
Fischer’s “jazz” is only intuitive to the soft determinist.  On this “hard determined Intervener objection”, 
whether he intervenes or not will not help the soft determinist:  If he does, it was not up to him to do so, 
and so he cannot be held responsible for doing so; if he doesn’t, he never had control anyway.  So, the 
design of the thought experiment is contaminated.  I couldn’t agree more:  Accounts resting on mere 
“jazz” collapse. 
 Since the hard determined Intervener objection is reasonable, such assumptions from Frankfurt 
Cases as premises for the conclusion that there is such a thing as Intervener-style self-regulative control 
would be unacceptable.  But those are not premises in my account; my critiques of actualism, a, and b 
eliminated the grounds upon which pessimists may claim it is question-begging to presuppose any 
possibilities.  Weak possibilities were not presupposed here, for Frankfurt Cases precisely model the 
blocking of strong possibilities.  PAPW1 is designed precisely to capture the voluntary in the absence of 
alternatives of any kind.  PAPW2 is designed to capture the causal efficacy of Agent intention 
traditionally sought in conditional ability.  Thus, weak regulative control is independent of assumptions 
from Frankfurt Cases, but was introduced therewith only because intuitions are vivid for the Frankfurt 
Cases jazz cognoscenti. 
 Weak regulative control exhibits the dispositionality that PAPW captures.  The idea in PAPW2 is 
that when agents want to do otherwise, they do.  R1’s motivational system starts to direct the functioning 
of his whole system so that he wants to do otherwise than what he is beginning to do, which is to throw in 
the towel.  Since he wants to do other than what he is actually doing, he does otherwise.  If runner “R2” 
quits after 3 miles, he still exhibits guidance control, for his akratic intentions guide his quitting.  But he 
fails to exhibit weak regulative control, for although, like R1, he selected the 5-mile run from among 
entertained alternatives, he failed to carry that out.  Both of these runners exhibit guidance control, but 
only R1 exhibits regulative control. 
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 There is a temporal factor involved here, as earlier.  R1 and R2 both wanted to run 5 miles; only 
R1 succeeded.  One might object that when they hit the 3-mile barrier at T+n, R2 does what he wants at 
T+n (throw in the towel), so it is not that R1 is doing what he wants and R2 is not, but that R1 is doing 
what he wanted at T, and R2 is not.  But R2 is not doing what he overall wants during span S from T to 
T+n, for the better part of R2’s motivational system is committed during span S to the 5-mile run, even at 
T+n.  R2 fails PAPW2 with respect to long-term, span-S-committed desires, but passes PAPW1 with his 
short-term akratic desire.  That PAPW can finesse and account for the differences between R1 and R2 
constitutes a certain amount of indirect confirmation for PAPW’s explanatory purchase. 
 Intuitively, akratic behavior is loss of weak self-regulative control, but not guidance control.  The 
fact that agents regret their akratic behavior coheres well with the idea that they normally exercise weak 
regulative control over activities of similar sorts, without which background of typical control it would not 
make sense to adopt those reactive attitudes towards oneself on the mere ground of guidance control over 
these akratic activities.130  This idea of a background assumption of autonomy needs to be incorporated 
into the metacausal theory as the agential functionality norm against which individual cases must be 
judged.  (This sort of background assumption constitutes another reason why I argued from the outset 
against single-criterion theories and for a broad array of auxiliary hypotheses.)  We do not circularly 
assume a background of autonomy to explain autonomy, for the dialectic was not first establishing 
autonomy by reference to the background assumption; other grounds were offered to think that we have a 
background of ubiquitous autonomy.  The claim here is that this background needs to be referenced to 
sort out intuitions in individual cases; by analogy, for example, the plausibility of the golfer’s conditional 
ability claim must be assessed relative to the background defined by his proven skill set and track record.  
The general background of autonomy is an essential feature of the metacausal conception:  Autonomous 
agents are generally autonomous in most of the non-phi-fi domains of their intentional behavior, and it is 
by reference to their unique constellation of autonomous functional specifications as idiosyncratic agents 
that test cases need to be adjudicated. 
 Weak (counterfactual) regulative control differs from (indeterministic) regulative control, which 
can only be possessed by agents in indeterministic worlds with access to strong (indeterministic) 
alternatives.  Weak regulative control, however, can be possessed in deterministic worlds in which agents 
only have practical access to weak/counterfactual possibilities, but no access to strong/metaphysical 
                                                
130 Not all reactive attitudes are sensible:  Studies show women feel responsible for breast cancer though they know 
it doesn’t result from lifestyle choices (Benson, 1996, p. 264). 
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possibilities.  It is enough if Agent accesses practical possibilities, Bok-style, and acts on them.  Doing so 
determines his future, for on determinism everything in nature has causal powers, and what distinguishes 
determinism from fatalism is precisely this intuition, shared by the Buddha and relied upon in his 
prescriptions for total freedom from mental bondage:  that our deliberative, volitional behavior is what 
determines our futures. 
 Recall Fischer’s similar point about reason-responsiveness (1987).  Agent need not access an 
alternate world by doing otherwise to exhibit guidance control, so long as his deliberative mechanism is 
reason-responsive in the actual world sequence.  To see if it is, we only need to imagine varying the 
circumstances – we don’t actually vary them – say, a stronger reason that should defeat Agent’s choice.  
If it does defeat his choice, hypothetically, then Agent’s deliberative mechanism is reason-responsive; if 
not, it is not reason-responsive.  Counterfactual testing doesn’t require Agent access to alternate worlds, 
but just the judgment whether the mechanism would or wouldn’t respond differently under the influence 
of better or worse reasons.  The truth conditions are externalist and have nothing to do with Agent’s 
entertaining of alternatives; our justification that a real Agent satisfies such conditions can only be made 
inductively, based on our knowledge of his general background of agential effectiveness. 
 This defense applies exactly equally to both models:  Fischer’s and ours.  However, the shift from 
Agent’s counterfactual abilities to the reason-responsive mechanism’s counterfactual abilities packages 
counterfactual abilities just covertly enough to slip by the hard determinist warden.  But the shift to 
mechanism reduces agency to something on par with a thermostat.  A climate-responsive thermostat 
exhibits climate receptivity (it properly detects the temperature) and climate reactivity (it properly adjusts 
the temperature to desired settings) in the same way a reason-responsive mechanism exhibits reason-
receptivity and reason-reactivity.  This is not a bad thing, per se, but its focus on mechanism misses 
something essential in persons and absent in thermostats – agency. 
 PAPW helps distinguish actions that manifest in full accordance with Agent’s will from those that 
originate within Agent, with or without full consent or control.  Libertarians and other ultimatists want 
endogenous origination, but exogenous origination does not pose a problem if Agent maintains 
Intervener-style self-control over intentions.  As Locke noted (1690), we have the “power to suspend the 
execution and satisfaction of any … desires” – regardless, we may add, of their ultimate source.  For 
Frankfurt (1971), origination in Agent is inessential if Agent approves of the intentions, and on this 
ground he eschews a causal control analysis.  But a more robust ability is one that can also disapprove 
effectively, which amounts to metacausal control.  For Frankfurt’s inter-level volitional/metavolitional 
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harmony may be brought about by serendipity or manipulation, and therefore mere inter-level harmony is 
insufficient, on analysis.  What is needed is Agent self-control – not mere harmony, and not mere 
endogenous origination. 
 All that weak ability (PAPW2) entails is that Agent would have done otherwise under a different 
volitional history, i.e., if he wanted to do otherwise.  That it is determined that he does not want to do 
otherwise doesn’t entail that he cannot want to do otherwise, as actualism supposes, but only that he 
doesn’t so want.  (If a certain phi-fi Frankfurt Case is an exception, then that proves that it is not 
analogous to determinism, which doesn’t entail actualism.)  For, as R1 evinces, there are countless actual 
world cases in which we want to do otherwise and actually do otherwise.  The inclination to deny that 
there are actual world mundane conditional ability cases of wanting and/or doing otherwise is a CON 
holdover.  For Agent’s PAPW2 satisfaction implies Agent’s wants are effective without strong 
alternatives.  Thus, it makes sense to speak in the ordinary way – that we actually do otherwise whenever 
we change our minds, form new intentions, or battle old ones.  This is everyday autonomy. 
 Contrary to van Inwagen, Judge J need not violate Present Fixity or render P false, since J’s ability 
is never manifest as a Fixity-violating change in actual world history or law.  Since J need not violate 
Fixity or render P false, J need not render false P0&L either.  J exhibits autonomy within his Fixity-
compliant world when he satisfies PAPW2, evincing weak regulative control over his actual sequence 
actions and thus over his segment of history.  Determinism implies autonomy must be actual sequence 
type, verified counterfactually, or else it won’t be Fixity compliant.  PAPW2 satisfies such demands. 
 J’s power manifests differently in counterfactual worlds in which antecedent causal conditions 
(CJ) are different, producing different actions.  When counterfactual conditions CJ1, CJ2, ... CJn hold, 
respectively, state descriptions referring to J’s different actions (at T) P1, P2, ... Pn result, accordingly.  
This principle is inductively confirmed within the actual world by countless observations where relevantly 
different intentions of agents appearing to satisfy PAPW2 standardly result in concordantly different 
actions.  Again, this illustrates mundane conditional ability. 
 No Fixity-violating abilities are needed to satisfy PAPW2, only the everyday ability to do different 
things when we want to do so.  When we want to do different things and we do them, PAPW2 is 
massively confirmed, but when we want to do otherwise but fail (akrasia), we only satisfy PAPW1.  
When we chronically fail, we may also fail to satisfy PAPW1 thereby.  In these cases, PAPW2 is violated, 
though PAPW1 may be satisfied, but its violation explains privation cases.  
 Akratic behavior is local failure of PAPW2, since it is typically only occasional, and typically 
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involves only a small subset of motive and action types.  Compulsion involves global failure of PAPW2 
because it is chronic, though it does not usually involve the entire set of motive and action types.  If all of 
X’s motive/action pairs chronically failed to satisfy PAPW2, it is doubtful we would be inclined to 
consider X sane, a moral agent, or a person. 
 Frankfurt’s “wantons” are chronically deficient locally, relative to a subset of motives, but that is 
too weak a ground for exclusion from personhood, though perhaps it applies to those deficient both 
chronically and globally.131  But personhood need not be denied to those who suffer chronic privation 
globally, relative to the entire set of motives.  For in order for it to be privation, they must have 
previously enjoyed the use of this faculty.  Illness can place a person in this category temporarily, and 
they can experience it chronically, but still recover, as people sometimes do from lengthy comas.  
Intuitively, they remain persons during privation, as dreamers remain each night.  So, if they injure 
someone or run up bills during such lapses, they may still be partly liable for their actions, depending, of 
course, on the circumstances.  The background assumption of – resilient, if minimal – personhood 
maintains liability, and its abeyance is what accounts for mitigating and exculpating intuitions. 
 Both occasional and chronic cases of failure are typically local.  Sufficiently autonomous agents 
may instantiate both.  For they maintain a background of enough PAPW-satisfying activities – e.g., 
crossing the street when they want to – to count as autonomous.  One must attain global functioning as a 
person to suffer its privation.  Consider catatonia and Parkinson’s disease.132  There are some forms of 
schizophrenic and psychotic behavior that exhibit more global forms of PAPW-violation, e.g., motor 
disturbances.  It makes sense to view them as insufficiently autonomous, thus not moral agents, even if 
still “personhood-challenged” persons.  So, along the spectrum between cases where PAPW is or isn’t 
satisfied, our judgments about personhood, responsibility, and exculpation fit nicely. 
 PAPW tests close range (Russell, 2002) behavior:  whether volitions produce behavior.  The 
ubiquity of apt linkages between volitions and behavior constitutes massive confirmation for daily 
autonomy qua PAPW-satisfying control of volitions over actions, and of their power as variables:  When 
others are present, we do other things.  As the ancient Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva put this sort of 
causal inference: 
If something does not come to be when something is absent,  
                                                
131 Frankfurt (1971) restricts “wanton” to non-privation cases – those incapable of failing to carry out their will 
with respect to desires of type d because they lack a hierarchical d-division and so cannot suffer privation of d-
range autonomy.  While many competent adults are wantons in this (local) sense, they are not what philosophers 
(globally) mean by ‘nonpersons’. 
132 Both suffer akinesia, but the broken links in their intention/action sequences differ (Northoff, 1999). 
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And does arise, that factor being present,  
That factor is indeed its cause.  (2008, 6.104)133 
This Buddhist view of causation is consistent with our counterfactual analysis of causation.  The 
justification for weak/mundane conditional ability is in numerous such counterfactuals, confirmed in 
countless causal generalizations about daily experience.   
Thus, when we talk about Agent’s weak conditional ability, we do not mean he has access to 
world W2, such that in choosing he determines which world he makes actual.  He comes close to doing so, 
however, for his selection from among entertained possibilities does determine the subsequent state of the 
actual world.  But his selection is not from an item that would connect him with another world or violate 
Fixity.  His selection is necessarily from the world he occupies; of the unselected items he entertains, all 
we mean is that had he wanted otherwise, which would put his past in W2, he’d have acted differently.  
That translates into his wants being effective.  Nobody violates que sera sera Fixity, but what they 
ultimately do is a function of their control over their wills and of their wills over their actions. 
 CON conflates que sera sera inability with conditional inability.  If ultimate non-control over 
choice renders Agent’s intentions causally impotent, then mundane conditional agency is a global illusion.  
There is little evidence to support an error theory about what amounts to massively confirmed experience.  
Studies like Milgram’s (1963) (test subjects perform cruel actions under the assumption of experimenter 
authority), Nisbett and Ross (1980) (shoppers unconsciously select the right-most item and invent reasons 
afterward), and the like provide at most the basis for what on analysis amounts to no more than a hasty 
generalization.  These cases may be valid, like unconscious Freudian motives are operative in some cases, 
but just like unconscious Freudian motives, they are not representative. 
 We are not globally deceived about the causal efficacy of our wills.  The global illusion claim 
equates us all with intentional zombies that happen to have a spoonful of epiphenomenal consciousness, a 
sprinkling of catatonia, and a wallop of self-delusional beliefs and impotent desires that all coincidentally 
map the contents of their epiphenomenal mental states onto their actions, making each of them appear 
intentional, willful, coordinated with their efforts, etc.  What a massive coincidence that would be.  
Probability powerfully disfavors that level of coincidence. 
 Odd bed fellows, Descartes and Wittgenstein can help here.  The arguments Descartes gives 
toward the end of the Meditations that rest on the coherence of the evidence in favor of the waking state 
(a thread of continuity in space and time, coherence, etc.) intuitively support the claim that such a 
                                                
133Cited as “Shantideva and Padmakara Translation Group”. 
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complex illusion is incredible.  Autonomy equally enjoys massively coherentist confirmation, but 
illusionism has little to recommend it; the evidence strongly supports autonomy, but largely 
underdetermines illusionism.  Wittgenstein’s arguments against private language apply here.  Without 
confirmation from a common public reality, our level of complex agreement in experience would be 
impossible.  The public world of agential action is a necessary condition for the agential way of life for 
each individual among billion who coordinates his agential, reactive-attitude-rich life with others.  
Strawson makes a similar point (1962).  Just as the notion of a private language is highly improbable and 
thus implausible under the assumption of solipsism, but to the contrary public language is highly probable 
and plausible under the converse assumption, so too the assumption of illusionism is highly improbable 
and thus implausible relative to the ubiquity of our massively confirmed, shared experiences of mundane 
autonomy. 
 Assuming illusionism displaced, let us return to the issue of how our control is established, and 
compare our account with Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998).  In ordinary agency, then, Fischer and Ravizza 
say, guidance control is exhibited in the actual sequence iff Agent’s actual sequence action producing 
mechanism is moderately reason-responsive.  To see if his mechanism is weakly reason-responsive, we 
need to see if there is a world in which his action producing mechanism, presented with a different RFA, 
responds differently.  If there is such a world, then the action producing mechanism is minimally 
responsive to reasons, and exhibits weak guidance control. 
 Since Intervener blocks Agent from doing otherwise in the alternate sequence, however, Agent 
cannot do otherwise, and so lacks regulative control.  If Agent possessed regulative control, then Agent 
would possess strong reason-responsiveness.  Determinism is equivalent, Fischer and Ravizza aver, to 
Intervener with respect to blocking Agent from possession of regulative control, for under Present Fixity, 
Agent is only capable of acting at T in accordance with whatever singular outcome the past and laws 
determine for Agent at T.  Determinism implies that there are never alternatives for Agent’s actions at any 
T, so it rules out regulative control.  PAP requires regulative control, but it is therefore unsatisfiable.  But 
responsibility does not require regulative control, as Frankfurt Cases are designed to show.  Fischer and 
Ravizza contend all that is required to explain the intuition that responsibility remains in the absence of 
alternatives is guidance control, which is consistent with determinism, since it involves only actual 
sequence reason-responsiveness. 
 So far we have given only the conditions for weak guidance control, i.e., there must be a world in 
which Agent’s action producing mechanism is responsive to a different incentive.  But since weak reason-
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responsiveness could obtain under bizarre circumstances, Fischer and Ravizza note, weak reason-
responsiveness is insufficient for responsibility. 
 Suppose Jane wants to see the Rolling Stones perform live, but was only able to purchase a ticket 
for $1000, and declines.  But suppose she will purchase one for $500.  At first, she appears to be weakly 
reason-responsive, since there is a world in which she responds to different incentives differently.  But 
now suppose she is offered a ticket for $450, but won’t purchase it.  Maybe she has numerological and 
astrological beliefs about details about the band with which she has become obsessed.  In that case, her 
ability to respond to some reason(s) is intuitively insufficient for responsibility, despite initial appearances 
to the contrary.  More is needed, and to meet this need Fischer and Ravizza suggest moderate reason-
responsiveness, which obtains when one’s reason-responsiveness under an array of counterfactuals 
displays an appropriate pattern of recognizable rationality, which they define as a fit with socially 
recognized standards of reasonableness in the relevant domain. 
 A mere pattern would not suffice, e.g., ticket prices formed by prime numbers or astrological 
patterns, which is why Fischer and Ravizza tie the requirement to wider standards of rationality in 
Agent’s community.  Communitarianism only wards off counterexamples that target the over-
inclusiveness of the pattern criterion, however, but resilient objections could be made by reference to 
doomsday cults and other irrational communities.  This is a problem, but there is a bigger one.   
By switching from Agent’s abilities to Agent’s mechanism’s abilities, Fischer and Ravizza seek to 
circumvent the intuition that guidance control indirectly relies on alternate worlds, which are ruled out by 
both Intervener and determinism.  By questioning whether the mechanism has the counterfactual 
disposition to respond a certain way in alternate worlds, while maintaining that Agent has no access to 
such worlds, Fischer and Ravizza deflect – like bullfighters waving a red flag – the charge that guidance 
control invokes alternate possibilities, and so violates determinism.  For mechanisms are the sorts of 
things that it is intuitive to view as behaving in certain ways under certain conditions, and this way of 
thinking seems innocuous.  But Fischer and Ravizza buy into actualism, rule out regulative control, and so 
adduce an actual sequence account of responsibility that doesn’t require alternate possibilities; this is 
necessary to distinguish their semi-compatibilism from full-on compatibilism.  But the very notion of a 
‘mechanism’ makes no actualistic sense if it must have dispositional properties that manifest in alternate 
possible worlds.  Thus, Fischer and Ravizza smuggle in non-actualism via the seemingly innocuous 
substitution of Agent’s mechanism’s ability for Agent’s ability.  The shift from Agent’s ability to 
mechanism’s ability cannot circumvent the smuggling charge, for if the mechanism has the dispositional 
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ability, and Agent has the mechanism, then, by the transitivity of “has”, Agent has the ability to respond 
differently under different circumstances – the ability to do otherwise.  Any actualism that denies Agent’s 
ability must also deny the mechanism’s ability. 
 Fischer and Ravizza have done no work toward dispelling the actualist implications of CON.  
Rather, they embrace CON,134 which is what gives rise to their attempted semi-compatibilism.  Thus, they 
are not entitled to models that violate the actualism that motivates their semi-compatibilism, but the 
mechanism model implies dispositional non-actualism.  Though they come close to laying the 
foundations for a refutation of actualism in their move to the effect that Agent need not access 
counterfactual worlds, they just barely miss it when they say that the mechanism has the dispositional 
properties, tested for in counterfactual worlds.  The slightest adjustment to their formulae – plus lots of 
conceptual work – would have given them my anti-actualist account:  For roughly the same sorts of 
counterfactual tests that ground responsibility on their account ground autonomy on mine. 
 My account can make the same moves, but I have the dialectical luxury of not needing to hide 
dispositionality in Trojan horse type “mechanisms”:  I can attribute this power directly to Agent without 
compunction.  The metacausal features of my account permit me to defend a robust, non-semi-
compatibilism in which Agent standardly has Fixity-compliant weak regulative control, weak conditional 
ability.  Recall Fischer and Ravizza’s Agent does not access other worlds, but to test whether his actual 
sequence mechanism is reason-responsive, counterfactually possible worlds are considered to see 
whether, under alternate scenarios, Agent’s mechanism responds appropriately to alternate stimuli.  A 
similar approach is available to test whether Agent satisfies PAPW.   
 Thus, if Agent satisfies PAPW1, his actual sequence behavior exhibits guidance control.  This is 
visible in the nearest world in which Agent can do otherwise under otherwise identical conditions, but 
does not.  If varying only the opportunities results in a different action in the counterfactual sequence, lack 
of opportunity may be inferred as a factor that influenced Agent’s actual sequence behavior, in which 
case Agent fails PAPW1, his behavior is not fully voluntary, and so he lacks full guidance control over 
his action.  Similarly, if Agent satisfies PAPW2, his counterfactual sequence behavior exhibits 
determinism-friendly regulative control stemming from his will.  This is, similarly, determined by a third-
personal view of the nearest world in which Agent can do otherwise and wants to do so.  If varying 
Agent’s intentions immediately results in a different action in the counterfactual sequence, then Agent 
minimally satisfies PAPW2, and so possesses minimal regulative control; further, we may infer that the 
                                                
134 Fischer has an in-depth analysis in favor of CON (1994). 
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guidance-controlling intention in the actual sequence was not a factor that overly influenced Agent’s 
actual sequence behavior.  For, in the counterfactual sequence, Agent responds equally to an alternate 
intention.  
 Were Agent to continually pursue intention X even under the presence of more attractive 
intentions Y and Z, however, this would reveal a problem with Agent’s ability to act on X or not, and thus 
would show that X functions in the actual sequence as a constraining influence:  If all other things are 
equal, but Agent’s having another intention does not result in another behavior in the counterfactual 
sequence, then he does not satisfy PAPW2, he lacks regulative control, and cannot do otherwise.  This is 
why conditional ability (PAPW2) and not merely voluntariness (PAPW1) is necessary for a robust sense 
of freedom, contrary to the Frankfurt Cases jazz cognoscenti.  This analysis strongly suggests that 
Frankfurt Cases do not support anti-PAP intuitions.  Here, Agent must do X, but the type of modal force 
is not the mere “must” that attends all determined actions, nor even the stronger “must” that attended 
Luther’s famous choice, but the “must” associated with loss of autonomy, e.g., in addiction, coercion, etc.  
That these different modal forces all may be referred to by the homonym “must” is no reason to 
homogenize necessities, contra a, and assume that they all imply non-control; they don’t. 
 The presence of the guidance-controlling intention ought not to be a constraining factor that overly 
influences Agent’s actual sequence behavior.  A weak case of guidance control that fails to satisfy this 
requirement is a counterexample to Fischer and Ravizza’s equation of guidance control with 
responsibility.  A super-resilient intention, like a targeting mechanism in heat-seeking missiles that cannot 
be deflected, could satisfy moderate reason-responsiveness, yet fail to be under Agent’s control in a sense 
sufficient to ground responsibility.  Some suicide bombers may possess super-intentions that are reason-
responsive relative to their otherwise rational communities.  We mustn’t conflate their being responsible 
with Fischer and Ravizza’s explication of why they are responsible. 
 Here is a valid horizon level worry about our lives being beyond our ultimate control.  Though 
invalid in CON, horizon level worries may be valid in individual cases, where special features of Agent’s 
early history overdetermine his subsequent character.  It is a matter of bad moral luck if Agent is born into 
a fanatical fundamentalist community, say, and raised in a Taliban grammar school, since those 
circumstances may conspire to create a suicide bomber.  Not everyone raised in certain circumstances is 
destined to become evil, but I am only isolating intuitive such cases. 
 Suppose “Suicide Bomber” exhibits weak guidance control and maybe even weak regulative 
control, in that if he wanted not to bomb the Israeli school bus under some scenarios, he wouldn’t.  (Some 
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Jews were sent to the “life” line at Dr. Mengele’s entrance examination at Auschwitz, rather than to the 
gas chamber line, because they looked beautifully Aryan, for instance; perhaps reasons of this sort might 
prevent Suicide Bomber.)  The problem is that in most nearby worlds, Suicide Bomber still wants to 
bomb the school bus.  We might have to go back to a pre-agential point in Suicide Bomber’s life and fork 
from there into possible life-paths that radically diverge from his actual one to locate any world in which 
he does not want to bomb the bus.  That he does not bomb the bus in some distant world does not show 
that he has sufficient regulative control over that desire in the actual world.  The great distance between 
the actual and possible worlds needed to assess these principles matters, though only an informal account 
of the role of such distance is needed to support these intuitions. 
 If the fork needed to locate a world where he wants not to bomb the bus is pre-agential, that 
doesn’t support Suicide Bomber’s regulative control now, though there may be a very weak sense in 
which he possesses some regulative control, analogous to being minimally responsive to one bizarre 
reason, analogous to Dr. Mengele’s Aryan beauty reason.  That he possesses this control is insufficient for 
responsibility.  If so, however, then Fischer/Ravizza-style guidance control is insufficient for 
responsibility in certain cases, though not in most others.  What is needed is supplied in PAPM, which 
adds a metacausal criterion to PAPW to yield more robust control conditions.  PAPM is thus more able to 
sort out cases where necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy and responsibility come apart.  The 
informal idea in PAPM is that autonomous agents possess robust metacausal control over their actual and 
counterfactual sequence behaviors to the extent that they satisfy PAPW1 and PAPW2 and normally 
maintain meta-conscious control over their doing so.  To the extent that Buddhist meditation practitioners 
cultivate metacognitive awareness of their cognitive/conative states, they are intuitively more autonomous 
than the average person, but this analysis applies across the spectrum of ordinary agency and into the 
realm of abnormal agency.  PAPM is thus also applied to the formative years of agent self-cultivation, and 
to every part of the action producing system, any and every part over which Agent may have metacausal 
control.  Agent has metacausal control over himself iff he has the same sort of access to his own mental 
states and thus the ability to alter them that Intervener has over Agent. 
 Thus, Suicide Bomber may not possess self-formative control, but he does have current control 
sufficient for responsibility, though he lacks moral luck and may have “blind spots” in his moral-reason-
responsiveness, due to fundamentalist overdetermination.  His lacking moral luck may generate some 
sympathy for his childhood, but not enough to exculpate his current choices and actions.  Despite the 
overdetermination of his “unsheddable beliefs” and volitions in the vicinity of his terrorist behavior, he 
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has enough mundane autonomy resources in the background of his daily life to warrant the claim that he 
has the capacity to know better and to do otherwise, and his bad luck kicks in as misfortunate failure to 
turn this capacity into an operant ability, but that doesn’t exculpate his behavior either. 
 On Fischer and Ravizza’s model, guidance control should explain the Suicide Bomber case, but it 
doesn’t, and the fact that it doesn’t is revealing.  The metacausal theory does, however:  The regularly 
exercised capacity for weak regulative control in the non-blind-spot areas of his life reveals a background 
of general autonomy and thus moral agency.  Compare Frankfurt’s local, say, desire d-range wantons:  In 
non-d areas of their lives they are not wantons, thus they are still persons.  Fischer and Ravizza cannot use 
weak regulative control, so their account cannot explain why we hold Suicide Bomber responsible, but 
our account can explain why we do. 
 Let us turn now to the key principle of the metacausal theory, the metacausal principle of 
alternate possibilities. 
PAPM: Agent is robustly metacausally self-guiding, self-regulating, autonomous iff he 
satisfies both PAPM1 and PAPM2. 
PAPM1:  If Agent satisfies PAPW1 and has metacognitively conscious guidance control over 
the actual sequence functioning of his action producing system, then he exhibits 
minimal metacausal self-guidance and autonomy. 
PAPM2: If Agent satisfies PAPW2 and has metacognitively conscious (determinism-
friendly) regulative control over the counterfactual sequence functioning of his 
action producing system, then he exhibits moderate metacausal self-regulation and 
autonomy. 
“Metacognitively conscious control” needs to be spelled out, for metacognition doesn’t guarantee control, 
as seen in cases like Hamlet and Woody Allen. 
 Intervener has a form of inclusively metacognitive control over Agent, since he has cognitive 
access to Agent’s cognitive states, thus generating a 2nd-order cognition, though not within ‘the same 
mind’.  One might argue that if a second mind/body system is under one’s control, such that when 
controller exercises an intention and controlled body executes it, controlled mind/body just is the 
controller’s.  One might object that my control of a stolen car doesn’t make it mine, but things are 
different with mind/body systems, and here there are two senses of ‘mine’, the first moral and perhaps 
also legal, and the second metaphysical.  If I control a stolen body the way I control my birth body, it is 
mine metaphysically, but not morally.  If temporary, as in hypnosis, controller is responsible for the action 
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but doesn’t own controllee body; controllee functions as a temporary extension of controller’s will.  If the 
take-over is permanent and involves the cessation of the previous psychological entity, then such a take-
over would be morally equivalent to murder, though the second mind/body system remains 
homoeostatically operative – no habeas corpus.  The resultant mind/body would then be one’s own, 
metaphysically.  In the case of total Intervener take-over, Intervener has metacognitive control over 
second body the way he has control over another person, but here over his own ‘second self’, since he 
then is both bodies, a scattered individual.  Agents typically have this sort of Intervener-style self-control, 
for these are, on reflection, equivalent. 
 Note that metacognition made control possible here, suggesting the principle discussed in 
connection with seizures:  Any increase in metacognition makes an increase in metacausal control 
possible.  If “possible” is removed from the last sentence, the principle is subject to many 
counterexamples.  The idea is that looped consciousness of X makes its control possible.  This is an 
extension of the generalization about feedback being a condition for the possibility of control. 
 Feedback about environmental orientation concurrent with proprioception of motor exertions is 
necessary for the sort of coordinated motor control we exert in daily movements.  This is a basic 
organismic fact.  Organisms operating solely on the unmediated S/R level possess the same elementary 
capacities for motor control as we do,135 but lack the options that come with our metacognitively looped 
meta-consciousness, which permit us to mediate between S and R.   Motor control with looped 
consciousness is at the root of autonomy.  Though it is enough for it to become a capacity for control, 
more is needed for the capacity to become an operant ability.  For this, one condition is repeated practice, 
what converts mere bike riding capacity into bike riding ability. 
 The sort of control Intervener has over Agent via access to Agent’s mental states is available to 
Agent in Intervener’s absence, via Agent’s access to his own mental states.  Agents have these meta-
abilities contingently and as a matter of degree.  Those that do, satisfy PAPM.  The “action producing 
system” includes all the input/operations/output stages discussed earlier when comparing Fischer and 
Ravizza’s bifurcation with my threefold distinction.  To the extent Agent possesses metacausal control 
over any segment of his action producing system, he possesses autonomy.  For every division in the 
system, Intervener can find an aperture.  Similarly, for every element of the system, some Agent will 
possess control over that element and others will lack control over it.  
 In light of the heterogeneity, ubiquity, and idiosyncratic nature of voluntary experience, the 
                                                
135 On motor control and feedback, see Schwartz and Shapiro (1976) and Langer (1967). 
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idiolectical hierarchical structure of the self system, plasticity, and multiple realization, it is likely that the 
neurosignature-dependent causal/functional structures that embody the wills of beings with autonomy 
differ radically.  Recall, after all, how meditation alters the structure and function of the brain (Begley, 
2006).  This is why the autonomous will must be described by abstract causal/functional principles, with 
many qualifications.  The vagueness in our theory should match that in the data.  Idealizations set upper 
and lower limits:  Any being who has 100% control over 100% of its behavioral system has maximal 
autonomy, and one with non-zero control over any element in its behavioral system has minimal 
autonomy.  Yes, it follows that thermostats and snails have non-zero control over their behavior, which 
behaviors differ.  Of course, thermostats are not conscious, so they lack what meta-consciousness makes 
possible for us.  So? 
 Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance control does not require access to alternate worlds.  Similarly, we 
only consider counterfactual worlds to test whether Agent has dispositional agential functioning.  This 
disposition is minimally instantiated when PAPW1 is satisfied, and increasingly so when PAPW2, 
PAPM1 and PAPM2 are satisfied:  when, in the nearest world(s) in which Agent can do otherwise, he 
does the same thing (PAPW1); when, in the nearest world(s) in which Agent wants to do otherwise, he 
does otherwise (PAPW2); and when his doing so in the actual world (PAPM1) and counterfactual 
world(s) (PAPM2) is under his metacognitively conscious control. 
 Talk of possible worlds here is externalist, or else Agent would be akin to epistemic candidates 
incapable of satisfying internalist conditions for knowledge.  But just as a knower need not be able to 
prove that he is not a brain in a vat for us to be confident that he satisfies externalist conditions for 
knowledge, so, too, Agent need not be aware that he is not under the hidden control of Intervener for us to 
be confident that he satisfies the externalist condition for autonomy, PAPM.  Nor need Agent perform 
PAPM tests for his beliefs about his autonomy to be grounded:  The ubiquity and heterogeneity of his and 
others’ wills in daily experience and the countless causal/counterfactual inferences drawn therefrom 
provide massive tacit confirmation.  Though Agent need not know that he satisfies PAPM, if he does it is 
more likely than not that he reliably believes that he is autonomous.  
 Though internalism is not apt for the specification of autonomy conditions, the RFAs that Agent 
considers form his cognitive horizon in deliberation, are internal, and do shape his selection of RFAs that 
bring about his actions.  Internal reasons play a causal role in deliberation, not external reasons of which 
Agent is unaware.  Though Agent’s receptivity to external reasons factors into assessing his 
responsiveness to reasons and thus his responsibility, his ignorance of external reasons only bears 
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indirectly on the determination of his autonomy.  If his disposition to recognize external reasons is of low 
caliber, this reduces the range of options that become his internal, subjectively available reasons.  Thus, 
the counterfactual worlds we need to view when assessing autonomy are determined by Agent’s cognitive 
horizon, which demands an internalist view of his reasons.  But this does not suggest internalism 
simpliciter. 
 Internalism is required for RFAs that determine Agent choice and affect which counterfactual 
worlds enter the equation when assessing whether he satisfies PAPM.  But PAPM testing requires 
externalism.  Internalism about RFAs invokes Bok’s practical possibilities, the RFAs that Agent 
considers and from which he selects.  The causal/counterfactual properties of these practical possibilities 
within Agent’s cognitive horizon determine what Agent chooses, and which world states result from his 
choices, however determined the outcome may already be.  Since RFAs are causally effective, not 
epiphenomenal, freedom is causally grounded, naturalized, and determinism friendly.  Bok’s practical 
reasons, then, are not “merely epistemic”, which is the only non-actualist impression that might seem to 
justify dismissing them. 
 Wolf (1990) argues that there is an asymmetry in responsibility.  Agents are praiseworthy when 
they do what is right, but never blameworthy.  She cites Luther’s famous case and that of a woman who, 
upon seeing a child drowning, feels compelled to save him, simply because she so identifies with the child 
and is so attuned to the ‘Good’ that she cannot consider not saving the child.  Agents seem compelled 
here to do what is right for good reasons.  Wolf says they cannot do otherwise, given their virtuous 
natures, but are still praiseworthy.  The criminal or other wrongdoer, however, also cannot do otherwise, 
given his vicious character, but it would be unfair to hold him blameworthy, since his turning out to have 
his character was not up to him, and his behavior flows from his character in ways in which he cannot 
control.  The implicit justification for this disparate treatment of equivalent cases must be that while it 
does no harm to praise the virtuous, it does harm to blame the vicious.  Though neither deserve our praise 
or blame, it would be acceptable to praise the virtuous, but unfair to blame the vicious. 
 Fischer and Ravizza object to the idea that reason-responsiveness entails moral asymmetry (1998).  
The example they use involves auto mechanic Leno and his neuroscientist son Nick (1998, p. 59).  Leno 
is plotting on his own to charge Mrs. Pratt for imaginary repairs on her Mercedes.  Nick has planted a 
chip in Leno’s brain designed to guarantee that Leno rips Mrs. Pratt off, iff Leno should show signs of 
weakening his intentions.  Leno’s intentions remain in force on their own.  Fischer and Ravizza dub this 
Franfurt Case “Mechanic”, and argue that since Nick’s chip played no role, Leno is blameworthy, though 
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he lacked alternatives.  So, the asymmetry thesis is false.  Their explanation is that Wolf’s examples are 
not representative.  But comparison with Fischer and Ravizza’s own case of “Hero”, one page prior, 
undermines this conclusion.  In Hero, Matthew walks along the beach, sees a drowning child, deliberates 
momentarily, and jumps in and saves the child. 
We can imagine that Matthew does not give any thought to not trying to rescue the child, but if he 
had ..., he would have been overwhelmed by literally irresistible guilt feelings that would have 
caused him to jump into the water and save the child anyway....  Here is a case in which no 
responsibility-undermining factor operates in the actual sequence and thus Matthew is morally 
responsible for what he does.  (Id.) 
Because his alternate sequence irresistible guilt didn’t enter into the actual sequence operation of his 
reason-responsive mechanism, he remains praiseworthy.  Fischer and Ravizza conclude that “[t]aken 
together, ‘Hero’ and ‘Mechanic’ ... illustrate that Wolf’s asymmetry thesis ... is false” (1998, p. 59).  I 
agree that the asymmetry thesis is false.  But their analysis doesn’t establish this. 
 There are two types of inability to do otherwise in the cases of Hero and Mechanic.  Matthew’s is 
internal, and has to do with Matthew’s own irresistible guilt feelings, whereas Leno’s is external, and has 
to do with an external agent, Intervener Nick.  Matthew’s own necessitating conditions operate in the 
alternate scenario, in which case he fails to satisfy PAPW2.  (Levin would insist that there be a world in 
which he is able to want to not save the child.)  But we are still inclined to praise Matthew because his 
own necessitating condition in the alternate scenario is a sign of a virtuously cultivated character.  Thus, 
though he lacks alternatives now, his autonomy may be “traced” back, using their tracing criterion, to his 
satisfying PAPW2 when forming that strong conscience, even if it is so strong now that he cannot but act 
on it.  Thus, though Matthew directly fails to satisfy PAPW2 and apparently lacks alternatives in the 
present, he derivatively satisfies PAPW2, so Hero and Mechanic are asymmetrical.   
 I have avoided the dubious Aristotelian move of saying that we can always trace the life story of 
an autonomous person back to a choice, so that a person now is free because of what he freely chose when 
he was three.  If the needed back-tracking passes beyond the pre-agential barrier, we part ways with 
Aristotle, and say Agent is not responsible in such a case. 
 Matthew’s self-cultivation supplies the alternative-eliminating conditions, but Nick’s chip in Leno 
provides the alternative-eliminating condition, so his condition cannot be traced back to earlier PAPW2 
satisfaction.  Thus, Matthew is responsible, though he lacks alternatives, because he designed himself so 
that he must do the right thing.  This may smuggle in the warrant of responsibility from traced-back, thus 
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derivative, conditions of responsibility, in which case we don’t have a case of full responsibility without 
earlier, but relevant, alternatives. 
 To test for symmetry between Hero and Mechanic, we need to see the difference in distance 
between the actual world and the first possible worlds for Matthew and Leno in which they (a) are able to 
do otherwise, and (b) want to do otherwise.  So, to test PAPW1, we need to go to the nearest worlds in 
which they are each able to do otherwise, and see if they still do what they did in the actual sequence.  It 
matters how far away from the actual world such worlds are for each of them, to see how committed they 
each are to what they did.   
 Nick interferes with our calculations, for it is not clear how we are to determine what worlds to 
view in order to run the PAPW experiments on Leno.  To test Leno’s normal, non-Intervener-involving 
ability, which he lacks under the chip, we need to (a) go far out from the actual world to one in which 
Nick’s chip is absent, and that is a distant world if for no other reason than that the chip’s being implanted 
is a condition of the thought experiment, or (b) just stipulate that a nearby world is one in which the chip 
is not present.  I submit that when we vary the alternate/counterfactual conditions in Intervener cases, we 
can just stipulate (b), so long as we keep track of the fact that we are varying the ex hypothesi conditions 
of the case.  Option (a) threatens to warp the case in ways which will make it difficult to respect the 
relevant intuitions.  Outside the phi-fi realm of Intervener cases, (a) is appropriate – in normal cases, 
distance to worlds is a substantive feature. 
 So, if we agree on (b), we subtract the chip, go to the nearest world in which Leno wants to do 
otherwise, and see whether Leno does otherwise.  For it may turn out that removing the chip and 
entertaining a world in which the impulse comes over Leno to be honest reveals that Leno feels an 
irresistible greed at the prospect of an easy profit, and cheats Mrs. Pratt anyway.  Suppose, for instance, 
Leno has recently tried crack cocaine, unaware of its instantaneously addictive properties.  Unbeknownst 
to him, in the actual world, the desire to cheat Mrs. Pratt seemed to have arisen spontaneously within him, 
but that sort of appearance of spontaneity often accompanies addiction-driven behaviors in people 
otherwise ignorant of the hidden motivational powers of addictive substances. 
 Thus, even if we remove external agent Nick and his chip and restore Leno’s alternatives, Leno 
may fail PAPW2.  In this case, Leno lacks alternatives, but unlike Matthew, his lacking alternatives 
cannot be traced back to actions that satisfied PAPW2 that render him autonomous derivatively.  For 
Leno’s original consumption of crack was in ignorance of its instantly addictive properties, so we cannot 
trace back his autonomy derivatively.  If Nick knew what he was getting into when he first consumed the 
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irresistibly addictive drug, then his autonomy would be derivatively traceable, together with his 
responsibility.  Vicious addiction with foreknowledge is equivalent to virtuous self-cultivation with 
foreknowledge, but differs from indoctrination without foreknowledge – Stump’s lapsed Baptist, who 
cannot, but wants to, have a drink (1993). 
 “Baptist” is not an apt target of praise, not even in her own post-reflective eyes, for her virtuous, 
Luther-like aversion to alcohol is one she would rather be without, and it fails PAPW2.  Suppose she was 
like Matthew in having an invincible or “unsheddable” aversion, but one which didn’t play a role in her 
actual sequence decision not to have a drink, because she wasn’t aware of that irresistible aversion.  
Suppose she just formed the desire, weighed it briefly against its opposite, and casually opted to refrain.  
This fails PAPW2, but satisfies PAPW1, just as crack-addicted Leno does when he appears to 
spontaneously cheat Mrs. Pratt, though such spontaneous impulses are often caused “bottom up” from the 
still-hidden addiction.  Baptist’s PAPW1 satisfaction with her actual sequence behaviors warrants the 
stamp of approval “guidance control” on behavior she would rather be without, were she to try to have a 
drink.  Baptist would feel unfree, though she may never discover this.  Yet Fischer and Ravizza would 
have to say she has guidance control, Fischer and Ravizza and Wolf would have to say she is 
praiseworthy, and Wolf would have to say she is free – since, for Wolf, what renders one responsible 
renders one free.  Baptist is a strong counterexample to Fischer and Ravizza and to Wolf. 
 Consider a self-denying “Homosexual” whose gender-preference rationalizations, self-partitioning 
and other coping mechanisms have become deeply unconscious, inaccessible, and thus 
phenomenologically real – albeit false – indicators that he is not gay.  Suppose he likes homosexual porn, 
has no attraction to women, and engages privately in quasi-homosexual behaviors, but is so homophobic 
he ‘believes’ he is heterosexual.  His dating of women is socially encouraged, and he participates – 
apparently willingly – in which case his behavior exhibits guidance control. 
 If their analysis were correct, we would not hesitate to say Homosexual exhibits guidance control.  
But if we can still coherently ask the following question, however, then Fischer and Ravizza’s equation of 
guidance control with the fully voluntary will fail an open-question type test:  But is his behavior really 
voluntary?  That question is coherent, given our inclination to view his behavior as not fully voluntary.  
Thus, Homosexual’s guidance control fails the open question test; Baptist and the crack-addicted 
Mechanic would also fail the test.  Guidance control cannot define responsibility, contrary to semi-
compatibilism, which rests upon the notion that it can, in the absence of the stronger regulative control 
that is ruled out, according to them, by determinism via CON. 
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 Lapsed Baptist, crack-addicted Mechanic, and self-deceiving Homosexual justify a demand for 
more than guidance control or PAPW1 satisfaction, for the weak regulative control tested for in PAPW2 
to rule out the mere appearance of voluntariness.  Frankfurt would also insist on ruling out the mere 
appearance of voluntariness, but this sort of case explains the intuitive insistence on the further 
conditional ability, weak or determinism-friendly PAPW2.  For in this case, some kind of further 
conditional ability above actual sequence, PAPW1-satisfying guidance control is needed to ground 
attributions of causal responsibility and hence of moral responsibility. 
 Fischer and Ravizza improve on Wolf, but they do not establish the symmetry thesis; PAPW1 and 
PAPW2 do, and account for the warped intuitions in Baptist.  Baptist poses a problem for Frankfurt, since 
she has a 2nd-order desire – alcohol aversion – that compulsively prevents her from having the drink she, 
on later reflection, 3rd-order desires to have.  Frankfurt’s reply is that Baptist’s will is divided; he insists 
on wholeheartedness, as Stump acknowledges (1993).  But this seems unprincipled and weak; besides, 
stronger versions of Baptist may be adduced that satisfy wholeheartedness but still involve higher-order 
compulsions (Mele, 1995).  If Frankfurt accepted the relevance of causal control, he could strengthen his 
reply with PAPW, which succeeds just where Fischer and Ravizza and Wolf fail, but Frankfurt eschews 
all causal criteria as irrelevant to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. 
 Something these cases share is the distance between possible worlds needed to apply PAPW.  If 
Matthew’s psychology is akin to Baptist’s, then to locate the nearest world in which he is able to let the 
child drown or Baptist is able to take that drink, we may need to back-track to pre-agential points in their 
lives.  If so, then Matthew’s bent is not traceable to a time in which he satisfied PAPW2, his saving the 
child is not derivatively free, and thus not as praiseworthy, even if, in being a good deed, it is 
praiseworthy as such.  In this case, Hero and Baptist are analogous. 
 Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance control is insufficient for their purposes, but PAPW1 supports 
these more fine grained distinctions.  These cases illustrate that mere guidance control, established by 
PAPW1 satisfaction (the truth condition for Fischer and Ravizza’s jazzy guidance control), is insufficient 
both for proving the symmetry thesis and for responsibility.  Mechanic and Hero are asymmetrical, and 
Baptist is not responsible for her unwelcome alcohol aversion, though Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance 
control model renders them all responsible.  Nor is Homosexual fully creditable for his restraint. 
  What establishes these facts is the distance needed to locate a world in which these agents satisfy 
the antecedents of PAPW2.  If that must be located by branching from a pre-agential fork in these agents’ 
life paths, it defeats the derivative tracing formula for PAPW2.  If so, they are not responsible though they 
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exhibit what Fischer and Ravizza must concede is guidance control.  This proves guidance control is 
insufficient for responsibility, though in some cases it appears sufficient, due to PAPW1 satisfaction.  
PAPW1-satisfying guidance control is sufficient for weak responsibility; moderate responsibility is 
established by PAPW2.  Stronger responsibility may established by PAPM, but the degree is left vague, 
as is PAPM. 
 There is a difference between guidance control and voluntariness.  Guidance control is made out 
only intuitively through casuistry.  Fischer, frustrated with his inability to substantiate the guidance 
control intuitions in subtraction argument 1, appeals to the jazz analogy.  But PAPW1 accounts for those 
intuitions in a principled way.  There may be cases of guidance control which fail PAPW1 and vice versa.  
Just because PAPW1 captures the intuitions in these cases doesn’t entail that it is what Fischer and 
Ravizza have in mind.  Indeed, the cases they pick out may even be coextensive with the ones PAPW1 
picks out, and yet the intensions may differ.  Still, whatever is picked out by their intuitive approach, 
PAPW1 will likely pick out, for a principled account takes up the slack of an unprincipled one.   
 In any case, PAPW1 isolates factors their vague account does not.  The fuzzy, jazzy guidance 
control they trade in cannot finesse the crack-addicted Mechanic, lapsed Baptist, and self-deceiving 
Homosexual cases, whereas PAPW1, being more fine grained, can.  But I am somewhat undecided about 
the directions open for interpreting what is meant by such context-relative notions as “nearest possible 
world” and related ideas.  Let’s explore directions for interpreting these ideas, both to uncover the 
complexities of these notions and to settle upon more or less plausible interpretations. 
 The reason we hesitate to call Homosexual’s guidance controlling restraint really voluntary can be 
explained by my account, but not Fischer and Ravizza’s or Wolf’s.  What explains the failure of the open-
question test here is that it is not clear whether Homosexual satisfies PAPW1.  His restraint seems 
voluntary, under his guidance control, vaguely conceived, say, where some of the women he dates are 
sexually aggressive, but he declines, preferring to remain a gentleman.  But the worlds we need to test 
PAPW1 are obscured by the facade of his heterosexuality.  To determine whether in dating these women 
he would still do so were he able to do otherwise, we need to go far back into his homophobic upbringing 
to find the branch from which we may fork to a counterfactual Homosexual who is able to date men.  And 
that may be a pre-agential point.  For while the nearest worlds to which we will refer to test PAPW1 – on 
a superficial look – appear to be worlds in which he could do otherwise, since in those worlds he could 
refuse to date, come up with rationalizations for not dating that don’t tip his hand, etc., the fact that he is 
able to not date the women in those worlds under those conditions is only partially telling about the 
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voluntariness of his dating people of same or different genders.  The issue of intensionality in his 
intentions arises here, for how we frame his intentions depends on capturing the proper intensions; e.g., 
the categories of “women” and “gender he is attracted to”, to name but two formulations, obviously 
cannot all be thrown into the same hopper. 
 It is perhaps an element of contemporary folk wisdom that many heterosexual women feel 
comfortable around homosexual men, for there is no issue of sexual access.  This sort of psychological 
fact also needs to be taken into account with Homosexual, for just as gay men are not creditable for 
restraint in refraining from sexual aggression with women, neither is Homosexual.  Thus, to capture the 
voluntariness or not of Homosexual’s restraint, we need to go beyond worlds in which he has gender-
preference-extrinsic reasons for being able to do otherwise than restrain, e.g., rationalizations, to worlds in 
which he has gender-intrinsic reasons for restraint, e.g., inability to be sexually aggressive with women.  
There, Homosexual knows he is gay and that he cannot comfortably sexually engage with women. 
 This location, by the way, does not tell the whole story about Homosexual.  For here he is not yet 
able to do otherwise with respect to his ‘gentlemanly’ behavior, since, being gay, he is now consciously 
averse to heterosexual contact.  In this world, however, he is capable of dating men, in which case “able 
to do otherwise” is more thoroughly satisfied.  That being so, moreover, sheds light on the intensional 
nature of his ‘restraint’, and debunks the previous interpretation of self-control in the presence of sexual 
attraction as absence of sexual attraction; only the former is creditable.  Indeed, only the former exhibits 
restraint ability, for once Homosexual comes to grips with his homosexuality he may have no restraint 
abilities for men he is attracted to. 
 We must go farther out to a world in which he can have heterosexual contact to test for restraint, 
but in such a distant world he may not be recognizable, if gender-preference is essential to personal 
identity.  But suppose, before we go that far, we locate a world in which he processes his homosexuality 
through the lens of bisexuality, say, tells himself he is experimenting, in which worlds he is capable of 
female sexual contact.  It may be that there is such an individual, if not many of them, who are primarily 
homosexual, but with some bisexual leanings, born primarily of their process of coming to grips with 
their homosexuality.  If Homosexual is such, then we can locate a world in which he is capable of making 
sexual advances to women.  This would be the closest world(s) needed to test whether Homosexual is 
genuinely engaged in voluntary behavior in refraining from making sexual advances to women, to fully 
test whether he satisfies PAPW1. 
 Were Homosexual a real person, it would be a contingent matter about whether he would or 
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wouldn’t behave differently once counterfactually able to do so, but we can stipulate either or each of the 
alternatives just to see where the intuitions go.  So, we can describe his attitude toward heterosexual 
activity in this range of worlds as either positive, negative, or neutral, and possibly as varying from time 
to time.  If heterosexual activity was only something he was inclined toward during the process of coming 
to grips with his homosexuality, after which time he lacked a bisexual or heterosexual interest, but felt no 
great aversion to women, then he would still be largely homosexual, perhaps capable of, but not inclined 
toward, heterosexual relations.  Here, he would not be so creditable, though his refraining would be 
minimally voluntary, for in that world he would satisfy PAPW1 – he can make advances toward women, 
but refrains.  But since he lacks interest in women, PAPW1 satisfaction doesn’t render his behavior 
significantly creditable. 
 In cases where he is bisexually active, though, say, thoroughly homosexual later on, he might 
make advances toward women given the internal/motivational opportunity.  Here, say, he has interest in 
women, and either behaves as a gentleman or not.  If he still refrains from making advances toward 
women, then he is creditable for restraint, and his actual sequence behavior is fully voluntary; if not, then 
his ‘restraint’ was a function of constraining factors having to do with his gender preference restrictions, 
and was not fully voluntary. 
 This world may be too far from the actual world to support these intuitions, on the auxiliary 
supposition that gender preference is essential to personal identity, and altering Homosexual’s gender 
preference excessively warps his identity.  The supposition that gender preference is essential to personal 
identity is an auxiliary supposition:  Its truth is independent of the PAPW methodology, even if its truth or 
falsity plays a role in adjudicating these cases.  For Baptist and other analogous cases in which it is 
necessary to backtrack to a pre-agential fork to locate the nearest world in which Agent is able to or wants 
to do otherwise for purposes of testing PAPW or PAPW also involve such massive warping of the 
person’s character that I have taken it for granted that the intuitions fail in such cases.  If the world where 
Homosexual is bisexual is too far away for the test to be coherent, then the test may be run in the nearest 
analogous world, the one in which Homosexual knows he is gay, and is dating men.  In that world, is he 
chivalrous?  What we need to access to judge Homosexual’s actual sequence behavior is a world in which 
Homosexual is sexually attracted to the person he is dating, to see whether in that world he is creditable. 
 A crucial moral from the Homosexual case is that we need to be sensitive to features unique to 
each case to determine how to locate the relevant worlds for purposes of testing PAPW.  This possible-
worlds-determining function is highly context-relative, and blurred by the intensionality of intention and 
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action.  The differences between cases in which Homosexual doesn’t make sexual advances to persons he 
is or isn’t attracted to are partly intensional – dependent on how such persons are described relative to his 
interests.  Analogous to the distinction between event-particular and event-universal,136 which depends 
on similarly intensional differences between descriptions of the same general activity, disregard of which 
accounts for confusion in determining responsibility in Frankfurt Cases, disregard of the context-relativity 
and intensionality of the intentional components of these cases also accounts for confusion in determining 
degrees of voluntariness, autonomy, and responsibility.  Issues of personal identity are also relevant, 
though also independent auxiliary matters.  Again, the complexity of the subject matter counts heavily 
against single-criterion theories and in favor of multiply-complex sets of auxiliary hypotheses. 
 Given the complexity of these matters, therefore, it is expected that simplifying assumptions 
threaten to distort matters.  There needs to be a certain amount of looseness in the formulation of 
interpretations for testing procedures for PAPW.  These are features of the subject matter, not of the 
theory that purports to account for them.  Insufficient attention to auxiliaries results in examples in which 
intuitions are contaminated.  PAPM functions as our all-inclusive criterion for voluntariness and weak 
conditional ability, but it implies a host of auxiliaries.  Its application always engages auxiliary 
hypotheses extrinsic to the theory, but such auxiliaries present opposing theorists with equal difficulties 
tout court.  That our treatment of these passed without defeating PAPM constitutes post-reflective 
equilibrium with our original intuitions.  Our aim was to show that determinism friendly regulative 
control, “easy autonomy”, is established by PAPM satisfaction, and that the metacausal analysis does a 
better job than competitors in handling intuitions hovering around Frankfurt Cases.  Further refinements 
will be sketched in chapter 7, but our analysis has met its major aim.  It takes the “semi-” out of the most 
promising competitor theory, Fischer’s semi-compatibilism.  We do otherwise, on a daily basis, naturally. 
 With pessimism undermined at all three levels, we may now state with confidence that it is more 
plausible to think we have determinism friendly autonomy, in all three ranges of cases, than it is to think 
that we do not.  Having made our basic case, we turn to chapter 7. 
  
                                                
136 This distinction may be made out with an example:  In shooting the mayor, I may be responsible for the event-
particular in which I shoot the mayor at a certain time with a certain bullet, etc., but not responsible for the event-
universal that the mayor is killed by gunshot wound, if, for example, another shooter’s bullet hit him in a vital area, 
killing him, whereas my wound may have killed him anyway, were he not also shot more fatally by the other 
shooter.  Van Inwagen makes the distinction (1978, 1983); it is discussed in Fischer (2002).  
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Chapter 7:  Applications and Suggestions 
 
We can apply he metacausal theory to an error theory for inflated intuitions, e.g., contracausality.  Our 
theory explains them as functions of phenomenological features of off-line mechanisms that seem 
acausal, but are metacausal.  Subsumption under the causal aspect of the theory brings the phenomenon 
into contact with the natural order, deflates it, and reveals a recipe for how to correct anyone whose 
intuitions on the phenomenon led him to a nonnatural account of it.  A natural account trumps a 
nonnatural one, ceteris paribus.  Let us take a brief look at some of these tamable stallions. 
 Practical reason is a complex, off-line process that involves only weak possibilities.  The off-line 
selection from, and on-line implementation of, considered RFAs is causally effective in forming and/or 
authoring one’s choices and actions in ways that are immune from  horizon worries if one satisfies 
PAPM.  Thus, practical reasoning is natural, contrary to those who place its operation outside the 
phenomenal realm, e.g., Plato, Kant, and the libertarians. 
 Contracausal intuitions require indeterministic underpinnings, and are held implausible for their 
metaphysical baggage.  But the genesis of these notions is tied to the phenomenology of the off-line 
deliberator.  In being off-line, he acts independently of 1st-order, on-line causal forces or motions.  When 
off-line, he is virtually unmoved by 1st-order causation, and when he goes back on-line, he is virtually a 
prime mover of his acts.  This is not all virtual:  He possesses one literal form of contracausal power over 
1st-order hydraulic causal dynamics, though there are both on-line and off-line causes that ultimately 
move him.  Of course, we do not have contracausal power relative to anything that is determined, but this 
is only to say that determinism doesn’t entail our ability to go against certain causal potentials.  This point 
is analogous to Dennett’s claim that determinism does not entail inevitability, for we can foresee certain 
undesirable events and prevent their occurrence, even if we cannot prevent whatever it is that is 
determined to occur (1984, 2003), but this may simply be called “que sera sera inevitability”, something 
that ought not to trouble anyone, as it applies even in indeterministic worlds. 
 This off-line/on-line switching power differs enough from on-line/on-line 1st-order causal relations 
to warrant deflated talk of agent causation, without implausible metaphysics.  That behavior is ultimately 
determined is irrelevant, and it feels so.  The causally disengaged functioning of deliberative reasoning – 
though engaged in a mediated fashion – is the basis for our error theory of intuitions of being able to do 
otherwise under identical conditions.  The term “off-line” alone is suggestive of acausality, and invites a 
metacausal error theory. 
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 It seems likely that we can take most of our cognitive/conative systems off-line, so we have what 
we may call “off-line muscles”, a general ability like the ability to concentrate.  Our use of it is likely the 
basis of inflated intuitions about freedom, as in the popular example of raising one’s hand.  Libertarians 
ignore that off-line causation is still causation.  Their intuitions simply need to be bifurcated:  Autonomy 
is housed in the off-line architecture, but the extra-phenomenal intuitions are byproducts of a dim view of 
its opaque features.  Thus, a deflated view takes account of the fact that the 2nd-order phenomenology and 
causal disengagement of deliberation does not entail total causal isolation. 
 Social scientists, e.g., Meade and Perls, view the self as a socially constructed function that 
projects the judgments of others about the subject onto himself.  Since projection is a form of simulation, 
so is self-formation, which may involve, e.g., simulating others’ reactions to one’s choices, reactions, and 
other possible behaviors.  One need not adopt a social construct theory to see the role of off-line processes 
in self-development.   
 The ability to simulate the characters one might become if one engaged in behaviors, and to lend 
one’s will to some of these but not others, is a self-forming feature of autonomy.  Ainslie speaks of 
lending one’s will; Frankfurt speaks of identification of one’s will with one’s desires.  In this process, the 
feedback loop of teleological orientation, makes Ainslie’s intra-agential bargaining possible, and enables 
a naturalized version of Kane’s self-forming actions (SFA’s) (Dennett, 2003) to be genuinely self-
forming.  In light of its on-line/off-line and identification/alienation components, this account is immune 
to Wolf’s (1990) self-creation ex nihilo objection.  On “real self” or “deep self” views, Agent is free iff 
she acts from her real self and has a say in its development.  Kane’s is thus a real self view. 
 But real self views face a regress problem:  To have a say in its formation, a self would have to 
exist before it is formed, but to have a say in that self, a prior self must first exist, and so on.  Our theory 
is immune to this problem.  Its models of distancing, metaconative identification/alienation and of 
naturalized SFAs render the self deeply causally responsible for its gradual creation.  We may employ 
both intra-personal and inter-personal – off-line, metacognitive – simulations in every early SFA of 
deliberation; if so, we form ourselves in every significant early choice we make.  If our earliest SFAs 
satisfy PAPM, then we freely create ourselves in our earliest significant acts of choosing. 
 Autonomy is required on some views of responsibility, e.g., the real self view and Kant’s,  which 
inflate the self.  The belief in a self outside the phenomenal realm injecting novel causes into the causal 
stream (Chisolm, 1982) may be explained as a byproduct of an inflated view of opaque features of the 
phenomenology of off-line deliberation.  But off-line disengagement, however opaque, does not entail 
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total causal isolation.  Our recipe is to show that the process only seems acausal because it involves off-
line causation – no threat to freedom or determinism, thus no ground for burdensome metaphysical 
doctrines. 
 This analysis can be used in support of Plato’s model of the ideal agent, who exhibits top down 
control of reason over will, and will over passion.  For Hume, conversely, reason is slave of the passions, 
so Frankfurt’s unconflicted addict – a wanton, non-person – may only be criticized for lack of 
resourcefulness in maximizing hedonic returns on investments in heroin; Ainslie can criticize him only 
for poor intra-personal bargaining skills.  For Plato, the addict is so malformed in his intentional 
structures that he functions as an animal, is unhealthy, and is spiraling toward ‘self’ destruction; for us, he 
lacks psychic homeostasis, i.e., autonomy.  To Plato, the Humean model is only true of animals, the 
deranged, and other forms of wanton – not persons. 
 Watson (1975) adds a Platonic, value-based criterion to Frankfurt’s, so he may make the same 
criticisms of Hume’s view of the role of reason in the structure of the person.  On Hume’s view, self is an 
illusory cluster of fleeting sensory phenomena.  It is no accident, then, that his model cannot account for 
the integration necessary for personhood.  Hume’s vision of the free agent is that of the unconstrained 
functioning of an amorphous aggregate of animal attractions and aversions, subserved by reason and 
cognition, unfolding according to natural law.  But since there is no integrated self, there can be no 
‘agent’.   
 Nothing in Hume’s account can provide for the possibility of persons, or differentiate them from 
animals. Ainslie’s model also lacks conditions sufficient for an integrated entity that could play the role of 
a person.  Thus, unconstrained animals must be free for Hume, and, on Ainslie’s model, smart rats must 
be free.  But on Plato’s model, the will represents a broad range of attitudes such as indignation, and 
includes the moral sentiments and Strawson’s (1962) reactive attitudes.  Kant implicitly accepts a similar 
locus for the moral in the rational will. 
 Our model accounts for the integration needed for personhood, and rationally grounds our 
normative attributive practices.  We can go beyond Strawson’s account of these as rooted in ungrounded 
presuppositions of social life.  For Intervener-style self-regulative control grounds normative ascriptions 
in deep causal authorship and thus desert, and accounts for why Agent identifies with itself and its values 
as functions of its own SFAs and higher-order considered preferences.  The theory also offers a 
prescription for the attainment of ideal Platonic agency and suggestions for moral education, as we will 
see. 
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 Social science construes norms as abstractions from collective attitudes, forming a ‘generalized 
other’, and individual values as internalized norms, formed by introjection from the generalized other.  
Simulation may play a role in both.  Our theory thus not only grounds our normative attributive practices, 
but can account for our acquisition of personal and social value structures.  It thus can absorb those 
Platonic/Kantian views defended by Watson, Stump, and Wolf, according to which Agent is free iff she 
acts in accordance with her real, deep values.  We have a natural ability to simulate others’ mental states, 
independent of the just so story account of it, and are inclined to identify with them when we do.  This 
grounds our normative practices, moral psychology, and the possibility of altruism.  It grounds moral 
psychology by linking our ability to simulate others’ creedal/normative states to visceral sympathy; as 
Camus says, “to understand is to forgive”.  It grounds altruism by allowing us to experience how others 
feel, as if we are them (Goldman, 1993). 
 Developmental evidence suggests that to learn about others, we simulate them.  As parents know, 
children learn most object-vocabulary through imitation of ostensive definitions, e.g. mimicry of sounds 
associated with items.  They get it that the noises and gestures their parents are making have an aboutness 
to them, that their parents are trying to convey it to them, and thus that there is a content to their parents’ 
speech and gestures.  It is likely that this process already involves simulation:  The child tries to simulate 
the parent’s mind in looking at x and uttering x-related noises – thanks to our primatological penchant for 
both gaze following and its adjunct, mimicry. 
 Parents will link exaggerated sensations in pitch, facial gesture, etc. with disapproving attitudes 
towards “bad” items, to guide the child.  This primatological behavior, e.g., displaying teeth, raising 
brows, etc., is the “mother’s knee” basis of the child’s acquisition of the reactive attitudes; recall primate 
emotivism.  The developmental data support the claim that learning about normative expressions 
capitalizes on primatological gaze following and other mimetic skills.  Since learning others’ intentions is 
a precondition for forming the full range of reactive attitudes (Adler, 1997), and simulation is a 
precondition for such learning, simulation plays a key role in the acquisition of our normative attributive 
knowledge, both of the reactive attitudes of others and of ourselves. 
 In simulating others, we mock-experience what makes them like us, and see differences as 
functions of different intentional inputs.  If we adopt their input stance, we get their perspective on things.  
This is why we develop common attitudes under similar circumstances, and it grounds the ethical axiom 
that like cases ought to be treated alike.  Hume held that we are given to sympathy viscerally, and thus 
there is no rational basis for our emotive attitudes and judgements.  Strawson claims that the three kinds 
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of reactive attitudes, self-reactive, other-reactive, and vicarious-reactive, stand and fall together (1962), 
but are brute facts about us.  They are both wrong:  How we react given similar input is the same for each 
of us, so our ability to simulate others or ourselves under similar or different input is what accounts for 
sympathy and the intimate links between the three types of reactive attitude. 
 On our theory, our normative practices may be grounded factually and normatively.  Their factual 
grounding is achieved by locating their genesis on a late segment of the evolutionary continuum reflected 
in my causal column.  That segment begins with gaze following and mimicry, and proceeds with primate 
emotivism.  Primate emotivism describes social expressions of approval and disapproval as functions of 
natural selection pressures in primate social life.  In us, these evolved into reactive attitudes and other 
sentiments, and may involve such sophisticated mechanisms as counterfactual imagination (Walter, 
2002), described in the rude motorist case.  This explains the factual basis of resentment.  The normative 
grounding of the attitudes refers to the idea that simulation presupposes the belief that persons are 
importantly alike. 
 In many parts of our lives simulations are conspicuous and essential.  As Strawson claims,  life as 
we know it would not be the same without the network in which the reactive attitudes are intelligible.  
Diagrams, models, and illustrations of any form are all simulations.  While they are not logically 
necessary in math or theory construction, they may be psychologically necessary for understanding.  
Consider the prominence of imagination in Kant’s cognitive architecture.  In addition, toys and games 
involve simulations, as do acting, theater, and literature.  Consider also that celebrity actors and musicians 
– high priests of modern culture – are athletes of simulation, which might be a reason they are held in 
such high regard.  While imagination is essential to the arts and humanities, supposition is necessary for 
philosophy, mathematics, and science.  Supposition involves a form of simulation (cf. Sorenson (1992) 
and Stalnaker (1984)). 
 In light of the possible role of simulation in language acquisition, the Gricean communication 
model may be supported if a speaker’s simulation of the listener is involved in anticipating the effects of 
the speaker’s words on the listener.  Grice suggests we pick utterances on the basis of predictions about 
their effects on their hearers’ mental states.  Simulation fits nicely:  The speaker forms expectations about 
the hearer’s mental states by ‘seeing’ how he himself would react to hearing certain sentences, via a 
simulation along the following lines.  Speaker S runs utterance U1 and perhaps hearer H’s belief set B1 
through S’s off-line language processor and related mechanisms, which produces mental state M1 in S, 
which is not what S wants to occur in H, so S runs utterance U2 and B1 (or B2) through, etc.  More 
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generally, however, language itself is essentially the substitution of phonological or inscribed stand-ins 
for objects, and since stand-ins are simulations, language involves simulation essentially.  If so, it would 
be second nature for us to juggle Gricean simulations in even the most complex speech and thought.137  
This simulational feature of communication would connect our normative attributive practices with our 
very use of speech and thought, a serendipitous link with social survival value. 
 Our account adds to Dennett’s (1984, 2003).  The Sphex wasp is tropistically determined, but we 
are not an opaque collection of tropisms.  My account tries to make more explicit than Dennett does 
precisely how our flexibility emerged.  There are causal column watermarks for flexibility in the 
evolutionary record.  Plant behavior is determined by, say, “soil causation”, i.e., roots fixed in soil.  
Animal behavior is not; animals move.  Imagine plants that uproot, move, and feed off various soils.  
Such locomotory plants would be less soil determined, more “free”.  Like highly locomotory plants, we 
can block off 1st-order causal inputs and redirect their momentum within our metacausal system; animals 
cannot.  
 Determinism must be compatible with locomotion, or locomotion would disprove it.  Since 
autonomy is an abstract locomotion ability it must be compatible too, or else daily activity would disprove 
it.  Just as locomotory life forms are less exogenously determined than their fixed counterparts, 
metacausal agents – Flex – are much more endogenous, for they can pick up their 1st-order causal roots 
and operate metacausally; Sphex cannot. 
 These differences suffice to account for the differences in autonomy between average members of 
the two species, and for the intuition that there is a graded autonomy scale for species.  Certain animals, 
e.g., primates, have linguistic and related abilities, and their degree of autonomy seems closer to ours than 
to animals that lack such abilities, e.g., reptiles.  We may classify species as free to the extent that they are 
metacausally differentiated. 
 Reason seems post-evolutionary.  This invites an inquiry into the status of reasons.  We say that 
we do the things that we do because we have such and such reasons.  Though the “because” here is partly 
normative in that we rationalize our actions by reference to our reasons, it is also partly causal, for our 
reasons are what lead us to act.  Since agents act on reasons to bring about desired ends, however, this is a 
teleological form of causation, a type of causation most hold implausible.  The problem is, if reasons are 
genuinely causal, then they must be nomological.  And if reasons are causes the lawful effects of which 
                                                
137 Since speech involves simulation, it is metacognitive.  Most thought is linguistic; Ryleans view it as speech sotto 
voce (Dennett, 1984); it is also representational, involving a stand-in for the original presentation.  In either case, it 
is simulational and metacognitive. 
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are actions, then reasons are like desires – mechanical, robotic, involuntary:  Reasons mechanically push 
people, as desires mechanically push animals, into action – an image that invokes CON. 
 Davidson’s anomalous monism provides an escape (1968).  There are no laws that relate events 
described as ‘catastrophes’ and ‘hurricanes’, though these admit of lawfully related descriptions at more 
basic levels.  The level of description at which behavioral events and their psychological causes are 
described as actions and reasons admits of few or no laws that relate them as such, though all the elements 
of these phenomena admit of nomological descriptions at the neural and more basic science levels.  But 
neural description cannot capture the normative or pragmatic elements of reasons so described.  There are 
few or no laws that relate reasons and actions as such, but that does not entail that reasons-based behavior 
is acausal or nonphysical; all that follows is that it is anomalous at the level of description at which it is 
rational. 
 Just as the metacausal model supplies details for Dennett’s functional complexity account, so, too, 
it helps fill in some of the details of anomalous monism:  The nomic architecture of the mental is not 
merely causal, but metacausal.  But the unique psychoneural pathways that instantiate agential metacausal 
structures vary from agent to agent, so I call its nomic character “idionomic”.  In short, just as metacausal 
doesn’t entail acausal and anomalous monism doesn’t entail anomie, idionomic doesn’t entail anomic. 
 Wolf’s “Reason View” of freedom (1990) does not address issues in philosophy of mind.  She 
implicitly presupposes a Davidsonian view of mind, and contrasts her view with “Real Self” and 
“Autonomy” views.  One of her insights is that incompatibilists of all stripes presuppose that 
responsibility requires autonomy, whereas compatibilists do not; she cites Kant and Sartre as exceptional 
on extrinsic grounds.138  Wolf presupposes that autonomy leads to incompatibilism, but since ours is a 
compatibilist autonomy view, it contradicts her claim and helps identify what is unique about the 
metacausal theory. 
 On the Real Self View, Agent is free iff she can act in accordance with her ‘real self’, i.e., the 
intentions that issue from her valuational – not just her motivational – system (Wolf, 1990, p. 75, citing 
Watson, 1975).  The autonomy view considers both systems insufficient: 
To be responsible, they say, [Agent] not only must be able to govern her actions by her real self, 
she also must be able to ensure that her real self is not in turn governed by anything else.  (Wolf, 
                                                
138 Contrary to Wolf, however, Sartre is an incompatibilist, for he is widely taken to advance a thesis of radical 
freedom.  Moreover, Kant’s ‘compatibilism’ strains the meaning of the term, and does not mean determinism is 
compatible with freedom in the physical world.  So, all standard forms of compatibilism reject autonomy as a 
condition of responsibility. 
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1990, p. 76) 
Wolf’s main objection to the Real Self View is similar to the one made by the autonomy view:  Agent’s 
values may be constrained, such that her having the values she has may not be up to her at all.  The 
Reason View substitutes an ability more general than that involved in Agent’s ability to act according to 
her valuational system, what she calls Reason, the highest of all faculties, which consists of the ability “to 
‘track’ the True and Good in her value judgments” (Wolf, 1990) and act accordingly.  Wolf states, 
[T]he difference between the Real Self ... and the Reason View [is that on] the Real Self View, an 
individual is responsible if and only if she is able to form her actions on the basis of her values.  
The Reason View insists that responsibility requires something more[:]  an individual is 
responsible if and only if she is able to form her actions on the basis of her values and she is able 
to form her values on the basis of the True and Good.  (1990, p. 75) 
There is enough of a difference between Agent’s values not being “governed by anything else” and her 
being “able to form her values on the basis of the True and Good” to warrant the idea that the Reason 
View is distinct from the Autonomy view, but not enough to block the idea that the Reason View is just a 
modified version of the Real Self View.  Saying that one has an ability to form one’s values on the basis 
of Reason is just another way of saying that one has the ability to form one’s values on the basis of Value, 
or one’s reasons on the basis of Reason.  The contrast between Reason, value, and autonomy needs to be 
examined. 
 But being able to form and act upon values on the basis of Reason is an autonomous ability, so 
Reason provides at least one way to realize autonomy, and may be subsumed under autonomy.  Similarly, 
if merely acting on the basis of one’s values is insufficient because one’s values may be constrained, then 
merely forming them on the basis of Reason is insufficient as well, because tracking and acting in 
accordance with the True and Good may be constrained.  There is no reason to hold the Reason View 
superior to the Real Self View either.  There is no parallel sense, however, in which autonomy may be 
constraining. 
 Wolf mischaracterizes autonomy as ability to act for or against Reason, to make radical choices, 
to act irrationally or on no basis at all.  She rejects autonomy, for if two agents possess the abilities 
required under the Reason View, but only one possesses autonomy, that doesn’t qualify her for greater 
praise or blame.  What Wolf fails to see is that what is preferable about autonomy is Agent’s ability to 
determine what will be the basis of her own reasons, values and actions.  Wolf is blinded by her 
persuasive definition of Reason: 
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[“Reason” refers] to the highest faculty or set of faculties there are ... that are most likely to lead us 
to form true beliefs and good values.  If [so], the autonomous agent must be one who is able to act 
in accordance with Reason or not.  We have seen, moreover, that this ability to choose among the 
rational, irrational, and nonrational alternatives alike is not an ability to choose on some higher-
than-rational basis.  Rather, it is an ability ... to choose whether to use any basis for (subsequent) 
choice at all.  (Wolf, 1990, pp. 54-55) 
Wolf seems to rule out, definitionally, a faculty higher or more general than Reason.  But a metacausal 
volitional system may be construed as superordinate to Reason, since any or all of the processes that 
realize ‘Reason’ may be taken off-line by an act of will. 
 Wolf dismisses Frankfurt’s analysis because “an agent who is alienated from her first-order choice 
may be alienated from her higher-order choice as well” (1990, p. 30).  But Agent may equally be 
alienated from her Reason.  Consider a Manichean insistence on only performing maximally justified 
actions or accepting maximally evidenced beliefs.  Such paradigms of Reason would be candidates for 
therapy.  Wolf bars all counterexamples to the Reason View by speaking in the abstract about Reason as 
the highest of all faculties or as whatever tracks the True and Good, but this cannot vacuously mean 
whatever is invulnerable to counterexamples. 
 Imagine a case where an ideal True and Good tracker’s Reason is manipulated by manipulating 
her environment (Mele, 1995).  Wolf may consider the chains of Reason golden, but they may be chains 
nevertheless.  Here Agent has an interest in acting against Reason – unless that sort of agent is defined 
away.  Wolf tries just that, for her reply to these sorts of counterexamples is to weld Reason to “normative 
pluralism”, which holds there is not only one set of normative truths.  If so, it is contradictory to ‘track’ 
the Good or maintain that it is a subset of the True, as she says it is, or that Reason is the highest of such 
faculties:  Either the tracking model collapses on pains of ‘alethic pluralism’ – the claim that there are 
incommensurable sets of truths – or else a reason to act against Reason must be glossed over by making 
Reason so pluralistically inclusive and attenuated that appeal to it borders on vacuity.  Neither will do. 
 Even if we grant Wolf’s inclusive view of Reason, not all behavior within the sphere of our 
normative attributive practices is a function of True and Good tracking.  Love, for example (G. Strawson, 
1986, Frankfurt, 1999), can involve elements of Reason, but often is motivated by factors that have 
nothing to do with Reason, however construed.  Yet we regard it as an appropriate object of regret or 
praise.  An artist’s motives in creating a piece may be arational, gripped by a Muse, or carried away by an 
emotion or stream of consciousness.  The same arational factors may motivate much behavior that is 
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facially Reason-based; someone may be attracted to the virtues for visceral, unconscious purposes 
ultimately explained in evolutionary terms, by aesthetic sensibilities, or in other arational terms. 
 Indeed, it is a Muse-invoking strategy of the creative to circumvent Reason, and having a reason 
to circumvent Reason doesn’t subsume Reason-circumventing behavior under Reason.139  To say, ex post 
facto, that such arational indulgences typically pay off for artists, lovers, or the virtuous and so are 
justified and covered by pluralistic Reason, as ways of “tracking the Beautiful”, the “Mystical” or the 
“Erotic”, either begs the question or misses the point:  Love, art, and other amoral and/or arational 
activities in the core of our normative attributive practices are mischaracterized by the Reason View, 
though not by the Autonomy view.  Wolf treats arationality as if it were in a league with irrationality.  
While irrational behavior has little to recommend it, we need autonomy for arational behavior. 
 Thus, to characterize autonomy as the ability to be irrational or insane is to erect a straw man.  On 
a charitable interpretation, Reason is extraneous:  Autonomy is the ability to do or refrain from doing any 
act, to let any intention lead to action or refrain from doing so.  Likewise, ambidexterity is the ability to 
use both hands in equally skillful ways, not the ability to use them according to Reason or not.  Autonomy 
is simply a doing ability more inclusive than dexterity, the most inclusive, one that includes the ability to 
place any number of cognitive/conative systems on-line or off-line.  Reason-based cognitive systems are 
one subset of such systems.  There are reasons for wanting autonomy, but not every reason for autonomy 
is, qua reason, a reason for the Reason View:  We want autonomy for its own sake and because it 
constitutes what it is to be a person.  What one does with one’s autonomy is definitive of individual 
character.  Nothing about these reasons for wanting autonomy involves “the True and the Good”.  And 
unlike responsibility, which is at least partly nonnatural or normative, autonomy is a strictly natural, 
metaphysical matter. 
 Love and art involve the arational; so do the creative, emotional, and erotic.  “Emotional 
intelligence” competes with Reason (Goleman, 1995), as do the mystical and transcendent.  We may 
construct counterexamples to the Reason View from these domains of “the Arational”, if, with Wolf, we 
capitalize.  We may reinterpret these to comport with Reason, but their value is missed by the Reason 
View.  Wolf’s theory is too normative: 
Since the point of the Reason View is to stress that the kind of freedom we need for responsibility 
is a freedom within Reason, a freedom to be governed by Reason (or, if you like, Rationally to 
                                                
139 See Dennett (1984), pp. 65-66, Parfit (1986), pp. 12-13, Mele (1987), ch. 10, and Pears (1984) on useful 
irrationality; see Mele (1995), pp. 177-194, on irrationality in the face of CNC. 
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govern ourselves), it may be thought that, insofar as Reason fails to pick out a uniquely best 
choice, the maximally free agent must be able to choose among the Rationally acceptable choices 
independent of all forces whatsoever.  Such an understanding, however, seems to me to be a 
symptom of a continued tendency to see freedom and responsibility as ultimately metaphysical 
matters, and not, as the Reason View proposes, as more primarily normative ones.  (Wolf, 1990, 
p. 144; emphasis added) 
Either Wolf’s view is eliminativist, so freedom is unnecessary for responsibility and thus does not exist, 
or entirely normative, so that freedom just is whatever responsibility requires.  Her freedom is determined 
by her ethics – a reverse is/ought error.  But even if freedom is defined by responsibility, that turns out to 
require autonomy.  Again, to avoid manipulation and manage the Arational, autonomy is necessary and 
desirable. 
 Wolf’s normative model fails to distinguish between unconstrained and constrained Reason-based 
action, and this is primarily a causal/metaphysical matter.  If one must act in accordance with Reason, one 
is unable to do otherwise.  One is fully free only with respect to things one is able not to do, even if one is 
responsible for what one must do.  Ability to act on Reason is one way to develop ability to not act on the 
basis of impulse, a form of autonomy – control over the bases of what one acts on. 
 Wolf distinguishes between superficial and deep responsibility:  The former is only causal; the 
latter is moral.  Wolf adds that many athletic, intellectual, and artistic endeavors admit of a similar 
distinction, though she focuses on the moral.  But the distinction may be expanded to include non-morally 
deep attributions.  A skilled artist and a child may each produce art that appears in all relevant respects 
alike, but only the former is deeply attributable to the author.  Similarly, merely acting on one’s values 
may be a superficial expression of self, whereas forming one’s self on the basis of sensitive reflection may 
be an expression of deep self behavior.  Other areas admit of a similar distinction, such as friendship, 
parenting, and teaching.  Why not include gardening, if not all activities?  Anything we do may reflect on 
us superficially or deeply, depending on the circumstances.140 
 Strawson (1962), too, has gone beyond the moral in addressing freedom, and has identified the 
reactive attitudes as including our visceral and emotive reactions, and our normative attributive practices 
in general.  He held that any rational reconstruction that accepts the consequences of (CON’s) 
determinism – e.g., one that would exculpate all behavior – would either be practically impossible or 
render whatever is left of human life unrecognizable.  For the normative beliefs which underpin the 
                                                
140 In light of exclusionary remarks Wolf made (1995), she would likely deny this. 
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reactive attitudes are so deeply entrenched in our way of life as to be indispensable to it.  The metacausal 
theory bars global exculpation, and maps onto our normative attributive practices in ways that rationalize 
them consistently with determinism. 
 The reason we hold 1st-degree murderers maximally culpable is that they deploy such higher-order 
deliberative mechanisms as prudential planning and egoistic strategizing, conditions sufficient for mens 
rea.  The murder is not an immediate result of lower-order on-line causal antecedents, such as the 
emotions that might be present in aptly-termed ‘crimes of passion’.  Since a free act is authored at higher 
levels of the metacausal structure, and murder is of just that sort, it is free.  Our deep negative reactive 
attitudes are grounded in the fact that murders are deeply attributable to murderers as autonomous agents. 
 By contrast, stepping on someone’s shoe while being shoved onto a crowded subway car usually 
results from a form of causation that involves minimal higher-order processing, and that is why it is partly 
excused.  Stepping on someone’s shoe on a crowded train is not always excused, depending on 
circumstances.  If the pressure from behind is closer to that of a rampage, then avoidability is lessened:  
This is closer to the sort of motion-transfer causation true of mid-sized objects in Newtonian physics.  It is 
thus no surprise that we do not develop resentful reactions to the offending parties:  There is tacit 
recognition of the sort of non-negotiable causation that triggers an exculpatory response.  Conversely, if 
there are only a few people eager to get into the subway car, and the pressure they exert on one from 
behind is slight, avoidability is higher; consequently, exculpatory responses are not evoked, but resentful 
ones are more naturally invited.  Stepping on someone’s shoe in cases of very low avoidability originates 
almost entirely at the 1st-order, on-line level of causation, whereas in cases of high avoidability it may 
originate from some higher-order off-line level.   
 Reactive attitudes and associated normative attributions, then, map onto the metacausal 
architecture just where the theory predicts them.  So, e.g., the kleptomaniac acts from lower-order-
dominant causal forces (compulsion), with little or no self-control, and so her act elicits some sympathy, 
just as the theory predicts.   
 We may draw the domain of the reactive attitudes further within a rational context by reference to 
simulation.  Thus, we may know others’ reactive attitudes if we simulate their creedal/normative, emotive, 
and visceral systems the way Goldman (1993) argues we ground interpersonal utility judgements in a 
simulation-deploying epistemology.  Indeed, these are related:  By simulating hedonic states and 
evaluative weighting mechanisms to arrive at interpersonal utility judgements, we are manipulating a 
creedal/normative reasoning mechanism akin to the one responsible for the generation of the reactive 
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attitudes. 
 Our account makes possible a rational reconstruction of our normative practices, and is sensitive 
to determinism.  It does not violate Fixity, nor lead to the dreaded results of global exculpation, the ending 
of all attitudes and normative practices – Strawson’s fears for any determinism-sensitive reconstruction.  
We have identified those conditions that do and do not underpin local exculpation, reactive attitudes, and 
normative attributions.  No global or catastrophic consequences are so much as suggested, so there is no 
peril to our way of life.  Strawson suggests our normative practices may be severed from metaphysical 
questions about the causal/nomological nature of action, but these issues are happily related here.  Thus, 
Strawson is prematurely pessimistic about the threat from determinist metaphysics to norms.  Since 
freedom is unproblematic, his pragmatic reconciliationism is unwarranted. 
 Our theory – unlike Wolf’s – is immune to a determinism-sensitive Strawsonian objection about 
asymmetry in praise and blame.  The Reason View holds a person free and responsible even if unable to 
fail to act on Reason, so long as she is somehow ‘able’ to act on Reason.  Let’s call “actualistic ability” an 
‘ability’ to do x but not to not do x.  It is the ability that is present when PAPW1 is satisfied but PAPW2 
is not, and appears in Locke’s prisoner and Frankfurt Cases where Agent’s ‘free’ choice lacks 
alternatives.   
 But it only makes sense against a background assumption of full, PAPW2-type agency that 
includes the ability to avoid the fortunate choices.  We only hold actualistic acts responsible because it’s 
stipulated that Agents would have so chosen were alternatives present.  Thus, even if we hold that they 
are responsible and they could not do otherwise, this does not warrant divorcing responsibility from full 
autonomy.  For it is the tacit PAPW1 idea that they would not have chosen otherwise were they able to 
that justifies ascriptions of voluntariness and thus of responsibility.  For it is stipulated that the 
motivational state is identical in agents who would not have chosen otherwise but could have, and agents 
who would not have chosen otherwise but could not have. 
 Hard determinists, libertarians, and semi-compatibilists think determinism entails all we could 
ever have are actualistic abilities.  But our arguments suggest otherwise.  The fact that some – exceptional, 
phi-fi – behavior is actualistic doesn’t generalize to even much behavior.  Rather, most human behavior 
involves PAPW2-satisfying, non-actualistic conditional ability.  This “Privation Subtraction Argument” 
subtracts the limitations from privation or actualistic cases as ones that fail PAPW2 and infers the 
properties of fully functional or conditional cases as cases of PAPW2 satisfaction. 
 Again, agents on the Reason View are praiseworthy for doing what comports with the Good but 
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not blameworthy for failing to, though both are actualistically determined.  Wolf tried to evade her own 
asymmetry on the grounds that agents who should have known better are responsible, but this is 
unconvincing, and ad hoc.  For whether they know better or not, if they cannot act on Reason, they should 
not be held responsible, despite what Wolf says.141  If agents know and can act on Reason, but do not, 
then they are not actualistically determined, they possess weak conditional ability, and their autonomy 
grounds their blameworthiness.  She could say that on an akratic model, stronger motives overpower 
Reason, so we should forgive the actualistically helpless agent, but not all blameworthy behavior is 
akratic.  But agents aren’t really helpless, since they are not only actualistic.  Our theory is immune to 
asymmetry:  Agents are responsible to the degree that they can control what they do. 
 Let us return to the ‘error’ part of the error theory.  The phenomenology of our ability to toggle the 
psychoneural gates that engage or disengage our cognitive/conative systems, “gate switching”, I argue, 
inflates our intuitions about freedom.  When we take intentions off-line that would issue in actions on-
line, and put off-line intentions on-line at will, it feels up to us, as if we are not moved by any force, 
though we move the world.  We imagine possible worlds tied to intentions, select one, and go on-line with 
it; we can simulate intentions we don’t have, cultivate ones we want to have, and eliminate others.  In 
doing so during self-formative stages, we feel these abilities enabling us both to design ourselves and 
author our futures.  We seem to be self-created unmoved movers. 
 As self-designing authors, we seem uncolored by nature.  Our freedom suggests the power to do 
otherwise under identical circumstances.  The error is to infer from the phenomenology of weak regulative 
control that the exact elements of choice could be held fixed while another could have occurred, for this 
ignores the causal power of the conative details:  To think an agent who went on-line at T could have 
stayed off-line at T under identical circumstances ignores that her going on-line is a function of her 
wanting to just then.  If agents want to go on-line/off-line, but cannot, that is akrasia – not just 
determinism.  Akrasia is a privation of autonomy, not the default for determinism; only autonomous 
beings can suffer akrasia, and autonomy is not opposed to determinism:  The fact that our autonomous 
agency is ultimately determined by prenatal elements is irrelevant, for there is enough autogeny and self-
authorship to ‘cancel out’ the pre-metacausal antecedents. 
 The error is to assume that the mechanism that subserves the phenomenology of choice is 
                                                
141 Acting on Reason or not is analogous to a weathervane responding to the wind or not:  It is not up to the 
weathervane whether it is rusty or not; by analogy, it is not up to Agent whether he acts on Reason or not, on the 
Reason View.  Thus, there is no basis on the Reason View for any asymmetry.  Sober’s weathervane theory (1995) 
is also insensitive to this problem. 
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contranatural, but metacausality is a species of causality.  Yet it is functionally complex enough to explain 
why it is taken as contranatural:  Its relatively endogenous self-controlling and action-controlling powers 
are 1st-personally transparent, but its exogenous elements are phenomenologically opaque.  It is tempting 
to go contranatural here, because we fear our normative institutions will fall unless we are ultimate 
causes.  The idea that it is ultimacy or nothing is what sustains incompatibilist optimism.  And indeed the 
ultimate causes of behavior extend back to before our births.  Autonomy guarantees origination 
(O’Connor, 1995), but is thought incompatible with determinism. 
 Metacausation is monistically causal, ergo compatible with determinism, but anomalous at the 
level where the principles that govern practical reasoning involve normative rules.  There are no purely 
causal laws at this level (Davidson, 1968).  This anomalism is physicalism friendly, for though 
phenomena folk psychologically described are not type-type reducible to those described neurally, 
principles of neuropsychology can account for how the brain instantiates rational structures (Walter, 2002, 
pp. 569-70).  PAPM-satisfying non-epiphenomenal mental causation is consistent with token-token 
physicalism, since the active causal elements function at the highest-order physical or metacausal level 
(mind), as opposed to the lowest-order physical or causal one (brain).  This naturalizes autonomy:  The 
ghost is the machine – a self-soft-wired, highest-level psychoneural functional integration constructed by 
the “idionomic” metacausal structure.  The theory specifies the causal/functional features of act-
origination, agent causation, and the attribution of causal authorship, in a way that rehabilitates inflated 
libertarian intuitions. 
 There is an element of autonomy qua Kantian self-legislation in the adoption of an idiolectical 
creedal/normative system and in its associated self-sculpting process.  The self system idionomically 
governs how its intentions will count in its deliberations and thus which RFAs become what Davidson 
(1968) calls “primary reasons”, i.e., those RFAs that lead straightaway to action.  The structure of one’s 
“idio-system” is soft-wired in one’s psychoneurally-realized metacausal structures, individuated in the 
SFAs (Dennett, 2003) of early development.  Each such element is subserved by a unique neurosignature 
in the higher-order functional networks of the mind/brain, and parallels that of idiolectical memory 
associations from unique experience.  The control levers for these ‘gated’ psychoneural paths are in 
reflexive consciousness.  These structures are complex and involve elements that appear anomalous when 
viewed across levels, but that does not imply that metacausality is anomic:  These idionomic psychoneural 
relations are subserved by lower level neurophysiological states that admit of nomological descriptions.  
1st-order causality is nomic, and metacausality is idionomic – not anomic.  Each of us is responsible for 
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the SFA-generated sculpting of the “idio-structures” that subserve our practical reasoning system, so our 
actions are significantly endogenous, under our control thereby. 
 The libertarian wanted acausality because he thought we must originate our actions to be 
responsible for them.  But Agent is a plausible originator of actions, for their determinants are 
significantly shaped by his own self-forming and self-ruling metacausal psychology.  Hence, he is 
metaphysically responsible for them, and there is no need to try to escape determinism.  Pre-natal 
ultimacy is impossible, but it is a red herring. 
 Similarly, the theory fills in details of Searle’s model of mind (1992) in a way that reveals how 
incompatibilists are led astray.  His view is that mind is an ineliminably subjective higher-order neural 
state; this amounts to noneliminativist materialist monism – despite Searle’s own antipathy for such 
traditional categories.  Yet, despite his defense of the mental as higher-order physical, he thinks lower-
order causation (or micro-physical explanation) delegitimizes freedom. 
As long as we accept the bottom-up conception of physical explanation ... on which the past three 
hundred years of science are based, then psychological facts about ourselves, like any other 
higher-level facts, are entirely causally explicable in terms of and entirely realised in systems of 
elements at the fundamental micro-physical level.  Our conception of physical reality simply does 
not allow for radical freedom.  (1984, p. 98) 
Searle implicitly shares Wolf’s contranatural misconceptions about autonomy as a radical ability to act 
without cause, motivation, or Reason at all; we have shown this view to be inflated.  But just as the view 
of mind as nonphysical and thus incompatible with body has led physicalists to eliminativism, so too the 
view of autonomy as contranatural and thus incompatible with nature has led physicalists to reject 
autonomy.  So, just as eliminativism is unwarranted in light of higher-order physicalism, so, too, the 
rejection of autonomy is unwarranted in light of higher-order physicalism.  Again, if mind just is physical, 
then autonomy just is physical.  It is plainly asymmetrical and illogical to rob the mental of causal 
efficacy if the mental just is physical. 
 If Searle’s bottom up formula does undermine the legitimacy of higher-order explanations or 
causation generally, then the same formula would eliminate the legitimacy of the “irreducibly subjective 
ontology of the mental” as well, a major theme in his recent work on mind (1992).  Further, the idea that 
freedom just is a higher-order physical property seems to be an almost immediate consequence of Searle’s 
analysis of mind.  If there is nothing in the bottom up causal model that contradicts the legitimacy of the 
mental as a nonepiphenomenal higher-order physical state with causal properties, as Searle conceives it, 
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then freedom can be construed simply as the subset of those higher-order causal abilities the control of 
which is located at the higher-order level.  We need not sacrifice the ontological legitimacy of freedom to 
bottom up reductionism. 
 Bottom up physicalism is a dogma that may be vacuous.  Consider the philosophical claim – it is 
not a claim based on experimental evidence – that quantum indeterminacy ‘cancels out’ at the macro-
level, so macro-level determinism is determinism enough for purposes of incompatibilism.  This 
inconsistent claim is a sheer assertion supported only by the eminence of bottom up physicalism.  But 
macro-determinism contradicts bottom up physicalism – it cannot be both canonical in, and contradictory 
to, bottom up physicalism. 
 More importantly, what is good for bottom up physicalism is good for anyone else.  Thus, if the 
notions of uncaused micro-event and of micro-event the causal effects of which cancel out at the macro-
level are licit, then we can infer that there are uncaused events and that micro-level causation can cancel 
out at the macro-level.  From these we can infer that bottom up neural causation can ‘cancel out’ at the 
macro-level of mind; that metacausation can be functionally cut off from lower-order causation by a 
canceling process, thus indeterminate relative to the lower-order level; and that metacausation can be 
indeterminate relative to micro-causation, as when Agent literally engages contracausation relative to 
lower-order causal forces he disengages.  Nothing about energy transfers across levels that involve a 
switch between merely pseudo-indeterministic/pseudo-deterministic modes (either way) entails 
contranaturalism. 
 A general metacausal principle is that the higher the metacausal level from which actions issue, 
the lower the degree of animal causation, constraint, or unavoidability, and the higher the degree of 
autonomy, personhood and responsibility thereby.  This “corollary freedom hypothesis” has a broad range 
of empirical and practical consequences.  For instance, it predicts certain relationships to hold, say, 
between highly metacausal states and liberating experiences.  Thus, consider the tremendous top down 
metacausal restructuring (reason and will over passion) needed to transform oneself into a skilled athlete.   
 Joggers experience “flow” and “runner’s high”.142  Their neuro-muscular reflexes are developed 
under the ceaseless exertion of their higher-order wills over lower-order tendencies to yield to pain and 
fatigue, with environmental and biological feedback systems oriented toward the self system’s autotelic 
ends, with one-pointedness of mind:  It is no wonder they enjoy liberating psychological states. 
                                                
142 Studies suggest they can toggle the psychoneural gates for pain and endorphins, the brain’s pain relievers, which 
combination engenders euphoria (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991). 
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 Similarly, certain authors, scientists, mathematicians, chess masters, and others may be considered 
to have highly differentiated metacausal structures, since they possess skills at bringing to bear a large 
number of symbolically ordered principles and rules on a tremendous mass of information; so, too, for 
adepts at ostensibly non-intellectual tasks, such as artists and mountain climbers, so long as they are in 
active command of a vast body of skills and related knowledge.  The mastery of these complex bodies of 
knowledge and related skills yield not only liberating experiences, but higher levels of psychic 
integration; since these autotelic individuals are paradigms of metacausality, the predictions of the 
corollary freedom hypothesis are confirmed in the link between their peak experiences and their 
metacognitive sophistication. 
 Most dramatically, yogis, zen masters, and other paragons of top down metacognitive training 
vividly illustrate the empirical consequences of the corollary freedom hypothesis, for these individuals 
report a great variety and intensity of ecstatic, transcendent, and otherwise liberating experiences (Austin, 
1998; Benson, 1975, 1996; Goleman, 1988).  What is striking cannot be explained away is that those who 
have them are radically transformed thereby.  Even Nozick seems to admits this at the conclusion of his 
soundless stereo argument: 
Will this debunking explanation have more difficulty in explaining the surprising and often 
momentous changes in the people who have the experiences? (1981, p. 159) 
They discover renewed meaning, purpose, and spirit; they rearrange their lives; and they become altruistic 
to the extreme.  Such radical transformations of perspective, character, and purpose constitute solid 
abductive evidence for the corollary freedom hypothesis. 
 These transformations may involve a shift above a previous threshold to a higher-order situs of 
functional integration that yields greater metacausal control.  Zen masters and other metacognitive adepts 
speak of a radical figure/ground shift in perspective, from identification with the stream of experience, to 
detached awareness of the stream of experience.  As Goleman puts it, “[i]n this state, [meditative 
awareness] crystallizes as a constant mental function” (1988, p. 96).  A figure/ground 
apperceptive/conative shift from cognitive to metacognitive identification would free one from the lower-
order contents of one’s mind; if so, stimuli, intentions, have less power to pull or push one to or from 
behaviors.  Psychic reintegration occurs at the metacognitive/metacausal level, the new situs for control, 
and illustrates that mind is causally nonredundant relative to brain. 
 Another empirical consequence of such radical transformation is illustrated in the degree of self-
control exerted by such adepts.  The karate master who remains poised when provoked, and so averts the 
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fight/flight impulse; the yogi who melts the snow by raising his body temperature at will (Benson, 1982); 
the Zen master who slows his EEG, EKG, EMG, GSR, and respiratory rates at will – each bears out 
another corollary hypothesis:  The greater the metacausal complexity, the greater the functional 
independence from 1st-order environmental causation.  Let’s call this the “anti-bottom-up determinism 
hypothesis”.  The phenomena just cited are well documented, e.g., EEG, EKG, and, inter alia, GSR 
responses demonstrate the skilled meditator’s superior degree of functional independence from stimuli. 
 In radical transformation, the self structure is reconfigured so that the action control center is no 
longer intimately engaged or controlled by the 1st-order stream of mental and/or environmental causation, 
e.g., what I presently think, feel, smell, crave, fear, etc., but is at a higher-order remove.  The distance 
principle comes to mind.  It is as if the newly configured agent, the act maker, is located at a new 
threshold, a control tower from which she looks down at a disjunctive world of functionally neutralized 
lower-order causal forces or equi-potent options, any of which may be toggled on-line/off-line, according 
to autotelic designs.  
 This power is so rich in imagery it must be reiterated that this is the naturalized version, so let’s tie 
these ideas down more.  Recall Kim’s remarks about specific supervenience relations.  Let’s review some 
here.  Lack of attention control is linked to constrained, unfree states, an inverse implication of Chalmers’ 
bridge law that awareness of a state enables one to verbalize it and act on it.  Attentional deficiencies are 
at the root of many debilitating disorders such as schizophrenia, a characteristic of which is “stimulus 
overinclusion” – functionally, attention overload: 
Psychiatrists describe schizophrenics as suffering from anhedonia, which literally means ‘lack of 
pleasure’.  This symptom appears to be related to “stimulus overinclusion”, which refers to the 
fact that schizophrenics are condemned to notice irrelevant stimuli, to process information whether 
they like it or not.  (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991, p. 84) 
Attention disorders confirm the anti-bottom-up determinism and corollary metacognitive hypotheses by 
virtue of the pointed effects of their lack of metacognitive control. 
[A] great variety of learning disabilities have been reclassified [as] “attentional disorders”, 
because what they have in common is lack of control over attention (id.). 
Excessive self-consciousness, narcissism and related neurotic behaviors likely involve over-attention to 
any stimuli with real or perceived bearing on the self (id., pp. 84-85). 
 Our exculpatory practices are sensitive to such illnesses that undermine autonomy.  Attentional 
disorders involve metacausal gate-switching dysfunction – failure to regulate the on/off switching of 
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psychoneural channels of sensory and other forms of attention.  Analysis of pathology reveals what is 
malfunctional or functional in a system (Walter, 2002), e.g., analysis of blindness sheds light on sight.  A 
fully functioning attentional system modulates the lens of sensory attention, i.e., salient world/mind input, 
by means of metacognitive concatenations configured by Agent’s interests, and motor attention, i.e., 
mind/world output, by means of metacognitive concatenations configured by sensitivity to features of the 
environment selected by Agent’s interests as alteration-worthy.  Fully functional attention autotelically 
modulates and integrates the quantity and quality of world-to-mind input and mind-to-world output by 
means of highly differentiated metacausal configurations of Agent’s will. 
 Our model of functional attention suggests a link between attentional skill and autotelic 
sophistication.  Research on visual perception and cortical activation patterns supports this idea:  Subjects 
who reported more intrinsic motivation in their lives – a sign of autotelic sophistication – required less 
visual focal points to reverse the figure/ground appearance of ambiguous figures. 
These findings suggest that people ... who require a great deal of outside information to form 
representations ... may become more dependent on ... environment for using their minds....  By 
contrast, people who need only a few external cues to represent events in consciousness are more 
autonomous from the environment.  They have a more flexible attention that allows them to 
restructure experience more easily....143 
This confirms the anti-bottom-up determinism and corollary metacognitive hypotheses by virtue of their 
metacognitive control; in stimulus over-inclusion, its privation is key.  Those who report more intrinsic 
motivation (autotelic sophistication) engage less cortical activation to concentrate on flashes of light and 
sound, less than the baseline required for ordinary nonconcentration states. 
The most likely explanation [is] that the [more autotelic group] was able to reduce mental activity 
in every information channel but the one involved in concentrating on the flashing stimuli.  This in 
turn suggests that [they can] screen out stimulation and to focus only on what they decide is 
relevant for the moment.  (id., p. 87-88) 
These remarks are directly on point.  What he says about people who have greater than average attentional 
skills is also noteworthy. 
While paying attention ordinarily involves an additional burden of information processing above 
the usual baseline effort, for people who have learned to control consciousness focusing attention 
                                                
143 Csikszentmihalyi (1991, p. 87), emphasis added; citing Hamilton, 1976, 1981; Hamilton, Holcombe, & De la 
Pena, 1977; Hamilton, Haier, & Buchsbaum, 1984. 
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is relatively effortless, because they can shut off all mental processes but the relevant ones.  It is 
this flexibility of attention, which contrasts so sharply with the helpless over-inclusion of the 
schizophrenic, that may provide the neurological basis for the autotelic personality.  
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1991, p. 87-88) 
These studies confirm our central and corollary hypotheses, our claims about attentional function and 
dysfunction, the relationship between attentional skill and autotelic sophistication, and freedom as a 
function of the attention-driven ability to modulate cognitive/conative input/output autotelically.  These 
Kim-satisfying specific supervenience correlations suffice for a solution to the easy problem of autonomy 
– self-regulation from the metacognitive attention (input) and control (output) level. 
 So, the theory can provide specifications for reconfiguring dysfunctional, heteronomous, 
heterotelic systems into functional, autonomous, autotelic ones.  Self-referential psychological 
identification is deeply bound up with attention, the focal point of consciousness, which is plausibly why 
cognitive authority is sometimes cited as a sine qua non of freedom or personhood.  By training attention, 
one may access the key to increased autonomy.  There are other ways to train attention, but I have focused 
on one-pointedness and mindfulness (Goleman, 1988; Keown, 1996).  Let’s review them. 
 One-pointedness consists of concentration on an arbitrary focal point, focusing attention on a 
singular point and refocusing it whenever it wanders; mindfulness consists of non-conceptual awareness 
of the contents of consciousness, simply paying attention to whatever objects or states enter or exit 
consciousness.  One-pointedness develops concentration, the ability to control the gaze of consciousness, 
and mindfulness develops detachment, the ability to dissociate from the contents of consciousness, and 
insight, the ability to see things as they are (Goleman, 1988).  That these skills may increase metacausal 
functioning seems implausible, for research has shown that what the mind pays attention to is determined: 
Essentially, long-term memory ... becomes the [sensory] filter, deciding what to block from short-
term storage (and [thus] awareness), thereby determining indirectly what to accept for eventual 
storage in long-term memory itself.  (Erdelyi, 1974, p. 19) 
On this model, memory scans sensory information at every stage of its processing and filters it for 
salience before it enters awareness; only a fraction available at any moment enters consciousness 
(Goleman, 1986).  But while LTM is the key determinant in filtering at the “doors of perception” (Huxley, 
1954), attention may be consciously selective, influence LTM, and modify the sensory filter:  We can 
scan for something, so awareness can modify how the filter operates – through LTM, the activity of which 
is not evident to awareness (Goleman, 1986).  But the self system determines what LTM marks as salient 
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– that the determination of the filter by awareness is indirect is irrelevant:  We are never directly aware of, 
say, the neural bases of any elements of our mental lives, but so what?  Insofar as one-pointedness 
training is one way to voluntarily control attention, and attention determines what gets filtered 
perceptually, it is a way to regulate 1st-order cognitive – environmental – input.  Walter’s (2002) ranking 
of environmentally triggered psychoneural states at the bottom of the hierarchy coheres well with the 
distance principle. 
 The other meditative skill, mindfulness, can be used to regulate whatever passes through the first 
meditative filter:  If one is skillful at merely attending to or noting objects or qualities of consciousness, 
one is skillful at not having to act on or react to them.  This can liberate one from compulsive, neurotic, 
and other unfree behaviors; e.g., the dissociative distancing that attends mental states characterized as 
being aware that anxiety is arising, that powerful hunger urges are arising, or that strong feelings of 
loneliness are arising differs radically from that of mental states characterized as identifying with the 
thoughts represented in the sentences, “I should take a sedative”, “I’m going to devour that Chinese 
food”, or “I’ve got to speak to someone”.  When one is in the grip of those states of mind, one is typically 
unconscious that one is in their grip. 
 The difference is not at the propositional level, but at the level of skill in maintaining mental states 
characterized as observing mental contents as opposed to being engaged with them, a skill developed by 
the practice of mindfulness (Keown, 1996).  The difference is also a matter of the degree to which one is 
on-line with respect to the contents of consciousness, and is confirmed by many generations of 
practitioners.  Theological lore is data for a theory of will; it contains the most complete record on the 
phenomenology of akrasia, ‘spirit versus flesh’, sin, etc. (Ainslie, 2001).  Thus, the contemplative virtues 
of long-term meditators are the subject of platitudes in contemplative communities, e.g., equanimity; they 
function as litmus tests of progress in contemplative communities throughout history.  Buddhist 
psychology classifies mental states or behavioral characteristics (e.g., lust, forgiveness) as 
virtuous/skillful or vicious/unskillful to the extent that they tend to further or hinder the development of 
metacognitive control, measured as attainment of advanced meditative states (Goleman, 1988) – a 
naturalistic approach to the virtues our theory may happily adopt. 
 A key virtue skill is restraint.  One is free from compulsive behavior if he can exercise restraint 
over his desires, if he can go off-line to eschew acting on them.  Attention training strengthens this ability.  
Insofar as these attention training techniques develop our top down ability to regulate 1st-order, on-line, 
S/R causation from a higher-order attentional vantage, they provide a generic means of redesigning our 
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agential structures – the figurative keys to the gates in the metacausal kingdom.  Since the more complex, 
the more fully formed the person, it follows that the formulaic advice on how to redesign our metacausal 
structures constitutes a way to decrease wantonness and increase personhood. 
 If attention training techniques help reconfigure our metacausal structures, then we have the 
beginnings of prescriptions not only for increased agency, but also for educational and moral psychology.  
Recall what William James had to say about attention and learning: 
The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention over and over again is the very root 
of judgment, character, and will....  An education that should improve this faculty would be the 
education par excellence.  (1910, quoted in Goleman, 1991, p. 98) 
Meditation is the elixir that James seeks.  It has obvious implications for psychology and ethics.144 
 Dennett claimed (1984) there will never be ‘a’ solution to the free will problem because there are 
many such problems.  We examined many dimensions of the free will problem, and exposed the 
heterogeneity and ubiquity of the data, of the phenomenology, and of the intuitions of our daily 
experience of mundane autonomy, which we may now call “non-phi-fi autonomy”.  We also supported 
the claim that most of these data and their associated phenomenology are misrepresented by single-
criterion conceptions of autonomy, responsibility, and related notions specifically designed to be what 
may be called ‘phi-fi-resistant’, akin to the way epistemic competency theories are designed to be Gettier-
resistant. 
 To gain an integrated perspective on this unwieldy collection of pre-philosophical and 
philosophical problems, we appealed to Russell (2002), who with intellectual economy groups these 
problems in three classes of pessimism:  close range, middle distance, and horizon level.  We have replied 
to horizon range pessimism in our critique of CON, and to close and middle range pessimisms with the 
cognitive architectural blueprints for easy autonomy, a metacausal theory of will and of autonomy.  Our 
theory circumvents horizon level pessimism about ultimate control and provides naturalized notions of 
possible, can, and free, opening a door for replies to close range and middle distance pessimisms in 
                                                
144 For empirical research in support of the positive effects of meditation, metacognitive exercises, and related 
forms of attention training on education, see Benson, Kornhaber, Kornhaber, LeChanu, Zuttermeister, Myers, and 
Friedman (1994), Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999), Deckro, Ballinger, Hoyt, Wilcher, Dusek, Myers, 
Greenberg, Rosenthal, Benson (2002), Gravois (2005), Roth (2006), Sarath (2006), Begley (2007), Shapiro, Brown, 
and Astin (2008), and Repetti (2010); for their effects on overall health and well being, see Kabat-Zinn, Massion, 
Kristeller, et al. (1992), Speca, Carlson, Goddey and Angen (2000), Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, 
Lau (2001), Brown and Ryan (2003), Sarath (2003), Chang, Palesh, Caldwell, Glasgow, Abramson, Luskin, Gill, 
Burke, and Koopman (2004), Galantino, Baime, Maguire, Szapary, and Farrar (2005), and Zylowska, Ackerman, 
Yang, Futrell, Horton, Hale, Pataki and Smalley (2008). 
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advance of positive arguments.  We provided an empirically supported just so story for, and a 
causal/functional analysis of, the powers involved in both hierarchical and nonhierarchical wills.  We 
developed a theory of will therewith, identified the specifications for easy autonomy, and showed how our 
theory satisfies them.  We specified the metacausal principle of autonomy, showed how it handles phi-fi 
Frankfurt Cases, the moral asymmetry problem, and akrasia, how it grounds a naturalized form of Fischer 
and Ravizza’s regulative control, and how it supports a model of self-formation. 
 Our theory has plausible rebuttals for all three pessimisms, and grounds our reactive attitude, 
moral, and other normative attributive practices.  It also promises to unite libertarian, Kantian, and many 
related inflated intuitions about mind and action under a natural conception of self that squares with 
neurophilosophy (Walter, 2002) and common sense, and has pragmatic implications for education, 
psychology, and ethics. 
 Since our solution to the easy problem is plausible, it renders hard problems otiose by way of its 
parsimony and its other explanatory virtues.  These include its coherence with what we know in 
evolutionary science, developmental psychology, behavioral science, and neurophilosophy; its reflective 
equilibrium with the relevant pre-reflective data, phenomenology, and intuitions; and its ability to absorb, 
deflate, naturalize, and otherwise account for the intuitions – and even save the reflective insights – of its 
competitors.   
 Further empirical studies may also be expected to supply the neural details for the 
causal/functional specifications of our solution.  In light of its empirical base, improvements over 
competing theories, and philosophical and practical applications, our theory covers much ground.  While 
there may be other solutions, to the extent that our theory collects and responds to all forms of pessimism 
under one all-encompassing explanatory blanket capable of absorbing all the surviving intuitions of all its 
previous competitors, our theory comes close to rebutting Dennett’s negative claim about ‘a’ solution.  If 
this is plausible, it is something worth knowing, a worthwhile project in its own right. 
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